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Decision concerning this structural problem can be reached only by an analysis of the play itself; however, a review of Euripides' adaptation of the legendary material (in so far as it can be ascertained) may provide some preliminary indication of the dramatist's intent.

In Euripides' version of the sacrifice of Polyxena, Achilles himself (as described by the ghost of Polydorus in the Prologue, 37 ff., and later by the chorus, 109 ff.) appears as a shade over his tomb and demands the sacrifice as the Greek host is about to sail homewards after the sack of Troy.² The army assembly is divided in their opinion on the matter until Odysseus persuades it not to reject the best of the Danaans for the sake of a slave (116-40). In each of these passages, Achilles' ghost is represented as restraining the ships (38-9, 111-12), though in the subsequent plot development, little is made of the idea of obtaining favourable winds by the sacrifice:³ indeed, Odysseus, both in the reported assembly scene (138 ff.) and in his later

of Gilbert Norwood in *Essays on Euripidean Drama* (Toronto, 1954), pp. 32-6, who quotes Spranger's argument on the *Hecuba* with approval. Delebecque's conclusion is reached by quite a different route, viz., his tortuous political argument that half-way through the composition of this play, the fall of Amphipolis, in December, 424, turned Euripides' energies (at what cost to his artistic integrity!) to a concentrated attack on the King of Thrace.

The analysis to be put forth in the present paper will, it is hoped, suffice to refute these more extreme views about the two parts of the *Hecuba*. Among the various works consulted, the following studies (as well as those of Delebecque and Spranger mentioned above) will be referred to hereafter by the author's name alone: G. M. A. Grube, *The Drama of Euripides* (London, 1941); Gordon M. Kirkwood, "Hecuba and Nomos," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXVIII (1947), pp. 61-8; Louise E. Matthaei, *Studies in Greek Tragedy* (Cambridge, 1918); L. Méridier, *Euripide* (Budé edition), II² (Paris, 1956); Max Pohlenz, *Die griechische Tragödie*² (Göttingen, 1954); W. Schmid, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, III² (Munich, 1940); L. Preller and Carl Robert, *Griechische Mythologie*, II⁴ (Berlin, 1923); Th. Bergk, *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*, III⁴ (Leipzig, 1878).

² On the difficulty involved in the setting of the play on the shores of the Thracian Chersonese, see below, note 15.

³ The "favouring winds" are mentioned twice in the subsequent action, both times by Agamemnon: once (900), when he tells Hecuba that he has time to spare, since these winds have not yet come, and again (1289-90), when he prepares the chorus for departure, since he has discerned a favouring breeze at last.

defence of the decision to Hecuba, argues only in terms of *charis*, the gratitude due to great warriors such as Achilles.

The sacrifice itself, in Euripides' play, is carried out by Neoptolemus, since he is Achilles' son. However, this scene, in Talthybius' moving account of it (518 ff.), belongs almost wholly to Polyxena, who succeeds in reducing her captors to the role of mere executors of a fate which she herself has willingly accepted.

References both to the apparition of Achilles to the departing Achaeans and to the sacrifice of Polyxena at the tomb of Achilles occur in the epic and lyric tradition prior to Greek Tragedy. The two events are referred to separately in two passages from Proclus, one, in his account of the *Nostoi*, to the effect that Achilles' shade tried to prevent the departure of the Greeks by prophesying dire events in store for them, the other, in his epitome of the *Ilioupersis* of Arctinus, to the effect that the sacrifice of Polyxena at Achilles' tomb was narrated therein.⁴

Of Ibycus' treatment of the Polyxena theme, all we know is that here, as in Euripides, Neoptolemus is given as the slayer of Polyxena; the scholion providing this information also gives us this interesting variant cited from the Cyprian lays: that Polyxena was mortally wounded in the sack of Troy by Diomedes and Odysseus, and was *buried* by Neoptolemus.⁵

⁴ See G. Kinkel, *Epicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1877), 53 and 50, respectively. (References to most of the sources cited in the present discussion are to be found, in one form or another, in Méridier, pp. 165 ff., Preller-Robert, pp. 1278 ff., and Schmid, pp. 465 ff.; however, since it is not always clear from their discussions how much or how little information is to be gleaned from each source, it seems preferable to scan them again individually.)

⁵ Schol. *Hec.* 41 (Ibycus, frg. 36). This scholiast also quotes "others" to the effect that Achilles was slain in the grove of the Thymbraean Apollo, after coming to an agreement with Priam concerning the marriage of Polyxena. Cf. also Seneca, *Tro.* 195 and 942-4, from which it is clear that the sacrifice demanded by Achilles is regarded as a kind of nuptial. Certainly the idea of an earlier betrothal of Polyxena to Achilles would help to explain the sacrifice, but all extant allusions to it are late (for a full list of such references, see Roscher, *Lexicon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie* [Leipzig, 1897-1909], pp. 2719 ff.) and many, such as those in Hyginus, Philostratus, and "Diety's," and in the scholion quoted above, contain details which conflict, both in tone and in fact, with epic accounts of the Trojan Wars. It is on such grounds that H. Weil, *Sept tragédies d'Euripide* (Paris, 1879), pp. 204-5, insists on the post-tragic origin of erotic legends linking

There seems, then, to be some uncertainty, or, at least, inconsistency in the accounts, with regard to the responsibility of Achilles' ghost in the death of Polyxena. One authority has even suggested that this element first appeared in Simonides' treatment of the myth; however, all that we actually know of Simonides in this connection is that, according to Longinus, he most vividly described the appearance of Achilles, over his tomb, to the departing Greeks: there is no mention of Polyxena in Longinus' reference to this description.⁶ Nor does our sparse knowledge of Sophocles' *Polyxena* help us much in this matter. It is true that a scholion on *Hecuba* 1 tells us that "the part about Polyxena is also to be found in Sophocles," but this rather vague account need not be taken to include Achilles' request for her sacrifice, particularly as the fragments themselves suggest a possible indication in the other direction. None of these deal with the sacrifice itself, but we do learn (fragments 523 and 525) that the ghost of Achilles appeared in the play, gave prophetic warning of the murder of Agamemnon and, possibly (fragment 525), of the storm which was to plague the Greeks on their homeward journey.⁷ There is nothing in the fragments to suggest that Achilles' ghost demanded the sacrifice of Polyxena; indeed, H. Weil has suggested⁸ that the most probable place for the ghost's prophetic warnings is at the end of Sophocles' play, *after* the sacrifice of Polyxena, for these warnings, coming early in a play not concerned with their fulfilment, could only serve to distract the audience (not to mention Agamemnon!) from the business on hand.

Polyxena and Achilles. There is, at any rate, no definite evidence for the view (expressed by Méridier, p. 166, and others) that they may go back to the Cyprian lays.

⁶ See Preller-Robert, p. 1279 and note 1; see also Simonides, frg. 209 (Bergk, p. 526).

⁷ See Sophocles, *Fragments*, ed. A. C. Pearson, II (Cambridge, 1917), pp. 161 ff.

⁸ Weil, p. 204. Pearson (*op. cit.*, p. 162) appears to believe that the connection between the appearance of Achilles' ghost and the death of Polyxena was made at some time later than the composition of the cyclic epics. He cites the view of F. Noack, *Ilioupersis* (Giessen, 1890), pp. 11 ff., that Sophocles was the first to bring the appearance of the ghost into causal relation with the sacrifice, but concludes, "... the gaps in the evidence are too wide to permit us to entertain these speculations." (Cf. also above, note 5.)

That Odysseus played some part in early versions of the Polyxena legend seems highly probable. We have already noted his "alternative" role in the euphemistic Cyprian version and both Odysseus and Calchas (who is not mentioned by Euripides) appear as witnesses in a scene, possibly inspired by Stesichorus, on the *tabula iliaca*,⁹ which shows the sacrifice of Polyxena at the tomb of Achilles. In Euripides' play, Odysseus' role in the sacrifice is quite fully developed (possibly at the expense of Calchas); here too, we should note an interesting, if minor, invention of the dramatist: the passage (239-50) in which Hecuba is represented as having once saved the life of Odysseus during the siege of Troy. This incident, together with the whole treatment of Odysseus' role, contributes to a kind of dialectic on the subject of *charis* which runs through the play.

Thus, despite the meagre evidence concerning early treatment of the details of the Polyxena legend, we can, perhaps, detect certain tendencies in Euripides' adaptation of it. By various means, he presents the sacrifice theme in such a way as to place the Greeks in the least favourable light. Achilles' ghost specifically demands the sacrifice of the maiden (whether this was the case in previous versions, we cannot be certain; at any rate, it was not the case in all versions); then Odysseus' defence of it in terms of political expediency ("Otherwise, who hereafter will fight and die for Greece?") distracts attention from the

⁹ *I. G.*, 1284. (On the much debated origin of this tablet, found near Bovilla, and on the sources of its scenes, see Max Paulke, *De Tabula Iliaca Quaestiones Stesichorae* [diss. inaug., Koenigsberg, 1879].)

The scene in question bears, in addition to the names of the personages represented, the inscription ΙΑΙΟΤΗΡΕΙΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΣΤΕΣΙΧΟΡΟΝ. Bergk (p. 212) gives only qualified acceptance to such attributions on the ground that, in matters of detail, the craftsman may well have added material from other poets as well. Both Paulke (pp. 47 ff.) and Méridier (pp. 165-7.), in arguing for the Stesichorean inspiration of the scenes so inscribed, refer to Pausanias' descriptions (X, 25 ff.) of (according to Pausanias) Polygnotus' paintings, in the *Leschê* (or Club Room), at Delphi, of scenes following the sack of Troy. It should be noted, however, that the cyclic poet Lesches is given as the chief inspiration of these paintings, and that neither of the two references (at X, 26, 1 and 27, 2) to the *Ilioupersis* of Stesichorus concerns the sacrifice of Polyxena, which is not, as a matter of fact, given as the subject of any of the Delphic paintings. Pausanias does, however, refer to the sacrifice of Polyxena (at X, 25, 10) as a common subject for poets and painters.

idea of religious necessity, or of supernatural blackmail, which would surely have provided the best excuse (though hardly a Euripidean one) for fulfilling Achilles' appalling command. Furthermore, Euripides' suppression of the role of Calchas, the priest, in favour of Odysseus, the politician, in the sacrifice of Polyxena, is in keeping with this tendency of his to secularize such themes, or at least to provide motives of a political, as well as those of a supernatural order.¹⁰

This treatment, in turn, gives occasion for other typical Euripidean ingredients; the vivid assembly debate (reported by the chorus at 116-40), rich in contemporary overtones, and the sophistic plays on the *charis*-theme, which, as we have seen, he has taken some trouble to introduce.

Finally, the Polyxena of this play, converted from a passive victim to a heroic character in her own right, surely bears the typical Euripidean stamp, for, provided that we do not press the comparisons too closely, she shows affinities with various noble ladies who face similar deaths in other Euripidean plays.¹¹

While it has been argued that there is little mythical innovation in the first part of the *Hecuba*, the dearth of references (in sources independent of Euripides) to Polydorus' murder and Hecuba's revenge has led some scholars to regard these incidents as the poet's own invention.¹² Neither of these extremes, how-

¹⁰ There is at least a hint of this duality in the motives, however noble, ascribed to Theseus in Euripides' *Suppliants*; note especially the twofold basis of the argument by which Aethra persuades him to aid the Argives (*Suppl.* 297-331) and the emphasis on political principle, as much as on *aidôs* for the suppliant, in Theseus' own explanations of his decision, at 334-64, and 517-63. (This point has been discussed at some length in my article, "Religious and Ethical Attitudes in Euripides' *Suppliants*," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVII [1956], pp. 8-26, esp. sec. II, pp. 14-21.)

¹¹ E. g., Macaria in the *Heraclidae*, Evadne in the *Suppliants*, and Iphigenia in the *Iphigenia at Aulis*: granted the differences in motive and context, there is a similarity in the noble acceptance of an early and violent death.

¹² It is generally agreed that the Polyxena episode is by far the more traditional part of the plot and that Euripides' most original stroke is his joining of this myth with the story about Polymestor. See, for example, *R.-E.*, VII², col. 2657, Preller-Robert, pp. 1280-1, Schmid, pp. 465-6, and Méridier, pp. 169-74, who remarks (pp. 172-3) on the complete silence, except for Euripides, until the *Iliône* of Pacuvius (2nd

ever, strikes one as typical of Euripides' creative adaptation of myth. Pohlenz's view of the Polymestor-Polydorus development seems the most probable: that this particularly barbarous murder belonged to a legend arising from the hatred of Greek settlers for their Thracian neighbours in the Chersonese. As for Hecuba, Polymestor's prophecy at the end of Euripides' play, that she will turn into a hound, and that her tomb will be named accordingly, no doubt relates to an already established legend which need, of course, have no previous connection with her vengeance on Polymestor. Pohlenz, with some mythical imagination, accounts for "the baying of the hound-dog Hecuba," after her bereavements at Troy, in metaphorical terms comparable to the plaints of Philomela for her child which became changed in myth to the cry of the nightingale; this unconscious mythical metaphor became, in time, linked with one of several "Hound's Grave" (κυνὸς σῆμα) promontories in the Thracian Chersonese and so with the legend of Thracian barbarism mentioned above.¹³ It is possible that Euripides himself invented both the relationship between Polydorus and Hecuba¹⁴ and the tale of her vengeance on Polymestor for his murder. At any rate, as far as we can tell, no other version of the woes of Hecuba, or of the sacrifice of Polyxena, includes this curious sequel in which the Trojan Queen turns to the slayers of her daughter for aid in vengeance on the murderer of her son.

If the most distinctive feature in the plot-material of this play consists in the blending of the traditional "sacrifice myth"

century B.C.) on the subject of the murder of Polydorus by the Thracian King. Some critics, e.g., Schmid and Kurt von Friedrich (*Euripides und Diphilos* [Munich, 1953], pp. 38-9, 52) argue that Euripides uses the traditional Polyxena material mainly to prepare for, or to support, in one way or another, the (allegedly) unknown, original material concerning Polymestor and Polydorus. However, as we shall see, opinions differ on the degree of originality involved.

¹³ Pohlenz, pp. 277-8; cf. the similar view of Méridier (p. 173), who also ascribes Vergil's veiled reference (*Aen.*, III, 15-16) to the fate of Polydorus to a local Thracian legend. Most authorities are agreed on the pre-Euripidean origin of the "hound-dog Hecuba" myth: see Schmid, p. 466, Preller-Robert, p. 1280, Méridier, p. 173, note 6, and the references there given.

¹⁴ In the *Iliad*, Polydorus is the youngest son of Priam (XX, 409-10) and of Laoltoë (XXI, 85 ff., XXII, 46 ff.). He is slain by Achilles during battle (XX, 407 ff.).

with an obscure Thracian legend and its Euripidean sequel, surely it is reasonable to suppose that we shall find the central meaning of the play in the dramatic exploitation of this new juxtaposition, and of its distinctly Euripidean climax. The patent dissimilarities between the two subjects and the very real technical difficulties (particularly in the matter of the play's *setting*)¹⁵ would surely seem to indicate that Euripides must have had some very specific purpose in attempting such a combination. Only if we fail to find any real thematic or structural links between the two parts of the play, should we seek that purpose in explanations extraneous to its dramatic meaning. Perhaps, however, it can be shown that the distinctly Euripidean adaptations noted in the first part of this play's material give rise to certain themes, and certain dramatic expectations, which find their tragic fulfilment only in the play's concluding passages.

II

The *Hecuba* has suffered ~~most~~ as badly from its defenders as from its detractors, for several critics have sought to minimize, or to explain, the play's duality in ways which tend to obscure certain essential dramatic contrasts in it. There have been two main lines of defence. According to the first, the real unity of the play lies in the person of Hecuba. (Thus, Hecuba is said to

¹⁵ The fact that the scene of the play is laid on the shores of the Thracian Chersonese, across the straits from the traditional site of the tomb of Achilles at Sigeum, must be admitted as a Euripidean inconsistency. Euripides obviously needed the Thracian setting to make the discovery of Polydorus' body and the prompt arrival of Polymestor more probable; the geographical vagueness, or inaccuracy, does not appear to have bothered him as much as it does certain modern critics, some of whom have used this difficulty to further unlikely theories about the composition of the play as a whole. (See, for example, Spranger, pp. 155 ff., Delebecque, pp. 161 ff.) Apart from the intrinsic unlikelihood of these explanations, the evidence is all against attempts to place a "Polyxena-play" in the Troad and a "Polymestor-play" in Thrace: all the local references (30-41, 70-2, 1142) explicitly indicate the Thracian setting and none that of the Troad. Nor will it do to argue that the references to Achilles' appearance over his tomb itself implies the setting of the play (or a part of the play) in the Troad, for Polydorus' ghost twice emphasizes the present Thracian setting in the very passage in which he first mentions Achilles' appearance over his tomb and his staying of the ships (30-41).

"experience" both actions, the sacrifice of Polyxena being regarded, sometimes as a dramatic means of gaining sympathy for the bereaved mother, sometimes as a factor contributing to her moral break-down in the second part of the play.)¹⁶ According to the second, the structural key to the play is to be found in some form of ideological contrast between the two actions. (In its simplest form, this approach has produced such analyses as that of Miss Matthaei,¹⁷ which presents the sacrifice of Polyxena as an example of community justice and the revenge of Hecuba as an example of individual, somehow identified with "primitive," justice.) Neither of these approaches has been completely successful, for neither pays sufficient attention, in considering the meaning of the play as a whole, either to the early characterization of Hecuba or to the very real dramatic impact which the attitude of Polyxena makes on us in the first half. Two of the most perceptive examinations of the *Hecuba* (those of Pohlenz and of Kirkwood) combine both of the approaches just described; a brief examination of them may,

¹⁶ See, for example, Schmid, p. 467; Méridier, pp. 175-8; H. Vandaele, "L'unité d'Hécabé," *Xenia* (Athens, 1912), pp. 10-24. The main fault with these descriptions, true enough in themselves, of Hecuba's sufferings, followed by Hecuba's vengeance, is that they fail to bring out the essential dramatic, and thematic, relations between the two parts of the play. Méridier, for example, describes the various stages in "la progression psychologique" of Hecuba, but such progression, in itself, constitutes neither tragic, nor even dramatic, form.

The discussions of this play's structure in Grube, pp. 82-4, 214 ff., also start from the character of Hecuba, but avoid, for the most part, the fault just indicated, for here the critic succeeds in establishing certain thematic links between the parts of the play. Most useful are his hints of the contrast between Polyxena and Hecuba (pp. 95-6, 220) and his reference to the anticipations of the "Polydorus bereavement" in the first half of the play: the "emotional tie" established by this latter device helps to connect the two complementary sides of the Queen's personality which Grube believes to be key to the structural difficulties of the play (pp. 83-4). This is, perhaps, the most promising approach to the problem, but it may be possible to define more clearly the thematic links between the two parts of the play in such a way as to indicate the importance to the whole of what appear to be isolated dramatic effects in the first half.

¹⁷ Matthaei, pp. 118-57, especially 128 ff. (Even if true, such descriptions will help us little in problems of structure and dramatic effect, for a successful drama does not deal directly with such generalized ideas.)

actions or attitudes which, judged in terms of human ethics, could not be condoned.

In the second place, the whole tone of Euripides' treatment of the sacrifice of Polyxena contradicts that in which the "*nomos*-argument" would have us take it. Listen, for example, to the terms in which Hecuba describes Odysseus' motives (254-7):

Ungrateful is the tribe of demagogues, you who seek the plaudits of the mob! May you ever be beyond my ken, you who think naught of injuring friends, if only you may say something to win the public favor.

This is surely an odd preparation for that "acceptance of social necessity" which some critics would have us believe to be Hecuba's ultimate reaction to the sacrifice. Surely, too, we may accept as Euripides' own, Hecuba's sneer at the kind of reasoning which can justify human, in place of the normal animal, sacrifice at tombs. (Here, indeed, is where the "*nomos*-argument" might legitimately be invoked!) Finally, any attempt to justify the Odysseus of this play must surely fall before the savage paradox with which he concludes his argument (326-31):

We Greeks, if we make bad decisions with regard to honouring the brave, will incur the charge of folly; we leave it to you barbarians not to treat your friends as friends, not to honour those who have nobly died for you, so that, while Greece prospers, you may reap the just rewards of foolish policy.

The Greek policy, both ethical and expedient, is certainly a model for all civilized nations—until we remember the barbarous manner in which Odysseus proposes to fulfil it!

Kirkwood's use of the "*nomos*-argument"²¹ is both more cautious and more subtle than that of Pohlenz. First of all, he makes it clear that the *nomos* on which Odysseus bases his position may well be an evil one. Secondly, his use of the "*nomos-peithō*" antithesis to contrast the two kinds of appeal in Hecuba's speech to Agamemnon (787 ff.) is, as we shall see, entirely justified. However, Kirkwood extends his "*nomos-peithō*" antithesis too far into the structure of the play: he

²¹ Kirkwood, pp. 64-8. (Cf. also Grube, p. 83, "The sacrifice of Polyxena . . . does stand for some legitimate principle: satisfaction to the shades below.")

argues that Hecuba's ultimate disillusionment with the principle of *nomos* derives in part at least from Odysseus' use of it in proposing to sacrifice her daughter. But Hecuba has never for a moment accepted the alleged "moral justification" of Odysseus' argument: her reaction is not one of "helpless bewilderment," as Kirkwood has called it, but one of wrathful indignation.

Thus like Pohlenz, though by a somewhat different route, Kirkwood comes to place the wrong kind of emphasis on the sacrifice of Polyxena in the structure of the play as a whole. By concentrating exclusively on one aspect of the sacrifice (Odysseus' manner of "justifying" it) and on the alleged effect of this on the Queen's psychology, both Pohlenz and Kirkwood, in their different ways, miss the really significant contrast between the two parts of the play.

The dramatic centre of the first part of this play is surely Polyxena herself. Neither the later deterioration of the character of Hecuba, nor the change in dramatic tone which this occasions, need be denied, but the essential contrast between the two actions—and the one which best illuminates this change—is to be found in the characters of Polyxena and Hecuba, as, each in turn, they face their final crisis. One aspect of this contrast has been excellently described as follows:

On pourrait même dire qu'Euripide a dessiné comme une courbe ascendante avec le caractère de Polyxène, alors qu'il traçait une courbe descendante avec celui d'Hécabé. Polyxène conduit aux sommets les plus sublimes de l'humanité, l'évolution d'Hécabé la conduit fatalement à l'animalité.²²

To this description, we should add the important reservation that (*pace* Professor Kitto) the final meaning of the tragedy concerns Hecuba; ²³ thus the two dramatic centres are not of equal importance, since the first exists for the sake of the second.

²² G. Méautis, *Mythes inconnus de la Grèce antique* (Paris, 1944), p. 109.

²³ Kitto, in his attack on this view, argues that "the separate actions (of the play) are meant to point to one overriding idea, the suffering which the human race inflicts upon itself through its own follies and wickedness" (H. D. F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy*² [London, 1950], p. 219). One could wish that this author observed in his writings on Euripides that principle which he expresses so eloquently and so consistently

In the terms of plot, the very loss of Polyxena has an important bearing on what Hecuba becomes in the later episodes; it is for this reason, as we shall see, that the dramatist dwells so much on the pathetically dependant aspect of Hecuba, *before* she becomes the most active figure on the stage. The thematic relation is, however, the more important one, and here we are concerned not merely with the contrast between "sublimity" and "animality" (as Méautis expresses it) in the actions of the two women. Rather, the particular kind of heroism which Polyxena manifests in the face of the national enemy serves to throw into relief, almost to define, the essential nature of Hecuba's fall from queenly *aretê*.

III

Critical emphasis on the contrast between the two parts of the *Hecuba* has perhaps tended to obscure certain skilful devices by which the dramatist prepares us, quite early in the play, for the dénouement. Apart from the merely mechanical "hooks" by which the two actions are joined,²⁴ we may note various "dramatic expectations" which the poet arouses with regard to the later development of the theme and of the characterization of Hecuba. Prominent among these early thematic indications are the uses of rhetoric, particularly in the passage between Odysseus and Hecuba (at 218-31), Odysseus' cynical instruction of Hecuba in the political aspect of *charis* (i. e., in how to recom-

with regard to Aeschylus (*ibid.*, chap. iv, *passim*, especially p. 96), that tragedies are concerned not merely with ideas but with ideas conceived and expressed in dramatic terms. Surely, as Kirkwood argues (p. 63), it is Hecuba who is the dramatic focus of the more general ideas underlying this play. Besides, though the *Hecuba* may not be a "character study," we are shown considerably more of Hecuba than Kitto admits; as the subsequent analysis will seek to prove, the play expresses just those aspects of Hecuba which are essential to her tragedy.

²⁴ See Kirkwood, p. 63, note 7, for a list of these links; it is, perhaps, arbitrary to distinguish too sharply the "mechanical" from the "thematic" links between the parts: thus, Kirkwood lumps together all the passages which associate Polyxena and Polydorus in one manner or another, while Grube (p. 83) separates the practical devices for joining the two tales together from those passages which merely keep the idea of Polymestor before our minds. Both types of passage may easily be distinguished from the type of thought-sequence which we are now discussing.

pense one's friends) and, most important and most pervasive, the preliminary characterization of Hecuba, both by herself, as the chief sufferer among the captive Trojan women, and in relation to her children, Polydorus and Polyxena.

From the very beginning of this play, great emphasis is placed upon the helpless dependance of Hecuba, the misery of her enslaved state and (in contrast to her daughter's attitude) her own apparent acceptance of it (59-64):

Slaves, lead me out of doors, old woman that I am,
Set me upright, my Trojan ladies, and lead me forth
Who was once your Queen and who am now your fellow-
slave,
Take and carry me, raise me and set me on my way,
With firm grasp upon my withered hand.

Stylistically, the effect of the Queen's opening words lies in the alternation of *παῖδες* and *ὁμόδουλον* with the proud *Τρῳάδες* and *πρόσθε δ' ἄνασσαν* followed by the four pathetically dependant imperatives *λάβετε, φέρετε, πέμπετε, αἶρετέ μου*. This sense of the helpless dependance of Hecuba's fallen state has already been suggested by the tender solicitude of the ghostly Polydorus in the prologue, as he retreats before his mother's entry on the stage (54-7) and it is immediately echoed by Hecuba's own prayer about her dreadful dreams, "O ghostly powers, save me my son, the sole remaining anchor of my home" (79-80).

The chorus' announcement of the Greek decision to sacrifice Polyxena evokes another cry of helpless desolation from Hecuba (*οἱ ἐγὼ μελέα* . . . 154, *τίς ἀμύνει μοι*; 159). Polyxena's anguish, on the other hand, is mostly for her mother (202-4):

No longer will your child be here to serve you,
As fellow-slave, in your declining years.

The brusque entry of Odysseus, come to drag Polyxena off to the sacrifice, interrupts the lament between mother and daughter, and a scene of quite another kind ensues. However, toward the end of the Queen's supplication of Odysseus, we hear again the pathetic anguish of the Queen's dependance on her child (276-81):

I beg you, don't tear this child from her mother's arms, . . .
In her I take joy, forgetting all my woes,

For she, in place of many others, is now my second self
(παρὰ νύχην),
My city, my nurse, my staff, my guide along the way.

To the end, Hecuba still clings to her daughter "as ivy to an oak" (398), declaring her own misery to be the greatest, and lamenting above all the bitter fate of an old age bereft of children. As Polyxena is led off-stage, Hecuba still pursues her with her cries (439-40):

My child, clasp your mother, stretch forth your hand,
Don't leave me childless . . . I am lost, my friends!

Some modification in this depiction of the forlorn and helpless Queen must be made with regard to her scene with Odysseus. Here Hecuba shows for the first time that rhetorical power which, for good or ill, is to prove her chief strength throughout the play. After a brief exchange (238-50) in which she reminds Odysseus that once he owed his life to her, the Queen launches into a powerfully persuasive speech (251-95), a very model of the rhetorician's art.²⁵ It proceeds, in the approved fashion, from the general to the particular, with reason dominating until its point is made, and then being swept aside in a flood of personal emotion.

The proëmium provides a general indictment of the ingratitude of demagogues, who neglect their friends but will say any-

²⁵ The *Hecuba* abounds in opportunities for Euripides to indulge in several kinds of set debate. See Schmid, p. 465: this critic, while praising the many passages of skilful rhetoric and dialectic, suggests that, for modern tastes, this emphasis somewhat detracts from the play's impact. We may find, however, that this very emphasis plays an important part in the delineation of Hecuba's tragedy.

(The rhetorical quality of many of Euripides' plays has, of course, long been noted, e.g., in U. von Wilamowitz, *Herakles* [Berlin, 1895], Einleitung, p. 27: "Wohl aber hat er die Kunst des ἀντιλέγειν so sehr ausgebildet wie nicht einmal ein Rhetor, und seine ganze Technik ist davon durchdrungen." There are several good technical studies of this aspect of Euripidean drama; see, for example, J. T. Lees, *Δικανικὸς Λόγος in Euripides* [Johns Hopkins diss., published Lincoln, Nebraska, 1891], D. Thomson, *Euripides and the Attic Orators* [London, 1898]. John H. Finley, in "Euripides and Thucydides," *H. S. C. P.*, XLIX [1938], pp. 23-68, provides some excellent parallels in form and content between the speeches of Euripides and those in Thucydides; see especially pp. 26 and 31 ff.)

thing to curry favour with the mob.²⁶ Soon, the indictment becomes more specific: what excuse, however sophistic (τί δὲ σόφισμα ...; 258) can be found for human sacrifice, where cattle-slaughter is the customary rite? And how, in justice, can Achilles demand *this* girl, and not rather Helen, as an offering at his tomb (251-70)?

To "the argument from justice" (τῷ μὲν δίκαιῳ, 271) Hecuba adds further the just plea for *charis*: her daughter's life in return for the favour owed her by Odysseus (272-8). Here the emotional succeeds the moral appeal, as Hecuba describes her desperate need of Polyxena ... "my city, my nurse, my staff, my guide along the way" (281). After an impassioned peroration, imploring Odysseus' intervention, Hecuba ends her speech with a quiet but dignified reminder: Greek law (*nomos*) concerning blood-shed is the same for slave and free alike, but argument (*logos*), to prevail, needs power behind it (291-5).

To this splendid appeal, Odysseus replies with a lawyer's masterpiece. The genius of the speech lies in the air of sweet reasonableness with which Odysseus surrounds his cruel argument. Each of Hecuba's claims is considered with ironic courtesy—and answered in terms which frustrate the very purpose of her plea. Gratitude? Return for favours once received? Odysseus is ready to save Hecuba's life, as once she saved his. Justice? Odysseus replies with a brilliant essay on the justice—and good policy—of rewarding mighty heroes, and thus ensuring loyal service from other heroes still to come (306-8):

And for this reason many states grow weak,
Whenever a noble, zealous warrior receives no more
Than baser men.

The justice of honouring the tombs of mighty heroes, Odysseus describes as an enduring form of *charis* (διὰ μακροῦ γὰρ ἡ χάρις, 320), and one which pays dividends in ensuring the future greatness of the state. Thus, by a sophistic twist, Odysseus negates the arguments for justice and gratitude, for, as he defines them, all manner of barbarous deeds are countenanced in

²⁶ Here we should note the play on *χάρις*: ἀχάριστον ... σπέρμ' (254) scornfully echoing the ἀχάριστοι of Odysseus' original argument (138) and πρὸς χάριν (257) ironically anticipating Hecuba's own ultimate abuse of *χάρις* in the second part of her plea to Agamemnon, 824-30.

their fulfilment. Hecuba's intervention, then, changes nothing, but the scene raises various themes to be developed later in the tragedy. *Nomos* and *charis*, the basis of Hecuba's twofold appeal, have been twisted by the sophistic use of rhetoric, and *logos* not backed by power has come to naught. Hecuba is to use the same double approach in her appeal to Agamemnon, but next time it is to be the Queen herself who accepts (and proves) the greater power of the baser argument.

Where Hecuba has failed, Polyxena, in a sense, succeeds. In a single speech to Odysseus, she transforms the whole situation (342-7):

I see you, Odysseus, hiding your right hand
Beneath your cloak and turning your face away
For fear as suppliant I'll touch your beard.
Take heart! you have escaped my suppliant prayer,
For I will follow, both since I must,
And since I wish,
To die.

With this scornful opening, Polyxena eschews both supplication and, with it, rhetoric and argument, batteries which the sophist Odysseus is only too well-equipped to frustrate. Simply but effectively, she converts the impending slaughter of a chattel into the heroic deed of a free woman. In a few striking phrases, she paints the glory of her past, as a Trojan princess, "like to the gods, save only in mortality" . . . and then concludes:

And now I am a slave. The very strangeness of the name
Brings on the love of death . . . (357-8).
From eyes still free, I now shut out this light.
Odysseus, complete your office, lead me hence! (367-9)

Thus is Odysseus dismissed from his command of the affair. It is this invincible sense of freedom, of aristocratic integrity, which enables Polyxena to transform even her enforced death into, not suicide, but an expression of her own free will.²⁷ In

²⁷ In this ability, Polyxena is, perhaps, a better exemplar of "existential heroism" than even Antigone or Orestes, who have been particularly chosen for that role by contemporary "mythographers": see J.-P. Sartre, "Forgers of Myth—The Young Playwrights of France," *Theatre Arts*, XXX (June, 1946), pp. 324 ff., and "Les Mouches," *Théâtre* (Paris, 1947), pp. 11-109.

her peroration, she expresses an almost Sophoclean *aretê* (375-8):

Whoever is not wont to taste of ills,
Bears them, but shudders as he sets his neck
Beneath the yoke.
For him, far happier death than such a life;
A painful burden, life not nobly lived!

In her scorn for "life not nobly lived," Polyxena is like the Ajax of Sophocles' play, but more fortunate: for her a fate stands ready which she may make her own.

A little later (518-82), Talthybius' moving report to Hecuba complements this impression that Polyxena has taken charge of her own sacrifice. Again she insists on her freedom: no enemy hand, but only the sacrificial blade is to touch her, since she wills her death herself. Indeed, Polyxena's personal preëminence in this scene, with the Greek soldiers crowding about bringing reverent adornments for her body, calls to mind those mystic sacrifices in which, to the minds of the initiated, the roles of victim and divinity are centered in a single being.²⁸

The strange tranquillity with which Hecuba receives the news of Polyxena's death has often been taken at its face value, as if her daughter's nobility, or even Odysseus' arguments about national policy, had somehow reconciled her to her sorrow. However, the Queen's most violent expressions of grief have already been made as Polyxena was dragged offstage to the sacrifice: the report of its consummation she receives in a state of numbed passivity, her faint protest the more poignant for its vague uncertainty (585-8):

I know not where to look amid my ills,
So many, all around; if I grasp one of them,
Another stops me, and then a third summons me thence,
Bringing some fresh exchange of woes.

Her daughter's nobility, Hecuba tells us, inhibits any excessive outcry of grief from her; this thought leads her to a queer detached little passage on the sources of such nobility. This passage should not be interpreted either as an irrelevant Euripidean aside, or as an indication of Hecuba's philosophic resignation.

²⁸ See E. R. Dodds, introduction to Euripides' *Bacchae* (Oxford, 1944), pp. xvi-xvii.

Hecuba is, for the moment, emotionally exhausted, and we know from the prologue that another blow is soon to fall upon her: thus, both psychological probability and a very necessary dramatic economy dictate how she must be presented in this *entr'acte*. Hecuba is kept paralyzed by grief; in her struggle "to blot out" (ἐξαλείψασθαι, 590) her daughter's agony, she seizes on the one saving aspect of it—the nobility with which her daughter died. Even this subject Hecuba's mind, in spasm like protective muscles around an injured limb, quickly depersonalizes, and soon she is pondering the familiar question, "Is it parents or training that makes the difference between the noble and the base?" Thus, by the most "natural" of devices, the dramatist alerts us for the coming contrast between Hecuba's and her daughter's *aretê*.²⁹

After the emotional lull of this skilful *entr'acte*, comes the shocking discovery of the body of Polydorus, murdered and cast into the sea by his protector, the barbarous Polymestor. The effect of this second blow on Hecuba may be gauged from what we have seen of her so far and the moral collapse which now takes place must be regarded as the result, inevitable and tragic, of this twofold loss on such a character as hers. Thus, the very terms in which her present plight is described by the serving woman remind us, though they are more extreme, of those used to express her earlier desolation (668-9):

Mistress, you are lost.

Though your eyes still see the light, you live no longer

(οὐκέτ' εἶ),

Of child, of lord, of city, all bereaved.

This emphasis on the completeness (ἄπαις, ἀνάνδρος, ἀπολις) of Hecuba's bereavement, and on the idea of non-existence which accompanies it, is surely most significant. ἀπολις, in the servant's speech, refers to the loss of Troy, but for Hecuba her city still lived in her children, for she has called Polyxena her "city" at line 281. Now, with all her family as well as Troy

²⁹ Cf. Grube, pp. 95-6, 220. It is true, of course, that the subject of Hecuba's little homily is rather a favourite one in "gnomic" passages of Euripides (see, for example: *El.* 367-90, *Hec.* 379-80, *I. A.* 558-67, *Suppl.* 911-17); however, this fact does not preclude the possibility of such passages having their own dramatic relevance within their specific contexts.

destroyed, Hecuba loses, as it were, all sense of moral identity; nothing has any longer any meaning for her save vengeance on Polymestor, the *xenos* who has betrayed his trust. "*ἀπολόμην δύστηνος, οὐκέτ' εἰμὶ δῆ,*" cries Hecuba (683), echoing the servant's words. Only thus can her moral degradation be understood; no longer a proud queen, jealous of her city's honour, no longer even a human being in the full sense of the word, she grovels before Agamemnon, king of her city's enemies and of her daughter's murderers, because in him she sees the only means to her revenge.³⁰

This sense of moral death, or moral abdication,³¹ is dramatically conveyed by an eerie little passage of self-interrogation by Hecuba, as soon as Agamemnon arrives on stage (736-51). However, her hesitation is pitifully brief and the manner of her supplication heightens the contrast between her abasement and the fierce and noble freedom of Polyxena:

Agamemnon! by your knees, I beseech you, and by your beard,

³⁰ Too much has surely been made of the alleged community of feeling between the Greeks and the Trojans of this play: see, for example, Grube, pp. 220-1, Delebecque, pp. 151-3 (where the point is urged to serve a part of Delebecque's interpretation in terms of contemporary politics). Certainly this impression is not supported by Hecuba's address to Odysseus (251 ff.) nor by the proud words of Polyxena, first to Odysseus (342 ff.) and later to those "Argive sackers of my city" who had almost presumed to lay their hands upon her (547 ff.). Odysseus, for his part, has explicitly included the Trojans in his scornful description of barbarian races, unlike the Greeks in policy and in success.—Furthermore, the limited *entente* eventually reached between Hecuba and Agamemnon is dictated by self-interest on each side, and to reach this agreement, Hecuba has to use the basest means of persuasion on Agamemnon. There remains the Greeks' admiration, reported by Talthybius (571-82), of Polyxena's noble bearing *in extremis*, but this hardly suffices to indicate friendly and congenial sentiments between the races. The most that can be granted to Delebecque's view of the gentle treatment of the conquerors in this play is that there is not as strong an anti-Spartan bias as in the *Andromache* and, perhaps, the *Troades*. (Cf. also H. Steiger, "Warum Euripides schreibe seine Troerinnen?" *Philologus*, XIII [1900], pp. 389-91, who also contrasts the *Hecuba* with the *Troades* in this respect.)

³¹ Vandaele (above, note 16), p. 20, expresses a similar view of Hecuba's state at this point in the play: "Dès ce moment, le désespoir d'Hécabé l'a mise hors d'elle . . . elle n'est pas elle-même: l'infortune l'égare."

And by the prosperous power of your right hand . . .
(752-3).

Let me take vengeance on my enemies
And willingly I'll be your slave for life (756-7).

In the long, formal speech of supplication which follows, Hecuba once again bases her argument on the claims, first of *nomos*, and then of *charis*. It is for their twofold rupture of social obligation (duty to a guest and duty to the dead) that the crimes of Polymestor, who has slaughtered a guest-friend and left his body unburied, particularly cry out for vengeance—and Hecuba again reminds us that, in these matters as in the case of Polyxena's rights, justice is the same for slave and free alike. This part of Hecuba's appeal leads to a brilliant rhetorical disquisition on *nomos* as the source not only of all man's distinctions between justice and injustice but even of our belief in the gods,³² and ends with the statement that, if Agamemnon will not support her claims, there can no longer be justice in men's affairs (787-805).

From this appeal Agamemnon turns aside (812) and in the second part of her speech Hecuba, abandoning the "ethical argument," stoops to a base device by which to move the king. Her daughter Cassandra, she reminds him, is now his spear-won mistress; some payment (*χάρις*, 830) is surely due for the favours of love, both to Cassandra and to the mother who supplied her. And in avenging Polydorus, Agamemnon will be avenging his own brother by Cassandra (824-35).

This passage provides a grimly ironic parallel to Hecuba's earlier appeal to *charis* in the speech to Odysseus (271-8), for now there is no question of the just payment of a favour generously given, but of bought favours and the calculated returns

³² . . . νόμος γὰρ τοὺς θεοὺς ἡγούμεθα (800): the ambiguity of this very Euripidean (and, perhaps, Anaxagorean) remark of Hecuba's has been much discussed. Does it mean "It is by reason of the existence of the law that we believe in the existence of the gods" (Hadley) or (in a more "sophistic" vein), "By convention we believe in the gods" (and so give some authority to our distinctions between right and wrong [801] by which we live)? As T. T. Jeffrey has suggested *ad loc.* in his edition of the *Hecuba* (London, n. d.), "there may also be some political irony implied against the Athenian laws, under which a man could be prosecuted, as Socrates was, for not believing in the recognised deities."

of whores and pimps. It may be said, perhaps, that Hecuba has learned too well Odysseus' lesson in the political uses of *charis* and of rhetoric, for even her "master" might now be shocked at the length to which she goes.

It is often assumed that in the first part of her appeal to Agamemnon, Hecuba's honour has not been compromised, that only when the argument from *nomos* fails does she undergo her fatal change.³³ It is true that Hecuba's arguments for Poly-mestor's punishment are irreproachable in themselves, and are rendered the more impressive by her near-*apotheosis* of the concepts of law and justice. But Hecuba herself has already offended against another kind of *nomos*. In grovelling before her city's enemies she has already shown a considerable decline in queenly *aretê*; then, in pandering to them with her daughter's honour, she takes the final step in degradation.

This second "descent" is, like the first, marked by a moment of hesitation, of self-colloquy, in which the Queen again reminds herself that her city and her children gone, she exists no longer: "οἴχομαι· καπνὸν δὲ πόλεως τόνδ' ὑπερβρώσκονθ' ὁρῶ" (822-3). However, the most striking feature of this passage is the Queen's sudden reference to *Peithô*, the only goddess, or the only power, for which she now has any use (813-19):

Alas! Why do we mortals labour at all other kinds of knowledge, and take what pains we must to track them down, while Persuasion (*Peithô*), man's only ruler (whereby 'twere possible to win any argument and so gain one's end), we take no special pains—nor pay our fees!—to learn?

Thus *Peithô*, in its various aspects, has now become the guiding genius of the Queen.³⁴ Persuasion, is, of course, the end of

³³ Thus Sheppard finds that the refusal of Hecuba's appeal for justice, "marks the crisis in her moral catastrophe" (J. T. Sheppard, *Euripides' Hecuba* [Oxford, 1924], p. 11). Cf. also Matthaei, p. 149, Kirkwood, pp. 61-2, 64-7.

³⁴ Kirkwood (p. 67) remarks of the second half of Hecuba's appeal to Agamemnon, "It is only the beginning of Hecuba's degeneration, but by its tone it sets the pattern for the rest." Méridier (p. 212, note 1) writes of Hecuba's praise of *Peithô*, "Allusion claire aux sophistes, dont Euripide recommande ici l'enseignement." Doubtless there is a reference to the sophists here, but it is difficult to see how, in the context, anyone could regard the passage as implying the poet's recommendation of their art.

rhetoric, but it is only rhetoric in its most ungoverned use which dispenses with all other considerations. From the first, Hecuba has shown her greatest strength in rhetoric; now, as her *aretê* declines, she openly worships it in its most vicious form. Previously, she has used it honestly and has savagely attacked the crowd-pandering of demagogues; now she, too, exploits rhetoric, using the basest of inducements to win the favour of the King. *Peithô*, as well as being the guiding genius of the rhetorician, suggested to the Greek mind what "temptation"—particularly such "passionate" temptations as lust, avarice, ambition, vengeance—does to the Christian mind.³⁵ Hecuba, herself in the grip of her passion for revenge, uses the temptations of lust and avarice respectively to persuade first Agamemnon and then her victim Polymestor to her will. In all of this, she depends increasingly on her power of rhetoric which becomes (in sad contrast with her honest and unsuccessful plea to Odysseus) the more effective the more unscrupulously she employs it. Finally, when the ruined Polymestor seeks to arraign her before the bar of Agamemnon's justice, it is Hecuba's power of rhetoric which once again prevails.

This general picture will, perhaps, suffice to indicate the pattern of this tragedy's dénouement. Most commentators agree on the moral degradation of Hecuba in these final passages, though here the emphasis has been on the savagery of her vengeance on the innocent children of Polymestor—a dramatic anticipation (or interpretation?) of that "hound-dog Hecuba" myth to which the poet alludes at the end of the play. It is true that action, even melodramatic action, now takes precedence: the luring of Polymestor and his children to their destruction, the bloody slaughter of the children and the blinding of their father, the "epic exchange" of taunts and dire prophecy (1254 ff.) between the victorious Hecuba and the vanquished barbarian king. Nevertheless, even in this tumultuous close, certain ironic reminders of the earlier thematic development reappear. So might we interpret the chorus' puzzled comment on the

³⁵ Perhaps the most vivid example of this use of *Peithô* in Tragedy occurs in Aeschylus, *Ag.* 385 ff., where the Chorus is describing the temptation of Paris:

βιάται δ' ἂ τάλαια πειθῶ
προβούλου παῖς ἄφερτος ἄρας. . . .

nomoi, as Hecuba has represented them in her plea to Agamemnon ("Strange, how they've defined anew the bonds of loyalty, making friends of one's worst enemies . . ." 846-8), and Hecuba's request that the burial of Polyxena be delayed to coincide with that of Polydorus. Agamemnon agrees, and immediately the chorus bursts into a sombre ode on the sack of Troy, as if to underline these grim reminders of Hecuba's defection to her daughter's and her city's enemies.

In like manner, the themes of *Peithô* and *Charis* reappear in ironic guise in the "trial scene" following the vengeance of Hecuba. Here Polymestor lays claim to Agamemnon's gratitude on the grounds that he has slaughtered Polydorus to make sure that Troy shall never rise again. Hecuba, in her reply, expresses the pious wish that good speeches might accompany only noble actions and that cunning words should never have the power to veil base deeds (1192-4):

Sharp men there are all too well versed in this,
But not until the end their skill prevails.
Foully they perish: no one has yet escaped.

Of the Queen's many comments on the art of rhetoric, this must surely strike us as the most cynical—an ironic comment on her own case, and on the fate which lies in store for her. Furthermore, though Hecuba's rebuttal of Polymestor's argument is doubtless "just," the terms she uses ("How could *thy* barbarian race expect friendship with the Greeks?") are, to say the least, unfortunate, for they provide yet another reminder of that base alliance which the "barbarian" Hecuba (for so Odysseus in *his* account of *charis* has described the Trojans, 328-31) has made with her enemies, the Greeks.

Thus Hecuba, in making *Peithô* serve her ends, is herself dominated by it. Once the passion of revenge has seized her, it assumes the obsessive character so marked in the tragic *pathê* of Euripidean drama, and Hecuba is led to stoop to any base persuasion to gain her ends. She does not, however, undergo the complete and sudden transformation which some critics would have us believe to be the case. This is a strange tragedy, in that at no point does the tragic sufferer achieve heroic stature: tragic decline, rather than tragic peripety, informs the action. Once the Queen's sufferings have been foretold to us in the

prologue, the tragic probabilities are not long in making their appearance: we may infer them from the weak dependance of the Queen's early utterances and from the contrast between her character and that of the heroic Polyxena. Hecuba's chief strength throughout lies in her power of rhetoric and the course of her moral disintegration may best be followed in her uses and abuses of the persuasive art. Her final violence then appears as a spectacular but not improbable fulfilment.

The sacrifice of Polyxena, far from being an action separate from the tragedy of Hecuba, helps both to cause and to define it, for Hecuba, overwhelmed by the loss of both son and daughter, avenges one child by betraying the other. Moreover, the characterization of Polyxena herself has a most important function in the play. As she meets her death, Polyxena preserves her dignity, her impregnable sense of freedom, and avoids, above all, subjection to the enemy. It is this paradigm of tragic *aretê* which shows up the essential nature of the fall of Hecuba: her self-abasement before the knees of one enemy in her passion for vengeance against another. Finally, it is at the death of Polyxena that the Queen first begins "to abdicate," to forget her essential quality as Queen of Troy. Eventually, without family, without city, she reaches that desperate state of *anomia* which spells her ruin. Only in characters such as Polyxena can *aretê* survive in splendid isolation.

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CICERO AND THE GREEK ORATORS.¹

The object of this paper is modest and limited. It is to try to discover, from Cicero's own writings, the extent of his acquaintance with the orators of Greece, and his attitude to them individually; and then to examine the view that the orator who most influenced Cicero, and whose mantle (stylistically speaking) he assumed, was Isocrates. The Asianism-Atticism controversy I shall only touch on incidentally. It has been thoroughly discussed, and one may doubt whether much can be added to what Wilamowitz said about it in his article in *Hermes*, XXXV (1900). The attitude of the Atticist reactionaries at Rome was plainly wrong-headed, and for our purpose its chief importance was that it drew forth from Cicero, during his latter years, a voluminous counterblast, which included many, indeed the majority, of his recorded remarks on the Greek orators. It may be objected that the evidence of these works (the *Brutus*, the *Orator*, and the *De Optimo Genere Oratorum*) is rendered suspect by their polemical character. This objection would be valid, if the Atticist point of view were not so plainly untenable; as it is, Cicero is arguing from a position of such strength that we can safely assume that he is expressing his real views, as indeed is implied in a letter which he sent to Lepta (*Fam.*, VI, 18, 4), in which he acknowledges the other's complimentary remarks about his *Orator*: *Oratorem meum tanto opere a te probari vehementer gaudeo. mihi quidem sic persuadeo me, quicquid habuerim iudicii de dicendo, in illum librum contulisse.*

—It is of some importance that we should remind ourselves of the fact that the Romans, in thought as in language, always distinguished the orator from the rhetorician. The Greeks had one word *ῥήτωρ*, which was applied both to the public speaker, and later, after the teaching of the art had become established, to the teacher. For the Romans the orator represented the man of action and responsibility, whose words influenced events; the term *rhetor* was reserved for teachers of rhetoric, and it tended

¹ Contributed to a Seminar on "Cicero in relation to Greek Literature," held under the auspices of the University of London Institute of Classical Studies in 1958-59. Some slight modifications have been made in the present version.

to imply, not merely the unpractical and cloistered theorist—the *umbracula*, as opposed to the *sol et pulvis* of real life—, but also something of the *levitas* which clung to the Greek national character, as seen through Roman eyes. *Orator* was an ancient Latin word, and in early times was applied to the spokesman of an embassy, a man who, since he might have to bear the responsibility of a nation and speak with a nation's authority, must have not only the ability to speak, but a dignity and integrity fit to sustain his part. From this it is but a short step to Cato's famous definition of an orator as *vir bonus dicendi peritus*. The tendency to seek a Greek origin for everything in Latin literature has led to attempts to derive this definition from Stoic sources.² Affinities there may be, but I should need more evidence than has yet been produced to convince me that this was not an original Roman concept. It is visible at several points in Cicero's *De Oratore*. It may be true, as has been argued by more than one scholar, that Cicero owed to Isocrates some of his ideas about the importance for the orator of a broad cultural background.³ But the stress that he lays on the necessity of dignity and character in the orator, as well as the emphasis on his practical importance in public life, is surely Roman. Cicero puts into the mouths of both Crassus and Antonius two very similar statements about the functions of the orator, in which it is made clear that his art only finds its true fulfilment when it is exercised for the good of the commonwealth (*De Or.*, I, 202; II, 35). At another place he uses words which seem consciously to recall Cato's definition: *tantum ego in excellenti oratore et eodem bono viro pono esse ornamenti universae civitati* (II, 85). Quintilian develops the concept fully and eloquently in the first chapter of his twelfth book. The teachers of rhetoric, on the other hand, seldom win more than a contemptuous tolerance from the interlocutors in the *De Oratore*,⁴ and when Cicero uses the word *rhethorem* of himself, in the introduction to Book II, it is by way of humorous self-depreciation.⁵ This Roman

² See, for example, F. H. Colson in his edition of Quintilian, I, p. 6.

³ H. M. Hubbell in *The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius and Aristides* (Yale, 1913); S. E. Smethurst, "Cicero and Isocrates," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXIV (1953), pp. 262-320.

⁴ E. g. I, 84; II, 75, 77; III, 54.

⁵ II, 10: . . . *sive, ut ipse iocari soleo, unum putasti satis esse non modo in una familia rhethorem, sed paene in tota civitate.*

outlook undoubtedly influenced Cicero's attitude to the Greek orators; it sometimes betrays itself in the judgements which he makes on them, and it will help to answer the question, who it was on whom he modelled his style.

Among the early orators of Athens who flourished before there was any formal art of rhetoric, Cicero's hero was undoubtedly Pericles. Naturally so, for here was a man in whom eloquence was combined with integrity, wisdom, and statesmanship, and who for forty years guided the destinies of Athens, both in domestic affairs and in the conduct of war; who, moreover, had never been taught to yelp at a rhetorician's waterclock, but had profited by the wisdom of Anaxagoras (*De Or.*, III, 138). In two places Cicero speaks as if he knew of written works of Pericles (*De Or.*, II, 93; *Brut.*, 27). In the first of these passages his words suggest that he may have read some of these writings, for he makes a stylistic comparison between Pericles and his successors, Critias, Theramenes, and Lysias: *omnes etiam tum retinebant illum Pericli sucum, sed erant paulo uberiore filo*. We cannot, however, draw any reliable conclusion from this, and it may be that Cicero, like ourselves, knew Pericles' oratory only through the medium of Thucydides. Certainly Quintilian is at pains to deny the existence of any genuine written speeches of Pericles.⁶ But there is no doubt about Cicero's interest in Pericles, and his belief that he was the greatest orator of his age. Three times he mentions the tribute of the comic poet Eupolis, who had said that Persuasion sat upon Pericles' lips, and that he alone of orators left his sting in the minds of his hearers.⁷ Cicero also points out, for the benefit of the Atticist extremists, that, if Pericles had employed a plain style, *numquam ab Aristophane poeta fulgere, tonare, permiscere Graeciam dictus esset*.⁸ In short, this first age of Athenian oratory produced, in Pericles, an *oratorem prope perfectum* (*Brut.*, 44).

Of the ten Attic orators who subsequently became accepted as the standard canon, two, Andocides and Isaeus, are not mentioned at all in Cicero's works, and the single reference to Anti-

⁶ *Inst.*, I, 1, 14; XII, 2, 22; XII, 10, 49.

⁷ *De Or.*, III, 138; *Brut.*, 38, 59. Cf. Pickard-Cambridge, *Greek Comic Fragments*, p. 23.

⁸ *Or.*, 29. Cf. Aristophanes, *Acharn.*, 530.

phon (*Brut.*, 47) suggests that Cicero knew him only through the medium of Aristotle and Thucydides. Dinarchus and Lycurgus are both mentioned twice, together with Hyperides and Aeschines, as contemporaries of Demosthenes, and the chief representatives of the great practising Athenian orators (*De Or.*, II, 94; *Brut.*, 36). There are two other references to Lycurgus, one in a letter to Atticus of 61 B. C. (*Att.*, I, 13, 3), in which Cicero, speaking of the proceedings against Clodius in the Bona Dea affair, remarks: *nosmet ipsi, qui Lycurgei a principio fuissetus, cotidie demitigamur*,⁹ the other in the *Brutus* (130), where a Roman orator of that name, an *accusator vehemens et molestus*, is described as having brought disgrace upon his family and parentage by invariably choosing the rôle of prosecutor, *ut Athenis Lycurgus*. All that we can justifiably conclude from these passages is that Cicero knew Lycurgus to have specialised in prosecutions, and disapproved of him on that account, presumably because such a *penchant* indicated a flaw of personality inconsistent with the character of a *vir bonus*.

Cicero seems to show a more direct knowledge of Hyperides. In the *De Oratore* (I, 58) he and Demosthenes are spoken of together as *perfectos iam homines in dicendo et perpolitos*, and the same two are again coupled in the *Brutus* (138). He is twice linked with Lysias: in the *Orator* (90) they are both described as *satis faceti*; in the *Brutus* (67) Cicero criticizes the Atticists who admire Lysias and Hyperides for their old-fashioned plainness, but fail to see the same virtues in their own countryman Cato. Hyperides is assigned the characteristic quality of *acumen* (*De Or.*, III, 28), and in the *Brutus* (290) he shares with Pericles, Aeschines, and Demosthenes the reputation of having achieved the glory that belongs to the greatest orator, who can attract a crowded and silent audience in anticipation of his speech, and, when he speaks, can sway it as he wills.

Lysias, who, because of his plain style and lack of ornament, was proclaimed by the Atticists as the perfect model, naturally receives a good deal of attention; and though Cicero does not mention any of his speeches by name, he speaks of them as being numerous (*De Or.*, II, 93), and gives the impression of having

⁹ It is possible, but less likely, that the reference here is to the Spartan lawgiver.

a good first-hand acquaintance with them. Lysias is an *egregie subtilis orator atque elegans*, but he cannot be called *perfectus*, because he is outshone by his successor Demosthenes (*Brut.*, 35, 66). In this he somewhat resembles Cato as compared with later Roman orators. Both Cato and Lysias are *acuti, elegantes, faceti, breves*; but Lysias is more fortunate, in that he has so many admirers who consider leanness (*tenuitas*) in itself a positive virtue. Pursuing the physical metaphor, Cicero concedes that Lysias often shows muscular strength (*lacerti*), though, on the whole, his style is somewhat meagre (*strigosior*: *Brut.*, 63). The comparison with Cato might well seem a little far-fetched, and he allows Brutus to ridicule it later in the dialogue (293). In the *Orator* (29) Cicero points out that the real grounds on which Lysias' style can be called "Attic" are not its plainness and lack of ornament, but its correctness and purity of diction (*quod nihil habeat insolens aut ineptum*). He goes on to say that, although Lysias is a mere pleader (*causidicum quendam*), who lacks fulness and elevation, those who follow him are at least more justified than those who profess to imitate Thucydides, who was not an orator at all. In the *De Optimo Genere Oratorum* Lysias is politely set aside as being *ieiunior*, because he restricted his activities to writing speeches for others to use in petty private lawsuits; the result was that he never attained the power of elevated utterance, whereas Demosthenes could command all styles: *ita fit ut Demosthenes certe possit summis dicere, elate Lysias fortasse non possit*. Lysias, in short, may be considered an orator, *sed de minoribus*. When one has surveyed all Cicero's references to Lysias, one is left with the impression that his real opinion of him was not very high, not merely because the plain style did not appeal to Cicero, but also because a writer of speeches who did not himself deliver them, and who confined himself to relatively unimportant subject-matter, hardly qualified, in Cicero's eyes, for the title of orator at all. Cicero seems to have expressed himself more generously than he really felt as a means of disarming his opponents, who, when he put Lysias thus high, could not complain if he put Demosthenes still higher.

Before turning to the remaining three names of Isocrates, Aeschines, and Demosthenes, about whom Cicero has much to say, it may be worth while to take note of his acquaintance with a few who are outside the canon. At one end of the great period

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as *abiectum*, an adjective which, whatever its proper translation, must be considered fairly damning. The most interesting reference is in a letter to Atticus (*Att.*, XII, 6), which begins as follows: *De Caelio vide, quaeso, ne quae lacuna sit in auro. ego ista non novi. sed certe in collybo est detrimenti satis. huc aurum si accedit—sed quid loquor? tu videbis.* After this unusually jerky start, Cicero pauses to add: "There you have the style of Hegesias, of which Varro speaks with approval" (*habes Hegesiae genus, quod Varro laudat*). Anyone who is acquainted with Varro's manner of writing, and remembers the painfully conspicuous silence which Cicero maintains on this aspect of his illustrious contemporary's achievement,¹⁰ must feel that this casual remark is almost the most crushing thing that Cicero has to say about Hegesias.

We hear of two Asiatic orators belonging to a later age, the generation before Cicero himself. They are the brothers Menecles and Hierocles of Alabanda. In 91 B.C., the dramatic date of the *De Oratore*, they are said to have been admired and imitated throughout Asia (*De Or.*, II, 95). They represented the type of Asiatic oratory which affected elaborate and prominent concinnity, and which influenced, not only Hortensius, as Cicero says, but also, as he seems to imply, the youthful Cicero himself (*Brut.*, 325, 326). His considered judgement on them in the *Orator* (231) is that they were *minime contemnendi*. What they lacked in Attic purity and correctness, they made up for by their fluency and fulness. Their main fault was the rhythmical monotony of their sentence-endings.

Cicero's real enthusiasm, however, is reserved for Aeschines and Demosthenes, above all Demosthenes. Of Aeschines we may say at once that, whilst he is specifically credited with *sonitus*, *lēvitas* and *splendor verborum* (*De Or.*, III, 284; *Or.*, 110), not his least merit for Cicero is that he proved himself a worthy opponent of Demosthenes. How many of Aeschines' speeches Cicero had read we do not know, but one of them, because it had been matched against the masterpiece of the greatest orator of all, he knew intimately—the speech against Ctesiphon. In the *De Oratore* (III, 213) he tells the story of Aeschines, banished after his defeat in the *cause célèbre*, reading to the Rhodians

¹⁰ Cf. Augustine, *Civ. Dei*, VI, 2.

first his own speech, and then that of Demosthenes, *suavissima et maxima voce*. When his hearers expressed their admiration, he said: *quanto magis miraremini si audissetis ipsum*. Our reaction to this remark may well be that it does credit to Aeschines' magnanimity, but for Cicero, without doubt, it was more significant as evidence of his hero's acknowledged supremacy. It is from *In Ctesiphontem* 130 that Cicero derived the statement attributed to Demosthenes in *Div.*, II, 118, that the Delphic oracle sided with Philip. In the *Tusculan Disputations* (II, 63) he praises the oratorical brilliance of *In Ctes.*, 77-78, where Aeschines is attacking Demosthenes' character; and in the *Orator* (26) he recalls in detail a passage in which Aeschines ridicules Demosthenes' language (*In Ctes.*, 166), as well as Demosthenes' retort in *De Corona*, 232. Finally, it was the *In Ctesiphontem* which, with the *De Corona*, Cicero chose to translate into Latin, as a means of exemplifying Attic oratory at its best in its most appropriate Latin dress:

Converti enim ex Atticis duorum eloquentissimorum nobilissimas orationes inter seque contrarias . . . nec converti ut interpres, sed ut orator, sentiis isdem et earum formis atque (*Hedicke. tamquam codd.*) figuris, verbis ad nostram consuetudinem aptis (*Opt. Gen.*, 14).

The translation has disappeared, leaving virtually no trace in later literature,¹¹ but the introduction survives under the title of *De Optimo Genere Oratorum*. That the translation did exist I have no doubt whatsoever. Cicero speaks of it as completed, and we have no reason to doubt his word; the whole tenor of the *De Optimo Genere* gives the same impression, and it is confirmed by the specially intimate knowledge which Cicero shows of both speeches, and his frequent references to them. It is possible that in *Orator* 26, mentioned above, we have glimpses of both translations. As for the *De Corona*, at the risk of seeming fanciful, I will venture to express a belief that, if one had the time and patience to acquire a sufficiently detailed and verbal knowledge both of the *De Corona* and of Cicero's last series of public speeches, the *Philippics*, one might collect a considerable number of parallelisms of thought and expression similar to that

¹¹ The passages in which Jerome, *Ep.*, 57, 5, 2, and Sidonius, *Ep.*, II, 9, 5, mention the translation are inconclusive.

which commentators have long noted between *De Corona* 59 and *Phil.*, II, 55.¹² If such a result did emerge to any striking degree, one would be justified in seeing reflections of Cicero's translation, which in 44 B. C. would still be quite fresh in his mind.

We need not collect Cicero's numerous references to Demosthenes in order to discover his opinion of that orator. His admiration is everywhere obvious. At least four times he states categorically that Demosthenes was the greatest of the Greek orators (*Brut.*, 35; *Or.*, 6, 23; *Opt. Gen.*, 13), and he hardly mentions him without implying the same thing. Only once (*Or.*, 104) does he criticize him, and then it is only to say that even the greatest orator of all sometimes falls short of Cicero's ideas of perfection: *qui quamquam unus eminet inter omnes in omni genere dicendi, tamen non semper implet auris meas: ita sunt avidae et capaces et saepe aliquid immensum infinitumque desiderant*. As we have seen, he finds in the *De Corona* the high-water mark of Demosthenes' achievement, but he also knows and admires other speeches, among which he mentions that against Leptines, the *De Falsa Legatione*, and the *Philippics* (*Or.*, 111). We are told that Demosthenes was a student of Plato; we hear of his appetite for working before daylight, of his heroic and successful efforts to overcome physical impediments and to perfect his art, of his delight on one occasion, when he overheard a poor woman carrying water whisper to her companion *hic est ille Demosthenes*.¹³ It is the *vir bonus*, no less than the *vir dicendi peritus*, who rouses Cicero's devotion; the greatness of the *De Corona* is bound up with the greatness of the occasion, a patriotic leader of the people justifying his services to the state.

In this connexion, a special interest attaches to a passage of a letter which Cicero wrote to Atticus in May 44 B. C. This was a time of disillusionment for Cicero. The Ides of March had failed to throw off tyranny, and had merely resulted in one tyrant being replaced by another. The conspirators had not

¹² *De Cor.*, 159: ὁ γὰρ τὸ σπέρμα παρὰσχών, οὗτος τῶν φύντων κακῶν αἴτιος. *Phil.*, II, 55: Ut igitur in seminibus est causa arborum et stirpium, sic huius luctuosissimi belli semen tu fuisti.

¹³ *Or.*, 15; *Brut.*, 121; *Tusc.*, IV, 44; *Div.*, II, 96; *De Or.*, I, 260; *Tusc.*, V, 103.

succeeded, at the time, in securing the support of the masses; Antony, on the other hand, with Caesar's private papers and Caesar's money at his disposal, was steadily gaining strength and behaving more and more like a despot. The conspirators had been compelled to go into hiding, and Cicero had withdrawn from Rome. It was clear to him that, if senatorial government was ever to be reestablished, Antony must first be overthrown. Brutus had sent to Cicero the written version of the speech which he had made on the Capitol after the assassination of Caesar, and had asked Cicero to suggest improvements, before it was published. In sending it on to Atticus, Cicero explains why he cannot do what Brutus requests. The passage, though it is well known, is worth quoting at length (*Att.*, XV, 1B, 2):

Est autem oratio scripta elegantissime sententiis, verbis, ut nihil possit ultra. *ego tamen si illam causam habuissem, scripsissem ardentius.* Ὑπόθεσις vides quae sit <et> persona dicentis. itaque eam corrigere non potui. quo enim in genere Brutus noster esse vult et quod iudicium habet de optimo genere dicendi, id ita consecutus in ea oratione est ut elegantius esse nihil possit; sed ego secutus aliud sum, sive hoc recte sive non recte. . . . *sed si recordabere Δημοσθένους fulmina, tum intelleges posse et ἀπικρότατα <et> gravissime dici.*

The most significant sentences here are those in italics. Cicero is certainly making a stylistic judgement. He cannot do what Brutus has asked, because his own attitude to oratorical style is fundamentally different. In his view, the occasion had demanded a more elevated and impassioned style, in fact, the thunderbolts of a Demosthenes; and this is the style which he himself would have adopted. At the same time, one is not, I think, being unduly imaginative in seeing in this passage evidence that Demosthenes was in Cicero's thoughts, not only as the orator, but as the patriot rallying his nation against a despot. As Demosthenes had used his eloquence as a weapon against Philip, so Cicero imagined himself, if ever the opportunity came, standing forth against Antony, as champion of all loyal elements at Rome. It seems probable that from such thoughts as these, in the early summer of 44 B. C., was born the title "Philippics," which he subsequently gave to the series of speeches against Antony which began later in the same year. According to

the letter of Brutus in which the title is mentioned (*Ad Brut.*, IX, 3, 4 Sjögren), Cicero suggested it jokingly. Naturally Cicero would wish to give this impression to his friend, for he was not lacking in sensibility. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that he was really in earnest. For the speeches which he knew were likely to be his swan-song he chose a title which not only paid tribute to his Greek predecessor, but asserted for himself, as unmistakably as Ennius had claimed to be the Roman Homer, the right to be recognized as the Roman Demosthenes.

From the evidence so far considered the obvious and natural conclusion to be drawn is that Cicero admired Demosthenes above all other Greek orators, and modelled his style on him. This, however, unless I am mistaken, is not the orthodox view, which holds that, whilst Cicero regarded Demosthenes as the perfect pattern of the orator in public life—the *vir bonus*, he was indebted for his style chiefly to Isocrates. This view, as I shall try to show, is not supported, either by what Cicero actually says about Isocrates, or by a comparison of typical passages from the works of both.

Let us first have the "Isocratean" view stated in the words of two distinguished scholars, Richard Jebb and J. E. Sandys. In his *Attic Orators*, II, p. 73, Jebb writes as follows:

But the best representative of Isocrates in his influence on the development of oratory is Cicero. Cicero was intellectually stronger than Isocrates . . . But as a stylist he is inferior to Isocrates. The idea which Cicero got from Isocrates was that of number. To this Cicero added special Isocratic graces with more than the richness but with less than the elegance of the Greek master. Seldom perhaps has an unconscious criticism on self told the truth more neatly than does the phrase of Cicero, when he speaks of having used 'all the fragrant essences of Isocrates and all the little stores of his disciples'. The brilliancy of Isocrates had come to Cicero through the school of Rhodes.

And this is what Sandys has to say in the introduction to his great edition of the *Orator* (p. xxii):

Cicero himself, while constantly acknowledging Demosthenes as the most perfect model of eloquence, is in the formation of his own oratorical style much more indebted to Isocrates, to whose points of excellence he has, as a stylist, though not as an orator or as a politician, a far

closer affinity. When he had clothed in a Greek dress the story of his own consulship, he wrote to his friend confessing that he had 'lavished on its toilet the whole of the fragrant casket of Isocrates and all the little perfume boxes of his pupils, besides giving it a touch of the rhetorical rouge of Aristotle'. And the same self-criticism may be applied with almost equal justice to his own oratorical prose.

Sandys goes on to say that, in his efforts to develop Latin oratorical prose, there were two points on which Cicero set special store, the proper use of rhythm and the development of the period. He continues:

In both these points his true prototype in Greek literature is undoubtedly Isocrates; and this is the reason why he dwells with such emphasis on the services of his Greek precursor towards the perfecting of these two important elements of artistic prose.

Sandys then proceeds to recommend that the reader should take the passage from the *Panegyricus* which describes the benefits conferred by Athens on Greece (*Paneg.*, 28-50).

Let him read the whole of it aloud slowly, or learn any large portion of it by heart and repeat it in a subdued voice, minding the pauses and attending to the sense. . . . When from such a passage of Isocrates he turns to similar masterpieces of style in Cicero, and then to the most artistic models of prose among modern nations, he will recognise to how large an extent the most finished forms of prose in the present time are founded, whether consciously or not, on that of Cicero, while the oratorical prose of Cicero is founded mainly on that of Isocrates.¹⁴

It will be observed that both Jebb and Sandys invoke the evidence of a familiar passage from a letter of Cicero to Atticus (*Att.*, II, 1, 1), and indeed seem to attach considerable importance to it. It will be worth while to look at the passage in its context. Writing in the year 60 B.C., Cicero begins by acknowledging the receipt of a *commentarius* in Greek on his consulship, which Atticus had written. He remarks that he is

¹⁴ P. xxxiii. Blass, whom Sandys appears to be following, expresses himself more cautiously. He says simply that Cicero "die beiden grossen Elemente der künstlerischen Prosa, den Rhythmus und die Periode, dem Isokrates abgelernt hat" (*Die Attische Beredsamkeit*, II, p. 212).

glad that he had already despatched to Atticus his own *commentarius*, also in Greek, on the same subject; otherwise he might have been accused of plagiarism. He thinks Atticus' version *horridula* . . . *atque incompta*, politely adding that this lack of ornament could be counted a virtue, just as, according to the Roman proverb, a woman was well perfumed when she used no perfume.¹⁵ He goes on:

Meus autem liber totum Isocrati myrothecium atque omnis eius discipulorum arculas ac nonnihil etiam Aristotelia pigmenta consumpsit. . . . Quem tibi ego non essem ausus mittere, nisi eum lente ac fastidiose probavissem. quamquam ad me rescripsit iam Rhodo Posidonius se, nostrum illud ὑπόμνημα cum legeret, quod ego ad eum ut ornatus de isdem rebus scriberet miseram, non modo non excitatum esse ad scribendum sed etiam plane deterritum. quid quaeris? conturbavi Graecam nationem.

Seen as a whole, the passage invites two comments. The first is that we should not take too solemnly the cosmetics metaphor which Cicero uses in the crucial sentence, coming as it does immediately after his reference to the perfume-proverb. He is drawing a playful contrast between his own work and that of Atticus, not making a serious avowal of his stylistic ideal. Secondly, Cicero evidently regards his Greek *commentarius* as a *tour de force*, and is proud of it for that reason (*conturbavi Graecam nationem*). He has chosen to write in the style of Isocrates, because for works of an epideictic or historical character that style (as he says elsewhere) is specially appropriate.¹⁶ But he is not acknowledging Isocrates as a model for other kinds of prose, even in Greek; still less are we justified in assuming that his words can tell us anything about his own Latin style. On the contrary, the pride which he takes in this achievement suggests that he feels his Isocratic essay to be something quite different from the manner in which he normally writes himself.

If we now go on to consider Cicero's attitude to Isocrates in general, we shall find that, whilst he regarded him as the most important and fertile influence in the development of the art

¹⁵ Cf. Plaut., *Most.*, 273.

¹⁶ More strictly, his words seem to mean that he has used all the devices which the masters of Greek rhetoric enjoined for the epideictic style.

of rhetoric, especially in having first shown the possibilities of prose-rhythm and of the period, and whilst he had obviously studied his works carefully for that reason, he did not look upon Isocrates as an orator in the full sense, nor did he think Isocrates' style relevant, except occasionally, to the requirements of real-life oratory.

Isocrates was the father of eloquence (*pater eloquentiae*), and his house became for the whole of Greece virtually a training-school and factory of the art of speaking: *cunctae Graeciae quasi ludus atque officina dicendi* (*De Or.*, II, 10; *Brut.*, 32). Cicero is fond of this simile and uses it several times. He uses another: Isocrates establishment was like a Trojan horse, from which came forth absolute champions (*meri principes*), some to distinguish themselves on the parade-ground, others on the battle-field (*De Or.*, II, 94). Among these celebrated pupils of Isocrates, we hear especially of Ephorus and Theopompus, and the anecdote about one needing the spur, the other the bridle, is told three times (*De Or.*, III, 36; *Att.*, VI, 1, 12; *Brut.*, 204). In the *De Oratore* (III, 173) it is stated as a common view that Isocrates was the first to introduce prose-rhythm; this not-quite-accurate opinion is corrected in the *Orator* (174), where Cicero points out that Gorgias and Thrasymachus brought rhythmical prose into being, but Isocrates was the first to handle it with skill and comparative restraint.

We have two general judgements on Isocrates, one in the *Brutus* (32) and the other in the *Orator* (40 f.). In the *Brutus* passage Cicero says of him: *magnus orator et perfectus magister, quamquam forensi luce caruit intraque parietes aluit eam gloriam quam nemo meo quidem iudicio est postea consecutus*. At first sight, it looks as if Cicero were conceding to Isocrates absolute supremacy as an orator, but *eam gloriam* refers to his reputation for the teaching of rhetoric, in which he remained unrivalled. In the *Orator* (40), after speaking of the epideictic style, he says that Isocrates *praeter ceteros eiusdem generis laudatur semper a nobis*. He was the first to expand his sentences with words, and fill them with softer rhythms, and since the pupils whom he instructed in this art became eminent either as orators or as writers, his establishment came to be considered an *officina eloquentiae*. What follows is significant of Cicero's attitude. After saying that, if he errs in admiring Isocrates, he does so

in company with Socrates and Plato, he adds (42) that the *dulce orationis genus et solutum et fluens* (by which he undoubtedly means the Isocratic style) is *proprium sophistarum, pompae quam pugnae aptius, gymnasiis et palaestrae dicatum, sprellum et pulsum foro*. He has discussed it because eloquence gets its first nourishment from this style, before developing its own strength and *color*. Therefore it has not seemed inappropriate to say something about the infancy of the orator's art (*de oratoris quasi incunabulis dicere*). Cicero then repeats that the epideictic style is only relevant for the purposes of training and display, and he returns *in aciem dimicationemque*.

Later in the *Orator* (207), when discussing the period, he says that in the writing of history and in epideictic oratory *placet omnia dici Isocrateo Theopompeoque more, illa circumscriptione, ut tamquam in orbe inclusa currat oratio, quoad insistat in perfectis absolutisque sententiis*. By *Isocrateo more* he evidently means a succession of long, flowing periods, as contrasted with the more varied style required in the oratory of public life. He goes on to say that occasionally in forensic oratory the highly rhythmical and periodic style will be appropriate, either in a passage of elaborate eulogy, or in a description *quae plus dignitatis desiderat quam doloris*, and he mentions (210) examples from his own speeches, especially from the *Verrines*. As Kroll observes in his commentary (p. 178), these examples are not noticeably more rhythmical than other parts of Cicero's works.

In the *De Opt. Gen.*, 17 Cicero, while recognizing that expert opinion has generally regarded Isocrates as *summus orator*, will not himself allow him a place in that class: *non enim in acie versatur nec ferro, sed quasi rudibus eius eludit oratio*.

I have been maintaining that Cicero's references to Isocrates do not support the view that his oratorical style was chiefly indebted to him. I wish, in conclusion, to test and, I hope, confirm this thesis by attempting a stylistic comparison of characteristic passages of Isocrates, Cicero and, finally, Demosthenes. The extracts from Isocrates are drawn from that part of the *Panegyricus* which Sandys recommended should be read aloud in a subdued voice, and I have tried to set them out in such a way that their structure and balance is more obvious to the eye.

34-35 :

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου τῶν εὐεργετημάτων
καὶ πρώτου γενομένου καὶ πᾶσι κοινοτάτου
ταῦτ' εἰπεῖν ἔχομεν.
περὶ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους ὁρῶσα
τοὺς μὲν βαρβάρους τὴν πλείστην τῆς χώρας κατέχοντας
τοὺς δ' Ἑλλήνας εἰς μικρὸν τόπον κατακεκλημένους
καὶ διὰ σπανιότητα τῆς γῆς
ἐπιβουλεύοντάς τε σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καὶ στρατείας ἐπ' ἀλλήλους ποιου-
μένους,
καὶ τοὺς μὲν δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν,
τοὺς δὲ διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἀπολλυμένους,
οὐδὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχοντα περιεῖδεν
ἀλλ' ἡγεμόνας εἰς τὰς πόλεις ἐξέπεμψεν,
οἱ παραλαβόντες τοὺς μάλιστα βίου δεομένους,
στρατηγοὶ καταστάντες αὐτῶν καὶ πολέμῳ κρατήσαντες τοὺς
βαρβάρους,
πολλὰς μὲν ἐφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς ἡπείρου πόλεις ἔκτισαν,
ἀπάσας δὲ τὰς νήσους κατέκτισαν,
ἀμφοτέρους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀκολουθήσαντας καὶ τοὺς ὑπομείναντας
ἔσωσαν.

47-49 :

Φιλοσοφίαν τοίνυν,
ἢ πάντα ταῦτα συνέξευρε καὶ συγκατεσκεύασε
καὶ πρὸς τε τὰς πράξεις ἡμᾶς ἐπαίδευσεν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους
ἐπράυνεν
καὶ τῶν συμφορῶν τὰς τε δι' ἀμαθίαν καὶ τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γιγνομένας
διείλεν
καὶ τὰς μὲν φυλάξασθαι, τὰς δὲ καλῶς ἐνεγκεῖν ἐδίδαξεν,
ἢ πόλιν ἡμῶν κατέδειξεν,
καὶ λόγους ἐτίμησεν,
ὧν πάντες μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, τοῖς δ' ἐπισταμένοις φθονοῦσιν,
συνειδυῖα μὲν
ὅτι τοῦτο μόνον ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν ζώων ἴδιον ἔφυμεν ἔχοντες,
καὶ διότι τούτῳ πλεονεκτήσαντες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αὐτῶν
διηνέγκαμεν,
ὁρῶσα δὲ
περὶ μὲν τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις οὕτω ταραχώδεις οὔσας τὰς τύχας,
ὥστε πολλάκις ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς
ἀνοήτους κατορθοῦν,
τῶν δὲ λόγων τῶν καλῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐχόντων οὐ μετὸν τοῖς φαύλοις,
ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς εὖ φρονούσης ἔργον ὄντας,
καὶ τοὺς τε σοφοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀμαθεῖς δοκοῦντας εἶναι ταύτῃ πλείστον
ἀλλήλων διαφέροντας,
ἔτι δὲ τοὺς εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλευθερίως τεθραμμένους
ἐκ μὲν ἀνδρείας καὶ πλούτου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν οὐ γιγνωσ-
κομένους,

ἐκ δὲ τῶν λεγομένων μάλιστα καταφανεῖς γιγνομένους,
καὶ τοῦτο σύμβολον τῆς παιδεύσεως ἡμῶν ἐκάστου πιστότατον
ἀποδεδειγμένον,
καὶ τοὺς λόγῳ καλῶς χρωμένους
οὐ μόνον ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν δυναμένους ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις
ἐντίμους ὄντας.

In the first passage (*Paneg.*, 34-35) it will be noticed that the balance is of the simplest type, consisting of two-member antithesis or parallelism, which is effected by μὲν...δέ (three times), by τε...καί (once) and by καὶ...καί (once). The structure of the period as a whole is still predominantly paratactic: ὀρώσα ... κατακεκλημένους καὶ ... ποιουμένους καὶ ... ἀπολλυμένους οὐδὲ ... περιεῖδεν ἀλλ' ἡγεμόνας ἐξέπεμψεν, οἱ ... ἔκτισαν ... κατόκισαν ... ἔσωσαν. The total effect of the period is of a gentle progress, accompanied by a rocking movement.

The second passage is much longer and more elaborate, but in its essential features it is very similar to the first. The basic structure of the whole is paratactic: φιλοσοφίαν ... ἣ ... συνεξεύρε ... καὶ ... ἐπράυνεν καὶ ... διεῖλεν καὶ ... ἐδίδαξεν, ἣ πόλιν ἡμῶν κατέδειξεν καὶ λόγους ἐτίμησεν ... συνειδυῖα μὲν ... ὀρώσα δὲ ... οὐ μετὸν ... ἀλλὰ ... ἔργον ὄντας καὶ ... διαφέροντας, ἔτι δὲ ... γιγνομένους, καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδεδειγμένον καὶ ... ἐντίμους ὄντας. This framework is filled out mainly by balanced clauses, consisting of two-member antitheses and parallelisms of the same kind as in the previous passage. Here we have a good illustration of what Cicero meant, when he described Isocrates' contribution to the development of prose as *dilatare verbis et mollioribus numeris explere sententias* (*Or.*, 40). The consequence of the Isocratean period still retaining so much of the character of λέξις εἰρομένη is that it rarely gives the impression of moving inevitably towards its conclusion; it seems rather to drift on its way. Its parts, however elaborate in themselves, tend to be strung along by means of coordinating conjunctions; the elaboration itself is restricted to a few types of two-part balance, often repeated. It is strange that Sandys should have found the reading of Isocrates so satisfying; most readers, after a page or two, will find him cloying and monotonous. This is a style which still has something naïve and primitive about it.

Let us now set beside Isocrates three passages of Cicero, all of

an epideictic character, and therefore places in which, if anywhere, we might expect to find Isocratic affinities. The first (*In Verrem*, II, 2, 6) is one of the passages which Cicero himself mentioned in the *Orator* (207); the other two are highlights from the two speeches which, perhaps, come nearest to being showpieces, the *Pro Archia* and the *Pro Marcello*.

In Verrem, II, 2, 6:

Quid? illa quae forsitan ne sentiamus quidem, iudices,
 quanta sunt!
 quod multis locupletioribus civibus utimur,
 quod habent propinquam fidelem fructuosamque provinciam,
 quo facile excurrant, ubi libenter negotium gerant;
 quos illa partim mercibus suppeditandis cum quaestu com-
 pendioque dimittit,
 partim retinet, ut arare, ut pascere, ut negotiari libeat,
 ut denique sedes ac domicilium collocare;
 quod commodum non mediocri rei publicae est,
 tantum civium numerum tam prope a domo
 tam bonis fructuosisque rebus detineri.

Pro Archia, 31:

Quae cum ita sint, petimus a vobis, iudices,
 si qua non modo humana verum etiam divina
 in tantis ingeniis commendatio debet esse,
 ut eum, qui vos, qui vestros imperatores,
 qui populi Romani res gestas semper ornavit,
 qui etiam his recentibus nostris vestrisque domesticis peri-
 culis
 aeternum se testimonium laudis daturum esse profitetur,
 quique est ex eo numero
 qui semper apud omnes sancti sunt habiti itaque dicti,
 sic in vestram accipiatis fidem,
 ut humanitate vestra levatus
 potius quam acerbitate violatus esse videatur.

Pro Marcello, 5:

Soleo saepe ante oculos ponere,
 idque libenter crebris usurpare sermonibus,
 omnes nostrorum imperatorum,
 omnes exterarum gentium potentissimorumque populorum,
 omnes regum clarissimorum res gestas
 cum tuis nec contentionum magnitudine
 nec numero proeliorum
 nec varietate regionum

nec celeritate conficiendi
 nec dissimilitudine bellorum posse conferri,
 nec vero disiunctissimas terras citius passibus cuiusquam
 potuisse peragrari,
 quam tuis non dicam cursibus, sed victoriis lustratae sunt.

When we look at these three passages, the most striking thing is the comparative absence of simple, two-part parallelism or antithesis of the kind which is so prominent in Isocrates. Indeed, the only obvious example is at the end of the *Pro Archia* extract, where the effect is enhanced by the verbal jingle *levatus*—*violatus*. What we do observe in all these passages, and indeed everywhere else in Cicero's works, is a strong predilection for what might be termed progressive rhythm, produced by a succession of parallel words within a phrase, or phrases within a sentence. Such a succession may have two or more components; its most frequent form is that of the Tricolon, with three. An important principle in the use of this progressive rhythm-pattern is that the successive members should, if anything, increase in weight and length, and certainly that the last member should be noticeably the heaviest. For this principle German scholarship has devised the name of "das Gesetz der wachsenden Glieder,"¹⁷ but the principle itself was known to Cicero, and enunciated by him in the *De Oratore*.¹⁸ This rhythm-pattern is often used in conjunction with anaphora.

In the passage from the *Verrines* the pattern appears three times, twice with anaphora; it has a central position in *Pro Archia* 31, again with anaphora; in the case of *Pro Marcello* 5, it occupies practically the whole period. It is in fact Cicero's favourite stylistic device, and the chief means whereby he not only fills out his periods, but gives them movement. In Isocrates this pattern, in so far as it exists, is still rudimentary, and does not seem yet to be exploited as a conscious device. In the *Panegyricus* most of the few examples give the impression of having arisen involuntarily out of the parataxis, e. g., 6: τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὃς ἦν κατορθωθῆ καὶ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τῆς παραχῆς τῆς παρούσης καὶ τῶν μεγίστων κακῶν ἡμᾶς ἀπαλλάξει, where

¹⁷ The whole subject is discussed by E. Lindholm in *Stilistische Studien zur Erweiterung der Satzglieder im Lateinischen* (Lund, 1931).

¹⁸ III, 186: *qua re aut paria esse debent posteriora superioribus, et extrema primis aut, quod etiam est melius et iucundius, longiora.*

it will be noticed that the element of expansion is lacking. The same is true of 9: τὸ δ' ἐν καιρῷ ταύταις καταχρήσασθαι καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα περὶ ἐκάστης ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὖ διαθέσθαι τῶν εὖ φρονούντων ἰδίῳν ἐστίν. (Compare a similar example in *Paneg.*, 25.) Other examples do show expansion, e. g. 120: νῦν δ' ἐκείνός ἐστιν ὁ διοικῶν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ προστάτων ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν ἐκάστους καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἐπιστάθμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν καθιστάς. (Cf. examples in 98, 121, 174.) Only one passage in the *Panegyricus* (121) shows the pattern being used in a way that can be called sophisticated, and it may be added that this is the only example in which the successive members are not linked by καί:

οὐχ ὡς ἐκείνον πλέομεν ὥσπερ πρὸς δεσπότην ἀλλήλων κατηγορή-
 σοντες;
 οὐ βασιλέα τὸν μέγαν αὐτὸν προσαγορεύομεν ὥσπερ αἰχμάλωτοι
 γεγονότες;
 οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐν ἐκείνῳ τὰς ἐλπίδας
 ἔχομεν τῆς σωτηρίας,
 δὲ ἀμφοτέρους ἡμᾶς ἡδέως ἂν ἀπολέσειεν;

The most that we can say is that Isocrates offers some foreshadowings of the progressive rhythm-pattern, but they are by no means prominent, or typical of his style. The salient characteristics are those to which attention has been called in the two long passages quoted above. As a further good example of Isocrates writing in a characteristic, and entirely un-Ciceronian, manner, one might add *Paneg.*, 80-81:

τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων διῶκουν, θεραπεύοντες ἀλλ'
 οὐχ ὑβρίζοντες τοὺς Ἕλληνας, καὶ στρατηγεῖν οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἀλλὰ
 μὴ τυραννεῖν αὐτῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἡγεμόνες ἢ δεσπότες
 προσαγορεύεσθαι καὶ σωτῆρες ἀλλὰ μὴ λυμεῶνες ἀποκαλεῖσθαι, τῷ
 ποιεῖν εὖ προσαγόμενοι τὰς πόλεις, ἀλλ' οὐ βία καταστρεφόμενοι,
 πιστοτέροις μὲν τοῖς λόγοις ἢ νῦν τοῖς ὅρκοις χρώμενοι, ταῖς δὲ
 συνθήκαις ὥσπερ ἀνάγκαις ἐμμένειν ἀξιούντες . . . , etc.

The next most characteristic feature of Cicero's style is perhaps his habit of obtaining greater fulness by using a pair of words to express a single, or virtually single, idea. Such "geminations" (if one may use the word) are very frequent, and in the first of our passages we observe *quaestu compendioque, sedes ac domicilium, bonis fructuosisque*. It is pure accident that the other two passages do not yield further examples, for every attentive reader of Cicero will agree that nearly every page of his

works contains several instances of this feature. It is found also in Isocrates, but to a much more limited extent. The whole of the *Panegyricus* (189 sections) shows only 17 examples, two of which (συνεξεῦρε καὶ συγκατεσκεύασε, καλῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς) appear in the second long passage (47-49) above.

If we now turn to the *De Corona*, we find such geminations much more in evidence. In sections 5 and 6, for instance, we encounter, in close succession, λυπηρόν . . . καὶ χαλεπόν, εὐνοίας καὶ φιλανθρωπίας, ἀξιώ καὶ δέομαι. In the whole work, which, allowing for the documents quoted, is less than twice the length of the *Panegyricus*, there are at least 140 examples. The contrast with Isocrates is palpable. In Demosthenes the feature, if less frequent than in Cicero, is at least sufficiently prominent to attract the reader's attention.¹⁹

More significant still, however, is the obviously deliberate exploitation by Demosthenes of the cumulative and progressive rhythm-pattern which bulks so large in Cicero. The following are some of the more striking examples in the *De Corona*:

- 48: μέχρι τούτου Δασθένης φίλος ὠνομάζετο, ἕως προῦδωκεν Ὀλυνθον·
μέχρι τούτου Τιμόλαος, ἕως ἀπώλεσε Θήβας·
μέχρι τούτου Εὐδίκος καὶ Σίμος ὁ Λαρισαῖος, ἕως Θετταλίαν ὑπὸ
Φιλίππῳ ἐποίησαν.
εἴτ' ἐλαυνομένων καὶ ὑβριζομένων καὶ τί κακὸν οὐχὶ πασχόντων
πᾶσ' ἢ οἰκουμένη μεστή γέγονεν.
- 121: τί οὖν, ὦ ταλαίπωρε, συκοφαντεῖς;
τί λόγους πλάττεις;
τί παντὸν οὐκ ἐλλεβορίζεις ἐπὶ τούτοις;
- 158: τίς οὖν ὁ ταῦτα συμπαρασκενάσας αὐτῷ;
τίς ὁ τὰς προφάσεις ταύτας ἐνδούς;
τίς ὁ τῶν κακῶν τῶν γεγενημένων μάλιστ' αἴτιος;
- 244: οὐκ ἐκ Θετταλίας οὐδ' ἐξ Ἀμβρακίας,
οὐκ ἐξ Ἰλλυριῶν οὐδὲ παρὰ τῶν Θρακῶν βασιλέων,
οὐκ ἄλλοθεν οὐδαμῶθεν, οὐ τὰ τελενται' ἐκ Θηβῶν.
- 250: τούτων οὖν οὕτως ἐχόντων, τί προσήκειν ἢ τί δίκαιον ἦν
τοῖς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ πεπραγμένοις θέσθαι τὸν Κτησιφῶντ' ὄνομα;
οὐχ ὁ τὸν δῆμον ἑώρα τιθέμενον,
οὐχ ὁ τοὺς ὁμωμοκότας δικαστάς,
οὐχ ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ πᾶσι βεβαιῶσαν;

¹⁹ Antiquity recognized it as characteristic of Demosthenes (Dion. Hal., *Dem.*, 58; cf. Blass, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 166 ff.).

322: οὐκ ἐξαιτούμενος,
 οὐκ εἰς Ἀμφικτύονας δίκας ἐπαγόντων,
 οὐκ ἀπειλούντων, οὐκ ἐπαγγελλομένων,
 οὐχὶ τοὺς καταράτους τούτους ὥσπερ θηρία μοι προβαλλόντων,
 οὐδαμῶς ἐγὼ προέδωκα τὴν εἰς ὑμᾶς εὐνοίαν,
 τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὀρθὴν καὶ δικαίαν
 τὴν ὁδὸν τῆς πολιτείας εἰλόμην,
 τὰς τιμὰς, τὰς δυναστείας, τὰς εὐδοξίας τὰς τῆς πατρίδος
 θεραπεύειν,
 ταύτας αὔξειν, μετὰ τούτων εἶναι.

The predominance, in these extracts, of tricolon and anaphora has innumerable close parallels in Cicero. Noteworthy, too, is Demosthenes' frequent use, in this pattern, of asyndeton, a device which appears very rarely in Isocrates, but which, as is well known, is very common in Cicero. It can be seen, for instance, in the latter part of *De Corona* 322 above, and in many other places, e. g. 216: τῷ κόσμῳ, ταῖς παρασκευαῖς, τῇ προθυμίᾳ; 235: . . . οὐδ' ἐπεύθυνος ὦν οὐδενί, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς αὐτὸς δεσπότης, ἡγεμών, κύριος πάντων.²⁰

My conclusion is this. Cicero recognized the importance of Isocrates as the virtual founder of artistic prose, and saw in the study of his works and of his style a necessary part of the ground-work of an orator's training. He was specially interested in him as the great pioneer in the development of the period. But the real significance of Isocrates was that he laid the foundations on which built the great Attic orators of the next generation. Cicero was thus indebted to him, but indirectly. The style that interested Cicero was the style appropriate to the orator-states-

²⁰ Gilberte Ronnet, in her recent *Étude sur le style de Démosthène* (Paris, 1951), a work to which Professor J. H. Oliver has kindly drawn my attention, rightly stresses (p. 65) the prevalence of anaphora in Demosthenes, as compared with its relative absence in Isocrates; it is misleading, however, to explain as "l'oeuvre de la passion" what is in fact the calculated exploitation of a technical device. On the use of synonyms (what I have termed "geminations") Ronnet (pp. 71-3) seems to me to minimize the development which Demosthenes shows over Isocrates, and her figure of "près de 80" for the *De Corona* is a considerable understatement. Similarly, the relative prominence of asyndeton in Demosthenes, as compared with Isocrates, is a point which Ronnet does not make. I am glad to note that in several places (e. g. pp. 88, 89, 92, 113 f.) she speaks of progressive movement and expansion as a characteristic feature of Demosthenes' periods.

man, playing his part in public life. If anyone was likely to exert on Cicero a direct stylistic influence, it was the man who had swayed a nation, and whom all Greece had flocked to hear—Demosthenes. That we have found actual evidence of such influence in Demosthenes, and not in Isocrates, is, after all, only what was to be expected. The line of artistic prose ran from Isocrates to Cicero, but it reached him through Demosthenes. Nor would one be justified in arguing that, though Cicero was indebted to Demosthenes in his oratorical style, he may have owed more to Isocrates in his other writing. Cicero's prose style as a whole is based on his oratorical manner, and the language of his treatises—what he himself describes as *aequabile et temperatum orationis genus* and *hoc quietum disputandi genus* (*Off.*, I, 3)—is not different in essence from his forensic style, but is a modified and smoother form of that style, showing the same characteristic features. First and foremost, Cicero was an orator, and chiefly as an orator, in the full Roman sense, he would have wished himself, and his style, to be judged.

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THE ORDER OF ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGICAL WRITINGS.*

The aim of this paper is to establish that the composition of the *Parva Naturalia* and the completion or final compilation of Aristotle's biological works were very probably later than the composition of the *De Anima*.¹ Some scholars are persuaded that the *De Anima* was written after the *Parva Naturalia* and the biological works. The first part of this paper will attempt to show that their principal arguments for the priority of the *Parva Naturalia* and the biological works are unsound. The second part will argue directly for the priority of the *De Anima*.

Part I

The Arguments of Ross and Nuyens

The view that the *Parva Naturalia* and the biological works were written before the *De Anima* has been taken recently by Sir David Ross, in the Introduction to his recent edition of the *Parva Naturalia*.² This view is also held to some extent by François Nuyens in his book, *L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote*.³ These two give the most explicit defense of the view, and the authority of Sir David Ross, especially, requires that we pay close attention to whatever opinion he may support.

The fulcrum of the reasoning of both Ross and Nuyens is their assumption that the view expressed in the *De Anima* that the soul is the entelechy or form of the entire body excludes the possibility of connecting the soul primarily with any single organ of the body. That is, when Aristotle says that the functions of the soul have their source (*ἀρχή*) in the heart, he is expressing a view which is at least distinct and separate from

* I am indebted to Professor Rogers Albritton for his valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.

¹ By the biological works I mean the *Parts of Animals*, the *Generation of Animals*, and the *History of Animals*.

² W. D. Ross (ed.), *Parva Naturalia* (Revised Text with Introduction and Notes [Oxford, 1955]).

³ F. Nuyens, *L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote* (Louvain, Paris, and the Hague, 1948).

that of the *De Anima*, or even logically incompatible with it. One is not quite sure whether Ross means to assert both of these propositions or only one of them. He stresses the first, that as a matter of fact these two views express entirely different outlooks and that when Aristotle adopted one he rejected the other. He may think that they are logically incompatible, but the burden of his argument rests on the weaker proposition. Nuyens, on the other hand, asserts that "the idea that the soul is seated (siège) in a well-defined part of the body is absolutely incompatible with the concept of the soul as *ἐντελέχεια*" (p. 257).

Ross bases his argument on the premise that Aristotle's "heart view" and "entelechy view," as we shall call them, represent different views which must have been held at two different periods (pp. 5-7). In the biological writings "... soul is thought of as closely associated with heat, and with the hottest organ in the body, the heart" (p. 6). However, when Aristotle comes to write the *De Anima* "... we hear no longer of a location of the soul in any one part of the body, but it is described as the *ἐντελέχεια*, the principle of structure or organization of the whole body" (p. 7). Aristotle never calls the soul an entelechy in the *Parva Naturalia* and the biological writings, and he attaches no importance to the heart in the *De Anima*. Ross appears to believe, moreover, that the entelechy view and the heart view belong to or imply larger theories that are contradictory.⁴ The entelechy view implies a one-substance theory in which the body and soul are the matter and form of one substance, the living organism. The heart view, however, points to a two-substance theory in which the body and soul are separate substances. Ross does not say this explicitly, but it seems to be the reasoning by which he is led to assert that the entelechy view of the *De Anima* "... involves a complete departure from the two-substance view expressed in the biological writings" (p. 16). Since the two-substance theory is more Platonic, Ross assumes that it is the earlier one.

If these arguments of Ross and Nuyens are correct, it follows that all writings in which we find the heart emphasized as the seat of the soul, or as the *ἀρχή* of the vital functions of the

⁴ Ross never says that the entelechy view and the heart view *per se* are contradictory, as Nuyens does.

soul, belong to a period of development that precedes the entelechy view of the *De Anima*, and must have been written before it. This would include the *Parts of Animals*, the *Generation of Animals*, and the entire *Parva Naturalia*⁵ with the exception of *De Sensu* and *De Memoria* where we find no mention of the heart as an important organ for sensation and the other vital functions.⁶ Our contention is, however, that the arguments are unsound: The heart view and entelechy view (1) are not logically incompatible and (2) do not represent larger theories that are logically incompatible, and finally (3), as a matter of fact, Aristotle himself did not consider them as incompatible or divergent views.

With respect to the first point, Aristotle's definition of the soul as the form or actuality (*ἐντελέχεια*) of the body does not logically forbid him to emphasize a particular bodily organ above the others and single it out as the source of those activities whereby the body lives. Take a light bulb, for example. If Aristotle could have had the opportunity of commenting on such an object, he probably would have said that the glass and wire were the matter of the light bulb, while the light that shone in it was its form or actuality. The light is found throughout the bulb, but this does not prevent us from saying that the light has its "source" in the filament, that this part of the bulb is the part from which the light comes or in which the light is

⁵ Cf. *Parts of Animals* where the heart is said to be "the original cause of life" (678b 2), "the principle of life" (665a 12), and "the central and commanding part of the body in which lodges the sensory portion of the soul and the source of life" (678b 3). For similar remarks about the heart in the *Parva Naturalia*, see *De Somno* 456a 5, where the heart is said to be the *ἀρχή* of motion and sensation; *De Juventute* 469a 7, which reiterates "that the *ἀρχή* of the sensitive and nutritive soul is in the heart"; and finally 469b 15-18, where the life in the parts of the body is said to be "fired" (*ἐμπεπνευμένης*) by the heart in the blood whose source is in the heart. (Cf. also *De Respiratione* 474b 10-14, where the life of the entire body is dependent upon natural heat in the blood, both the heat and the blood having their source in the heart.) In the *History of Animals*, the heart is not particularly emphasized, but this work obviously belongs to the same period as the *Parts* and the *Generation*.

⁶ Ross thinks that even these two works come before the *De Anima* (pp. 16-17), but Nuyens believes that they were written about the time of the *De Anima* (pp. 251-2).

originally caused. Similarly, the soul for Aristotle is defined in terms of the functions that it performs, and all of these functions, with the exception of intellect, are dependent upon the body (413b 11-12).⁷ But, even though these functions are carried out by the organism as a whole, there may well be one part which is the source or causal origin of these functions. The theory that the soul is the actuality of the living animal, whereby it moves, perceives, desires, and is nourished, is not "absolutely incompatible," as Nuyens supposes, with the view that there is one organ of the body that is the causal origin of these functions or is the source of these activities. To put the matter more generally, the attribution of an activity to a complex body as a whole is not incompatible with the claim that one part of that body is more directly the cause of the activity than another.

It may be that we have not correctly ascertained Nuyens' interpretation of the heart view. He may not be thinking of the heart as the organ which is the causal source of life or the ἀρχή of the various functions of the soul. He may take Aristotle to mean that the soul is the entelechy of the *heart*. That would certainly be incompatible with his statement in the *De Anima* that the soul is the entelechy of the body as a whole. However, Aristotle does not mean that the soul is the entelechy of the heart and never suggests such a view. What he means is that the heart is more intimately connected with the vital functions of the body than any other organ of the body, and that it is here that we find the source and causal beginning of those functions whereby the soul of a living organism is defined. The entelechy of the heart is its own activity whereby it carries out its private functions of pumping blood and concocting heat. These may be considered as causal origins of the vital functions, but they are not the vital functions themselves, such as nutrition, appetite, locomotion, and sensation. If these functions of the soul were the entelechy of the heart, then it would be true to say that it is the *heart* that perceives, desires, moves, or is nourished, when "we" perceive, move, or are nourished. But Aristotle is not committed to these strange propositions by what he says, which is only that the soul is seated in the heart or that the ἀρχή of its functions is in the heart.

⁷ The functions mentioned are intellect, sensation, locomotion, nutrition, and growth and decay (412b 23-25).

Granting that the heart view and the entelechy view are not logically incompatible, a second and perhaps more fundamental question is whether they represent or imply larger theories which *are* logically incompatible. Ross seems to say that the heart view belongs to a two-substance theory of body and soul, while the entelechy view is a one-substance theory. The entelechy view obviously does imply a one-substance theory, but where does Ross find that the heart view belongs to a two-substance theory? In the biological writings and the *Parva Naturalia*, where we find the heart view, Aristotle never says that the body is one substance and the soul another. In his exposition (pp. 5-7), all that Ross shows is that in the biological period the soul of man is compared with the souls of animals and receives more or less the same kind of treatment, and that the soul is "closely associated with heat" and with other natural processes. Neither of these facts implies that the soul is conceived to be a substance, separable from the body, nor does Ross claim that they do. How, then, did he come to think that the biological writings express a two-substance theory?

We can perhaps understand what led him to think so from his words on page 16, where he is arguing his case for including the *De Sensu* and the *De Memoria* in the period of the biological writings. He says that although Aristotle does not discuss in these works the nature of the soul in general, his remarks "... in the *De Sensu* show clearly that Aristotle still holds a two-substance view, as he certainly does in the more biological parts of the *Parva Naturalia*" (p. 16). Ross never tells us why the more biological parts of the *Parva Naturalia* "certainly" manifest a two-substance theory, and we can only speculate what his reasons were for saying that they do. However, he quotes five passages which he thinks exhibit a two-substance view in the *De Sensu*. The passages which Ross gives in Greek are here quoted in English from the Loeb translation:

- 1) "The most important characteristics of animals, both general and specific, appear to be those which are common both to soul and body, such as sensation, memory, passion, desire, and appetite generally" (436a 7-9).
- 2) "It is obvious that the characteristics already mentioned belong both to body and soul" (436b 1-3).
- 3) "That sensation is felt by the soul through the medium of the body is obvious" (436b 6-7).

- 4) "For the soul or the sense organ of the soul does not reside in the surface of the eye, but must evidently be within" (438b 8-10).
- 5) "For it is obvious that one must consider such a thing (memory) which occurs in the soul by means of sense perception, and in that part of the body which contains the soul . . ." (450a 27-29).

When we examine these passages, it is not obvious how a two-substance theory is implied in them. The first three seem to be saying simply that the functions of a living organism are necessarily carried out by the body and the soul in conjunction. This community of action does not imply that the body is one substance and the soul another substance. Indeed, in the *De Anima*, where everyone agrees that Aristotle holds a one-substance theory he says that "It would appear that in most cases, soul neither acts nor is acted upon apart from the body (*ἀνευ τοῦ σώματος*); as, e. g., in anger, confidence, desire, and sensation in general" (403a 6-7). An exception to this is thought, which works independently of the body. But the other functions of the soul, by which it is defined, "all appear to be conjoined with body of some sort (*μετὰ σώματος τινός ἐστιν*)" (403a 16) and ". . . inseparable from the physical matter of the animals to which they belong (*ἀχώριστα τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης τῶν ζώων*)" (403b 17).

On Ross' interpretation of the first three of his passages from the *De Sensu*, these passages of the *De Anima* would also indicate a two-substance theory. But Ross must agree that they do not, and is therefore inconsistent in his interpretation, for the passages in the *De Sensu* and the *De Anima* express the same thought, namely, that the functions of the living animal are carried out by the body and soul in conjunction with one another. This is also the opinion of Hicks, who comments in his notes to the *De Anima* that its view of the soul's connection with the body is reiterated in the *De Sensu*, and that "Aristotle sums up his own view of sensation thus: (*De Sensu* 436b 6) 'That sensation is felt by the soul through the medium of the body is obvious.'" ⁸

The fourth passage that Ross quotes is a little more difficult to discuss, for it is not clear why he thinks that it manifests a two-

⁸ R. D. Hicks (ed.), *De Anima* (Text and Translation with Introduction and Notes [Cambridge, 1907]), p. 195.

substance theory. It may be because he construes it as locating the soul inside the body, or more accurately inside a particular organ of the body, in such a sense that the soul cannot be the form of the entire body and is therefore probably a substance, as Plato supposed. If this is Ross' interpretation of the passage, it is not justified. Aristotle does not mean that the soul is in the heart or any other part of the body as water might be said to be in a glass. The heart is the center or source (*ἀρχή*) of the vital functions, but this does not mean that perception, nutrition, and locomotion are in the heart. It means that the heart is the organ from which all these functions originate. Furthermore, Ross himself, in his notes to this fourth passage, says that Aristotle does not mean to contrast the outer surface of the eye with the inside of the body, but with the inside of the *eye*, and is not speaking of the soul in general, but of sight (p. 192).⁹ This is undoubtedly the correct interpretation, but then it becomes even more puzzling how the location of the sense of sight inside the eye implies that the soul is a separate substance.

The fifth and final passage does seem to say that the soul is located in a specific part of the body. Ross, commenting in his notes on this passage, says that the heart is meant and points to *De Juventute*, 469a 5-7 for corroboration (p. 238). What is said there, though, is not that the soul is in the heart but that "the source of the sensitive and nutritive soul is in the heart."¹⁰ The principle or origin (*ἀρχή*) of nutrition is in the heart which is not to say that either nutrition or the soul is in the heart, and this in no way implies a two-substance theory or excludes the possibility of the soul's being the entelechy of the body. As to the misleading wording of the *De Sensu*, following Ross' own note, we suggest that it is a short-handed way of expressing what is more precisely and accurately stated in the *De Juventute*.

Granting, however, that there is no two-substance theory of body and soul to be found in Aristotle (outside his early Platonic period), what reason is there to believe that Aristotle held a single theory of the soul, which combined the proposition that the soul is the entelechy of the body as a whole and the proposition that its seat or the source of its activities is in the heart?

⁹ Cf. G. R. T. Ross (ed.), *De Sensu and De Memoria* (Cambridge, 1906), p. 142, who gives a similar interpretation of this passage.

¹⁰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καὶ τῆς θρεπτικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι.

In Book Z 1035b, Aristotle is discussing the relationship between the parts and the whole, in particular with regard to the parts and the whole of a definition. The question is whether the parts exist before the whole, or only after it. With respect to essences and definitions, the parts of the definition are prior to the definition. Aristotle then continues in line 14: "Since the soul of animals (for this is the substance [οὐσία] of living beings) is their substance according to the formula, i. e. the form and essence of a body of a certain kind . . . Therefore, the parts of the soul are prior, either all or some, to the concrete animal." He goes on to explain that the parts of the body can be spoken of in two senses: one in which the finger, for example, is a mere mass of flesh and bone and another in which it is the active organ of a living body. In the former sense, the parts of the body can be separated from the concrete, living animal, as when a finger is severed, and in this sense the parts of the body can be both prior and posterior to the concrete whole. Such a part, however, is only a part in name. The severed finger is only a finger in name and not in its actual being or activity, but the real finger considered as a functioning organ of a living body is a part that exists only posterior to the concrete whole with its essence, the soul. Aristotle continues in line 25, "Some parts are neither prior nor posterior to the whole, the living organism composed of body and soul as matter and form, i. e. those which are most important (κύρια) and in which the formula, i. e. the essential substance, is immediately present (ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ οὐσία), e. g. perhaps the heart or the brain" (Oxford translation).¹¹ That is, this part is essential for the existence of the living animal; and without this part "in which the essence primarily resides" there can be no living animal. Therefore, the existence of this part is "simultaneous" with the existence of the living animal. Here we see that Aristotle can speak of the soul as the λόγος or οὐσία of the body and at the same time say that there is one part, the heart or the brain, which is the main one (κύριον) and in which the essence primarily resides.

If any further indication were needed of Aristotle's belief that the essence of an object, although it is the essence of the entire object, yet may be connected principally with one part of that object, one could point to *Metaphysics*, Book Δ, 1024a 24. Aris-

¹¹ Professor Albritton first called my attention to this passage.

totle is there discussing mutilation. When we mutilate something we mar it but do not destroy it. "If a cup is mutilated, it must still be a cup" (line 15). However, if we destroy the primary parts "which determine the essence" (τὰ κύρια τῆς οὐσίας) then the entire object is destroyed, and this is not simple mutilation but complete destruction. Again we see that the essence of an object can be centered in one part of the object. Indeed, so Aristotle implies, the essence of every complex object is centered in one or more parts of that object.

These passages show that Aristotle at one time (when he wrote Books Δ and Ζ of the *Metaphysics*) did not have to consider what we call the "heart view" and the "entelechy view" as incompatible or divergent views, and that he thought the essence or entelechy of a complex substance is centered in one or more specific parts. This establishes our third and final point.

As to the question why Aristotle does not say in the biological works and in the *Parva Naturalia* that the soul is the ἐντελέχεια of the body as a whole, there is an answer which Ross himself has suggested. In discussing the dating of the *Parva Naturalia*, he says that the absence of any reference to the soul as entelechy of the body "is not itself sufficient proof of a difference of date (from the *De Anima*); for the *Parva Naturalia*, being concerned not with the nature of the soul in general but with certain of its manifestations, is not bound to state a one-substance doctrine or a two-substance doctrine" (p. 16). Not being concerned with the soul in general, Aristotle in these works was not bound to define the soul as the entelechy of the body. Indeed, he himself says in the opening chapter of the *Parts* that as natural scientists "we need not concern ourselves with the Soul in its entirety; because it is not soul in its entirety that is an animal's 'nature' but some part or parts of it" (641b 10).¹²

This may account for Aristotle's silence about any entelechy in

¹² What Aristotle means to exclude here is the intellect which is the only faculty of the soul separable from the body. It is not part of the "nature" of the organism, in the sense that when the organism dies, the intellect is not destroyed with it. (Cf. *De Anima* 413b 10-32.) Such other functions of the soul as sensation, nutrition, appetite, and locomotion do compose the "nature" of the organism, and when the organism is destroyed they are destroyed with it. Cf. William Ogle, *Parts of Animals* (Translated with Introduction and Notes [London, Keegan Paul, 1882]), p. 146, n. 17.

the above-mentioned works. However, the question of why Aristotle attaches no importance to the heart in the *De Anima* is a little more difficult to answer. In that work, the heart is mentioned a number of times.¹³ On none of these occasions is any particular importance attached to it. This is indeed puzzling, for though the early chapters of the *De Anima* are concerned with giving a general definition of the soul as a whole, still a large part of the work is concerned with details of the processes involved in sense-perception.

Our answer is that in the *De Anima* Aristotle had not yet come to realize the importance of the heart for the vital functions. This will be supported by the argument of Part II of this paper, which traces a development in Aristotle's notion of the common sense. There we will see that the *De Anima* represents an early period in Aristotle's thought and may, therefore, have been written at a time when he had not yet seen the importance of the heart for any of the vital functions. We must, however, defer this discussion to Part II.

One other argument upon which Ross and Nuyens base their claim that the *Parva Naturalia*, or the more biological parts of it, were written before the *De Anima* is that the content and form of these works are similar to those of the biological writings. Ross (p. 10) lists twelve parallel passages from the *De Juventute* and the *Parts*, and three from the *De Somno* and the *Parts*. Really, one does not need the parallel passages. It cannot be denied that in content and manner of treatment, the *Parva Naturalia* are very similar to the biological works. The doctrine of the heart as the source of sensation and the center of the vital functions is common to them, along with the notion that the primary sense, to which the individual senses lead (*συνιέναι*), is located in the heart. However, the inference that Ross and Nuyens draw from this similarity is not undeniable. They both argue that the biological works were written and completed during Aristotle's travels between the time when he first left Athens around 347 and his return around 334. During this period, he visited Assos in the Troad, Mitylene, the island of Lesbos, and Pella in Macedonia. The reason that both Ross (p. 8) and Nuyens (pp. 147-9) give for placing the biological

¹³ Cf. 403a 31, 408b 8, and 432b 31.

works in this period is that suggested by D'Arcy Thompson in his Introduction to the Oxford translation of the *History of Animals*, which is that most of the geographical references in this work refer to places in Macedonia and on the coast of Asia Minor which Aristotle visited before he returned to Athens.¹⁴

This seems weak evidence for the view that the biological writings were completed before Aristotle returned to Athens. Numerous other considerations militating against that thesis are mentioned by Jaeger.¹⁵ One is that some animals are mentioned (for example, the elephant) which the Greeks could not have had the opportunity to study before Alexander's campaign into Asia. Another is that such a compendious and comprehensive collection of empirical facts could never have been carried out by a single individual but must have been the work of an entire school such as Aristotle established after his return to Athens. F. H. A. Marshall stresses this point in the foreword to the Loeb translation of the *Parts*: "It would seem certain that no man singlehanded could possibly have acquired such a vast body of knowledge, hardly any of which could have been derived from earlier observers."¹⁶

Jaeger has another more comprehensive argument for his late dating of the biological works. He claims that towards the end of his development, Aristotle became less and less metaphysical and more and more empirical. This is borne out by the late date (around 329/8) of the *Constitution of Athens*, which is only one of the 158 constitutions of cities that were to be examined. "With the colossal compilation," Jaeger tells us, "the result of careful and detailed work, based on local source material, Aristotle reached his point of greatest distance from Plato" (p. 328). These empirical writings ". . . represent a scientific type of exact research into the real world that was something absolutely new and pioneer in the Greek world of the time" (p. 328). This exact research was the final point to which Aristotle's philosophy led. The *History of Animals* and the other biological works also belong to this final empirical period, and Aristotle's eloquent appeal in the fifth chapter of the first

¹⁴ Cf. D'Arcy Thompson (trans.), *Metaphysics* (Oxford, 1927), p. vii.

¹⁵ Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle* (Oxford, 1934), pp. 324-32.

¹⁶ Cf. A. L. Peck (ed.), *Parts of Animals* (Loeb Classical Library, London, William Heinemann, 1937), p. 6.

book of the *Parts*, 644b 22, for the study of nature in all its prosaic detail is his final word of direction to his students. It is, in a sense, his intellectual will, the field of science that he bequeaths to his students. As Jaeger says, "The words read like a programme for research and instruction in the Peripatetic school" (p. 339).

The truth would appear to be somewhere between the positions of D'Arcy Thompson and Jaeger. The references to Macedonia and Asia Minor do suggest that Aristotle did some research there himself, but the other arguments of Jaeger, mentioned above, seem to preclude the possibility that the works received their final form before Aristotle returned to Athens. This is more or less the view expressed by Peck in the Introduction to the Loeb edition of the *Parts*: "It is generally held that the composition of the biological works is to be placed in the second period of Aristotle's residence at Athens when he was organizing the systematic observation and specialized research which produced the great collection of 158 constitutions of states as well as the *History of Animals*. Nonetheless, it is probable that some collection of the material was made by Aristotle himself between his two periods of residence at Athens" (p. 10). Aristotle must have carried out the process of collecting facts over a long period of time that may well have included the years of his travels in Asia Minor, but it seems fairly certain that the biological works could not have been *completed* until after Aristotle's return to Athens.

Granting this, we still have the problem of fixing a specific date for the *Parva Naturalia*. We have no way of knowing at what point in the long span of Aristotle's biological investigation the works composing the *Parva Naturalia* were actually written. This span, as we have seen, probably began with Aristotle's first departure from Athens around 347 and continued through the rest of his life. The *De Anima* was probably written during this period, and we have no way of deciding on this basis alone whether it was written before or after the *Parva Naturalia*.

To answer this question, we must turn to the second part of this paper. Now that we have seen the arguments of Ross and Nuyens for the priority of the *Parva Naturalia* to be unconvincing, the ground is cleared for the reception of positive evidence for the priority of the *De Anima*.

Part II

The Development of Aristotle's Conception of the Common Sense and the Priority of the "De Anima"

Our primary aim in this part is to show that there is a development in Aristotle's notion of the common sense as we find it discussed in the *De Anima* and the *Parva Naturalia* and that once this development is realized it must be admitted that the *De Anima* was written before the *Parva Naturalia*.

It may come as a surprise that in the *De Anima* the common sense is referred to only a few times and is discussed very briefly. It is not even mentioned until Book III, 425a 27, where Aristotle says that there is a common perception of the common sensibles not indirectly. It is not certain whether Aristotle means here by "common perception," perception by the common sense or perception in common by the individual senses. Assuming that the former is meant, the reference is not to the faculty of the common sense but merely to a kind of perceptual act called a "common perception." We next get a glimpse of a function of the common sense in the lines immediately following. The various senses perceive one another's sensibles indirectly, not as individual senses separated from one another ($\text{o}\iota\chi\ \eta\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha\iota$) but rather as combined into one single sense ($\alpha\lambda\lambda'\ \eta\ \mu\iota\alpha$). Sight does not see something as yellow and the sense of taste, something else as bitter, but we see and taste the same object, e.g. the gall. In this particular passage (425a 31), one is not sure that there is a separate faculty that accomplishes the unification of the individual senses. It appears that the individual senses just come together and make this union as the original thirteen colonies came together and made the United States. Later, in Book III, chapter 2, 426b 10-427a 16, Aristotle does mention the need of a separate faculty to compare the qualities of different senses. Sight can perceive colors and taste can perceive flavors, but to compare colors and flavors, some kind of unitary sense is required which can entertain both colors and flavors. Even though a separate faculty is mentioned here, it is referred to vaguely as a "unitary faculty"— $\tau\omicron\ \tau\epsilon$ —(425b 20) or as "some kind of unity"— $\epsilon\nu\ \tau\iota$ —(426b 18). Neither here nor elsewhere in the *De Anima* is this faculty given a specific name.

As we progress in the *De Anima*, we find in Book III, chapter 7 some more discussion of the "single faculty." It is said to be the last thing affected by the sensory motions and it is repeated that since this faculty can perceive heterogeneous qualities it must be "some kind of unity"—*τις ἓν*—(431a 17-25). This is the last reference to this faculty in the *De Anima*.

If we go back and review the common sense as we find it in the *De Anima*, we notice (1) that it is given no specific title but is referred to vaguely as a "single faculty," and (2) that only one function is attributed to this faculty which is that of comparing and unifying the various sensations of different senses. It is clear that this sense plays a minor role in the plan of the *De Anima*.

The senses which are emphasized are the individual senses. They carry out the primary perceptual acts and are even called critical faculties that judge differences among their own sensibles: for example, sight distinguishes between black and white (426b 10-12). In addition, self-awareness or self-consciousness is attributed to the individual senses. It is through sight that we are aware that we see or "see" that we see (425b 12-22). However, this kind of "seeing" is not the same kind whereby we see colors. Rather, it is through some judgmental power similar to the kind whereby sight can distinguish darkness from light even when the eyes are closed (425b 21-22). Thus, not only are the individual senses the primary perceptual faculties in the *De Anima*, but they are given a number of judgmental powers over and above the mere act of perceiving. As long as we stay on the plane of discriminating the sensibles of each genus without attempting to compare one with the other, we would find no need of going beyond the individual senses. They accomplish all the phenomena of elementary perception and self-awareness.

Another point to notice about the individual senses in the *De Anima* is that the external organs of the eye, the ear, the tongue, etc. are the only sense organs mentioned. Sight is the form or actuality of the eye as the soul is the form or actuality of the body (412b-413a 3). Eyesight is a function solely of the eye and hearing of the ear, and no other organ is mentioned as connected with sight and hearing. Therefore, when the proper stimulating motions reach the eye and no farther, we see, and

when they reach the ear and no farther, we hear. This implies that the individual senses are self-dependent faculties. They are independent of one another and of the functioning of any other organ of the body. The individual senses would also be independent of the "single sense" as we have it described in the *De Anima*. The only function given to the "single sense" is that of comparing and unifying the reports of the individual senses. The "single sense" is thus dependent upon the individual senses, since if no qualities were perceived by them there would be nothing for the "single sense" to compare or unify.

Having made clear the position of the *De Anima*, or as clear as the text will allow, let us now take up the *Parva Naturalia*, beginning with the *De Sensu*.

The first six chapters of the *De Sensu* make no mention of the common sense and the discussion of the individual senses proceeds much as in the *De Anima*. In the seventh chapter, we begin to find remarks that are not paralleled in the *De Anima*. The single sense is mentioned in connection with the familiar function of comparing different sensibles (449a 3-8), and then we are told that through this single faculty of the soul *all* things are perceived—*ἅπαντα αἰσθάνεται* (449a 9). This is repeated again in 449a 18 where it is said "that the faculty which perceives everything (*τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πάντων*) is one and the same numerically, but in aspect (*τῷ εἶναι*) it is many-sided, perceiving qualities that differ in genus as well as species." At this point, one cannot be certain just what this means, but it is something not found in the *De Anima*. There is one other remark in this chapter which is not only new but appears to deviate from the *De Anima*. In 447a 15-17, it is said that "Men do not see things impinging on their eyes, if they happen to be concentrating on some thought, or in some state of fear, or listening to a loud noise." This goes against the independence of the individual senses which we noticed in the *De Anima*. If sight is a function solely of the eye, why should sight be affected by what happens in the ear or in the brain or any other organ of the body? It is difficult to draw implications from these statements of the *De Sensu* on the basis of this work alone. Keeping them in mind, let us go further.

In the *De Memoria*, we have many new things said about the common sense. It is said to be the faculty of imagination (450a

10) and memory (450a 23). However, the most noteworthy step is that this faculty is now given not one but two official names. It is called the "common sense" (κοινή αἴσθησις) and the "primary sense" (πρῶτον αἰσθητικόν) (450a 10-15), and it is the latter term which predominates.¹⁷

In the *De Somno*, another function is given over to this faculty, e.g. sleeping and waking (454a 22-24). When the primary sense is active we are in a state of waking and when it stops functioning, we sleep. In chapter 2 of this work, we find a view that contradicts the *De Anima*. The individual senses are now said to have no judgmental function at all, and it is the common sense that is aware that we see or "see" that we see. (455a 20). Further, the individual senses are said to be dependent upon the primary sense but the primary sense in no way is dependent upon the individual senses (455a 4-455b 2 and 455b 10-13). Finally, we are told that there is really only one perception and one primary sense organ (455a 20). The last statement is important, but before we assess its value let us examine the last work of the *Parva Naturalia* in which we find sense-perception discussed.

Dreaming is added to the list of functions of the common sense in the *De Insomniis*. It is said that dreaming does not occur until images stored up by the eye during the day travel down from the eye to the common sense in the heart, and then we dream. If we have eaten, the heat from the food intercepts the images. Therefore, after eating we never dream (461a 1-12). These images went unnoticed during the day because of the

¹⁷ The term κοινή αἴσθησις occurs only two more times in Aristotle, once in the *De Juventute* and once in the *Parts of Animals* (686a 31). The terms πρῶτον αἰσθητήριον and ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ἀρχή are used to refer to the general sensitive faculty in the later books of the *Parva Naturalia* and in the biological works. It is puzzling why this faculty should have been given the name of "common sense" at all in post-Aristotelian literature instead of the more proper name of "primary" or "central sense." Probably, the reason was because of the desire to associate the common sensibles exclusively with the common sense. Really, this is not Aristotle's intention and those commentators who along with Beare say that the common sensibles received their name from the common sense have it backwards. (Cf. J. I. Beare, *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition* [Oxford, 1906], p. 285.) It is more likely that the rare term "common sense" was given to the primary sensitive faculty because it was associated with the common sensibles.

bustle of waking experience. When we sleep the bustle subsides and the images are released from the external organ and travel down to the heart (461a 1). From this we see that the mere fact that images are in the eye does not mean that we see the images. A final function is given to the common sense when it is said that "Generally, the controlling faculty ($\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta$) affirms the reports of the individual senses" (461b 5). Thus it is the common sense that attributes objectivity to our sensations.

If we now collect the important statements in the *Parva Naturalia* regarding the general nature of the common sense and the individual senses we see that:

1) The common sense is said to be the sense whereby all things are perceived (*De Sensu* 449a 9).

2) It is said to be one and the same numerically but different in its aspects ($\tau\tilde{\omega}$ $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\upsilon\alpha\iota$) whereby it perceives the various sensibles (*De Sensu* 449a 18).

3) There is one perception and one main sense organ (*De Somno* 455a 21).

4) The individual senses are dependent upon the common sense (*De Somno* 455a 38-455b 12).

5) The individual senses are not independent of one another (*De Sensu* 477b 15).

6) Images can be stored up in the eye without being seen (*De Insomniis* 461a 1).

From four, five, and six one must conclude that the external organs are not the seats of the individual senses. They do not carry out the psychic acts of seeing, hearing, etc. We can not say that when the appropriate physical motions reach the eye and the ear, we see and hear, for if this were the case the individual senses would be independent of the common sense and of one another, and there would be no unseen images stored in the eye. A clue to the real perceptual process is found in Aristotle's description of how dreams occur. Just as dream images must reach the common sense before we dream, so in waking sensation sensory images must reach the common sense before we perceive. This follows only if the internal process whereby perception occurs is the same as that of dreams. There

is no way of assuring this, but it does seem to be implied by four. Indeed, the best explanation of the last three points is that the individual senses are simply various functions of the common sense and this is also implied by one, two, and three. There is really only one perception and one main sense organ, the common sense. It is this faculty alone that carries out every psychic act of perception or it is by means of this that everything is perceived. The individual senses represent merely a diversity in the aspects ($\tau\tilde{\omega}$ εἶναι) of the common sense which numerically is a single, unitary sense.

This we submit is Aristotle's doctrine of the common sense and the individual senses as we stand at the end of the *De Insomniis*, but this is a radical change from the *De Anima*. In the *De Anima*, the individual senses are the primary sense faculties and are seated in the external organs. They are the forms or the actualities of their respective external organs (412 b). But in the *De Sensu*, the common sense is that by which everything is perceived (449a 9, 18), and in the *De Somno* there is said to be one perception and one main sense organ (455a 20), and finally in the *De Insomniis* it is implied that sight is not seated in the eye at all and that sight does not occur until the appropriate motions reach the common sense in the heart (461a 1-30). The individual senses of the *De Anima* are self-dependent faculties, while in the *De Somno* they are dependent upon the common sense (455a 34-455b 2, 455b 10-13). In the *De Memoria*, the common sense is the faculty of imagination (450a 10), while imagination is never said to be a function of the "single sense" in the *De Anima* although it is discussed in some detail (Book III, chapter 3). In the *De Anima*, self-consciousness is a function of the individual senses while in the *De Somno* it is attributed to the common sense (455a 17). Throughout the *Parva Naturalia*, the common sense is given a number of specific, technical names. In the *De Memoria* it is called the "common sense" and the "primary sense" (450a 10-15), in the *De Somno* it is referred to as the "master sense organ" ($\tau\tilde{\omega}$ κύριον—455a 33); and "the first principle of sensation" (η τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀρχή—456a), and finally in the *De Insomniis* it is called "the controlling and discriminating sense" ($\tau\tilde{\omega}$ κύριον καὶ τὸ ἐπικρίνον—461b 25). This wealth of titles stands in marked contrast to the vague reference of a "single sense" in the *De Anima*.

It is obvious, then, that the *De Anima* and *Parva Naturalia* represent divergent if not incompatible viewpoints and that if both writings are genuine, as they undoubtedly are, Aristotle's views on sense perception must have undergone a change.

The direction of the change, however, is not from the *Parva Naturalia* to the *De Anima*, as Ross supposes, but the reverse. The remarks of Aristotle on the common sense, as we progress through the *De Anima* and *Parva Naturalia*, represent the thinking of a man who is developing a new idea. At first in the *De Anima*, Aristotle has a vague notion of some kind of unifying sense. As yet the scope of its powers is undefined except that it unifies the reports of the various senses. It has no name and is seated in no specific organ of the body. In the *De Sensu* its scope is broadened and it is said that through it everything is perceived, but it is still called vaguely the "single faculty" as in the *De Anima*. In the *De Memoria*, the concept has become definite and clear enough to give it specific titles. It is named the "common sense" or the "primary sense" and is the faculty of memory and imagination. Later more functions are added—as sleep, waking, dreaming, and the attributing of objective reality to the sensations of the individual senses. In the *De Somno*, the organ of the common sense is located in the heart (456a 5). A host of other names are now given it: It is called the first principle (*ἀρχή*) of sensation,¹⁸ the master (*κύριον*) sense organ, and finally the controlling and discriminating (*τὸ κύριον καὶ τὸ ἐπικρίνον*) faculty. The individual senses are no longer separate senses having their own distinct organs. They all have one organ, the organ of the common sense, and are simply various functions or aspects of the common sense. To be sure, sight is dependent upon different physical conditions from those of hearing and the appropriate motions enter through different organs of the body. But always the actual seeing or hearing does not occur until the motions reach the organ of the common sense in the heart whereupon a single, unitary perceptual field is generated. Colors, sounds, and tastes are simply abstractions from this field as sight, hearing, and the other

¹⁸ This is the term used most predominantly in the biological works to refer to the common sense. Cf. *Parts* 667b 13-29, 672b 2, and *Generation* 781a 32.

individual senses are a few of the many activities of a single common sense.

This view is more subtle and philosophically more adequate. From the viewpoint of the *De Anima*, many things are inexplicable. If sight is seated in the eye and we see whenever the appropriate motions reach the eye and no farther, we would always perceive color first in isolation from all other sensations and only afterwards would we experience a single sense field in which we see, hear, feel, and smell. This is not true to our actual experience and points out the falseness of this view. Further, if the individual senses perceive qualities of the object while the single sense receives only the reports of these perceptions, it would follow that the single sense never perceives objects but only sensory images. This implies that in the final analysis we never perceive objects but only sensations reported by the individual senses. Indeed, C. Baeumker, who maintains that the individual senses are separate and distinct from the common sense and have different organs, is led to say that ". . . objects of this general sense are not external objects—for the external senses have these for objects—but the sensation. It (the common sense) perceives the external object only in so far as it perceives that representation (Bilder) of it."¹⁹ Aristotle, of course, never intended to say this and that his words in the *De Anima* seem to imply it is a sign that his views are at an incomplete stage at this point and should not be crystalized and taken as his final doctrine.

In general the scheme of the *De Anima* is vague. There is no hint as to just how physical objects are perceived,²⁰ and above all the relationship between the individual senses and the com-

¹⁹ C. Baeumker, *Des Aristoteles Lehre von den aussern und innern Sinnesvermögen* (Leipzig, 1877), p. 77.

²⁰ The physical object cannot be said to be an object of direct (*καθ' αὐτό*) perception for this is defined as the reception of the sensible forms *without* the matter. Neither can it be an object of indirect (*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*) perception which is merely an association of ideas, as perceiving sweet when we see sugar (425a 22-23) or perceiving the son of Diaretes when we see the white object (418a 2-25). How then do we come to be aware of the concrete, physical object? There is no answer to this question in the *De Anima*. See further my article, "Aristotle and the Physical Object," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XXI (1960), pp. 93-101.

mon sense is far from clear. Is the common sense a kind of double-exposure superimposed upon the individual senses, a kind of second-line perceptual act filling in the gaps between the first-line individual senses or does each individual sense have its own, private common-sense faculty? As Beare asks, "Do processes of sense complete themselves in the special senses? Or is each affection of the latter something merely inchoate and requiring to be completed in the central office of the *sensus communis*?"²¹ Beare seems inclined to think the latter; however, "When we inquire more closely into the nature of this relationship of outer and inner sense, to discover how they are united while yet divided, we can receive from Aristotle no assurance that he had ever cleared up this matter even for himself."²² Indeed, in the *De Anima*, we have no hint how Aristotle might have solved this problem as well as others involved in the relationship between the individual senses and the common sense.

On the other hand, the viewpoint of the *Parva Naturalia*, where the individual senses are not separate faculties but are various functions of the common sense, immediately clears up most of these problems. With respect to the perception of physical objects, an answer is provided in the *De Insomniis* when "... the controlling power (*ἀρχή*) affirms (*φησιν*) the reports given by each individual sense" (461b 4, 25). This "affirmation" of the sensory image is Aristotle's answer to the question of how we perceive physical objects, which is never suggested in the *De Anima*. The problem concerning the relationship between the individual and common sense is solved in a manner that involves no odd perceptual experiences, and finally, we no longer find it necessary to say that the common sense perceives the sensations of the individual senses and not the objects themselves.

If the development we have traced is correct, we can now explain why an important role is not given to the heart in the *De Anima*. In this work, Aristotle had not yet come to realize its importance. It seems that the heart as the center of the vital functions was not realized until after the concept of the common sense had been developed. Both of these concepts are absent from the first and second Books of *De Anima*. In Book III we have the embryo of the common sense and this concept reaches its

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 325.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 327.

full development in *De Somno*, chapter 2. It is in this very chapter that we have the heart described for the first time as the seat (*ἀρχή*) of the vital functions. Why Aristotle came to stress the importance of the heart only after he had developed his notion of the common sense is difficult to determine. It may have been that while he focused on the individual senses, his attention was directed towards the external organs, but when he realized the importance of the common sense he looked for some inner organ as its seat and came to realize the importance of the heart for all the vital functions.

At this point, it might be said that Aristotle dropped the heart view in the *De Anima*, having held it earlier in the *Parva Naturalia* and biological works, and that this is a sign that the *Parva Naturalia* was written before the *De Anima*. This in essence is the claim of Ross, but there is one consideration which makes such a claim untenable from the very beginning. Any view which holds that the *Parva Naturalia* and the biological works were written before the *De Anima* commits itself to the conclusion that Aristotle's theory of sense-perception became in his "later" writing (i.e. the *De Anima*) less explicit, less complex, and less philosophically adequate than it had been in "earlier" writings (i.e., the *Parva Naturalia*). From having a fairly complex and explicit view about the nature and functions of the primary sense, which is designated by a number of specific names, Aristotle comes to speak about a "single faculty" that has merely the power of comparing various sensibles and is given no other function. From attributing imagination to the primary sense in the *De Memoria*, he comes "later" in the *De Anima* to speak of it as a separate function in itself connected with no specific faculty. From attributing self-consciousness to the primary sense in the *De Somno* (chapter 2) he comes in the *De Anima* to attribute it to the individual senses (Book III, chapter 2). In general, we would have a "development" in reverse of the one which we traced. The notion of a primary sense would gradually lose its explicitness and finally disappear into the "single faculty" of the *De Anima*, while at the same time the functions and independence of the individual senses would increase until they reached the view of *De Anima*, Book III, chapter 2, where the individual senses are also critical faculties judging and comparing their own sensibles and being

self-conscious of their own acts. From conceiving of the individual senses as functions of the common sense, Aristotle would come to believe that they are separate, independent senses located in different external organs. All the philosophical problems involved in this position would remain insoluble and be a mark against Aristotle as a philosopher.

This result is indeed intolerable. To believe that Aristotle's theory went from good to bad as he proceeded in expounding it is to attribute to him an incompetence of which not even his worst critics accuse him. Whatever may be said of Aristotle, to say that he (or any author for that matter) started out with a relatively clear and adequate account of a subject and then later settled for a rather vague and certainly inadequate view, is to say either that his mental faculties degenerated in the process, or else that the view that he started with was not one that he thought out for himself but one that was adopted from someone else. It is, I believe, impossible to say either of these of Aristotle and his theory of sense-perception. This consideration, I suggest, is sufficient to decide with as much finality as may be hoped for on such a subject that the *Parva Naturalia* and with it the completion of the biological works were written after the *De Anima*. Indeed, we are tempted to say that they had to be written after the *De Anima* if any sense is to be made out of Aristotle's theory of sense-perception.

It should be noticed at this point that the argument from the development of the common sense *per se* proves only that the third Book of the *De Anima* must have been written before the *Parva Naturalia*. It is not directly relevant to Books I and II because in these Books there is no notion of a common sense or anything resembling it and therefore no development can be traced. It might be said, then, that we have shown the priority of Book III but not of Books I and II. This coincides with Ross' view that the third Book of *De Anima* actually pre-dates the first two. If one inserted the *Parva Naturalia* and the biological writings between Book III and Books I and II, one could say, as Ross does, that the second Book of *De Anima* is ". . . in all probability the latest of Aristotle's writings on psychology."²³

²³ See Ross' Introduction to his edition of the *Parva Naturalia*, p. 17.

In general, the primary evidence appealed to by those who maintain an early date for the third Book is the *nous* doctrine of chapter 5. There the intellect is said to be constantly thinking, separable from the body, immortal and eternal. This doctrine is Platonic and seems to express the view of *Metaphysics*, Book A which is also placed early. Besides this, there is no solid reason for placing Book III early, and even this is scanty evidence for pre-dating the *entire* third Book. For there are reasons for thinking that chapter 5 does not belong in the *De Anima*, and might have been a later insertion. Chapter 5 is uncommonly short, only fifteen lines, and if extracted, no break in continuity is noticed between chapters 4 and 6. Further, the distinction between an active intellect and a passive intellect is never mentioned again in the *De Anima* (nor in any other work of Aristotle) though it would seem to be important. All this might lead one to suspect this chapter.

Even if we accept chapter 5 as a genuine chapter in the *De Anima*, there are other reasons for thinking that the third Book was written or completed after the first two Books. Consider the opening words of Book III. Aristotle begins with a proof that there is no sixth sense for perceiving the common sensibles over and above the five specific senses. This is a natural development after having discussed the five specific senses and their sensibles in the last five chapters of the second Book. Further, in the second and third chapters of the third Book, imagination and conception are discussed and these discussions depend upon the description of direct sensation which we find in the second Book. Without sensation being described as always true and defined as the reception of the sensible form without the matter (Book II, chapter 12), imagination could not have been contrasted with sensation as being often false and defined as a sensation generated by actual sensation (429a 1). In 429a 13-15 and again in 430b, Aristotle compares the appreciation of quiddities with direct perception of specific sensibles by the individual senses. Such a comparison could never have been made prior to the discussion of sensation in Book II. Finally, in Book III, chapter 8, Aristotle presents his famous doctrine of *nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*, and that imagination and thought are impossible without sensation. To advance such a doctrine without first having discussed sensation itself is

poor methodology and not Aristotle's manner of philosophizing. However, there is no discussion of sensation *per se* in Book III. Unless one grants that Book II, with its description of the operation and objects of the five senses, precedes Book III, one must conclude that Aristotle compares imagination and conception with perception, and to a large degree bases them on sense-perception, without having discussed perception or having defined what it is.

In addition to these arguments for the lateness of the third Book, there are difficulties with claiming that the second Book is Aristotle's latest writings on psychology as Ross says. In particular, there is a puzzle about chapter 6 if Book II is dated late. This chapter speaks in a language that introduces the objects of sensation for the first time. Consider the following passages:

1) "By sensible object may be meant any one of three things, two of which we say are perceived directly, while the third is perceived *per accidens* or indirectly" (418a 8-9).

2) "By the common sensibles are meant motion, rest, etc." (418a 15).

3) "By a special object of a particular sense, I mean that which cannot be perceived by any other sense and about which error is impossible" (418a 11-12).

4) "What is meant by an indirect object of sense may be illustrated, etc." (418a 20).

If Aristotle had really written the third Book of *De Anima* and *Parva Naturalia* before he wrote this chapter, it is puzzling why he should suddenly explain what he means by specific sensibles, common sensibles, and indirect sensibles after having discussed them at length in the "previous" works. In general, the language of this chapter is that of one introducing new concepts for the first time.

These arguments point to the order of the *De Anima* as we have it handed down to us. As to the Platonic element in chapter 5 of Book III, I think that one must accept this element in Aristotle's final philosophy. My main reason for thinking this is that the separableness and eternality of the intellect are also mentioned in the first and second Books of the *De Anima* which are admittedly late. In the first Book (408b 18), Aristotle says

that "Intellect would seem to be developed in us as a self-existing substance and to be imperishable." In the second Book (413b 23-27), intellect is said ". . . to appear to be a distinct species of soul, and it alone is capable of separation from the body, as that which is eternal from that which is perishable." These passages seem just as Platonic as Book III, chapter 5. The first two Books are not dated early because of this and I suggest that the third Book should not be pre-dated because of chapter 5. It seems that the doctrine of a separable and eternal intellect must be accepted as a permanent aspect of Aristotle's philosophy. The alternative is to date the entire *De Anima* in Aristotle's early Platonic period, but I doubt if many scholars are prepared to do this.

These remarks show that there are serious difficulties in pre-dating the third Book of *De Anima* and claiming that the second Book is Aristotle's final word on sense-perception. Therefore, I do not think that this claim presents a problem for us. It is true that our primary argument is from the development of the common sense and in the first two Books this development cannot be traced. However, lack of any mention of a common sense in these two Books itself indicates their priority. For this silence on the matter can be more easily explained by saying that the first two Books are earlier than the third Book than by saying that they are later. On the former view, Aristotle had not yet begun to develop his concept of the common sense, while on the latter view, absence of all mention of a common sense is unaccountable.²⁴

Finally, there are two points that indicate that Book II of *De Anima* pre-dates the *Parva Naturalia*. In the eleventh chapter of Book II, Aristotle discusses the sense of touch and its organ. Touch is not like the other senses in that it perceives a number of contraries, not just one pair as do the others, and in 422b 34 Aristotle says that he is not sure where to locate the organ of touch. Later in the chapter he says that it seems

²⁴ There was ample opportunity to mention the common sense in the second Book, especially in chapter 6 where the three kinds of sensibles are discussed. Of these, the common sensibles and incidental sensibles are said by Ross to be objects of the common or central sense. (See his *Aristotle*, pp. 140-1.) Yet there is no hint in this chapter of a sense faculty other than the five individual senses. This is surprising if Book II is really Aristotle's latest writing on sense-perception.

to be some part within the body and not simply the flesh, though he never says exactly what part within the body is the organ of touch. However, in the *Parva Naturalia* and the biological writings, the sense organ of touch is centered in or near the region of the heart without any hesitation, as if this were a doctrine of long standing. (See 439a 3 and 469b 14.) If one were to say, as Ross does, that the second Book of *De Anima* is later than the *Parva Naturalia*, it would follow that Aristotle at first was fairly definite that the sense of touch was located in the heart and then in his latest statement of his views, he became unsure where to locate the sense of touch.

The second point is in regard to the references in the *De Sensu* and in the other works of the *Parva Naturalia* to the *De Anima*. Ross rightly questions the dependence on cross references in Aristotle as a correct guide in dating the works. There are many reasons for this which we need not go into here.²⁵ However, to dismiss *all* such references without distinction as Ross does (p. 17) would seem a bit too drastic. Not all of them need be assumed to be later additions. If we could find one which, because of the context, could be said to have been written by the original author, our point would be established. Consider the reference in *De Sensu* 440b 27. From the context in which it occurs, it is very probable that it was written by the original author, whether Aristotle himself or some student. Aristotle had previously said at the beginning of chapter 3 (439a 10) that the aim of this treatise is to give an account or description of the essence of each of the sensibles, i. e. color, sound, odor, flavor, and the tactual qualities. Chapter 3 is then devoted to color. After treating of color, Aristotle says at the beginning of chapter 4 that since the nature of sound has been discussed in the *De Anima* he will skip over sound and proceed to examine odors and flavors which he does in chapters 4 and 5 respectively. Now it is hard to believe that this reference to the *De Anima* could have been written by anyone except the one who originally planned and wrote this treatise. For otherwise, why would he have omitted sound from his discussion since he says at the beginning of chapter 3 that he will discuss it? It is hard to believe that he would have omitted sound without giving some explanation, or that some scribe saw that sound was left out of

²⁵ Cf. R. Shute, *History of Aristotelian Writings*, chap. 5.

the discussion as originally planned and added his own explanation as to why it was left out. It seems probable that granting cross references in Aristotle to be suspect in general, this particular one seems genuine. If it is, then this is good evidence that the *De Sensu* was written after the second Book of the *De Anima*, where the five sensibles are discussed.

We might find other indications to help establish our main contention that the *De Anima* as a whole was written or completed before the *Parva Naturalia*, but I think we have presented a strong argument. The strength of our position is that one who would reverse the order we have established must be prepared to admit a regression in Aristotle's thinking concerning sense-perception. No one, we believe, is willing to make such an admission and therefore will be unwilling to place the *Parva Naturalia*, and along with it the final completion of the biological works, before the *De Anima*.

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WHY IS ARTEMIS ANGRY?

There is no doubt that Eduard Fraenkel's notes to the parodos of the *Agamemnon* are, like everything in his edition of the play,¹ infinite riches in a little room. Yet one may regret his conclusion that Artemis is angry for a reason never broached in the trilogy and made explicit only in Proclus' epitome of the *Cypria*.² There would be no objection to this decision if the *Oresteia* were no more concerned than the *Iliad* with discerning and justifying the ways of the gods to men. But Aeschylus created a profound study of retribution and salvation, and it would be astonishing if the vexation that led Artemis to require the sacrifice of Iphigenia were the only crucial problem in any of the three plays that he solved by a cryptic allusion, "confident that the power of his song would keep the hearers firmly in its grip and leave no room for idle speculation or curiosity about details."³ The goddess surely does not act out of pique; she has a much more compelling motive powerfully suggested in the parodos itself and confirmed later in the play.

Folk etymology gives many poetic insights into truth. The Norman buffetiers who tasted the king's meat have become the Saxon Beef-Eaters of the Tower of London. An ingenious minstrel, who possessed such a mastery over the Homeric language that he could abruptly repudiate the traditional formulas to gain a brilliantly sophisticated effect, caused Athene to pun upon the name of her favorite: $\tau\acute{\iota} \nu\acute{o} \omicron\iota \tau\acute{o}\sigma\sigma\omicron\nu \acute{\omega}\delta\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\alpha\omicron$, *Zeū*; (*Od.*, I, 62). Hesiod's efforts to understand the name of Aphrodite (*Theog.*, 195-8) have resulted in Botticelli's *The Birth of Venus*. Cronus was thought by Aristotle (*Mun.*, 401a15) equivalent to Chronus and has become, $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\kappa\lambda\omicron\mu\acute{\eta}\tau\eta\varsigma$ reaper that he is, our Father Time.⁴ Such word-play is in a very real sense crucial for a descriptive account of Greek religion; the mythologist's strictures against the association of homophones are valid only

¹ Eduard Fraenkel, *Agamemnon* (Oxford, 1950). This text will be quoted throughout the essay.

² Fraenkel, II, pp. 97-8.

³ Fraenkel, II, p. 99.

⁴ Erwin Panofsky, *Studies in Iconology* (New York, 1939), pp. 71-5.

for tracing the most ultimate origins. To Aeschylus names were profoundly significant; there is no levity behind the paronymasia that discovers in Helen a Hell and in Apollo an Apollyon. It is indeed all but demonstrable that the creator of the parodos of the *Agamemnon* held with *LSJ* that Artemis is less ἀρτεμής than an ἀρταμος. That is certainly what she is in requiring the sacrifice of Iphigenia: a Butcher. H. D. F. Kitto⁵ and others have discussed her role with regard to the seemingly hereditary curse eventually laid aside by gods who have evolved during the trilogy. But Artemis represents in addition a savage ritual deliberately executed and at length proscribed.

Upon Aristotle's eduction of Greek tragedy from the dithyramb, Jane Harrison constructs the theory that the *renouveau* of the year was celebrated canonically by mimesis: the Homeric poems with their accretions provided the dramatic content but the traditional rites of spring provided the form.⁶ In an excursus upon this theory Gilbert Murray observes that tragedy originated from a *sacer ludus* of the death and resurrection of Dionysus.⁷ The elements of the postulated *ludus* are a contest, a *pathos* in the form of a sacrificial death, a messenger to announce the death, a lament, a discovery of the slain daimon, and an epiphany. One is apt to complain of the poor correspondence between the *ludus* and the actual dramas,⁸ since the *Alcestis* is the only enactment of a heroic career in which the victim of the *pathos* is restored in the epiphany. Yet the parts of the *ludus* may be regarded not as a rigid outline for tragedy but as a primitive basis; Dionysus may stand as the prototype of Agamemnon and Oedipus as well as of Alcestis. The Greek tradition of tragedy in fact shows the same development as the English tradition. The *quem quaeritis* trope affixed to the Easter mass was the beginning of medieval English drama, and in assuming the strange forms of Everyman and Faustus and Hamlet, Christ endured greater change than did Dionysus.⁹

The really terrifying aspect of the family history in the

⁵ H. D. F. Kitto, *Form and Meaning in Drama* (London, 1956), pp. 70-86.

⁶ Jane Ellen Harrison, *Themis* (Cambridge, 1912), pp. 339-40.

⁷ Harrison, pp. 341-3.

⁸ See A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy* (Oxford, 1927), p. 187.

⁹ George Thomson, *Aeschylus and Athens* (London, 1941), p. 188.

Oresteia is that the bloodshed propagates a nearly exact image of itself in each generation. By myth and by poetic invention, the members of the family become largely interchangeable with each other. The sisters Clytemnestra and Helen are unfaithful to the brothers Agamemnon and Menelaus. The distinction between Clytemnestra and Aegisthus is blurred by the references to the woman as a man and to the man as a woman. Orestes and Electra are identical not only in purpose but in color of hair and size of foot. And all the association or confusion of one person with another etches in the remembrance of the deliberate slaughter ceaselessly performed anew with different participants. In *King Lear* the grief and torment that come upon the aged monarch because of his inability to discern true filial affection come upon Gloucester also for the same reason, so that the sub-plot mirrors the main plot. In the *Oresteia* the intensely direct progression of the story repeats and reflects itself. The daimon torn to pieces and resuscitated like Dionysus is not one person but the entire family.

In a simile that is Homeric in its vividness and may be adapted from *Od.*, XVI, 216, the chorus at the commencement of the parodos envisages Agamemnon and Menelaus crying War! at the beginning of the expedition as vultures robbed of their nestlings. Here the Atridae are clearly punitive because of the theft of Helen. Shortly afterwards the seer interprets the portent of the eagles seizing the pregnant hare as the two kings capturing the city of Priam. The explanation is cogent, for only the Atridae have the hegemony to warrant representation by the bird of kings and of Zeus himself, and only imperiled Troy, with its people inside the walls, is like a beast to be slain with young in its cincture. The herds kept without the walls do not correspond to any part of the omen, and would seem a detail unprovided for if the seer did not explain that they would be ravaged by fate. The prodigy shows the Atridae as raptorial and, like the figure of the vultures, has a Homeric clarity and vigor.

But it has been commonly observed that the images of the vultures and the eagles are too closely consecutive to stand distinct from each other; the simile of the punitive birds of prey is too striking not to be recalled by the omen of the raptorial birds of prey. The generic differences between the vulture and

the eagle are unimportant here; the eagle might well have been the bird of vengeance, the vulture might have been the bird of predacity.¹⁰ The two images combine to form a symbol that is complex and evocative and without analogue in the Homeric poems. Taken together the vultures and the eagles represent predacity resulting from vengefulness, the qualities compellingly implied as the patrimony of Orestes when he calls himself the orphan of the eagle (*Cho.*, 257).¹¹ The figure is recurrent rather than incidental, and thematic rather than personal. Like the lion¹² and the serpent,¹³ the eagle acquires a meaning that cannot be fully apprehended from a single passage. The repeated beast symbols of the *Oresteia* are the Aeschylean counterpart of the Sophoclean dramatic irony.

(Yet the eagles cannot be identified with the *στρουθῶν* of *Ag.*, 145, and Porson bracketed the word as an unnecessary addition based upon the portent in *Il.*, II, 311. The reference is unmistakable, but the Homeric sparrow and her brood represent the years Troy survives the siege, and if the eagle is reduced to this sparrow it loses all connection with the Atridae. The allusion to an event far outside the trilogy may therefore be marked the work of an interpolator whose memory was better than his attention to the passage at hand.)

The figure of the hare is not recurrent; it is a single representation of the Trojan innocents made to suffer for the abduction of Helen. The problem is why Artemis should require atonement. She cannot seek retribution for the predation against Troy paid in advance, Fraenkel argues, unless the formula *δράσαντι παθεῖν* is changed to *δράσοντι παθεῖν*.¹⁴ But if she bears a grudge against the Atridae for a reason unconnected with the sack of the city, the omen is dramatically misleading. The devouring of the hare is most understandably seen as the

¹⁰ The vulture and the eagle appear to have been frequently confused with each other. See D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, *A Glossary of Greek Birds* (Oxford, 1895), pp. 3 and 16.

¹¹ John H. Finley, Jr., *Pindar and Aeschylus* (Harvard, 1955), p. 9.

¹² Bernard M. W. Knox, "The Lion in the House," *C.P.*, XLVII (1952), pp. 17-25.

¹³ See my paper "The Serpent at the Breast," *T.A.P.A.*, LXXXIX (1958), pp. 271-5.

¹⁴ Fraenkel, II, p. 97.

sacrifice of Iphigenia¹⁵ or the children of Thyestes told in other terms. The question of justice is not immediately relevant, since the eagles and the hare create a timeless emblem of the recurring crime for which Artemis has a long-enduring wrath. The seer interprets only the particular and momentary significance; the general and perpetual significance is that the family is endlessly accursed with the ritual of teknophagy.

Dionysus was sometimes boiled and sometimes eaten raw, and the orgy in which he was consumed is clearly re-enacted in the feast of Thyestes, in the feast of the eagles and, since Troy is symbolized as a hare with unborn young, in Agamemnon's assault upon the city with the blood-thirst of a lion (*Ag.*, 828). Because of the teknophagy, Artemis is impelled by remorseless vindictiveness to require that Iphigenia be raised as a kid to the altar. The slight predilection towards Troy that the goddess has for no significant reason in the *Iliad* cannot be important in the *Oresteia*; her role in the Homeric poems as the archeress who sends death to women cannot be important; not even her use of the hare as a personal representative or embodiment (*Paus.*, III, 22, 12)¹⁶ is important. What shapes her part in the vast scheme of destruction wreaked upon the Argive house is her love for every kind of helpless offspring. The vocabulary in which the symbolism is couched conveys the lack of distinction between human and bestial lives: the chorus sees the Atridae as vultures bereft not of their chicks but of their *παῖδων* (*Ag.*, 50), and sees Helen not as a cub but as an *ἴνυ* (*Ag.*, 718) of a lion.¹⁷

The seer prays Artemis to fulfill the omen auspicious for the success of the expedition, even though she bears tender regard for the young lions and the suckling young of every kind. And with unwilling foresight he asks Apollo to divert her from urging

θυσίαν ἐρέ-
 ραν ἄνομόν τιν' ἄδαιτον,
 νεικέων τέκτονα σύμφυτον οὐ δεισ-
 ῆνορα·

¹⁵ See Benjamin Daube, *Zu den Rechtsproblemen in Aischylos' Agamemnon* (Zürich and Leipzig, 1938), pp. 147-8. See also Finley, p. 252.

¹⁶ Lewis Richard Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford, 1896-1909), II, p. 432.

¹⁷ See Fraenkel, II, p. 338.

Here the primary reference of *ἐτέραν* is, as Fraenkel argues, to the eagles' feast of the hare.¹⁸ But the *οὐ δεισήνορα* conjures up the thought of the adultery of Clytemnestra and of Helen and of Aerope, and the *ἄδαιτον, νεκρέων τέκτονα σύμφυτον* compels a dark remembrance of the feast of Thyestes and even of the maiming of Pelops.¹⁹ The seer's final words are a terse statement of the ultimate curse that brings ruin to each member of the family:

*μῖμναι γὰρ φοβερὰ παλίνροτος
οἰκονόμος δολία, μνάμων Μῆνις τεκνόποινος.*

It is sensible to understand Clytemnestra as the treacherous Housekeeper in these lines,²⁰ but the *παλίνροτος οἰκονόμος* connotes also that the wrath which exacts vengeance for a child is a clan destiny, which never subsides.

Neither human nor bestial young may be slaughtered wantonly without incurring the displeasure of Artemis. The eagles' predation, the sack of Troy, the banquet prepared by Atreus, the grisly probing of the gods' powers of discernment by Tantalus—all are impious distortions of the communal meal between the goddess and her worshipers. As the condition for absolution she requires the dedication of a sacrament in a re-enactment of the cause for guilt. The beast symbolism of the trilogy here gains one of its crucial effects: Iphigenia is to Artemis another offspring of the hare, another Trojan innocent slain in the destruction of the city. Why Cassandra should later see Orestes as her avenger would in fact be unclear if the expedition to requite the abduction of Helen had not already been incorporated into the cause for the ruin of the family. Agamemnon is delineated as a grand prince of princes to prepare for the presumption towards divinity manifested in his treading the purple carpet. Yet this unwilling action is more a sign of his coming destruction than its cause. What more than anything else is the immediate cause is his sacrifice of Iphigenia.

Sent by Zeus as an Erinyes against Troy, Agamemnon has no attractive choice. He faces the conflict between two punitive forces, Artemis and the Erinyes, and is scourged by the one for

¹⁸ Fraenkel, II, p. 91.

¹⁹ See H. L. Ahrens, "Studien zum Agamemnon des Aeschylus," *Philologus*, Supplementband I (1859), p. 290.

²⁰ Daube, p. 167.

satisfying the other. After the sacrifice, the Erinyes slay him by the hand of Clytemnestra and then seek fresh slaying of kin, and by their ceaseless quaffing of blood show forth further the daimonophagy that is the *pathos* of the *sacer ludus*. The blood that is shed cannot be soaked up by the earth but lies above ground (*Cho.*, 66) and draws to itself more blood (*Cho.*, 404). The knife destroys Clytemnestra and Aegisthus after it has mutilated the body of Agamemnon. Artemis and the Erinyes are thus clearly not of different natures; they are powers of devastation given impetus by different offenses. Why they are permitted because of opposition to each other to compel a man to plant the seeds of his own destruction—this is a charge that must be laid before Zeus, before the world in which the fiend of a house can work out a curse through several generations.

It is difficult to attach blame to Agamemnon. He sacrifices his daughter with free will, it is true, but an inimical cosmos has confronted him with a dilemma. The forces of nature or destiny run to cross-purposes; Artemis hates the winged hounds of her father. The same inimical cosmos confronts Orestes with a further dilemma, though unlike Agamemnon he has a god at his side, and though his task is to slay the guilty rather than the innocent. Kitto's penetrating discussion of the divinely ordained yet personally chosen commission of wrong²¹ amounts to the conclusion that the decrees of the gods are more mysterious than concordant with human notions of sin. The metaphysic is Homeric as it seems that (*Il.*, XXIV, 525-6)

ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι,
ζῶειν ἀχνημένους· αὐτοὶ δέ τ' ἀκηδέες εἰσί.

But Aeschylus at length rejects the theological system in which the world is ruled by divine caprice, and creates criteria for justice acceptable to man. The family then is saved by the increasing admissibility of the motives behind its crime. Tantalus makes trial of the gods, and Atreus gains solemn revenge; but Agamemnon seeks to save his expedition, and Orestes acts only as the immediate agent of Apollo.

What has this to do with Dionysus? First of all, it is a ritualistic laceration ending in an epiphany. The members of the family are the sacramental victims, one after another, and

²¹ Kitto, pp. 71-84.

become restored finally in Orestes, upon whom the grievous heredity is no longer operative. But the soil was fertile for fostering a later religion that perceived the Son in the Father and the Father in the Son,²² and Dionysus is honored as the dramatic ceremony not only enacts the human *pathos* but celebrates the career of Zeus. For Dionysus was equated with Δίος Νῦσος, the Thracian equivalent of Zeus Kouros,²³ and Zeus became annually reborn as Dionysus in cult-worship throughout a large area of Greece.²⁴ It is this Νῦσος or Kouros that is acclaimed by the parodos of the *Agamemnon* for having (just recently, it would appear) attained the Olympian rule by the violent overthrow of his predecessor:

οὐδ' ὅστις πάροιθεν ἦν μέγας
παμμάχῳ θράσει βρύων,
οὐδὲ λέξεται πρὶν ὧν.
ὅς δ' ἔπειτ' ἔφνυ, τρια-
κτῆρος οἴχεται τυχών.
Ζῆνα δέ τις προφρόνως ἐπινίκια κλάζων
τεύξεται φρενῶν τὸ πᾶν.

Yet in spite of this enthusiastic approbation, Zeus is not at rest in the *Oresteia* until the close. He is stigmatized by the brutality involved in his ascendancy, and the Erinyes' declamations against parricide apply to him as to Orestes. Here then the trilogy does have a sub-plot: Orestes is saved from the curse of bloodshed, and Zeus is established as secure from the usurpation of his throne by a stronger successor. The debate for the possession of Orestes is a contest testing whether Zeus will survive; and the victory of Apollo, the placation of the ancient elements of opposition, and the harmonious establishment of enduring blessings, are in the fullest sense the salvation of Zeus. While the family has evolved, Zeus has matured and become transformed into a god that can no longer be represented by eagles punitive and predacious. Further mutilation of the daimon cannot now be effected. Atreus and Agamemnon are resurrected in Orestes, who will be immune to inherited obligation to incur guilt; Uranus and Cronus are resurrected in Zeus, who will be a peaceful ruler supreme for all time, not (as he is

²² Arthur Bernard Cook, *Zeus* (Cambridge, 1914-25), II, p. 288.

²³ Cook, II, p. 277. See also Harrison, p. 48.

²⁴ Cook, I, p. 665.

in the *Agamemnon* and the *Prometheus Bound*) a tyrant new in power and seemingly liable himself to violent overthrow.

The exculpation of Orestes appears the first occasion on which the Erinyes are denied their ancient honors, and they chant imprecations against the younger gods for the sacrilege. But the trilogy as a whole obviously does not oppose the primordial powers to the Olympians. What the Erinyes protest against is a code of justice now adopted for the first time. At this point they represent a brutal law of retribution for crime committed even unwillingly; they are of like nature with the Zeus Kourois, the Apollo, the Artemis, of the *Agamemnon*. When they acquiesce in new honors and new functions, they are of like nature with the Zeus Pater, the Apollo, the Athene, of the close of the *Eumenides*. The law of the *Δίος Νῦσος* is then replaced by the law of the *Δίος Πάπας* proclaimed oracularly by a majestic god of white and gold who has given the lie to his name. The frenzied rites of Dionysus are absorbed into an Apollonian serenity dramatically, as in point of fact they were historically at Delphi.

M. P. Nilsson views Greek religion as the confluence of an early, orgiastic or Dionysian impetus and a later, legalistic or Apollonian impetus.²⁵ This legalism, he sees further, has reference to two views of justice, the old law under which a primal guilt is transmitted through several generations, and the modern law under which only the actual criminal is made to suffer.²⁶ The *Oresteia* arranges matters differently. All that bears implicit traces of the ritual of Dionysus is connected with the old law of inherited sin, and all that the bar-rister Apollo explicitly brings about is connected with the new law. The Areopagus is dramatically founded upon the principle of retribution against the criminal alone. Even so, Orestes is acquitted only by a special dispensation in the form of a casuistry approved by heaven. Mitigation and extenuation become a part of the Apollonian process. Faced with this hostility against any form of retribution, the Erinyes become Eumenides that will affect the world with blessings rather than with punishment.

The enduring quality of the alteration is solemnized by the

²⁵ Martin Persson Nilsson, *Greek Piety* (translated by Herbert Jennings Rose, Oxford, 1948), p. 22.

²⁶ Nilsson, p. 38.

localization at Athens. The city's patroness and citizenry pronounce the decision that ushers in the new epoch. The Eumenides, now regarded as the Semnai, are invested in the red robes of the resident aliens,²⁷ and welcomed with a chant of sanctification by an escort that leads them with torch-light to their domicile beneath the city. The timeless rebirth of Dionysus in the spring of the year is combined with the chronicle of the permanent residence of the aged goddesses who came as vindictive visitants, and an era of well-being is hailed liturgically as the audience takes part in the recessional. The aftermath of the dramatic action is a reconciliation of men with the gods. As in *Samson Agonistes* it becomes perceptible that (*S. A.* 1745-59)

All is best, though we oft doubt,
What th' unsearchable dispose
Of highest wisdom brings about,
And ever best found in the close. . . .
His servants he with new acquist
Of true experience from this great event
With peace and consolation hath dismiss'd,
And calm of mind, all passion spent.

The *πάθει μάθος* of the audience, the new perspective that is gained with the catharsis, is this assurance in the favor of Zeus and all the other powers of heaven and earth. The *Oresteia* is a religious mystery play, not only in its affinities to the *sacer ludus* of Dionysus, but in its association of the Dionysian ecstasies with the cosmic forces of revenge finally transformed by the most benign Apollonianism into spirits of grace.

Artemis was angry at the eagles' feast because she was a Butcher who held sacred to herself the young of every kind. The visitations of her wrath produced an endless continuance of the teknophagy. For like the Erinyes she was a deity whose punitive actions became predacious and necessitated further punishment. The world consumed itself and manifested symbolically the *pathos* seemingly inevitable for the Zeus Kouros, the *Δίος Νῦσος*. But after the triumph of Apollonian exoneration in the world of a matured Zeus who by leniency has caused the

²⁷ George Thomson, *The Oresteia of Aeschylus* (Cambridge, 1938), II, pp. 317-19. The association of the Erinyes with the resident aliens may be prepared for by the description of the robbed vultures as *μετοίκων* in *Ag.*, 57, for in the seizing of the hare the eagles appear the Erinyes of *Ag.*, 59.

REVIEWS.

AGOSTINO MASARACCHIA. Solone. Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1958.
Pp. 394.

In a penetrating study by Agostino Masaracchia the fourth century myth of Solon the great statesman is tested against the evidence of his own poetry and against the statements and silences of Herodotus and Thucydides. Long before the end Solon ceases to look like much of a statesman, if by "statesman" one means either a man of bold ideas or a man of successful policies. The author finds Solon much too conservative. His work did not satisfy the true interests of any group and was therefore ephemeral. But the author cheerfully admits that despite the limitations of Solon's ideas and despite the flatness of Solon's poetry he had an influence on both Aeschylus and Plato, who echo his thoughts and expressions. Though he finds Solon the myth more important than Solon the man who opposed the resentment of all in an impossible Utopia of conservatism, the author nonetheless appreciates the human symbol of justice, balance, serenity and is by no means unfair or unsympathetic.

The book is divided into three parts: I, the ancient tradition; II, Solon's life and political work; III, Solon's poetical work (where the twenty-seven fragments of Solon's poetry, as many as are more certainly genuine, are studied one after the other with great care, so that the reader has 162 pages of commentary and translations). Conclusions and indexes follow.

The Ancient Tradition

The author develops many ideas adumbrated by Jacoby. It is argued that in Herodotus Solon is merely a representative of Greek wisdom as seen by Delphic religiosity which the Seven Sages expressed, and there are echoes of Solon's poetry in what Solon says to Croesus. A conclusion is drawn that Herodotus reflects a stage of the Solonian tradition in which the importance of Solon as statesman and legislator is not yet highly rated. This conclusion may well hit the mark though it lies open to the charge of being an argument from silence and of being based on too little appreciation of the accidental importance of stories as stories. The author contrasts the situation in respect to Cleisthenes, whom Herodotus considered the founder of Athenian democracy; but it is natural that the Reforms of Cleisthenes would have had much more to do with the Persian Wars, and of course Herodotus had come into contact with Athenians whose political tendencies derived from Cleisthenes. However, though the argument from the silence of Herodotus and Thucydides may be disputed, the reviewer will agree that Solon came much to the fore around 411 B. C., when comic poets and politicians who were dissatisfied with the existing state of affairs looked back to the good old days.

Masaracchia assigns particular importance to Theramenes, and

his interpretation of the latter's psychology will interest students of the period of the Thirty. The moderate policy of Solon, he says, became the model for Theramenes and the democratic restoration of 403; Theramenes broke with the Thirty when the *πάτριος πολιτεία* was abandoned. From now on, the figure of Solon is gigantic. When Isocrates makes Solon a perfect democrat, Isocrates is in the tradition of the moderate movement of 411. The Delphic sage (the first Solon) becomes the great statesman (the second Solon). This section of the book should be compared with the contemporary article by E. Ruschenbusch, "*Πάτριος πολιτεία*," *Historia*, VII (1958), pp. 398-424; approaching the subject from different points of view, the two scholars differ considerably in their argumentation but are really not very far apart, even though Masaracchia stresses the role of Theramenes, while Ruschenbusch emphasizes the importance of the time (356 B. C.) in which Solon first appears as the founder of this or that democracy. For Solon the statesman Masaracchia carries the reader through Aristotle; Plato was particularly proud of his ancestor: "In the decline of his fortune as sage, Solon, in the pages of the two greatest Greek writers, is presented to us as an imperishable symbol of two fundamental attitudes of the Greek spirit, those which prepare not only its eternal value, civil and educational, but also its ever fresh and living youth and grace" (p. 65), i. e. the vision of a serene and wise life, and the youthful spirit.

After Aristotle a new phase begins. In the new phase Hermippus at Alexandria particularly builds Solon into a great cosmopolite who draws on his vast knowledge of the world to give Athens help. This is the third Solon. To Plutarch is ascribed a unification of myths; his biography is said to be based on cosmopolitan ideals and to owe most to Hermippus and Aristotle.

Life and Political Work

This section of the book commands respect because it rests upon a very careful study of the ancient evidence in content and stratification and is distinguished for the sobriety of its judgments, but there are serious gaps in the author's acquaintance with modern studies of the economic aspects (e. g. A. French, John Fine). Moreover, the timing of the book was unfortunate in the sense that Mycenaean inscriptions of Pylos were beginning to open new vistas on the earlier development of Greek systems of land tenure and that the implications were not yet recognized; for all practical purposes E. Will, "*Aux origines du régime foncier grec*," *R. E. A.*, LIX (1957), pp. 5-50, wrote the first study, and his article was unknown to Masaracchia. There was not just one unified system of land tenure; there were at least two systems of land tenure. Of course the objection will be raised that Mycenaean Pylos and seventh century Attica are far apart in time and distance, but once the idea that in Mycenaean Attica as in Mycenaean Pylos the aristocracy had personal holdings while the demos had communal holdings is seriously considered, all sorts of new considerations will suggest that the system which Solon found was fundamentally different from that of fifth century Attica, because Solon was dealing with a system of two main types of land tenure, personal holdings of the aristocracy

and communal holdings of the demos. Viewed in the light of the Bronze Age system of land tenure, the tentative conclusions independently reached by F. R. Wüst, "Gedanken über die attischen Stände: ein Versuch," *Historia*, VIII (1959), pp. 1-11 take on remarkable interest and importance. This article was too late, but it is a pity that Masaracchia did not see and ponder Wüst's note 3 in *Historia*, III (1954), pp. 177-9 and Wüst's article in *Historia*, VI (1957), pp. 176-91.

The law cited by Philochorus which forced the phratries to admit the *orgeones* as well as the *gennetai* is on pp. 179-81 handled with admirable caution by Masaracchia, who leaves the question of the authorship open. However, the reviewer, who feels that the alleged system of 360 *gene* has ceased to be an absurdity and that the *gennetai* were not in the main aristocrats but all those sharing in the communal holdings of this oversize demos (now organized in 360 communal units), cannot overcome the impression that the author has excellent judgment but insufficient information. At some time, perhaps in 683/2 B. C., the adoption of hoplite tactics made a new census and a new organization necessary. Even before 683/2 many local cults were in the hands of leading families who admitted others as foster-brothers, but in this particular census the system was expanded and equalized so that there would be 360 approximately equal cults served by eupatridae and uniting all holders of demos land as foster-brothers (*homogalaktes*) of the same eupatridae. Each local unit of foster-brothers was called a *genos* and was expected to provide thirty hoplites when the levy was raised. Neither the state nor the *genos* could allow the *genos* land to be alienated, as long as the army rested primarily on a levy of *gennetai*, but the constant fractionation of estates by inheritance aggravated economic ills. By making poor *gennetai* poor risks for would-be exploiters, Solon at least stopped an extremely vicious development which used to lead to enslavement for debt. If he forced unsuccessful *gennetai* to give up sooner than they would previously have been enslaved and to leave their land to relatives, was that such a bad thing? Masaracchia in condemning the economic reforms of Solon does not give sufficient attention to the fragmentation of estates and so judges Solon without rightly evaluating one of the fundamental difficulties.

The *thetes* whom Solon admitted to the Assembly were for the most part probably *orgeones* as distinct from the *gennetai*. One must ask himself whether commoners other than holders of ancestral estates had ever sat in the Assembly. On this depends our estimate of Solon's work whether as a restoration of previous conditions or as a moderate reform. Masaracchia assumes that all the *thetes* thus promoted were impoverished descendants of men who had sat in the Assembly. The reviewer thinks that beside the eupatridae and the second caste called *agroikoi*, *geomoroi*, or *georgoi*, there were Athenian *demiourgoi* who as first of their line obtained a place in the Assembly in the time either of Solon or of Cleisthenes.

The tradition about the Council of the Four Hundred, attributed to Solon as a probuleutic body beside the Areopagus, has long been defended and attacked. Masaracchia for what the reviewer considers excellent reasons strongly asserts the genuineness. In an article where Masaracchia is not cited the genuineness is once again denied

by R. Sealey, *Historia*, IX (1960), pp. 160-1, who claims that "no reason can be suggested why Solon should introduce a council of four hundred" and that the *boule demosie* in the so-called Constitution of Chios may be merely a village council. The demos of Athens demanded a share in the planning, which until now had been entirely in the hands of the aristocracy; Solon gave them a modest share. As for the inscription from Chios, the reviewer, who re-edited it in *A. J. P.*, LXXIX (1958), p. 298, finds the interpretation by Sealey fantastic.

The Poetical Work

The fragments are studied according to Diehl's order. The author's treatment of fragment 1 was first published in *Maia*, 1956; the discussion of the other fragments is, I think, entirely new.

Fragment 1, the Elegy to the Muses, begins in the spirit of Hesiod, who said "*olbios* is he whom the Muses love." The *olbos* for which Solon prays is that which Zeus gives to whoever wishes to speak wisely according to justice (Hesiod, *Works*, 280-1), namely fulfillment, which is then distinguished from material riches. In Hesiodic vein the distinction is drawn between just wealth which the gods give and unjust wealth which man acquires by *hybris*. Lines 9-13 read:

- πλοῦτον δ' ὃν μὲν δῶσι θεοί, παραγίγνεται ἀνδρὶ
 ἔμπεδος ἐκ νεότητος πυθμένος ἐς κορυφήν.
 11 ὃν δ' ἄνδρες † τιμῶσιν † ὑφ' ὕβριος, οὐ κατὰ κόσμον
 ἔρχεται, ἀλλ' ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθόμενος
 οὐκ ἐθέλων ἔπεται.

In line 11, where the phrase *τιμῶσιν ὑφ' ὕβριος* makes no sense, Masaracchia rejects attempts to vindicate the reading *τιμῶσιν*. He claims on the basis of N 570 that the phrase *οὐκ ἐθέλων ἔπεται* shows that *πλοῦτος* is metaphorically described as an animal. He rejects also Ahrens' palaeographically plausible emendation *μετίωσιν* (from *τειμῶσιν*), because *πλοῦτος* cannot "follow" one who chases it. Instead he suggests <φ>*ιμῶσιν*, which gives a, to me, unsatisfactory sense and seems palaeographically unlikely. The supposed corruption of phi into tau cannot be explained. And surely the required sense is not "bridle" but "pull away from others and appropriate." The contrast lies between wealth acquired justly and wealth acquired by *πλεονεξία*. To express the idea of grabbing what belongs to others the word *τίλλειν* would seem natural, because the ugly jackdaw who decked himself out with the feathers of other birds was the example of *πλεονεξία* in Greek fables concerning *κόσμος οἰκείος*, which was genuine, and *κόσμος ἀλλότριος*, which was spurious and disgraceful. For the word used by Solon I suggest *τί<λλ>ωσιν*, to be explained as a former metaphor now so faded that it meant merely "pull away what belongs to another." Solon, who wants *olbos* from the gods and *doxa agathe* from men, will not imitate the jackdaw. The contrast lies, I think, not quite between old wealth and new wealth, but between wealth which is the produce of one's own inherited land and wealth which is the produce of some-

one else's (inalienable) land acquired by unfair pressure (namely by servitudes which at Athens disappeared in the *seisachtheia*).

On pp. 246-72, in the discussion of fragment 3, the so-called *Eunomia*, the author protests effectively against the view that Solon was a rationalist, far removed from Hesiod. Occasionally in polite disagreement with Jaeger, Ehrenberg, Solmsen, and Vlastos, the author insists that everything is still moving in a world of Hesiodic gods who are either arid formulas or abstract personifications. The fundamental defect of Solon's poetry, the unstable balance between the imitation of the epic model and the search for new linguistic formulas capable of making an impression on an audience which had to be impressed in order to be convinced, appears according to the author particularly in this poem. For the historian this is certainly one of the two most important poems because it shows how the legislator saw the economic and political situation. The reviewer agrees most decidedly that *ἀστοί* means citizens in general and that *δῆμον ἡγεμόνες* means those who have economic and political power over the people. Some non-eupatridae may have had considerable economic power, but in the period preceding the reforms of Solon the political power was entirely in the hands of the aristocracy because they alone formulated plans and held office. Hence the reviewer concludes that Solon in mentioning *δῆμον ἡγεμόνες* referred to those eupatridae who combined political and economic power and used the combination to subvert the very principles (economic and political) on which the republic was based. And what does Solon mean when he accuses them of not sparing (in their rapine) οὐθ' ἱερῶν κτεάνων οὔτε τι δημοσίων? As the author says, *κτέανα* are "beni terrieri." The *ἱερὰ κτέανα* are sacred lands. The author says that one might be tempted to interpret *κτέανα δημοσία* as certain property in the hands of private citizens, but that *δημόσιος* always means something clearly distinct from *ἴδιος*, even opposite. Therefore, he concludes that *κτέανα δημοσία* must be undistributed public land. This the reviewer cannot accept. There may have been *ἐσχατιαί* which were valuable and undistributed public land, but the crying injustice was the desperate plight of the farmers. Masaracchia is thinking in linguistic and economic terms appropriate for the period after Cleisthenes. In Solon's time the three main categories of land were the personal holdings of the eupatridae, the communal holdings of the demos organized as 360 *γένη*, and sacred land. Solon accuses the eupatridae of stealing the produce of sacred land and of demos land.

In treating fragment 10 the author proposes the excellent emendation *ἐξαρθέντ'* for *ἐξέπαντα*, though he does so very hesitantly because he feels a palaeographical weakness in the suggestion. Elision is not always indicated; the emendation seems very good if one visualizes the change as starting with a text in which the word was written out: *ἐξαρθέντα* → *ἐξαρέντα* → *ἐξέπαντα*.

Without attempting to do justice to the rich exegesis by following the author through each fragment in turn, the reviewer will merely express his general admiration for a very sensitive and discriminating, at times brilliant commentary. The author may well exaggerate Solon's conservatism a little, and he occasionally writes as if the

economic struggle were between groups differentiated by old and new forms of wealth, which belongs rather to the period after Solon, or is true only in a limited sense. No one, however, can henceforth study Solon's poetry without consulting this very important book.

Epilogue

The author has traced with a skillful hand a convincing account of the growth of the tradition. Of course Solon was not a cosmopolite, but the reviewer would suggest that Solon may well have been a good statesman without being a permanently successful one and that his true greatness may not have been discovered by the late fifth and fourth century politicians who sought to use his prestige but by Plato, who borrowed ideas. The peculiar excellence of Solon lay, not only in the emphasis on justice, but in the fortification of justice by a rudimentary system of checks and balances.

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Menandros: *Dyskolos*, herausgegeben von HANS JOACHIM METTE.
Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1960. Pp. 32.

Here is a convenient edition of the *Dyskolos*. For scholarly work, however, it requires, as Mette observes, supplementary consultation of the photographs of the papyrus that were published by Martin with the first edition. For Mette does not cite the pointing nor readings before correction. His text is remarkably accurate. The nu missing from the end of the first word in line 688 and the missing accent in line 717 are as nothing. Numerous emendations and supplements are accepted, but nothing is said of others that may be equally or more probable. Kassel's *ἡμερωτέος* (903) and Barrett's *δνος* (550) among others seem certain. Mette's own contributions are almost always good when they have also been proposed by others. His separate proposals are less plausible. I like *τί οὐ βούλει*; (942). For attribution of words to speakers, stage directions, and punctuation no credit is given to the first proposer. Is Mette himself responsible for the correct solution, new to me, in line 629? He gives all of it to Sicon with an interrogation point after *οὗτος*. But this interpretation is already implied in Martin's translation. I was wrong in my attempt to make one sentence of the whole in *A. J. P.*, LXXX (1959), p. 414. It is remarkable how many of Martin's proposals still hold their own. Mette is not always fortunate when he deserts Martin. In line 482 the emendation *ὑμῶν* is necessary. Cnemon addresses the audience at this point.

There are stage directions, but no description of the stage and no discussion except for a summary of the division of parts among the actors. Scholars are not likely to be impressed by the bold statement at the end that Menander disposed of six actors. Nor will they consider his assignment of speakers at the beginning of Act 3 an improvement on Martin's. If Sostratus' mother had a speaking part,

she would be listed among the *dramatis personae*. She is elsewhere addressed, but only as "mother," by Sostratus (867), where she need not be on stage. Characters not addressed by name in the text are not named, though they are included, if they speak, in the list of characters. I suppose that Mette has adopted the view that Getas, as a slave, should not give an order to Plangon, daughter of the family, to "start at once." The Greek of 430 does not mean "walk faster," no matter how many scholars are guilty of the howler. Details were left to slaves, and directing the sacrificial procession was a detail. A Greek slave was a member of the family and might beat the children if that was necessary for their correction. Slaves might derive importance and deference from duties assigned to them. Modern Arabia still has slavery. Wilfred Thesiger in *Arabian Sands* (Dutton, New York, 1959) tells of the deference with which slaves may be treated (pp. 63 f.). Slaves serving him conversed with him quite informally or tried to lay down the law to him. In Greek drama even the most humble character uses the present imperative as a matter of course when giving directions. See my article, "Dramatic Uses of the Greek Imperative," *A. J. P.*, LIX (1938), p. 43. Getas is named as speaker of line 430 in the papyrus, and he has lines that are appropriate only to a conversation with Sicon. Mette assigns to the matron even an objurgation: "What are you gaping at, you moonstruck fool?" Actually this is Sicon's opening shot in the war with Cnemon. Though addressed to the farmer, it is not intended for his ears. Mette does not distinguish such asides. In lines 480 f. Getas and Cnemon, for example, express their opinions of each other in words intended only for the ears of the audience.

Remarks addressed to the audience should also be noted where no vocative appears. Cnemon addresses them twice, once as if they were a part of the play, at line 482, where Martin's emendation of first to second person should be kept: "If I catch any of *you* coming to my door." Compare the appeal of the miser to the audience in Plautus, *Aul.* 715-20, and that in Molière's *L'Avare*. In line 746 f. Cnemon addresses the audience again: "But perhaps you are better suited with things as they are. Carry on then as you do." Here he slips from the stage into the real world in a vestigial parabasis. His description of a society where all were on one level should not be taken as contrary to fact, but as real in the past, for Plato describes just such a stage in human evolution (*Laws* 679 B-C). The reading must be (743 f.).

ὡς ἔμοι]οι πάντες ἦσαν, οὔτε τὰ δικαστήρια
εἶχον ο]ἷθ' αὐτοὺς ἀπῆγον εἰς τὰ δεσμωτήρια.

In the next line *ἄν* is iterative. An example from real life is more impressive than a mere untried ideal. To be sure Praxagora's program in *Ecclesiazusae* includes making a *κοινὸν πᾶσιν βίον* and *τοῦτον ὁμοιον* (594) and abolition of *δίκαι* (657) with no precedent from history, but she no doubt gets her inspiration from the first edition of the *Republic*, not from the *Laws* of Plato. Moreover, Menander seems to take Plato seriously; Aristophanes was making fun of his ideals. There is in the *Dyscolus* no such complicated use

of two characters both thinking aloud independently by turns as we find in *Epitr.* 243-66. Neither overhears the other until a third character intervenes.

In an oral discussion of the play before the American Philological Association in December 1959 I pointed out that the romantic plot of *Dyscolus* brings it nearer to the *Andromeda* of Euripides than to any other Greek play. Among extant plays it is unique. It is a mistake to suppose that because the plot in which a hero wins a bride is familiar to us, it must have been so to the Greeks. At that time I had not studied the parody of *Andromeda* in Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae*, nor had I looked for parallels in the extant fragments of Euripides' play. It is now clear that Menander had the play either consciously or unconsciously in mind as he worked on the *Dyscolus*.

The first intimation of this comes in almost the first speech of Sostratus (54)

σκῶπτεις, ἐγὼ δέ, Χαιρέα, κακῶς ἔχω.

This line with its choking four repetitions of palatal plus omega is an echo of line 58 of the *Frogs*. Dionysus betrays his desperate passion for the dead Euripides by using four omegas, but only three are preceded by palatal stops:

μὴ σκῶπτέ μ', ὠδέλφ', οὐ γὰρ ἀλλ' ἔχω κακῶς.

Menander has slightly outdone Aristophanes. This echo transports us from Chaereas scoffing at Sostratus' passion to Heracles scoffing at Dionysus'. Now Dionysus was reading the *Andromeda* of Euripides (53) when he was overpowered by love of the poet. This is a pointing finger to show the direction taken by Menander's fancy. It is possible, I agree, that neither he nor his audience noticed the connection, but there it is.

There are clearer pointers than this. In the *Thesmophoriazusae* (1033) Mnesilochus, playing the part of the exposed maiden, says *πρόκειμαι*. This helps us to emend *Dysc.* 223. Here Barber's *ὡς προσήκον ἦν* is good enough for Philemon, but Menander can do better. The supplement that I offer is also more probable paleographically, since it presupposes only an omission of three letters occasioned by slipping from one epsilon to another. Read:

ἄκακον κόρην μόνην ἀφείς ἐν ἐρημίᾳ
ἔας, φυλακὴν οὐδεμίαν, ὡς προκ(ειμ)ένην,
ποιούμενος.

Translate "as if she were abandoned to be devoured."

At *Thesm.* 1057 Echo denounces the girl's father for exposing her, just as Daos denounces Cnemon at *Dysc.* 221, using the same words *ἀπολέσειαν οἱ θεοί*. So the same word *ἄγαλμα* is used of the girl by Sostratus (677) and by Perseus in Euripides (frag. 125). It was important to Menander to give the impression that the girl was cast off by her father in order to relieve Sostratus of any blame for addressing her without her father's sanction. Love at first sight and the heroic labor that it inspires are emphasized in both plays.

Cnemon at his first appearance has Perseus on his lips (153). Atlas, named in *Dysc.* 683, must have been mentioned in the account of Perseus' latest adventure before rescuing Andromeda, since we pass immediately from one to the other in Ovid (*Met.*, IV, 657, 671).

We may get help again from *Andromeda*, frag. 120, where the heroine is termed *πολυπονωτάτην*. This supports giving the whole line *Dysc.* 203 to the girl, who wants to be saved from her *πόνων*. But Barrett's *δαιμόνων* is perhaps as likely as Mette's *δ' ἐκ πόνων*. It is strongly supported by *Ep.* 535, *τίς ἂν θεῶν*. To be sure, Sostratus has *πόνους* of love, but he expects to work out his own salvation, enlisting help of course where he can find it. Even Alexander and Caesar had helpers. In line 201 *ναὶ πρὸς θεῶν* is a formula of entreaty, not appropriate to the girl, who need only consent. To put *ἄνθρωπε* in her mouth is to add a most improbable insult. That vocative is used to slaves and where a citizen wants to be rude. It is not interchangeable with *βέλτιστε*.

Menander may have many more echoes of Euripides that we cannot detect. Considering how scanty our fragments are, we are lucky to have found as many clues as we have. For a romantic play there could be no better inspiration and no better precedent than the masterpiece of Euripides. Daos' word *ῥημαῖον* (226) further reinforces the notion that the girl was abandoned to her fate and needed to be rescued from some eventual predator.

Such reminiscences as these presumably provided material for the six books of Latinus on borrowings in Menander. W. E. Blake has pointed out to me that there is a reminiscence of Theophrastus, *Characters*, 16, 2: *τὴν ἡμέραν περιπατεῖν* in *Dysc.* 755: *οὐδ' οἷος ἀργὸς περιπατεῖν τὴν ἡμέραν*. It is an odd phrase, and there may have been some private joke about it. This confirms my suggestion in *A. J. P.*, LXXX, p. 409, that we have here a twit at the Peripatetic School. The *Characters* must have been recently published. The notion that thinkers are idle is not new. Compare *Clouds* 316: *ἀνδράσιν ἀργοῖς*.

In place of the impossible vocative in 201 I should assume that the girl shyly accepts Sostratus' offered aid by silently handing him the jug. Such silent acceptance without thanks is presumably a rustic characteristic, for Gorgias twice does the same. The girl has already showed her quality as kind by risking a beating to save her old nurse, Simike. Sostratus comments to himself as he enters the shrine *ἀκακὸς ἐλευθερίως τέ πως ἀγροικὸς*, "an innocent girl in the fine old country way." Daos said the same in line 222. For the trinity of noble, rustic, and virtuous see frag. 338 and the remarks of Sostratus in *Dysc.* 387 f. Menander looks backward as obstinately as Aristophanes and Plato to a time when virtuous peasants made Athens great. He is neither more nor less decadent than those two.

Sostratus calls the gods to witness the girl's virtue as he had called on some of them to bear witness to her beauty at lines 191 f. From line 203 the girl, alone on stage, speaks, then retreats as Daos comes from the other house. He has crossed the stage past shrine and Cnemon's house before he hears Sostratus speak and notes the girl's reply from within the house. Sostratus must have seen Daos to make him say so cautiously: "Mind your father," and then bewail his bad luck. The suggestion of Goold that Pyrrhias on his

exit took sanctuary in the shrine merits attention. It would emphasize his fright, it would make it easier for the actor to shift from the girl's part to Pyrrhias so quickly, and it accounts for Pyrrhias' reëntrance here after a few words with Sostratus. It is not the only way of accounting for Pyrrhias' overhearing Sostratus' proposal to consult Getas (182, 217). The suggestion of Oguse (*Bull. Fac. Lettres Strasbourg*, XXXVIII [1960], p. 351) is very attractive. He would let Pyrrhias show himself again when Cnemon retires (177) and retreat in comic terror when the door sounds later (188) before the girl's entrance. But Pyrrhias cannot enter until just before he speaks line 214, for the actor had to be offstage for the girl's words in line 212. Mette, disposing of six actors, can keep Pyrrhias on stage throughout, his fear of Cnemon under control. How uncharacteristic!

In line 467 the vocative can belong only to Cnemon and should be joined to what precedes: *τρισάθλι', εἰπέ μοι, / ἄνθρωπε*. The split vocative is an effective indicator of excitement. The change of speaker is not noted in either place in the papyrus, but Getas is polite and addresses Cnemon as *βέλτιστε* in line 476. Note that Cnemon uses a similar rude adjective with the same vocative addressed to a slave in lines 108 f. The two instances perhaps add up to a mannerism. Failure to use such a vocative to a provoking slave may also be significant. In line 301 Sostratus has every reason to address Daos so, but he refrains. It is somewhat awkward to address the unknown slave as "you who speak" or "Mr. Speaker," but this is at least a neutral formula. Sostratus is courteous to everyone, slaves included. He goes much too far in the opinion of Getas (609 f.). Distinctions in the use of vocatives are evidently as important as in the use of oaths. Daos, be it noted, is rude in interrupting Sostratus, and in his challenging attitude; his using no vocative to him is another piece of rustic rudeness.

The vocative is a decisive clue to the speaker in line 144, where *βέλτιστε* cannot be addressed to the slave Pyrrhias. Siceon would use the term so by way of flattery (496 f.), but no one else is so polite to a slave. Nor would Pyrrhias address his master so formally. Nor again do intimates who have addressed each other by name revert to the formal term without reason. Gorgias shifts from the formal to the intimate in addressing Sostratus. The latter does not address Gorgias as *βέλτιστε* at all, perhaps because of the difference in social standing. We are left with one possibility, that Pyrrhias is addressing Chaereas. This proves that Chaereas is still on stage. It is he who speaks lines 145 f. So it must be he who reports the advent of Cnemon in line 143. He evidently moved to a position as lookout just before the side remarks of Sostratus (135-8). With *δὲ σὲ* (138) Sostratus turns on Pyrrhias. Similarly with *σὺ δὲ* (144) he shifts once more to Chaereas, who is about to slip out quietly. Of the three Pyrrhias is convinced that Cnemon is mad. Chaereas has no reason to linger since he disapproves of Sostratus' interest in the girl anyway. His coolness makes him as indifferent to love as to fear. He does not consider Cnemon any more mad than any other farmer. Sostratus does not question Cnemon's sanity until he has heard him speak. He is frightened but asks (168) the test question, "You aren't going to hit me, are

you?" When Cnemon does not hit him, Sostratus has no more doubt of his sanity. Pyrrhias must by dramatic propriety be the first to leave. He leaves hastily. Chaereas leaves deliberately after directing Sostratus' attention to the angry farmer. This builds up to a climax as Sostratus merely hides. To make Sostratus seek help from Pyrrhias at this stage is absurd. Pyrrhias speaks the words (144) αὐτός! ὑπάγω, βέλτιστε, an exit line addressed to Chaereas. Note 378, where Daos takes leave with the same phrase. For a similar stop after first trochee see *Fabula Incerta* 25.

Sostratus begins to be suspicious of Pyrrhias in line 93. Here are lines 92-5 as I see them:

—ἀπα[ντας, εἰς πέτρας (or δασὺ)
 ἐλθών. ΣΩ. τί πεπαρώγηκε; δεῦ[ρο φερόμενος
 εὐδελός ἐστι. ΠΥ. νῆ Δί', ἐξω[λῆς ἐγώ,
 Σώ]στρατ', ἀπολοῦ[μ'. ἄκο]νέ πως φυλακτικῶς.

I follow the correction—by upsilon—above the line here as elsewhere. In line 85 I assign μὰ Δί', ἐγὼ δ' ὄμην to Pyrrhias. Slaves are prone to swear on slight provocation. In lines 94 f. we have a staccato sentence to show excitement as in Pamphila's

γύναι, πόθεν ἔχεις, εἰπέ μοι, τὸ παιδίον / λαβοῦσα; (*Er.* 544 f.).

Another way of indicating strong feeling is by the use of assonance. In going from *Frogs* 58 to *Dysc.* 54 (see above) Menander got one more palatal plus omega by adding ἐγώ. So the ἐγώ in line 94 provides an echo for the first two vowels of the preceding word. The first person singular is required if we are to read ἄκουε. Note that I observed the assonance only long after I had adopted the reading for other reasons.

Such devices are a mild foretaste of what Menander does in *Perik.* 308-10 with ἔχειν ἔχθραν, —ὕμιν θ' ὑπόνοιαν, —καταλιπεῖν, ἣν ἐκβαλεῖν ἣν ἐξαλείψαι τ' οὐκέτ' οὐδ'. See my note in *A. J. P.*, LXII (1941), pp. 465 f. Here are words with the same initial and final consonant twice, same diphthong with same accent and rhythm three times, then same diphthong twice with same consonant and elision preceding. It took me many years to learn to read Menander rhythmically and dramatically aloud, as well as metrically. The jolts and echoes are part of the verse. One must feel them. For another case of this sort of thing note Gorgias' emphatic description of Cnemon's habit of working alone (330 f.):

οὐκ οἰκέτην οἰκείον, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τόπου
 μισθωτόν, οὐχὶ γείτον', ἀλλ' αὐτὸς μόνος.

Here we have chiasmus of initial ουκ and οικ, successive final kappas, and two cases of rhymed successive iambic feet reinforced by word ends, not to mention tripling of the negative and repetition of the syllable τον in the same metrical position. It seems not to matter much what particular sounds are repeated in such a case. Repetition of sound or rhythm is enough in itself to ensure a forcible effect.

There is a clue to line 88 in Plautus, *Stichus* 155; *Famem ego fuisse suspicor matrem mihi*. Since Plautus was translating Menander, we have two cases in which a grumbling slave attributes his

bad luck to an abstract mother. Read *ὀδύνης γὰρ υἱὸς ἢ κακοδαμονῶν* τις ἦ, "My mother's name was Grief or else I am cursed with bad luck." There is a son of Joy at *Rudens* 1284 from Diphilus. Our material from Menander is so scanty that a single confirmation is great good fortune. My proposal to read *ὅν πᾶσιν* [*ἀγαθοῖς*] in *Misumenus* 1 u (Teubner Menander, II, p. 286, see *A. J. P.*, LXXVII [1956], p. 217) is confirmed by *ὅν κακῷ γε* of *Dysc.* 510. Many guesses must wait for new tests before they can be judged with any certainty. But we need not wait to reject the assignment of *ἄφες*, *βέλτιστε*; in line 503 to Cnemon. An imperative repeated in a question is put in the deliberative subjunctive at *Ep.* 218 f. *θές, θῷ*. Plato in the *Laws* has the perfect imperative in a question. Can anyone cite an aorist?

In line 548 I detect after the high point a corruption of the words *πολὺ νωτοφορῶ*. Presumably there was a gloss *νότῳ φέρω*, or else some scribe had given the sense by mistake. Then two letters were omitted in copying to produce *πολυνοφέρω* as in the papyrus. It is not cited by Mette. For the first word of the line I have found nothing more probable than *φθῆναι* "to give you a start." I have no parallel.

We have seen that the sister of Gorgias accepted (201) an offer of aid without a word of assent or appreciation. Gorgias twice goes further and even says no to a flattering offer. But in the end he too acquiesces without a word. The fact that this trait appears twice makes it certain that Menander thought it characteristic of his rustic model. It becomes funny when it is not merely an invitation to lunch but a bride that is accepted in this awkward way. There is bound to be a difference between Menander's rustic and Theophrastus' (4). The latter is depicting unideal characters, whereas the dramatist is showing rusticity combined with virtue. In line 616 I propose for Gorgias the words *λαβὼν τὰδ' εἰσένεγκε, Ἀἷ, σὺ, εἴθ' ἦκε*. There is an effect of alacrity here. In the first line there are as many shorts as longs and as many vowels as consonants. In the short syllables one vowel is repeated twice, another three times. Gorgias seems eager. Galarotti has also proposed this.

The invitation is evidently accepted for Gorgias and the slave. But Sostratus intervenes: "You must certainly not leave your mother alone. See that she has whatever she needs, and I'll be with you in a moment." Thus Sostratus not only includes Myrrhine in his mother's party but arranges to come and escort her. Is there perhaps an implication that Gorgias should wash and change before the feast? We should expect Sostratus to discard his sheepskin. Unless Gorgias also discards his, how could he expect to pass Sostratus off as a farmer at line 754? Cnemon has noticed the sunburn, but says nothing of distinctive clothes. I take it that there was at this point no such distinction. Theognis (53-7) attests that, once in the lawcourts, farmers were no longer dressed in skins.

After line 840 Gorgias gets a bride almost in spite of himself. He says not a word of consent or appreciation. He is more courteously, but none the less firmly, initiated into the family of Sostratus than is Cnemon later. The fifth act has a single theme: compel them to come in. Were the girls necessarily present when they were affianced? There is no doubt that Glykera is present at *Perik.* 435.

Plangon may have been brought in by Sostratus just in time for the ceremony. An actor could indicate that Gorgias suddenly ceased to object when he caught sight of her. For lines 836-40 my reading and interpretation are as follows:

ἀπαρν]ος εἰ. ΓΟ. πῶς; ΚΑ. οὐκ ἔχων βούλει δοκεῖν
 ἔχειν,] ἐπειδὴ συμπεπεισμένον μ' ὀρᾷς.
 λόγῳ δ] ἐ τούτῳ μ' ἀναπέπικας διπλασίως.
 ἀπαξι]ῶν πένης <τις> ἀπόπληκτός θ' ἄμα
 τότε ᾗθo]ς ὑποδείκνυσιν εἰς σωτηρίαν.

"Your denial has its noble side." "How so?" "You want to give the impression of not having what you have, for you observe that I have given my consent, and by saying what you do you have won it doubly. A man who refuses such a match, being both poor and crazy, at that moment gives indication of a character that ensures against disaster." Other supplements are too long for the space.

The unraveling of social implications in Greek dialogue is an important factor in the study of Menander. When a slave raises his eyebrows, is he frowning or scowling, supercilious or malignant? The only slave known to me who raises his brows in Greek literature is Getas at *Dysc.* 423. For ἀνεσπογ' we may read ἀνες ποτ' as Mette does, and translate with Arnott, "Stop scowling," or we may read what I have proposed, ἀνεσπακότ', and assume that Sicon promises Getas a moment of supercilious dignity when the cook serves him his part of the feast. For a metrical parallel to my reconstruction note *Perik.* 58. It gives a gayer rhythm:

καὶ τὰς ὀφρῦς ἀνεσπακότ', ὦ τριθάβλιε,
 ἐγὼ σε χορτάσω κατὰ τρόπον τήμερον.

The mixture of curse and blessing is a lively touch. "And while you sit in state, you lousy bum, I'll serve you fodder to your taste today." No doubt, "If you'll stop scowling, I'll serve you," goes equally well in English. In Greek, however, though slaves may scowl, raised eyebrows, the frown of dignity, are the prerogative of gods, kings, officials, rich men, and politicians in the fifth century. From the fourth century on, philosophers and persons of superior culture may be credited with them. There is no more striking evidence of the revolution in Greek life produced by Plato. The scowl and the frown look alike, but only those whom we respect or fear are spoken of as frowning rather than scowling.

The subject of raised eyebrows is fully investigated by Karl Sittl, *Die Gebärden der Griechen und Römer*, except that he does not consider social distinctions nor chronological shifts. To show the connection between eyebrows and political importance I might cite the *Demes* of Eupolis in Edmonds' edition (p. 346, b 1):

τὰς ὀφρῦς ἤδη ἑξαίρει κάξιοι δημηγορεῖν.

But Page in the Loeb edition does not include the first four words of this, though the photograph published by Edmonds in *Mnemosyne*, series 3, VIII (1939), seems to provide evidence for the brows at

least. Edmonds' assurance that infrared photography confirms his reading (*The Fragments of Attic Comedy*, I, p. 344) will not allay suspicion of it. Hence I fall back on Cratinus, frag. 355, ἀνελκταῖς ὀφρῶσι σεμνόν, and Kock, *Adespota* 842 (Bekker, *Anecd.*, 25, 5), ἀνωφρυσμένος ἄνθρωπος: σημαίνει τὸν ἀποσεμνύνοντα ἑαυτόν. The one woman in Old Comedy who raises her brows is precisely Lysistrata (*Lys.* 8), who puts through a political program with dignity even on the Aristophanic stage.

It is with Plato that the philosopher first raises his brows and attacks political life. In Book VI of the *Republic* we have his statement of the need to raise the status of philosophy and to put philosophers in highest office. In *Amphis*, frag. 13, Plato is said to know nothing but how to frown and raise his brows like a snail majestically. At any rate for Menander (frags. 34, 395) οἱ τὰς ὀφρῶς αἶροντες are philosophers, and so Plutarch (*Mor.* 657 C): οἱ τὰς ὀφρῶς ἀνεσπακότες. Diphilus (frag. 86) contrasts the humble and the proud. The latter is supercilious. Nowhere in classical Greek is a slave spoken of as raising his brows in anger, worry, or resentment. That is for his betters. I submit that Getas must acquire some dignity before he can have raised eyebrows. Sicon is a flatterer who would even address a slave as βέλτιστε (497). So here he proposes dignity soon to come for Getas.

When Getas refers to the sacrifice of a snail in *Dysc.* 475, it may be a topical reference. Demetrius had a mechanical snail that led his procession, presumably during his archonship in 309/8, slaving as it went (Polyb., XII, 13, 11; Athen., XII, 542e). There is nothing to prove that he did not use the contrivance earlier as well, in his first year of office. A snail with raised eyes—and imaginary brows raised still higher—might be taken as a symbol of philosophy, or for that matter of caution or of autochthony; I do not see any way of deciding the point. In any case a reference to sacrificing a snail would be much more amusing if a mechanical snail had recently created a sensation in Athens.

At line 568 to read ταῦτα leaves γάρ in the next line with nothing to explain. The need to insert an article has been seen by Kraus and others. But read also ἄλλα and ταῦτά. Otherwise Getas is unaccountably incoherent. "Invite your guests. For me the sheep is only to look at anyway. But the women, since they are charming, would they share anything? Not even bitter salt, by Demeter." I suggest rather for 568-70:

ἄξιον ἰδεῖν. ἄλλα <τὰ> γύναια ταῦτά μοι.
ἔχει γὰρ ἀστείως, μεταδοίη δ' ἂν τινος;
οὐδ' ἂν, μὰ τὴν Δῆμητρ', ἄλδος πικροῦ.

"The sheep for me is a feast only for the eyes. The women are more of the same. For, though they are charming, would they let anyone have anything of theirs? Not so much as bitter salt, by Demeter." Getas echoes the reproach of Odysseus to Antinoüs (*Odyssey*, XVII, 455): "You wouldn't give a suppliant even salt." Sostratus understands that Getas would like to get his teeth into something besides mutton and comforts him with the assurance that all will be well before the day is over. His ἔσται καλῶς reminds

us of the comforting words spoken to him in his agony of love by Pyrrhias (215): *ἔσται κατὰ τρόπον* and by Chaereas (134): *τοῦτο δ' ἔξει κατὰ τρόπον*. Presumably Getas will get, not only his mutton, but his accommodating woman too, when the wine has done its work. Sostratus is a generous lover. He not only wants Gorgias to learn about love in marriage, but even sympathizes with the slave Getas in his amorous yearning. Thus we get good sense with humorous overtones that are in my opinion characteristic of Menander. He wants to see everyone happy, and his hero is like him. Note that Menander cannot possibly be indebted to Theophrastus for his ideal characters, since the philosopher dissects only those who have faults.

The following notes are for consideration by editors:

140 *ἀδικοῦντ' ἄρα. ΠΥ. οὐδέν] δ' ἡδίκηκα, Σώστρατε.*

173 *λεώφορον* for τὸ τοῦ λεώ seems almost certain in view of its occurrence in Libanius, *Declamatio*, 27, 5, which is sprinkled with expressions from *Dyscolus*.

247 *ὅποιον* seems likely as first word. The length seems right.

349 *οὐκ ἂν λά]βοιμι τὴν κόρην*; Compare *Perik.* 254 for a similar hopeful question with firm negative.

350 *ἔσει* or *ᾤσει* σὺ ν]ῦν, ἀ<ν> συν<α>κολουθήσας ἐμοὶ

351 *αὐτῷ] παρα<σ>τῆς.*

363 Daos must introduce here the plot to make Sostratus work. Gorgias is too decent to play such a trick. See 371.

398 *τοῦναντίον δ', ἀγαγὼν τε κατακέκομ' ἐγὼ.*

500 *ΣΙΚΩΝ. πρὸς γε ταῦτό.* "Yes, and for the same thing." This provokes Cnemon. Compare line 510 for Sicon's terse style.

550 For smoke driving a slave on stage note *Plutus* 821. Smoke in the eyes also keeps Getas from seeing Sostratus at first.

596 The last word may be *ποτε* to indicate impatience as at 866.

606 *ὀδύνας ἐπίσταται* is just possible. More likely *ἐπικτᾶται*.

612 *πάντ' ἔχομεν.* "That's final. There's no more to be said."

688 *οὕτω σφόδρ' εἰς αὐτὴν βλέπων / ἐρῶ.*

710 *ζῆν μόνο]ν προειλόμην. / οὐχὶ σω[θῆν' ἦν δικαίῳ γ'.* "For I could not have survived as an honest man." Compare Plato, *Ap.* 31 D. Traces of the letters seem to indicate that the papyrus had *δικαιοι*, possibly a mistake for *δικαίους* or *δικαίως*.

759 *τὸ λο[πὸν ἱκανὸς ἐκδοῦν' εἰ μόνος/ τὴν] ἀδελφὴν.*

760 *ἐπάνα[γε σαυτόν, Σώστρατε.* The letters *ωστ* are partly visible. Compare *Perik.* 353.

883 f. Note how Simike puts the cart before the horse. Translators should not disguise her chatting before she greets.

886-890 *διαπο[ρῶ τί χρὴ δρᾶν,
εἴ τινί ποτ' ἄλλῳ συναρ]έσει. καὶ τῶν θ[υρῶν (or <τ>ρόμων)
οὕτω δυνήσ[εται κρατῆσαι. ποῦ ποτ' εἰ, μάγειρε;*

Σίκων, πρόελ[θε δ]εὐρό μ[οι κάκουσ]ον, ὦ Πόσειδον,
οἶαν <σ> ἔχειν οἶμ[αι δι]ατριβήν.

913 Getas, pretending to be surprised at sight of Cnemon, speaks all but the last four words of the line, which are Cnemon's.

920 ἀπαγε καὶ σύ γ' ἤδη spoken by Cnemon.

935 ἄκουε δ' ἐξῆς πάντα τ[ἀνδοθεν προύμειν' ἤδη].

936 τὰς λίαν ἀν]άγκας οὐδὲ τὴν [πρόνοιαν οἶμ' ἀπείργειν.

939 The sequence is περιβολαί, ἐντυχήματα, διατριβή, "embraces, introductions, a good time."

940 μετὰ τῶν ἄ]νωθεν, "with those already there."

941 Emend to τοῦτ' οὐκ ἀκούεις;

963 τὸ τηνικα[ῦτ'. ἀλλ'] ἐκδότω

Note: Not having access to all articles on *Dyscolus*, I leave it to editors to determine claims to priority and originality. In many cases I have built on the proposals of others.

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ROBERT ÉTIENNE. Le culte impérial dans la péninsule ibérique d'Auguste à Dioclétien. Paris, E. de Boccard, 1958. Pp. xii + 614; 23 maps; 16 pls.; statistical tables within text. (*Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, Fasc. 191.)

Ruler cult in classical antiquity has been an unending topic of study ever since the appearance of Beurlier's classic *Essai sur le culte impérial* in 1891. Some notion of the more recent developments in this field may be derived from a perusal of the sixty-three-page bibliography given by L. Cerfaux and J. Tondriaux in *Le culte des souverains dans la civilisation gréco-romaine* (Tournai, 1957). Whether the results of all this activity are commensurate with the energy expended is probably a matter of personal opinion. According to M. P. Charlesworth, "the subject is of great, indeed of absorbing interest for anyone who is a student of ancient civilization, and especially of the Roman Empire" (*H. Th. R.*, XXVIII [1935], p. 5), but A.-J. Festugière is of quite another mind: "On a dépensé beaucoup d'encre, ce demi-siècle, pour décrire la naissance, les modalités, tout le détail monotone du 'Rulercult.' Du point de vue de la phénoménologie religieuse, ce culte est exactement *nil*. Rien de neuf là-dedans, rien qui présente la moindre amorcée de spiritualité" (*Rev. Bibl.*, LXV [1958], p. 93).

The rationale of Étienne's new study (which was fifteen years in preparation) was the lack of a monograph devoted to the imperial cult in a province or group of provinces such as Spain or Gaul which "la géographie autant que les hommes ont rendu solidaires" (p. 1). The Iberian peninsula was chosen in preference to other possible areas because of the important role it played in the develop-

ment of the imperial cult (pp. xi, 355, 519-23) and its wealth of material: more than one hundred different types of coins, nearly one hundred and fifty monuments (temples, altars, statues), and some nine hundred inscriptions pertaining to emperor worship (p. 18). The volume is divided into four "books." The first deals with the various races and the political and social structures in pre-Roman Spain, the Spanish mentality, and "le culte de chef étranger" from Hasdrubal to Caesar. The second treats of the organization of the imperial cult in the *provinciae*, *conventus*, and *municipia*, and ends with a description of the lesser priestly colleges. The third discusses the objects of the imperial cult: the living and dead emperors, their *genii* and *numina*, the imperial virtues, and the *dii augusti*. The fourth traces the evolution and ultimate decline of the cult in Spain from Augustus to Diocletian, and at the end several pages are given to the problems that emperor worship created for the Christians. In the conclusion, Étienne explains why he has brought his investigations to a close at the beginning of the Tetrarchy: "Dioclétien a trop bouleversé le visage administratif de l'Empire pour que le culte impérial à son tour n'en soit pas secoué" (p. 519). In this he may perhaps be accused of a trifle inconsistency, since nearly half of his discussion of emperor worship and Christianity is concerned with the decrees of the Council of Elvira which, though the exact year is disputed, is to be dated at least ten or fifteen years after the division of the empire. And even if the changes in the imperial cult were as radical as imagined (*quod est probandum*), they would be significant for the light they could throw on the final secularization of an institution which survived in many of its external trappings as a part of the court etiquette of the Christian emperors of the fourth and fifth centuries.

Despite the apparent wealth of documentation and the author's intent of penetrating into the "théologie impériale" and even into the "mystique impériale" (p. 6) of the Spaniards, the total impression left by the book is somewhat disappointing if not positively misleading. This is partly due to the materials available for such a study, partly to the way they are handled, but chiefly to the forced interpretations given to them. Just as it is impossible to write a Christian theology from the archaeological and epigraphical data of the Roman catacombs, so it is quite impossible to obtain an adequate understanding of emperor worship from a multiplication of coin types, statues, altars, and dedicatory inscriptions without comparable literary sources. But formal documents of this type, which the author eschews on principle (p. 6), are at a minimum for Spain. In developing his theme, Étienne follows a strictly inductive method. This would be excellent if he could rid himself of some of the incubus of previous scholarship. As it is, he is constantly dragging in *ad hoc* information as he proceeds along his tortuously slow way. It seems to me that if he had set out with fixed definitions and accepted findings elsewhere and then pointed up the differences in Spain the reader would not get the impression of endless backtracking without sufficiently defined goals. Only when he is nearly half way through his work, for example, does he get around to telling the reader what he means by "culte," and then only to state: "Pour l'instant, disons simplement que chaque empereur a reçu un culte

et qu'un tel culte le mettait au-dessus du rest de l'humanité, sans qu'on le considérât pour autant comme un dieu" (p. 288).

Even more unfortunate than this needless prolixity is the general interpretation which Étienne gives to his discoveries. He obviously has a thesis, or rather several theses, to prove: The success of the imperial cult in Spain cannot be explained in terms of the adoption of an Eastern concept or foreign imposition but only as the flowering of a natural inclination (pp. 4, 115). Spain played an exceptional role in the development of the imperial cult (p. 355). Far from being simply attentive to Rome or Italy, Spain was "toujours à l'avant-garde de l'adoration impériale" and became a model for the rest of the world (pp. 405, 522). Étienne is certainly right in postulating some natural inclination among the peoples of Spain to explain the ready adoption of the imperial cult, but the lengthy arguments he employs to explain this tendency are quite inadequate. They depend entirely upon a forced interpretation of two customs: the *proskynesis* of the Iberians and the *devotio* of the Celtiberians (p. 113). Much is made of the obeisance offered to Scipio by the captured citizens of New Carthage (Pol., X, 17) and by Edeco, ruler of the Edetani (Pol., X, 40), but the attempt to show that falling to one's knees was "un rite d'adoration" (p. 91) is far from convincing. Could it not more logically be taken simply as a natural sign of weakness and submission—*muta metu terram genibus summissa petebat* (Lucretius, I, 92)? I fail also to see why the *devotio Iberica*, the vow which a soldier took not to live on after the death of his captain, should be "le symbole de la soumission au pouvoir surnaturel du chef" (p. 79). It would seem rather that the one thing expected of a supernatural leader was victory in combat, and that as a consequence this peculiar type of *devotio* could have meant nothing more than an extraordinary attachment to another mortal. Instead of searching for a basis for the ready adoption of emperor worship in such dubious quarters, would it not have been sufficient to allude to the widespread belief among primitive tribes (and some not-so-primitive nations) that the mana or supernatural power of a *successful* leader is the sign of his godly and even divine nature? Further investigations along this line might have been as fruitful in explaining the precedents for emperor worship in Spain as they have been for those in Rome (cf., for example, H. Wagenvoort, "Imperium," in *Roman Dynamism* [Oxford, 1947], pp. 59-72).

Étienne maintains that the erection of an altar to Augustus at Tarraco is of great importance in that it shows that Spain was in advance of other provinces in the West in promoting the imperial cult (pp. 355, 367-76), but as he himself observes, the only evidence for its dedication during the lifetime of Augustus is a clever retort of the emperor cited by Quintilian (VI, 3, 77). Moreover, Augustus' reluctance at the outset of his reign to accept divine honors is so well known that it is at least possible that the possessive genitive in the critical phrase *in ara eius* refers to an altar erected "by," rather than "to," him. Capital is made of the permission given by Tiberius for the erection of a temple to Augustus at Tarraco since even Tacitus refers to it as an example *in omnes provincias* (pp. 409-11; Tac., *Ann.*, I, 78). But the remark could be ironic. Since a temple had been erected to Caesar at Rome after his

death, it certainly did not take a great deal of imagination on the part of the Spaniards to ambition the erection of a similar temple to Augustus. If the petition had not come from Spain, it would undoubtedly have originated elsewhere, with similar "exemplary" effects.

Questions may also be raised with some details in the book. It is suggested that the common abbreviation *pontif. aug.* should as a rule be read *pontif(ex), aug(ur)* rather than *pontif(ex) aug(usti)* (p. 198). Before subscribing to this opinion, one would have to be certain that the cumulation of major priestly offices during the Empire was much more common in the provinces than it had been at Rome during the Republic. Vegetius, *De re mil.*, II, 5: *Nam imperator cum Augusti nomen accepit tanquam praesenti et corporali deo fidelis est praestanda devotio*, is cited as a proof that a military leader honored by the *devotio Iberica* was to be considered "comme un dieu vivant" (p. 361, n. 5). But Vegetius was a fourth-century Christian who could not possibly have regarded the emperor as "a living god," and who, moreover, makes his meaning perfectly clear in the very next sentence: *Deo enim vel privatus vel militans servit, cum fideliter eum diligit qui Deo regnat auctore*. In general the orthography of the book is quite adequate. English readers have probably by this time ceased to expect foreign writers to master the rule for the capitalization of proper adjectives in English titles, so little complaint can be made about the aberrations on this score. In one set of tables there is considerable inconsistency in the capitalization and non-capitalization of *aug.* (pp. 205-6). On several occasions the *lares* are qualified by *augustes* rather than the proper *augusti* (pp. 346, 349). A list of forty other *errata* is given on page 615, but this could be at least doubled if the accents and aspirations on the Greek texts were all corrected.

Despite the author's exaggerated claims for the importance of Spain in the history of the development of the imperial cult and minor slips in detail, the volume is not without value. The numerous statistical tables which are scattered throughout the book are of particular interest. These list such items as the extent of *hospitium*, *clientela*, and *patronatus* throughout the peninsula, the careers of provincial priests before and after the flamine, the objects of cult of the *severi augustales*, and so forth. These statistical studies are recapitulated in a series of twenty-three maps at the end of the book which makes it possible to see at a glance the relative importance in time and place of particular manifestations of the imperial cult. The author's conclusions from these lists generally confirm what was known, or at least suspected, before: the municipal cults were largely centered about the worship of the living emperor, while the provincial cults were more concerned with the dead (p. 235); the variety of forms taken by the municipal cults indicates that they were of spontaneous origin and not imposed from above (p. 250); the priesthoods were largely confined to the wealthy (p. 230), and a provincial flamine was a step towards an equestrian career (p. 152); "status seekers" among the enfranchised could satisfy their ambitions by serving in the *severi augustales* (p. 251); under the last Julio-Claudians there was a marked decline in the imperial cult in Spain (p. 433), but this was followed by a revival under Vespasian (p. 458); in the second century private dedica-

tions become rare (p. 490); in the troubled third century the imperial cult, though continuing as an institution, could no longer satisfy the needs of the people (p. 497).

Similarly detailed studies of emperor worship in other areas of the empire will probably be made in the future. These undoubtedly will contribute to the final story of the imperial cult when, and if, it is ever written. They should prove to be of more assistance in the attainment of this ultimate goal if they are not so long and ambitious as the present work—*πλέον ἡμῶν παντός* (Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 40).

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R. P. HOOGMA. *Der Einfluss Vergils auf die Carmina Latina Epigraphica. Eine Studie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der metrisch-technischen Grundsätze der Entlehnung.* Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1959. Pp. xxiii + 373.

Dr. Hoogma's scholarly investigation of the influence of Vergil on the *Carmina latina epigraphica* is a welcome addition to the small number of studies of Latin verse inscriptions. Following the publication of the corpus of verse inscriptions by Buecheler in 1895, 1897 and by Lommatszsch in 1926, there was a flurry of literary and epigraphical activity. Since 1930, however, activity has been limited to publication of newly found inscriptions and to general studies such as those of A. Stein (1931), A. B. Purdie (1935), A. Brelich (1937), and R. Lattimore (1942). Specifically, the influence of classical authors upon the verse inscriptions has been investigated by T. Kleberg (Juvenal, 1946) and E. Lischberger in his excellent small volume, *Das Fortleben der römischen Elegiker in den Carmina epigraphica* (Diss. Tübingen, 1934). There were also articles on the influence of Vergil in various classical journals, e.g., M. della Corte, "Vergilio nell'epigrafi pompeiana," *Epig.*, II (1940).

Although it should not detract from the value of this investigation, it must be stated at the outset that the title is misleading since Hoogma limits himself to the study of the influence of the *Aeneid* on the *Carmina latina epigraphica*. The author defends his exclusion of the *Eclogues*, *Georgics*, and *Appendix* on grounds of size of the investigation of the *Aeneid* alone and because the *Aeneid* gives a representative picture of the borrowings. It is to Hoogma's credit, however, that contrary to the majority of scholars in the field of Latin metrical inscriptions, he does not limit himself to the Buecheler-Lommatszsch corpus but he includes E. Diehl, *Inscriptiones Latinae christianae veteres* (Berlin, 1925, 1927, 1931) and A. Ferrua, *Epigrammata Damasiana* (Roma, 1942).

This study by Hoogma will interest scholars in various fields of classical studies, probably in the following order: First, Latin metrics and verse construction; second, Latin verse inscriptions; third, Vergilian studies. Hoogma's methodology and conclusions will certainly be of value to those classicists who are concerned with the problems of originality and borrowing in antiquity.

The volume is admirably organized. After a brief *Vorwort*, he

cites his bibliography, explains his abbreviations, and gives a fine summary of the status of research in the field.¹ His *Stand der Forschung* (pp. 1-22) should prove of general interest and value especially for the scholar in another field who wishes to familiarize himself quickly with the status of scholarship in Latin metrical inscriptions. In the final two pages of this summary, Hoogma makes an eloquent plea for a new edition of collected pagan and Christian *carmina*, each with a basic commentary including the results of scholarship found in numerous periodicals. Such an edition, according to Hoogma, should include occasional translations, indices as in Dessau, and an introduction treating religious, philosophical, metrical, epigraphical, and literary aspects of the verse inscriptions. Most appealing to this reviewer would be the inclusion of those Latin metrical inscriptions published in various periodicals since the appearance of the earlier editions. Hoogma states that such an edition complete with introduction, old and new inscriptions, commentary, and indices would make the *Carmina latina epigraphica* available for study to scholars who are not specialists in this often difficult material.

In the first portion of his study (*Abschnitt I*, pp. 27-155), Hoogma investigates the borrowings of metrical units, verses, and parts of verses, apart from the *carmina* in which they appear. *Inter alia*, the author excludes Wand- und Gerätschriften and cites five external criteria for Vergilian borrowings (pp. 55, 58-9). The borrowings are classified according to seven categories: A. Metrical units having the same position in the verse as in Vergil; these are further classified as to location (foot) in the line. These are given according to the phrases in the *Aeneid* with no reference to the inscriptions. B. Change of location of the metrical unit in hexameter and pentameter. Both Vergilian and epigraphical lines are cited here. This section is divided by metrical units: I. — — — II. — — — III. — — — IV. — — — V. (—) — — — (half verse). C. Contracting and expanding of metrical units, e. g.:

Aen., VI, 884: *purpureos spargam flores animamque nepotis*

Buech., 610, 11: *p[urpurei flores mutati [lumi]ne pulchro*

Aen., XII, 472: *cuncta gerens vocemque et corpus et arma Metisei*

Damas., 201, B, 4: *mulcebat natum cuncta pro patre gerens*

D. Transposition of word order in metrical units, e. g.:

Aen., II, 537: *persolvant grates dignas et praemia reddant*

Buech., 816, 2: *persolvat dignas grates et praemia reddat*

E. Shift of ictus and change of rhythmic character of metrical units, e. g.:

Aen., VI, 546: *i, dēcūs, i, nostrum: melioribus utere fatis*

Damas., 1694, B, 4: *Festa, dēcūs, nostrum, certe veniemus in unum*

F. Other means of borrowing, including borrowing of two verses of Vergil in two verses of an epigram, of two or three Vergilian verses in one line, or one Vergilian line in two or three verses.

¹ To the bibliography, one might add such studies as H. Roth, *Untersuchungen über lateinischen Weihgedichte auf Stein* (Diss. Giessen, 1935) and Sebastián Maríné Bigorra, *Inscripciones hispanas en verso* (Barcelona, 1952).

G. Whole verses borrowed, including those with portions of two or more Vergilian verses placed together.

In *Abschnitt II*, larger borrowings (pp. 156-218), Hoogma studies twelve chosen inscriptions: three pagan dedicatory inscriptions, four pagan sepulchral inscriptions, one Christian honorary inscription, and four Christian sepulchral inscriptions. In this section there is an examination of the smaller borrowings within the poem as a whole. The author seeks to learn not only in what ways these inscriptions are dependent in form and content upon Vergil but also whether smaller borrowings are obtained independently throughout the work of Vergil or whether there is an agreement in form and content between the Vergilian and epigraphical verses. An excellent example of his study is the first metrical inscription, Buech. 868, of Rome, ca. A. D. 200. This inscription relates the sacrifice and giving of *simulacra* to Hercules Invictus by the praetor urbanus, Cilo; the ceremony was customary on 12 August at the Ara Maxima. Hoogma notes that a great number of Vergilian reminiscences are drawn from Book VIII where the origin of the cult, the construction of the Ara Maxima, and the sacrifice are described. In a footnote the author points out that there is no trace of the influence of Propertius, IV, 9, an elegy which describes the establishment of the Ara Maxima.

Also in *Abschnitt II*, Hoogma finds that the influence of Vergil is not limited to borrowing of metrical units but sometimes a *carmen* is inspired by a single known *locus* (e. g. soul purification in Book VI) or a famous episode (Dido and Aeneas). In his study of Christian inscriptions, it appears certain that the influence of the Christian poets is not nearly so great as that of classical pagan poets, especially Vergil.

The *Zweiter Teil* (pp. 219-343) consists of a *Verzeichnis der Anlehnungen*. His procedure in this part is to quote the whole Vergilian line first and then cite the line or lines of the verse inscription, indicating the borrowings by means of italics. The type, location, and date of the inscriptions are cited. In the footnotes are many references to other classical authors, especially Ovid, to similar passages in Vergil, etc. Although Hoogma includes the *Grabschrift Vergils*, *Mantua me genuit . . .* and the *Aeneis Proemium*, he does not include the other poem in the *Vitae Vergilanae*. This is unfortunate since the Ballista epitaph occurs twice and references to borrowings from these lines might also throw some light on the authenticity of the *Lives* themselves or at least show the influence of anything remotely identified with Vergil.

His volume concludes with a useful *Register* of the *Carmina Epigraphica* cited in his study according to the numbers in Buecheler I-II, Lommatzsch, Diehl I-II, Ferrua, Ihm, Engstrom, Della Corte, etc.; this citation is followed by the Vergilian verse borrowed, and a statement as to type, location, and date of inscription. This index could have been rendered more useful if it contained a page number reference to this study, especially to pages 1-218.

On the basis of a study of the appearance and use of *Aeneid*, VI, 429 (= XI, 28) conducted by this reviewer for another purpose, the thoroughness of at least this portion is open to question. The phrase from the *Aeneid* is a commonplace in Latin literature, appearing in essence before the *Aeneid* and often thereafter:

Abstulit atra dies et funere mersit acerbo.

In footnote 54, p. 285, Hoogma cites a few other appearances of this phrase; to those, others could be added, e. g.: Cic., *Dom.*, 16, 42; *Quinct.*, 15, 50; *Rep.*, II, 41, 68; Flaccus, *Argon.*, V, 31-2; Sil., *Pun.*, V, 591; Stat., *Theb.*, III, 635-7 and VIII, 375-6; P. Boyancé, "Funus Acerbum," *R. E. A.*, LIV (1952), pp. 275-89; H. I. Marrou, "Épithaphe crétienne d'Hippone à réminiscences vergiliennes," *Libyca*, I (1953), p. 227; S. Aurigemma, *L' "Area" cimiteriale cristiana di Ain Zâra* (Rome, 1932), pp. 54, 69, 82, 100, and 161. To the citations of this phrase in verse inscriptions by Hoogma (pp. 285-7, 329), one may add: Buech., 93, 5-6; 447, 4-5; 1159, 2; 1307, 7-8; 1649, 1-2; Lom., 2079, 2; 2106, 2; and A. Riese, *Carmina in codicibus scripta*, 487^a, 22 (*Epitaphium Vitalis Mimi*).

A further indication of the influence of Vergil upon the verse inscriptions may be seen by a study of the appropriateness of use of this Vergilian phrase. In *Aeneid* VI, Vergil is describing Hades and in particular (427 ff.) the weeping souls of young children snatched from their mothers; in Book XI (27 ff.), Vergil uses the phrase to describe the young Pallas, slain by Mezentius. The phrase as used in the *Carmina epigraphica* almost invariably refers to the untimely death of a young or relatively young person; in over one-half of the poems containing the phrase, the age of the deceased is given, varying from days to 38 years. In other epitaphs the deceased is described in general terms such as young wife. This type of investigation suggests a supplementary chapter which could be added to Hoogma's study or at least indicates another means of approach to the problem, i. e. of examining the felicity of the use of the Vergilian phrase in the verse inscriptions. This is what Hoogma has done with regard to individual poems. Perhaps study of a phrase or series of phrases would give interesting results.

The study of this individual phrase lends credence to the excellent suggestions modestly presented by Hoogma in his fine preface. He comments upon the importance of Vergil as a national poet, the use of Vergil as a school text, and the extensive employment of memory in ancient education. Hoogma offers the suggestion that the combination of these three factors may furnish an explanation for the great frequency of borrowings from Vergil in later classical authors and especially in the *Carmina latina epigraphica*. The infrequency of exact quotations, as may be seen from a study of the phrase from *Aeneid*, VI, 429 and XI, 28, further corroborates his suggestion. One wonders, however, about the part played by the text tradition of Vergil in the borrowings from Vergil by the authors of the verse inscriptions. May the variant textual tradition be reflected to some extent in the infrequency of exact repetition of Vergilian lines?

Dr. Hoogma's investigation will be welcomed by scholars as the definitive study of the influence of the *Aeneid* upon the *Carmina latina epigraphica*. It should stimulate further research on the process of borrowing in other authors. Supplements showing the influence of the *Georgics*, *Eclogues*, *Appendix*, and *Vitae* will complete the investigation of the influence of Vergil upon Latin metrical inscriptions.

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FREEDMEN AND FREEBORN IN THE EPITAPHS OF IMPERIAL ROME.*

Among the thirty-nine thousand odd inscriptions of the city of Rome published in Volume VI of the *Corpus* of Latin inscriptions, more than half, about twenty-two thousand, are an alphabetized collection of tomb inscriptions of the lower population, men, women, and children, without titles of any sort, who have left a record of their names on stones set up in independent and joint burial places along the major roads leading from the city or in cemeteries near the roads. Here is a mass of evidence for the population of the city, largely from the first two and a half centuries of the Empire. The only comprehensive study of the population depending on these inscriptions is the epoch-making paper of Professor Tenney Frank, "Race Mixture in the Roman Empire" published in 1916.¹ His conclusion, based on an investigation of names in the inscriptions, was that nearly ninety percent of the permanent inhabitants of Rome was composed of men of slave stock and that the slaves were predominantly of eastern origin. Frank also analyzed inscriptions of various towns of Italy, Narbonese Gaul, and Spain and concluded that there the percentage of men of slave origin, though not so great as in Rome, was high. These conclusions of Frank, repeated in his

* This paper was completed in November 1959 during my term as member of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton.

¹ *A. H. R.*, XXI (1916), pp. 689-708. Page references to Frank are to this article. Frank's statistics are based not on the entire collection but on the sequence of 13,900 inscriptions designated as *sepulcrales* in *C. I. L.*, VI, Parts 2 and 3.

Economic History of Rome,² gave rise to much discussion, especially, after the Italian translation of the book appeared in 1924. Many Italian scholars made objections. The great historian Gaetano De Sanctis called for a rigorous critical examination which would, he predicted, show that Frank's conclusions were far from being proved.³

There has been no such critical examination, but Frank's views continue to be discussed, often with scepticism. Recently F. G. Maier has questioned the use of statistics from inscriptions because of the incompleteness of the population data for ancient Rome and because of the accidental character of the discoveries.⁴ Frank's conclusion that Greek *cognomina* indicated freedman stock and that the freedmen were mainly of eastern origin has aroused widespread protest. Suggestions have been made that the Greek *cognomina* often belonged to enfranchised *peregrini* and much attention has been given, particularly in Italy, to the view of A. Calderini that the Greek *cognomen* became respectable and even popular and was often given by *Romans* to their children.⁵ Mary L. Gordon produced evidence to show that Greek *cognomina* were given to slaves of western as well as eastern origin⁶ and her objection to the idea that the empire was "orientalized" has been repeated by various scholars, including A. M. Duff and William Linn Westermann.⁷ But Frank's views

² First edition (Baltimore, 1920), pp. 155-64; 2nd ed. (1927), pp. 208-18. Frank found in the orientalizing of the population a major cause of the decline of the Roman Empire. See, for instance, his *History of Rome* (New York, 1923), pp. 565 ff.

³ Review of Italian translation, *Riv. Filol.*, LIII (1925), pp. 287-9.

⁴ "Römische Bevölkerungsgeschichte und Inschriftenstatistik," *Historia*, II (1954), pp. 318-51. Maier is interested in estimates of the entire population of Rome as well as of the men of slave stock. For the latter he concedes that some of the conclusions based on the epitaphs are valid, but urges caution in the use of statistics. On p. 343 (with n. 9), he misinterprets Frank's figures and constructs some figures of his own by adding unlikes. Other critics of Frank have written in general terms, without direct study of the inscriptions. See, for instance, E. Ciccotti, "Motivi biologici e demografici del mondo antico," *Nuova Rivista Storica*, XIV (1930), pp. 45 ff.

⁵ *Aquileia Romana* (Milan, 1930), p. 417.

⁶ "The Nationality of Slaves under the Early Roman Empire," *J. R. S.*, XIV (1924), pp. 93-111.

⁷ A. M. Duff, *Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1928),

have lately had support from Hilding Thylander.⁸ Basing his work on an exhaustive study of the inscriptions of Italian ports, and making use of Leon's analysis of Jewish *cognomina*, Thylander concludes that most men with Greek *cognomina* and many with Latin were freedmen or sons of freedmen of eastern origin, and that Frank's percentages of men of foreign stock were, if anything, too low.⁹ This is not the place to discuss the subject, for which the evidence has been collected by others, but in my opinion Thylander has provided important confirmatory evidence for the eastern origin of most of the freedmen in the Roman populace.

* This paper deals not with the origin of the freedmen but

pp. 1-11 (photographic reprint, 1958, with brief supplement containing corrections and slight bibliographical additions); W. L. Westermann, s. v. "Sklaverei," *R.-E.*, Suppl. VI (1935), cols. 1003 ff. See also Westermann's important posthumous book, *The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity* (*Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society*, XL [1955]), pp. 92, 96-102. Much of his evidence comes from Egypt. With one case from Germany, he notes (p. 96, notes 2-3) the use of Greek names for slaves from Syria, Egypt, Bithynia, Cappadocia, Thrace, etc., regions from which many slaves came to Rome. See M. Bang, *Röm. Mitt.*, XXV (1910), pp. 223-51. Frank's assumption is that slaves with Greek *cognomina* at Rome came in general from regions like these where Greek was the *lingua franca*.

⁸ *Étude sur l'épigraphie latine* (*Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Institutet i Rom*, series in 8^{vo}, V [Lund, 1952]), pp. 134-85. For discussion of Jewish *cognomina*, see pp. 167-9, with citations from H. J. Leon's articles on language and names in the Jewish catacombs of Rome, *T. A. P. A.*, LVIII (1927), pp. 210-33 and LIX (1928), pp. 205-24. Leon shows that Latin *cognomina* are common in these catacombs. On the Greek names of the early imperial bodyguard, composed of German slaves, an important element in Gordon's evidence for the use of Greek names for westerners, Thylander, p. 174, points out that these names are employed only for Nero's guard and attributes them to Nero's fondness for things Greek. Thylander's discussion, Chapter II, on the development of the Roman name has useful material on the decline of the *praenomen* and on evidence from names for the date of inscriptions.

⁹ The study covers the inscriptions of all the major ports of Italy from Aquileia on the Adriatic around the peninsula to Albintimilium in the northwest. The population of the ports, especially of Ostia and Portus (see n. 21 below for Thylander's publication of the inscriptions of Portus), which provide the largest number of inscriptions, was similar to that of Rome. For distinctions in the use of Greek *cognomina* in the various ports, see pp. 181-5.

with the proportion of freedmen and freeborn (the latter including freedmen's sons) in the epitaphs. My interest in the subject results from a reading of all the inscriptions of *C.I.L.* VI in order to determine the distribution of the thirty-five tribes in the population.¹⁰ In inscriptions of senators, knights, and soldiers I found many tribes, but surprisingly few in the epitaphs of men without title, even in inscriptions clearly of the first century A.D., when the tribe, later almost entirely confined to men of high rank and to *militares*, was still used in names of men of low rank. The explanation for the dearth of tribes was soon clear. In general only the freeborn man had the right to attach a tribe to his name,¹¹ and these inscriptions contain a large preponderance of freedmen. This paper makes an attempt to determine how large the preponderance is, and to find an explanation for it.

Since I read the entire collection for another purpose, I have not compiled complete statistics on proportions of freedmen and freeborn. The figures on which I base my conclusions depend on an examination, sometimes of several thousand, sometimes of a few hundred epitaphs in sequence in various sections of the alphabetized collection, with testing of results from time to time in the index of all *nomina*. I believe that the samplings are valid for all the epitaphs. Following the example of the editors of *C.I.L.* VI, I shall refer to these tomb inscriptions of men and women without title as the *sepulcrales* (or the epitaphs).¹²

¹⁰ Tribes are omitted from the index of citizen *nomina*, the only portion of the index of *C.I.L.* VI which has appeared. See Part 6, 1, published in 1926, a decade after Frank's study of race mixture.

¹¹ See Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, III (Leipzig, 1887), pp. 440-2.

¹² In this paper references by number to inscriptions are to *C.I.L.* VI. For the inscriptions described as *sepulcrales*, see Parts 2 and 3, and 4, 1, 10424-29680, with the alphabetized supplements in Part 4, 2 and 3, 34029-36602 and 37857-39082a. The term *sepulcrales* should properly include the epitaphs of senators and *equites* (about 700, published with other inscriptions of those classes), of *militares*, and of freedman bureaucrats. My statistics do not, in general, cover them; nor do they cover the inscriptions of the great *columbaria*, mainly of the early Empire, a somewhat illogical omission since many of the other *sepulcrales* undoubtedly come from *columbaria*, discovered often when records of excavations were inadequate. I have tested the inscriptions of the *columbaria* sufficiently to show that their inclusion would

The names of Roman citizens in the epitaphs (I exclude the slaves)¹³ may be divided into three classes, first those for whose status there is no definite evidence either in the name or in the text of the epitaph, second freedmen, and third freeborn. The first group, which I shall call the *incerti*, comprises, according to testings to be discussed below, roughly two thirds of the names. The freedmen (*libertini*) are indicated by the patron's *praenomen* or *cognomen*—for example M(*arci*) l(*ibertus*) or Atimetil.—in the name or by a reference to a *patronus*, *collibertus*, *conservus*, *contubernalis*, or the like in the epitaph.¹⁴ The freeborn (*ingenui*) are shown by the father's *praenomen*—for example M(*arci*) f(*ilius*)—in the name, by the use of a tribe, occasionally without filiation, and sometimes by internal evidence that a child was born free. Investigations of hundreds of inscriptions in several sequences show never less than twice as many freedmen as freeborn, and sometimes a much larger proportion. Many of

have led to a higher ratio of freedmen to freeborn. Unless otherwise specified, the figures I give apply not to inscriptions but to names, several of which are often found in one inscription.

¹³ It is difficult to estimate the number of slaves because it is often uncertain whether a Eutyches or a Felix is a slave or a freedman with *nomen* omitted. Numbers of slaves vary greatly throughout the *sepulcrales*. They are particularly frequent under the letters E, F, and H, which include many of the favorite slave names. See the list in the text below, with n. 31.

¹⁴ Sometimes the relationship to a patron is indicated by the statement that the person who set up the monument acted as *libertus*, though the term is not placed within the name. The words *verna* and *concupinus* (*a*) attached to a Roman name also indicate freedmen. For the city of Rome two signs of freedman status mentioned by Maier, *op. cit.* (in n. 4 above), p. 342, n. 3, are not pertinent—membership in the college of Augustales, a municipal institution rarely referred to in Roman inscriptions, and enrollment in the Palatine tribe. Freedmen are common in this tribe only in the Transpadana and in Transalpine Gaul. See Mommsen, *op. cit.*, III, p. 441, n. 2. I find only three cases of *libertini* in the Palatina in *C.I.L.* VI (27806, 38918, 39039), and several in other tribes. Most of the names recorded from Rome in the Palatina (they include senators and knights) have filiation. Freedmen's sons as noted by M. L. Gordon, *J.R.S.*, XXI (1931), pp. 68 f. (misleadingly quoted by Maier, who classes freedmen's sons with freedmen), are common in the Palatina; they are found also in some number in the Quirina and are attested in other tribes. For tribes in names of freedmen and freedmen's sons, see my *Voting Districts of the Roman Republic*, *P.M.A.A.R.*, XX (1960), pp. 147-9, esp. n. 55.

the freeborn are, moreover, clearly the sons of freedmen. The ratio of about three freedmen to one freeborn found in the approximately two hundred *sepulcrales* of the common people which the editors of the first volume of the *Corpus* have assigned to the Republic is my minimum estimate for the imperial inscriptions.¹⁵ If it could be assumed that all children of parents with citizen names, who provide less than a fifth of the names in the epitaphs, were freeborn, the proportion of freedmen would be slightly decreased. It is, however, evident that many children were born while the father was still a slave, and I have hesitated to include children among the freeborn unless there is clear evidence of free birth.¹⁶

Obviously the status of the *incerti*, which I have estimated as two thirds of the names, is important for the total ratio of freedmen to freeborn. Here the steady growth of the number of *incerti*, which I do not find noted in discussions of the means

¹⁵ *C. I. L.*, I, 2^a, 1226-1422. The inscriptions include a few men from the lower walks of life with titles. For the Empire my testings were made in various sections of the *sepulcrales*, particularly under F and L and under imperial *nomina*. Among the names with sure status, there are five or six freedmen to one freeborn under the Julii and the Flavii and about fourteen to one in the twenty percent of men of sure status under the Ulpri. (Did later generations tend to give up this new name? There are few senators among the Ulpri in *C. I. L.* VI.) The index of all *nomina* in *C. I. L.* VI shows that about two thirds of the names of sure status under A (which includes many Aurelii) and three quarters under C are freedmen. Partial testing in the index under F and P also shows three quarters freedmen.

¹⁶ In records of parents with different *nomina*, there are sometimes, in the same family, children with the mother's name, who were illegitimate, often because the father was a slave, and others with the father's name, born after his manumission or in any case after the marriage of the parents. See 18122, 25841, and especially 22047 where the son with the father's name has the *cognomen* Legitimus. Among the children discussed below (see text with n. 32), about a quarter of those whose parents have different *nomina* bear the mother's *nomen*, only rarely with the notation Sp(urii) f(ilius). For examples in which both father and son are designated as *liberti*, see 10666 and 21540. For children of imperial freedmen who seem to have died as slaves, see 8542 and 10644. Of interest here is the investigation, recorded on wax tablets of Herculaneum, to determine whether the girl Iusta was born before or after her mother was set free. See V. Arangio-Ruiz, *Parola del Passato*, Fasc. VIII (1948), pp. 129-51, with the publication of the tablets by G. Pugliese Carratelli, pp. 165-84.

of dating inscriptions, is of great importance. In the *sepulcrales* of the Republic only about seven percent of approximately five hundred names lack indication of status, and the status is almost always shown by *praenomen* of father or patron (occasionally by the patron's *cognomen*) in the name. Although in rare cases the man for whom the tomb was erected has no status in his name,¹⁷ the names without status are chiefly secondary, for instance a wife named after a husband with status. Rarely do we have to depend on internal evidence such as a reference to a patron or a *collibertus*. Early imperial inscriptions show a growth in the number of *incerti*, particularly among secondary names, and an increase in the number of epitaphs in which freedman status is indicated only by internal evidence. Nevertheless in two groups of epitaphs which belong mainly to the Julio-Claudian period, those in the great *columbaria* and those from the extensive cemetery outside the Porta Salaria, the names with definite status decidedly outnumber those without it.¹⁸ The situation changes radically in three groups of inscriptions which are later than the first century. The first group is the *sepulcrales* under Trajan's *nomen*, Ulpus, an almost unknown name before the accession of Trajan in 98. Here about eighty percent are *incerti*, and definite status for *liberti* is, except for imperial freedmen, entirely dependent on internal evidence, not on the

¹⁷ That is true of the baker M. Vergilius Eurysaces (*C.I.L.*, I, 2^a, 1203-5), whose tomb stands outside the Porta Maggiore.

¹⁸ For the *columbaria*, where slaves and freedmen provide most of the burials and where status is usually given in the major names but is sometimes omitted for subsidiary names, see 3926-8397; 33062-33710; 37301-37740. For the cemetery outside the Porta Salaria, with the important discoveries made when the Via Po (often referred to in *C.I.L.* by its former name, Corso di Porta Pinciana) was opened early in this century, see the excellent discussion of the date and character of the burials by G. Gatti, *Bull. Com.*, XXXIII (1905), pp. 154-82. (Only about a third of the names in the inscriptions published there lack status.) The cemetery consisted of rows of small *columbaria* divided by alleys which were parallel to the old Via Salaria. The inscriptions from this cemetery make up more than half the *sepulcrales* in *C.I.L.*, VI, 4, 3 (1933). See Bang's statement there, p. 3860. The stones were usually travertine *cippi* or marble tablets, mainly of the type used for *columbaria*. There are some burials from the time of the Claudian emperors, and a few of later date, but most of them date from the late Republic and the Julian emperors.

name form.¹⁹ Approximately the same percentage of *incerti* and the same general conditions are found in the epitaphs of two cemeteries discovered in the last thirty years, both dating from the second century and later, with most of the epitaphs from the second century. They are the cemetery under St. Peter with 105 names²⁰ and that at Isola Sacra between Ostia and Portus with about 500 names.²¹

It is primarily in the name of the freedman, not the freeborn, that the omission of status is apparent. The decline accompanies the decline of the *praenomen*, which in the early Empire led to the substitution of the patron's *cognomen* for his *praenomen*

¹⁹ The percentage of *incerti* is high under earlier imperial names, ca. 72 for the Julii and 75 for the Flavii, but these names continued to be common in the second century. See n. 22 below. For the Julii it is significant that more than sixty percent of the *incerti* are in the approximately forty percent of the epitaphs with the abbreviated heading D(is) M(anibus), which became common under the Flavians and is found in about eighty-three percent of the *sepulcrales* of the Ulpii. The earliest dated instance of D.M. known to A. Degraasi belongs to 58 A.D. (7303). See *Riv. Filol.*, XXXVII (1959), p. 213. See also his important discussion of the means of dating inscriptions in his inaugural address as Professor of Latin Epigraphy at the University of Rome, *L'epigrafia latina in Italia nell'ultimo ventennio e i criteri del nuovo insegnamento* (Padua, 1957), pp. 9-12.

²⁰ See the list of names from this cemetery in J. Toynbee and J. Ward Perkins, *The Shrine of St. Peter and the Vatican Excavations* (London, 1956), Appendix A (with additional names in Appendix D for which the inscriptions are not yet published). Eighteen or nineteen of the names surely belong to freedmen, of whom seven or eight, several of whom are not so listed by the authors, were imperial freedmen (nos. 3, 6, 7, 8, 14, 70, 80, perhaps 85, who may have been an imperial freedman rather than an imperial slave, as he is listed). I would class nos. 37, 61, 62, 88, 95, 97 as *ingenui*. The other 79 names are *incerti*, though twenty-one of them, children of parents with citizen names, may have been *ingenui*. I find no reason for the "Freeborn?" placed by the authors after a number of other names.

²¹ See G. Calza, *La Necropoli del Porto di Roma dell' Isola Sacra* (Rome, 1940). For a complete collection of all inscriptions from Isola Sacra, see H. Thylander, *Inscriptions du Port d'Ostie* (Lund, 1952, vol. IV, 1, of publication cited in n. 8 above), inscriptions numbered A 1-347. In the inscriptions with names well enough preserved to show the status of the individuals, I find 39 *liberti*, including 10 *liberti Aug.*, 44 *ingenui* and 410 *incerti*. Although the *ingenui* include knights and other people with titles, most of the epitaphs of Isola Sacra are of the type of the Roman *sepulcrales*.

in names like C. Iulius Atimeti l. Cotus (5429), but it went further. For freedmen the use of *libertus* in the name, either with *praenomen* or with *cognomen* of the patron, tends to disappear unless the patron was the emperor. It was still in use in official documents, as is shown by the Basis Capitolina (975), a list with status of Roman *vici magistri* dated in 136 A.D. But in other inscriptions there is a marked decline, particularly striking for the freedmen of the emperor's freedmen and more marked for men than for women. Here my investigations are supplemented by use of the index of all *nomina* in *C.I.L.* VI. Among the Julii, freedmen of the emperor's freedmen (or of their descendants) are frequently listed as C. Iulius C. l. or Ti. Iulius Ti. l., with many cases like the one cited above of the substitution of *cognomen* for *praenomen*. The instances are less common for the Claudii and markedly less for the Flavii. The majority of the instances of Ti. Claudius Ti. l. and T. Flavius T. l. come from the official record on the Basis Capitolina.²² The same record is the source for the only examples, two in number, of M. Ulpius M. l., and for one of the four P. Aelii P. l.²³ A similar decline in the use of *libertus* in the name forms

²² According to my count, there are twenty cases of Ti. Claudius Ti. l. in the index, thirteen of them from the Basis Capitolina, and fourteen of T. Flavius T. l., nine of them from the Basis. There are also a number of instances in the index of the substitution of patron's *cognomen* for *praenomen* and a few awkward names in which the entire name of a patron who was *Aug. lib.* is given. See, for instance, 8761, 15190, 18112. Of the many examples of freedmen Julii with imperial *praenomina* (C., Ti.), fifteen come from the Basis, an indication, supported by many records of intermarriages of Julii with Ulprii, Aelii, and Aurelii, that there were many Julii in the second century. Only about a tenth of the epitaphs of Julii with *libertus* in the name have the heading D.M., which did not become common until the Flavians. See n. 19 above. Although G. Vitucci, in the excellent article "Libertus" in Ruggiero's *Dizionario Epigrafico* (published 1958), notes the omission of the patron's *praenomen* in the freedman's name, he does not attempt to date it. On the evolution of the name, see pp. 909-20.

²³ There is one case of an Ulpia with the *praenomen* of a patron Marcus in the name (3413), Ulpiae M. lib. Dmoidi; cf. 1913, Ulpia C. l. Hedone, apparently a freedwoman of a non-imperial Ulpius. For the other imperial *nomina* from the Julii to the Aurelii, there are examples of freedmen with *libertus* in the names, but all these *nomina* were already known among senators who may well have had freedmen, Aelii with this designation, even those with the *praenomina* P., L.,

of non-imperial freedmen is apparent in the second century inscriptions of the cemeteries of St. Peter and Isola Sacra. *Augusti Liberti* occur in both cemeteries, but *libertus* (*liberta*) is found in no other name from St. Peter and in the name of only one man—and five women—from the much larger group at Isola Sacra.²⁴ It is clear that at least in Rome a name form like M. Cornelius M. l. is an indication (though not a proof) of pre-second century date and that extensive occurrence of names without status is often a sign of late first or of second century date.

The decline of the use of *libertus* in the freedman's name is undoubtedly a reflection of the freedman's unwillingness to declare his inferior status and his dependence on and obligation to his patron. But another factor was the growing importance of the large group of freedmen whose patron was the emperor. *Augusti libertus* became a sort of title, often used from Flavian times without the *nomen* of the *libertus*, or placed not after the *nomen* but after the *cognomen*, and frequently followed by an official title, *a rationibus*, *ab epistulis*, etc. In the index of *C.I.L.* VI there are only two examples of this order under the Julii, but there is a steady increase from the Claudii to the Aurelii, with a large number from the imperial freedman bureaucracy.²⁵

For the freeborn of the common people there may have been a decline in the use of filiation such as is apparent in the names of senators (*I. L. S.*, 862-1312) from the latter half of the second

and T., belonging to Hadrian, Lucius Verus, and Antoninus Pius, may well be earlier than the second century. One of the two, L. Aelii (10769) is specifically designated as a freedman of Sejanus, and a [P.] Aelius P. l. (4892) comes from the Vigna Codini, whose inscriptions date mainly from Tiberius to Claudius. Another P. Aelius P. l. (10788) lacks the heading D.M., which is, however, found in the remaining example, 34233.

²⁴ A 52 Thylander (*op. cit.* in n. 21), A. Cascennius Galli l. Herma, with a woman in the same inscription designated as Caesennia L. l. Erotis. For the other women designated as *libertae* in the name, see A 21, 43, 80, 276.

²⁵ My count from the index of *C.I.L.* VI of the examples of *Aug. lib.* after the *cognomen* is as follows: Julii 2; Claudii 9; Flavii 17; Ulpii 21; Aelii 32; Aurelii 46; with about forty percent of the cases (fifty percent for the first three names) from the *officiales*. On *Augusti liberti*, see Vitucci, *op. cit.* (in n. 22), pp. 933-46.

century to the third. But while the same freedman's name appears both with and without the designation *libertus* (10303, 15723, 17639, 33549), I have found no such cases among *ingenui*. The only evidence on the subject that I can detect in the *sepulcrales* is that filiation is more common for children who have tribes, mainly a pre-second century group,²⁶ than for children without tribes. But it is to be noted that filiation continues in the imperial *nomina*. The index shows that, after the Julio-Claudians, the freeborn descendants of the emperors' freedmen, T. Flavii T.f., M. Ulpri M.f., P. Aelii P.f., have their status recorded oftener than do the freedmen's freedmen. There seems to have been a persistent tendency to make clear for the lower population the full citizenship which belonged to the freeborn but not to the freedman.

My conclusion is that the majority of the *incerti*, and a large majority of those not named with their parents, are freedmen. This conclusion is supported not only by the character of the *cognomina*, a much discussed subject which I shall consider later, but also by another feature of the epitaphs which has had little attention, the association in them of men and women with the same *nomina*.

It would seem likely that, where no blood relationship is noted, people with the same *nomen* in an epitaph originated from the same slave *familia*. The lists of men and women with the same *nomen* (and the same *praenomen* for the men) suggests that possibility even when the designation *libertus* is lacking. Still more striking are the marriages or illegitimate unions of men and women with the same *nomen*. They are often described as *colliberti*,²⁷ but in the majority of the records neither man nor

²⁶ See Degrassi, *op. cit.* (at end of n. 19), p. 12. My collection of names with tribes bears out his statement. Many of the tribes are in names lacking *cognomina*, which rarely occur after Nero, and only a minority are in epitaphs with the heading D.M. There is a steady diminution of names with tribes under imperial *nomina* from the Julii to the Ulpri; for the Ulpri I find only one case, 15595. Sporadic examples of tribes of later date are 18378, 165 A.D. and 26279, time of the Severi. A record of 143 A.D. (20217) is specifically described as the restoration of an inscription *qui perivit*. There are, of course, many second century examples of tribes in the names of *militares*, including *vigiles*.

²⁷ For the combination *collibertus* (*a*) and *coniuna* (*uxor, maritus*),

woman has indication of status. According to my estimate, these unions of men and women with the same *nomen* make up about forty percent of the marriages recorded in the *sepulcrales*.²⁸ The percentage should probably be higher, for I have not included in my count the cases where the *nomen* of one of the mates was omitted, probably because it was identical with that of the other. Moreover, many of the husbands and wives with different *nomina* belong to two closely related families. That is demonstrably true of men and women with imperial *nomina*, among whom, in addition to unions with mates of the same *nomen* amounting to from thirty-eight to forty-seven percent, approximately another twenty-five percent are between men and women bearing two different imperial *nomina*.²⁹ Besides there are the unions of Julii with Livii and Vipsanii, of Claudii with Antonii, and, in the nobility, cases like the Plautia and Uргу-

see, for instance, the following in sequence: 24328, 24399, 24677, 24807-8, 25299, 25836. For identity of *nomen* resulting from marriages between freedwomen and their patrons, see 24711, 25146, 25319, 25485, 25832. For an example of a woman who married her freedman, a type of union condemned by Septimius Severus (*Cod.*, V, 4, 3), see 25504.

²⁸ The percentages in my testing show some variation. The smallest, ca. 26% (5 out of 19 unions), comes from the small group under St. Peter. At Isola Sacra the percentage is about 38. It is about 36 under the Pompeii (24472-577) and the Valerii (27922-28297) and in a thousand inscriptions in sequence under M and N (21862-22861). But it is in general higher under the most common names, the great imperial *nomina* from the Julii to the Aelii (see next note). Under the entire letter F the percentage is about 42. Approximately 48% of the children discussed below (see n. 32) are the offspring of parents with the same *nomen*.

²⁹ For unions between men and women with the same *nomen*, my figures, based on the *sepulcrales*, are as follows: Julii 46%; Claudii 40; Flavii 47; Ulpri 38; Aelii 41. The percentages of unions with mates bearing other imperial *nomina* are highest for the Ulpri and the Aelii (ca. 38 and 30). Though later imperial names are more common, the marriages here include a number of Julii and Claudii, a reflection perhaps of the fact that these names were widespread in the populace. For variation in the *nomen* of an individual, see 8432, Ulpia sive Aelia Aug. lib. Apate. Cf. Vitucci, *op. cit.* (in n. 22), p. 912. Frequently the *nomen* of a husband who is *Aug. lib.* is omitted, and one cannot be sure that his *nomen* is identical with that of a wife who has an imperial *nomen*. When the names of the two are identical, sometimes the *nomen* is used in the plural. See, for the Aelii, 10783, 10852.

lanius who bear the *nomina* of the parents of M. Plautius Silvanus, consul 2 B. C.³⁰ The possibility should always be considered that some of these unions, especially under the common imperial names, are between freedmen's children or grandchildren, but the large number of instances suggests that a common background in the *familia* is oftener the basis of the union.

The *cognomina*, like the marriages between mates with the same *nomen*, show little variation between the *certi* and the *incerti*. The pertinent fact for the *cognomina* is that they include a large number of names attested for slaves in the alphabetized *sepulcrales*. The freedman after manumission retained his slave name as *cognomen*, and men with the commonest slave names are likely to be freedmen. The great majority of the *cognomina*—seventy percent according to Frank, whose estimates are, if anything, too low—are Greek. The most frequent are Epaphroditus, Eutychus (Eutyches), Hermes, Onesimus, Phoebus, with various feminine equivalents.³¹ The repeated use of these and other familiar slave names as *cognomina* is a strong argument against the suggestion that many of the men with Greek *cognomina* are enfranchised *peregrini*. The most common Latin *cognomina*—Faustus, Felix, Fortunatus, Ianuarius, Primus, for instance—are also frequent as names of slaves, but these names, especially the first three, are common for freedmen's sons.

³⁰ 29587 (a record of joint burial, not necessarily marriage). See *Pros. Imp. Rom.*, s. v. "Urgulania." Much latent information about intermarriages in the senatorial class probably exists in the *sepulcrales*. A study of the marriages outside the imperial family of the imperial freedmen and freedwomen might be profitable for evidence on relations between emperors and the nobility.

³¹ On common slave names, see Frank's list, p. 692, and the detailed statistics not available to him in J. Baumgart's useful dissertation, *Die römischen Sklavennamen* (Breslau, 1936). Baumgart's study collects from *C. I. L.* VI, without distinction, the names of slaves and the *cognomina* of men and women surely to be classed as former slaves. In the absence of an index of *cognomina* in *C. I. L.* VI, consultation of the alphabetized *sepulcrales* shows clearly that the names cited as most frequent are well attested for slaves. Maier's discussion (*op. cit.* in n. 4), pp. 342 f., suffers from his failure to distinguish between freedmen and freedmen's sons (p. 321, n. 4). The latter often took good old Roman *cognomina*, and the list of them given by Maier can be extensively increased. Such names also occur for freedmen, but more rarely. See, however, the discussion of Thylander, *op. cit.* (in n. 8), pp. 122 f.

The suggestion of Calderini, frequently repeated by others in more definite form, that it became the fashion to use Greek *cognomina* breaks down on an examination of the names of parents and children in the epitaphs. That is clear from Frank's statistics (p. 693) from the *sepulcrales* in *C.I.L.* VI, Parts 2 and 3. In the series he found 1347 epitaphs which give the names of father and son. Sixty-four percent of the fathers' *cognomina* are Greek and thirty-eight of the sons'. Forty-six percent of the fathers with Greek *cognomina* gave their sons Latin *cognomina*, while only eleven percent of the fathers with Latin *cognomina* gave their sons Greek *cognomina*. In a number of these cases the mother's *cognomen* was Greek. The influence of the mother's *cognomen* led Thylander, in his study of names in the Italian ports, to consider the names of children of both sexes in records which give the names of both parents. He collected 537 such names of children, and I have gathered the same number in sequence from the Roman *sepulcrales* under the letters F to S.³² The following table shows the results for the ports and for Rome:

<i>Cognomina</i> of Parents	<i>Cognomina</i> of Children	
	Greek	Latin
1. Both Greek	Ports 100	91
	Rome 123	93
2. Father Greek	Ports 63	68
Mother Latin	Rome 37	67
3. Father Latin	Ports 22	60
Mother Greek	Rome 37	90
4. Both Latin	Ports 15	118
	Rome 11	79

In spite of certain differences, the figures for Rome accord with the conclusions stated by Thylander for the ports: 1) that

³² See Thylander, *op. cit.* (in n. 8), pp. 123-5. My collection is from the *sepulcrales*, 17478-26713. I have omitted a few names of whose classification I was not sure. I have considered as Greek not only names of obvious Greek formation, including those in -ianus, -inus, more commonly given to freedmen's sons than to freedmen, but also ethnic names like Atticus, Syrus, which were well established in Latin usage. For purposes of comparison I have followed Thylander in classing Hilarus as Greek, though I should have preferred to follow Frank in taking it as an established Latin word.

parents, both of whom had Greek *cognomina*, gave their children Greek *cognomina* slightly more often than they did Latin but that the Greek *cognomina* diminished decidedly in the second generation (by forty-three percent in Rome, by forty-seven percent in the ports; 2) that where one parent had a Greek *cognomen* and one a Latin, Latin *cognomina* predominate in the children, showing a marked increase when the father had a Latin *cognomen*; 3) that when both parents had Latin *cognomina*, the Greek *cognomen* was rare for the children (approximately one case in eight in Rome, one in nine in the ports).

Obviously the Greek *cognomina* diminished from generation to generation, and the predominance of Greek *cognomina* in the inscriptions is to be explained by new manumissions. There is evidence in the *cognomina* of municipal magistrates and eventually in the senate that the Greek *cognomen* had become more respectable in the late first and in the second century, but usually it is a sign of freedman stock or, particularly in the senate, of the enfranchised *peregrinus* or his descendants.³³ In the Roman *sepulcrales* of the common people, the Greek *cognomen* is, I believe, a sign either of freedman status or of descent from a freedman father or grandfather. The suggestion that it became the fashion to give children Greek *cognomina* is definitely disproved.

And when the Greek *cognomen* appears in a Roman sepulchral inscription without indication of status and without the name of father or mother, the bearer is, I believe, in the great majority of cases before Caracalla a freedman who, following a custom which became fairly general by the second century, refrains from indicating his origin in his name form. The situation may have changed after the wide extension of citizenship which culminated in the Edict of Caracalla. By that time slaves and

³³ The Greek *cognomen* appears among municipal magistrates at Pompeii. See the *duumviri* N. Istacidius N. f. Cilix and L. Iulius Ponticus, *C. I. L.*, X, 857, 827. Cf. M. L. Gordon, *J. R. S.* XVII (1927), pp. 173 f. For Ostia, see F. Wilson, *P. B. S. R.*, XIII (1935), p. 59. See also Gordon, *J. R. S.*, XXI (1931), pp. 70 ff., with n. 9 on p. 70. For Greek names in the senate, see the second-third century senatorial lists collected by Lambrechts and Barbieri. For that period as for an earlier time, Tacitus' statement, *Ann.*, XIII, 27, that *plerique senatores* were of servile descent, is probably exaggerated. See R. Syme, *Tacitus* (Oxford, 1958), II, pp. 612 f.

accordingly freedmen seem to have been less numerous. But the great bulk of the epitaphs are earlier than Caracalla, and even if we assume that all the children were freeborn, the majority of the *incerti*, not less, I think, than three fourths, are to be classed as freedmen. And the freeborn named were, in large numbers, children of freedmen whose tombs were erected by their parents or who themselves set up monuments to their parents. Grandchildren of freedmen are also attested, but much more rarely.

Freedmen also loom large in the epitaphs of Italy and the western provinces. The subject deserves a thorough investigation, with special attention to the well-preserved cemeteries of Pompeii. There can be no doubt that there are proportionately more *ingenui* in the municipalities than in Rome, though there are many towns where the *libertini* are more numerous.³⁴ In the republican epitaphs of the lower population in Italian towns over a third of the names preserved (about 37%) belong to freedmen, a large figure, but far smaller than the three quarters in the republican epitaphs of the capital.³⁵

There was special reason for a larger proportion of *libertini*

³⁴ Note the relative frequency of filiation, even when unaccompanied by titles, in the epitaphs of Isola Sacra (see n. 21 above) which are more like the epitaphs of Rome than those of most municipalities. Frank's statistics of the percentage of Greek *cognomina* in Italy (p. 701), though lower than his 70% estimate for Rome, are high: Latium, including Ostia, 64% (*C.I.L.* XIV); Apulia to Picenum 53% (IX); Cisalpine Gaul 46% (V). See also the figures, p. 702. But though Thylander notes, *op. cit.* (in n. 8), pp. 184 f., that the freedmen are disproportionately represented in the epitaphs of the ports, neither he nor anyone else, as far as I know, has investigated the relative frequency of freedmen and freeborn in municipalities. I am doubtful about the value of the figures I have collected on the subject, for chance discoveries of *columbaria* may account for the fact that freedmen are in the majority at Casinum, for instance, while freeborn are more numerous at Hispellum. Except at Ostia, whose population was too much like Rome's to provide a contrast, the records are sufficiently full only at Pompeii to supply adequate comparative material, and the picture at Pompeii has changed with the discovery of many more freedman burials than were known when *C.I.L.* X was published in 1883. See the comments of Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1957), p. 580, n. 23.

³⁵ *C.I.L.*, I, 2*, 1423-2172. From this group of inscriptions I have considered only the *sepulcrales* of people without title.

in the capital. The slaves who had the skills necessary to win freedom probably had a better chance in the city. But another reason, which I do not find stressed in modern discussions of the freedmen, was that freedmen, not slaves, were eligible for the free grain distribution in the capital and that masters are reported to have brought their slaves to Rome and to have freed them in order to have them fed by the state. Such manumissions were so extensive after Pompey reorganized the grain supply in 57-56 that a special census of *libertini* had to be made.³⁶

Yet the indication of the epitaphs that in the common people of the city freedmen were some three times as numerous as freeborn cannot reflect accurately the character of the population. We know that the number of freeborn declined steadily, *minore in dies plebe ingenua*, Tacitus says (*Ann.*, IV, 27); we know too that the freedmen became so numerous that senators hesitated to mark them out by a special dress for fear that the small number of freeborn in the city would be apparent (*Ann.*, XIII, 27). But freeborn men cannot have diminished as rapidly as the epitaphs suggest. Even if the old families among the people died out as we know the nobility did, it seems impossible that the new families created by the freedmen would have disappeared in like manner. It is incredible that the population of Rome should have been renewed almost entirely by the manumission of slaves. In spite of the *penuria ingenuorum*, there must always have been more freeborn than freedmen.

What is the explanation of the predominance of the freedmen, already apparent in the epitaphs of the late Republic? There was, I believe, a special reason why the freedmen wished to leave their names on enduring stone. Unlike the average man in the freeborn population, they had something to record, something in which they felt as much pride as the men who shared the space along the major roads and in the cemeteries, senators, knights, and soldiers, felt in their titles and honors. The freedmen had won the *tria nomina* of the Roman citizen, and the

³⁶ Dio, XXXIX, 24, 1. Cf. M. Gelzer, *Pompeius* (Munich, 1949), p. 157. For the Augustan period, see Dion. Hal., *Ant.*, IV, 24, 5, and for later periods, Philo, *Leg. ad Gaium*, 23 and *Schol.* on Persius 5, 73. Cf. Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, III, p. 446, n. 1. This evidence is discounted by Duff, *op. cit.* (in n. 7), pp. 20, 21, n. 1, who emphasizes Augustus' exclusion of freedmen from his *congiaria* (Suet., *Aug.* 42).

inscription of their names is, I suggest, a memorial of their citizenship. If they were rich like Trimalchio, they could purchase a park and erect a splendid tomb. If they had small means, they could perhaps obtain a small lot, twelve feet square, and place on it a stone, sometimes with a portrait in the toga, always with the new Roman name, written almost invariably in Latin. Often the freedman put up the monument not for himself but for a patron, a friend, a wife, still oftener for a child who died young, a child whose name is frequently recorded with the filiation and the tribe that only the freeborn could use. The monument belongs to the freedman as well as to his patron, his friend, his wife, or his child. If the freedman could afford no tomb of his own, he could frequently take advantage of the benefaction of a patron, who, with the freedman's desire for a record of his name in mind, left a monument to his freedmen and freedwomen and their posterity—*libertis libertabus posterisque eorum*. There the freedman's name could be inscribed in marble under the niches of the *columbaria* or in the spaces of the common tomb. The freedman who had no such inherited rights could purchase an *olla*, a funeral jar, in the common tomb of others, and an accompanying *titulus* to bear his name.³⁷

Where, one may ask, were the burial places of the freeborn members of the lower population? Except for the freedmen's children, particularly the ones who died young, there is singularly little evidence. Some of them undoubtedly left the city and sought their fortunes in the cities of Italy and in the empire. But there too they were often crowded out by freedmen. Many must have remained in Rome and have been buried without inscriptions in the potters' fields, like the one on the Esquiline, later covered by the gardens of Maecenas,³⁸ or in places like

³⁷ The name itself is sufficient to show citizenship. I find only one reference in the epitaphs to manumission, a subject that is prominent in the conversation of the freedmen at Trimalchio's dinner. See 28228 (Buecheler, *C. E.*, 1054): Valeria O. I. Lycisca XII annorum nata Romam veni.

quae mihi iura dedit civis dedit et mihi vivae
quo inferrer tum cum parvola facta cinis.

³⁸ Many of the pits (*puticuli*) on the Esquiline, which served as mass graves for the poor, were discovered soon after 1870 in the vicinity of the Via Napoleone Terzo. Unfortunately the promised publication of the finds did not appear, and we are limited for information to

the space behind the tombs at Isola Sacra where the ashes are found without name in amphorae sunk in the sands. It would appear that they were little interested in having their names survive.

The social and economic condition of the freeborn is at least partly responsible for this seeming lack of interest. At Rome there were no distinctions for the freeborn like the careers as imperial bureaucrats and as *apparitores magistratuum* available for imperial freedmen and the more prosperous freedmen of private citizens. The freeborn of Rome were also, in the main, shut out of the crafts and the professions.⁸⁹ The epitaphs of *officiales privati*—merchants, workmen, craftsmen, physicians, artists, architects, professors—show perhaps a larger proportion of freedmen than do the epitaphs of men without title. There was sound basis for Umbricius' reason for moving away from Rome (Juvenal 3, 21-2):

artibus, inquit, honestis
nullus in urbe labor, nulla emolumenta laborum.

The success of the freedmen in securing much of the burial space not in the hands of men of rank is an indication of the numbers, the wealth, and the initiative of the entire class. Signs of their success are already apparent at the end of the Republic. There can be no doubt that in the first two centuries of our era freedmen were a large element of the population of Rome and that much of the business life of the city was in their hands. One can hardly question that their descendants intermarried with the remnants of the old Roman lower population, for there was a long tradition at Rome of intermarriage between old and

Lanciani's rather general articles, *Bull. Com.*, II (1874), pp. 46-53; III (1875), pp. 41-54. This is the more regrettable for the time of the abandonment of the cemetery is fixed (cf. Horace, *Serm.*, I, 8, 8-16 with the *scholia*). See Jordan-Huelsen, *Topographie der Stadt Rom*, I, 3 (Berlin, 1907), pp. 268-70.

⁸⁹ *C. I. L.*, VI, 9102-10043, 33803-936; 37771-883. For statistics from these inscriptions, see G. Kuehn, *De opificum Romanorum condicione privata quaestiones* (Halle, 1910), and Gummerus, *s. v.* "Industrie und Handel," *R.-E.*, cols. 1496-1511. For Rome, see Helen Jefferson Loane, *Industry and Commerce of the City of Rome* (Baltimore, 1938) and Tenney Frank, *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, V (Baltimore, 1940), Chap. VIII, esp. p. 235. Maier, *op. cit.*, pp. 347-51, shows his characteristic scepticism toward statistics based on these inscriptions.

new citizens. It seems likely that most of the Roman populace eventually had the blood of slaves in their veins.

But statistics based on the epitaphs of the common people cannot be used to determine the proportion of slave stock at any period.⁴⁰ The names in the epitaphs do not give us a cross section of the population. Instead, as I hope my study of the decline of *libertus* in the freedman's name has shown, they belong primarily to one group in the city—to the freedmen, not infrequently associated with their sons and daughters. The epitaphs record the great achievement of the freedman's life, the acquisition for themselves and for their children of the Roman name. Sometimes besides their names the freedmen have left their portraits which we can examine today on the Appian Way or in the great Roman museums. Even though a *cognomen* like Apollodorus or Irenaeus betrays their foreign origin, they look grim and stern as they thought old Romans ought to look. And, carefully draped on their shoulders, they wear the toga to confirm the proud declaration of the *tria nomina, civis Romanus sum*.

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⁴⁰ On this point I agree with Maier, but the statistics I have given in this paper show that I do not share his pessimism about securing from the epitaphs important data for the population of imperial Rome. I differ with Frank's view (p. 690) that the epitaphs "represent on the whole the ordinary type of urban plebeians," because I hold that the proportion of freed slaves in the epitaphs is much higher than that in the population. In reaching that conclusion I have depended on sources not available to Frank—the index of *nomina* in *C.I.L.* VI and the newly discovered dated inscriptions of St. Peter and Isola Sacra. But Frank's comprehensive study of the inscriptions remains fundamental.

HERODOTUS ON THE CAUSE OF THE GRECO-PERSIAN WARS.

(Herodotus, I, 5)

The opening chapters of Herodotus are concerned with the origin of the war between Greece and Persia. They introduce not only the main subject but also the Lydian λόγος, both of which come into view when we read of Croesus in I, 5: ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἔρχομαι ἐρέων ὥς οὕτω ἢ ἄλλως πως ταῦτα ἐγένετο, τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς πρῶτον ὑπάρξαντα ἀδίκων ἔργων ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, τοῦτον σημήνας προβήσομαι κ.τ.λ. This sentence raises three questions which I shall consider in the following paper.

In the first place what is meant by ἀδίκων ἔργων? The phrase is to be explained by considering the following chapters which deal with the predecessors of Croesus. We can show that Herodotus here is distinguishing between various degrees of aggression or international injustice.

Secondly, the use of οἶδα here appears to be odd, since Herodotus is not describing a simple fact but incorporates a point of view (outlined in section I) into his statement. I suggest therefore that we should not treat the passage as though Herodotus were distinguishing between the "mythical period" on the one hand and the "historical period" on the other. He is not distinguishing between what did not happen (or probably did not) and what did; instead, he is saying that events need a certain degree of importance or magnitude before they can be relevant as causes of the great events of his own time. For this reason I give an examination of other passages in Herodotus where οἶδα occurs.

The third section compares what is said of Croesus here with other statements about him in the Lydian λόγος, and suggests that Herodotus' dependence on pro-Athenian sources may help to explain the discrepancies. The paper is divided as the third part deals with a different subject from the other two, and the second part, although it overlaps the first, is more tentative.

I

The sentence quoted occurs at a point where Herodotus is discussing the causes of the great wars, thereby taking up the last clause of the preface—τά τε ἄλλα καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι.¹ He now contrasts his own view with that of the Persians and Phoenicians,² who, he says, had traced the origin of the wars to Io. In Herodotus' account, however, Croesus replaces Io as first cause. The words πρῶτον ὑπάρξαντα look forward³ to I, 6—οὗτος ὁ Κροῖσος βαρβάρων πρῶτος τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν τοὺς μὲν κατεστρέψατο Ἑλλήνων κ.τ.λ. In order to explain the point of the contrast in I, 5, I shall expound first the main features of the views attributed to the Persians and Phoenicians.

The Persian λόγιοι stated that Phoenicians were ultimately responsible, since they had taken Io from Argos. Some merchants traded with the city and left with the king's daughter⁴ for Egypt. This, said the Persians, constituted the first wrong, and was avenged later when some Greeks took the king's daughter Europa from Tyre. The balance of aggression was next disturbed by the Greeks, who took Medea from Colchis and refused to return her on the grounds that no compensation had been paid for Io. This petty lawlessness encouraged Paris to take Helen; and, again, he refused to comply with a demand for her return.

Wrongdoing so far had been confined to the abduction of royal princesses. Now the Greeks, in the Persian view, committed a serious crime, for they were the first of the two nations to campaign against the other. They made a grievance out of the abduction, and actually attacked Troy, although the Persians, like reasonable men, had not been prepared to engage their country on behalf of their wronged families. The ruin and

¹ Myres, *Herodotus, the Father of History* (1953), p. 61 says: "Apart from speculative and prehistoric motives, the first wrongdoer was Croesus—not because he attacked Greek cities: his predecessors since Gyges had all done that—but because, having exacted tribute, he failed to protect them." This is a permissible view of Greco-Lyidian relations, but is not what Herodotus says (see I, 6).

² How and Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* (1928), I, p. 53. The story of the λόγιοι is at any rate anti-Greek in design.

³ Jacoby, *R.-E.* Suppl. 2 (1913), s. v. "Herodotus," cols. 337 f.

⁴ The same "cherchez la femme" motif occurs in the history of early Rome. Cf. Livy, I, 9 f. and Florus, I, 1: *Et haec statim causa bellorum*,

destruction of Troy thereby became the ἀρχὴ τῆς ἑχθροῦς. (The Phoenician account is not important here, as it virtually denies that the rape of Io could be a *casus belli*, on the grounds that it was not even an abduction but a royal escapade.)

The Persian account distinguishes between two kinds of aggression as between Greeks and Persians. First occurred a number of abductions—μέχρι μὲν ὧν τούτου ἀρπαγὰς μούνας εἶναι παρ' ἀλλήλων; the second was initiated by the campaign against Troy (and would correspond to an advance from the casual adventures of traders to deliberate military raids).⁵ Since the notion of cause is clearly associated with the idea of blame,⁶ the present account holds the Greeks responsible on several grounds. (a) In the Phoenician view Io was not abducted and the Greeks therefore had no occasion to take Europa. The Greeks themselves, then, started the sequence of abductions which culminated in the Persian wars. (b) Even if Io was abducted, the rape of Europa made things even; the Greeks who took Medea started the course of aggression all over again. (c) Abduction *per se* did not constitute a *casus belli*, and the campaign against Troy was therefore unprovoked.

This account relies upon two criteria to establish an ἀδίκημα, one abduction, the other campaigning (ἀρπάζειν and στρατεύεσθαι). Whichever criterion is adopted, the tenor of the argument is to make the Greeks responsible. According to this historical standard, warfare between nations is caused by misbehaving traders and (perhaps more adequately) by military raids against an individual town.

Herodotus, however, chooses Croesus as the man who first committed acts of aggression against the Greeks (ἀδικοῦ ἔργα⁷). It is evident from his language that he is using a different criterion of responsibility from those already described. He says of Croesus that he subdued (κατεστρέψατο⁸) the Ionians, Aeolians,

⁵ The interest in the early development of power is more explicit in Thuc., I, 1-20.

⁶ See Sealey, *C. Q.*, VII (1957), pp. 7 f. Also his detailed examination of Herodotean usage of *πρόφασις*. But Herodotus' view of Croesus is founded on an idea of power-politics, as well as "a chain of grievances."

⁷ To be distinguished from the ἔργα of Herodotus I, 1. See Jacoby, col. 334.

⁸ Radet, *La Lydie*, etc. (1893), pp. 212 f. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* (1895), II, pp. 498 f.

and Dorians in Asia, and was on terms of friendship with the Lacedaemonians.⁹ In what follows he is at pains to distinguish campaigning from subjugation, the raid (though duration may vary) from the act of conquest leading to economic dependence (*ἐς φόρον ἀπαγωγήν*); for he goes on to say that the Cimmerian¹⁰ burst into Ionia and Asia did not result in a subjugation of cities, but was a series of plundering attacks, a temporary interruption. *καταστροφή* is sharply distinguished from *ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς ἀρπαγή*, the result of the Cimmerian *strateuma*.

In this preface, then, Herodotus opposes his own criterion to those implied in the statements of the Persian *λόγοι*. His criterion of a historical cause is predominantly political. Croesus is *αἷτιος* because he conquered the Asiatic Greeks, making them politically and economically dependent, and treated also with Sparta. He means that important events are those which make a whole people experience a change in ways of government which now persist for some considerable time. This political requirement is clearly missing from the Persian idea of cause. Both accounts, however, work with the notion of blame, which helps to make Croesus, a non-Greek, a satisfactory cause for Herodotus, and explains why the Persian account picks on abductions and the sack of Troy, in order to implicate Greeks.

Two other points should be discussed here, as they arise naturally from a review of the preface. (i) Some have supposed¹¹ that the remarks on Croesus in I, 5 are at variance with the account of earlier Lydian interference in Ionia. Saying that Croesus was the first to wrong the Greeks goes oddly (if at all) with the account of wrongs committed by Gyges and his successors. (ii) The account of Helen¹² in the preface differs substantially from that given in II, 112 f.

Both are points of alleged internal disagreement; both have

* Radet, p. 244. Jacoby, col. 383.

¹⁰ See especially Radet, pp. 188 f. Busolt, II, pp. 461 f. The penetration of the Cimmerians was considerable, and in some places they continued a long while.

¹¹ Jacoby, col. 338: . . . "ein flagranter Widerspruch." On his view see esp. Maddalena, *Interpretazioni Erodotee* (1942), ch. I.

¹² De Sanctis, *Riv. Filol.*, XIV (1936), esp. p. 11. See Maddalena, whose essay seems admirable.

been made part-foundations for arguments leading to views of Herodotus' own development as a historian.

There is, however, no case for supposing that there are such discrepancies. The account of earlier Lydian kings gives the following facts about their relationship with the Greeks of Ionia. Gyges¹³ attacked Miletus and Smyrna and captured Colophon (τὸ ἄστυ εἶλε¹⁴). Alyattes captured Smyrna,¹⁵ attacked Clazomenae, and made war on Miletus, with which he came to terms. His successor, Croesus himself, attacked Ephesus first and followed his victory by attacking the Ionian and Aeolian cities in turn, some for good reasons, some on trivial pretexts.¹⁶ When his conquest was complete he turned to thoughts of dealing with the islands.¹⁷

Thus Croesus is still the king who subjected the whole of Ionia; the acts of his predecessors, while no doubt wrongs in the weak sense, were acts against individual towns and did not bring about the dependence of the whole area. This is probably not how we would consider the matter; for we would be more inclined to regard earlier Lydian successes¹⁸ as the prelude to the final victory of Croesus. But Herodotus chooses to consider the final state of complete subjugation as radically different from previous conditions; and it is clear from his account that Croesus had most of the work to do, and the responsibility was properly his.

Nor do the accounts of Helen conflict, although there is confusion in the second. In the preface (in the Persian account) it is argued that it was absurd for the Greeks to take an abduction seriously and so make war on Troy. The same point of view is apparent in II, 112 f., where Herodotus describes how the

¹³ His accession: see Herodotus, I, 8 f. and Nicolaus of Damascus, *F. Gr. Hist.*, 90, F. 47.

¹⁴ I, 15. Cf. *F. Gr. Hist.*, 90 F. 62, where Gyges is said to have attacked the Magnesians. The reason for the attack is on a par with the insistence of the Persian λόγιοι on abduction. Xanthos is one of Nicolaus' sources. See Jacoby, Commentary on *F. Gr. Hist.* 90. For Xanthos see Pearson, *Early Ionian Historians*, ch. III.

¹⁵ I, 16; *F. Gr. Hist.*, 90 F. 64.

¹⁶ I, 26.

¹⁷ I, 27. Cf. Busolt, II; p. 500 with references.

¹⁸ The Lydian penetration along the rivers to the coast is admirably described in Radet and Busolt.

Egyptian priests¹⁹ answered his questions about the historicity of the Trojan War.²⁰ Their version said that Helen remained in Egypt; the Greek army was told (truthfully) by Priam, that Helen was not in Troy, but concluded that the king was lying. Hence the Trojan war. Both accounts share the same view, that abduction is not a sufficient *casus belli*.

However, the second account is confused since, apart from Helen, Herodotus cannot give an explanation at all of the cause of the war, far from naming a sufficient cause like Croesus. Consequently he falls back on the gods, who are said to have caused the war in order to show that great wrongs are answered by heavy penalties. This is little more more than treating Helen again as cause *per accidens*, since the wrong was against her as Menelaus' wife.

Herodotus' view about Helen can be summarised as follows. The traditional account made the Persian war purposeful, but for an absurd and inadequate cause. Since he could not find for the Trojan war a cause of the same type as for the Greco-Persian, he resorted to the idea that the Trojan war was a moral example to mankind. The gods tricked men to achieve an instructive end. Both passages (I, 3 and II, 112f.) show that Herodotus thought the rape of Helen absurd as cause; but they also show the two different kinds of history that occur in his work, the kind which explains by pointing to deliberate agents and the kind that makes events seem inevitable, as the revelation of a moral theocracy.

II

The use of *oída* in the important sentence at I, 5—*τὸν δὲ οἶδα αὐτὸς κ.τ.λ.* There are two points to be considered: firstly, how does the usage²¹ of *oída* here compare with usage elsewhere in Herodotus; secondly, what is meant and conveyed by *αὐτός*?

¹⁹ Hecataeus is mentioned at II, 143. Latest study of Hecataeus, with bibliographies: Nenci, *Hecataei Milesii Fragmenta* (1954).

²⁰ Pohlenz, *Herodot* (1937), p. 7 (cf. perhaps Jacoby, *R.-E.*, col. 379), attributes to Herodotus a distinction between the *spatium mythicum* and the *spatium historicum*. This seems to me questionable, as Herodotus clearly believed that the Trojan war occurred. The significant advance was the notion of cause involved in choosing Croesus. See, however, Jacoby, *Klio*, IX, pp. 99 f.

²¹ See especially Powell, *Lexicon to Herodotus* (1938). The problem

I am assuming from the very start that οἶδα in I, 5 means—"Here is another account, different from those given, and this one is true." (The accounts rendered are of the causal adequacy of certain events, a subject to which I shall return later.)

Does this entitle us to conclude that in other cases also, where Herodotus introduces a report by οἶδα, and gives also another account (or even several), he means that the former is true and the others are dismissed as false? This interpretation is suggested by the language of I, 5 but does not stand in all cases.

Herodotus describes how Alyattes, faced by a protracted illness, consulted the Delphic oracle only to hear that the god would not speak until he had restored the temple of Athena at Assesus.²² This part of the account closes with the words: Δελφῶν οἶδα ἐγὼ οὕτω ἀκούσας γενέσθαι,²³ which describe his source, attest the truth of the information but do not imply that what follows—Μιλήσιοι δὲ τὰδε προστιθείσι τούτοις—is false. This is additional to the account of the Delphic reply, and tells how Periander of Corinth got to hear of the prescribed condition and warned Thrasybulus of Miletus. In the first place, there is no need for the Milesian account to be false, since it is not offered as an alternative to the Delphic version, but is explicitly a supplement (προστιθείσι). Secondly, Herodotus himself clearly does not think it is untrue, since only by assuming that Herodotus believes it, can we make sense of the continuation of the whole story—... Θρασύβουλος δὲ σαφέως προπεπυσμένος πάντα λόγον... If we reject the Milesian addition we cannot say how Thrasybulus came to be informed of the answer to Alyattes and the king's own plans. The truth of the story is implied by the words σαφέως προπεπυσμένος.

But in this passage there is no real antithesis of accounts.²⁴ A more satisfactory example occurs at IV, 14 and 15, where the story of Aristaeas is related. The first account was told to Herodotus in Proconnesus and Cyzicus. A fuller, in whose

may be similar to the interpretation of ἐπίστασθαι at II, 3. On this see How and Wells, I, p. 157, with references.

²² Radet, *La Lydie*, pp. 195 f.

²³ Crahay, *Les Oracles chez Hérodote*, p. 120. Herodotus, I, 19 f.

²⁴ Crahay, p. 87 has a different view, however.

works Aristeas had just died, was telling the news to the dead man's next of kin, when a stranger arrived and said that he had just met and talked with Aristeas on the way to Cyzicus. The relatives visited the works (which had been locked in the meanwhile) only to find that the body had vanished. Seven years later Aristeas appeared in Proconnesus, wrote an epic, and then disappeared once more. Now come the words—*ταῦτα μὲν αἱ πόλεις αὐταὶ λέγουσι, τάδε δὲ οἶδα Μεταποντίνοισι τοῖσι ἐν Ἰταλίῃ συγκυρήσαντα μετὰ τὴν ἀφάνισιν τὴν δευτέραν Ἀριστέω ἔτεσι τεσσαεράκοντα καὶ διηκοσίοισι, ὡς ἐγὼ συμβαλλόμενος ἐν Προκοννήσῳ τε καὶ Μεταποντίῳ εὕρισκον*. He next gives the story he heard in Metapontum.

Strictly speaking, we do not have to deal here with alternative versions of the same facts. Because of Herodotus' own chronological conjecture, the two accounts refer to different times and are not therefore chronologically incompatible with each other. But since the chronology is admittedly that of Herodotus, there is a possibility at least that the story from Proconnesus was meant to deny the truth of that from Metapontum (or *vice versa*).

Whether the stories are meant to be incompatible or not, does Herodotus mean that the second version (the Metapontine) is true, the former not? In the second version Aristeas appears in Metapontum and tells the people to erect an altar to Apollo and a statue to Aristeas of Proconnesus. (He describes how he once attended the god in the guise of a crow.) The Metapontines consult Delphi and are told to obey the *φάσμα*. Herodotus goes on to say that there is a statue of Aristeas next to that of Apollo.

Is it likely that Herodotus believed this story but not the former? The second account is no less miraculous than the first; for although there are two disappearances in the first, one only in the second, the same person is clearly meant in both. A disappearance of two hundred and forty years would be required.

The only possibility is that Herodotus argued that the statue of Aristeas, standing by Apollo, confirmed the truth of the Metapontine story. But he himself does not say this. It is one thing to say: "I know there is a statue of Aristeas at Metapontum because I have seen it"—and another thing to say: "Because I have seen the statue of Aristeas at Metapontum the

story about him, as told by the people there, is entirely true." Herodotus' point is that there is a story about Aristéas (the one told at Metapontum) and there is also a statue of him. The reader is left to think it over.²⁵

The usage of *οἶδα* here is confused. The writer begins by saying—"This is the story of Aristéas as told at Proconnesus"—and means to continue by—"and this is a story told at Metapontum. I know it is so, because I got it from them myself." (*Μεταποντινοὶ φασί*—IV, 15, 2). Instead of saying that he knows another story ('know' meaning 'having got it directly from the source') he says—"I know that the following happened"—implying apparently that he believes it. Since internal analysis of the two stories shows that this would be an enormous gullibility, it seems more likely that *οἶδα* here conveys only the notion of having at first hand, and does not deny what precedes.

In these passages the use of *οἶδα* does not argue for the truth of the attached version against the falsity of an opposed account. I shall now turn to cases where the assertion or denial proceeds from the quality of source or investigation.

In a negative way the section on Ocean resembles that on the Tin Islands.²⁶ In both cases a traditional account is given, the truth of which is denied because no eye-witness account is available, to test and confirm the tradition. The story about Ocean is unverified, since Herodotus says—*οὐ γάρ τινα ἔγωγε οἶδα ποταμὸν Ὀκεανὸν ἑόντα . . .*—and the question of the Tin Islands is bound up with that of the sea beyond Europe, of which he says—*τοῦτο δὲ οὐδενὸς αὐτόπτεω γενομένου δύναμαι ἀκοῦσαι, τοῦτο μελετῶν, ὅπως θάλασσά ἐστι τὰ ἐπέκεινα Εὐρώπης*. Herodotus has not seen these things himself, nor has he been able to meet a reliable eye-witness. Consequently, in denying the existence of Ocean and the Tin Islands, he is asserting the importance of his beloved "Autopsie"²⁷ as a critical weapon to be used on poetical and mythological stories.

But *οἶδα* is not confined to cases where the account of an eye-witness is described. The question of who showed Xerxes'

²⁵ Herodotus may have thought that the second version, since it referred to a memorial still extant and accessible to *ὄψις*, was less likely to be false than the first.

²⁶ II, 23 and III, 115.

²⁷ Jacoby, *R.-E.*, *passim*, and How and Wells, Introduction to vol. I.

army the path across the mountain,²⁸ which enabled them to take Thermopylae in the rear, is decided by referring to other facts and to fact generally known (*οἶδαμεν*). Herodotus says that Epialtes was the guide, but another version names two men, Onetes and Corydallos. Against this view he argues (a) that the Pylagoroi put a price on the head of Epialtes, not the other two, (b) that we all know that Epialtes went into exile on this charge. Evidently the version which named Onetes had been criticised before Herodotus, on grounds that he considered insufficient. For, he continues, Onetes could have known about the path without being a Melian, if he had had a considerable acquaintance with the country. Some one must have argued that Onetes could not be guilty, since "il n' était pas du pays." But the right grounds for rejecting the view, according to Herodotus, are the facts given, the decree of the Pylagoroi and the common knowledge of the reason for Epialtes' exile. The grounds are admittedly disparate, for one refers to a fact—the price put on Epialtes—the other is an assertion, not backed by a reference to facts. It is rather as though Herodotus had said: "Of course it was Epialtes, because that is the only way to make sense of the price decree, and anyway we all know it was Epialtes," answering the question by a correct and valid procedure and also simply begging it at the same time.²⁹

The cases discussed above have various points of emphasis and difference. The common feature is that an assertion or denial of facts is based on the adequacy of a source or a legitimate preference for one type of investigation against another.³⁰ Other passages, frequently simpler in form, confirm the analysis. The greatest liking is for "Autopsie," although reliable records are accepted and hearsay, when reliably mediated, confirms or rebuts a story.

To revert to the sentence at I, 5. Can it be said that *οἶδα* here is used in the same way as above? Is there evidence here of a reliable source or a reliable method of investigation, as in other cases?

²⁸ Herodotus, VII, 214. Cf. Paus., I, 4, 2; Diodorus Siculus, XI, 8; Ctesias, *Persica*, 24. How and Wells, II, p. 225.

²⁹ If my view is right, Herodotus means a *λεγόμενον* so generally believed that doubt would be absurd.

³⁰ E. g. what Delphi says is acceptable (I, 19 f.), and seeing is preferable to hearing (inferred from IV, 16 and II, 29).

The possibility of a source should be ruled out, although at first sight one might attribute the origin of the statement about Croesus to the Delphic priests. They told Herodotus much about Croesus, it might be argued, and they might also have thought of Croesus as the cause of the Greco-Persian conflict. The view is possible but unlikely. Delphic interest in Croesus was of a different order from the interest expressed by Herodotus. Most of the story of Croesus in Book I is designed to show, not the king of an aggressor-nation, governing conquests and making alliances, but an example of how to behave towards Apollo.³¹ It is a text vindicating the god and his oracles alike. The disparity of the two ideas has led to puzzles,³² and to suppose that they sprung from a common stock at Delphi (merely because the provenance of one is known) would be unwarranted.

Equally, a reference here to reliable ἀκοή is excluded. I distinguish this from the possibility of a Delphic source, a distinction between a source of information, on which explicit reliance is placed, and a method of inquiry. ἀκοή seems to be excluded, because of the use of αὐτός, which implies that the statement is Herodotean property all along.³³

If there is a passage where the use of the word is similar, it is the discussion of Egypt.³⁴ Here Herodotus criticises the view which restricts the term Egypt to the region of the Delta. His discussion is linked indecisively with the question of the threefold division of the continents. But he solves one of his problems by refusing to accept the restriction mentioned. Egypt is all the land inhabited by Egyptians just as Cilicia and Assyria refer to the territories occupied by peoples with that name.³⁵ We know of no boundary between Asia and Libya on a right view except the boundaries of the Egyptians (hence of Egypt).

³¹ Cf. Crahay, n. 23 above on the Croesus oracles.

³² Cf. Maddalena, p. 9 on de Sanctis.

³³ No source is given. As for method *ἔψις* is clearly excluded; and to suppose that Herodotus means a dominant tradition would conflict with the singular—οἶδα αὐτός. Contrast perhaps οἶδμεν of VII, 214 (p. 142, above).

³⁴ II, 17. Pearson, *Early Ionian Historians*, pp. 85 f.; Myres, p. 156 (misleading); How and Wells, *ad loc.*

³⁵ II, 17 esp. Αἴγυπτον μὲν πᾶσαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ὑπ' Αἰγυπτίων οἰκούμενην κατὰ περ Κιλικίην τὴν ὑπὸ Κιλικίων καὶ Ἀσσυρίην τὴν ὑπὸ Ἀσσυρίων κ.τ.λ.

The important words here are—οὐρισμα δὲ . . . οἶδαμεν οὐδὲν ἐὸν ὀρθῶς λόγῳ εἰ μὴ τοὺς Αἰγυπτίων οὐρους.

The plural οἶδαμεν (to take this first) appears to be merely an emphatic form of the singular, in view of the proximity of the words ἡμεῖς δὲ ὧδε καὶ περὶ τούτων λέγομεν. . . . But this does not fit the requirements of the analysis. His argument is this. People who restrict the term Egypt to the Delta have to abandon the threefold division of continents; for the rest of what is normally called Egypt has to be divided between Arabia and Libya (hence between Asia and Libya). The Delta is left over and has to make a continent on its own. The point is that there is general agreement on the threefold division, which is only jeopardized by this restriction of the term Egypt. Consequently, when Herodotus writes οἶδαμεν, he means that "you and I accept the division into three, and the way of defining the boundary between Libya and Asia as the boundary of Egypt. Define Egypt as we normally define other countries, and the problem is solved." His object is to save an accepted idea by using the normal reference of names of countries.

I have written on this at length to show first a difference between the usage in I, 5 and that here. The view of I, 5 is entirely and solely Herodotean, whereas here he is defending an accepted view by using accepted standards. The difference, however, is surpassed by the similarity. For in both cases it is not facts that are being discussed, which it is said that "we know," but points of view about facts. The view that there are three continents, the boundary between Asia and Libya being the boundary of Egypt,³⁶ is shown to depend on the scope given to Egypt. Similarly the view that Croesus was the first aggressor depends on the scope of aggression, defined shortly after in I, 6. Consequently οἶδα in these passages does not assert "it is true that this happened," which Herodotus means when he talks of Epialtes, or "not true that there is such a thing" (as in the case of Ocean), but it asserts the rightness of a view about uncontested facts.³⁷ The importance of the similarity between

³⁶ Whatever that may have been. See How and Wells, *ad loc.* and Pearson, who finds Herodotus too captious on this point.

³⁷ Hence Herodotus does not argue whether the mythological events occurred as related—οὐκ ἔρχομαι ἐρέων ὡς οὕτω ἢ ἄλλως πως ταῦτα ἐγένετο—but dismisses them for their comparative unimportance.

II, 17 and I, 5 is that Herodotus attacked the historical problem of the cause of the Persian War in much the same way³⁸ as he attacked an ethno-geographical problem: by defining his standpoint, in one case reintroducing the usual definition of a country, in the other substituting his own criterion of aggression for the inadequate standard in the account of the Persian λόγιοι.³⁹

The presence of αὐτός in the sentence (I, 5) only reinforces the individual standpoint taken. It helps to make the statement into something oracular and given, with justified pride in the different point of view. It is reminiscent of the words which begin an oracle given to Croesus—οἶδα ἐγὼ κ.τ.λ., except that from the historian we may infer the reason for his confidence that his view is right: namely, his conception of what constituted "unjust acts" or aggression.

III

The relevance of Herodotus' criterion to his treatment of Croesus throughout the Lydian *logos* (I, 6-94).

It is plain from reading the above section of Book I that Croesus' downfall is the handiwork of god, or rather of the fates, the working of which can be delayed but not averted by the benevolence of god. Croesus' gifts⁴⁰ to Apollo of Delphi, his testing of the oracular powers of the god, and the answer to the question "should he cross the Halys," give the king reasonable hopes of defeating the Persians and extending his own realm.⁴¹ His hopes are of course ended by his own defeat; the apparent injustice of Apollo is explained by the Pythian priestess. Croesus should thank Apollo for begging a respite; the curse on the Mermnad dynasty was bound to destroy Croesus himself, who was lucky enough to win the favour of Apollo and have his reign prolonged for so long.⁴²

³⁸ Consequently, if he developed from an ethno-geographer to a historian, he did not need to develop in critical ability. I do not mean that Herodotus made the same advance in geographical studies as in historical. On Egypt he is thought to have quibbled (n. 36) whereas his view of Croesus is clearly important (cf. How and Wells, *ad loc.*).

³⁹ Herodotus is not always so satisfactory on "aetiology." See III, 1 f. for Cambyses' campaign against Egypt.

⁴⁰ I, 50 f. Cf. Radet, pp. 216 f.

⁴¹ I, 73. Weissbach, *R.-E.*, Suppl. 5, col. 460.

⁴² I, 88 f.

Croesus is punished as a due and predicted act of vengeance on behalf of the Heraclids, who were driven out of Lydia when Gyges replaced Candaules as king. He is not punished, as one might expect,⁴³ for his aggression against the Greeks and his subjection of Ionia. This discrepancy itself requires an explanation which can be approached from two viewpoints, both needful for an accurate picture.

In the first place Herodotus' account of Croesus mostly comes from Delphi, and is clearly designed to show the workings of oracles and to justify the ways of gods to men. These ways are eventually disclosed, perhaps paradoxically, in the course of events. The account has also a genealogical slant, pro-Greek in kind, and shows how the Greeks (in the persons of the Heraclids) have eventually been revenged upon the Mermnad dynasty. This notion makes the historical importance of Croesus something over which he himself has no control; it is not the events which he makes happen that are important, but something which has to happen to him. It is an idea in sharp contrast with the criterion of Herodotus, when he singles out Croesus for his subjection of Ionia, a policy for which the king is himself responsible. The difference is between a conception of Croesus as explaining and fulfilling the remote past, and a conception of him as creating circumstances which parallel and also explain the events of the recent past. In the Delphic account Croesus is an irresponsible agency, making a prophecy come true,⁴⁴ whereas, in a few paragraphs only, he is responsible for events that lead on to the historian's own time. This is a case where the historian's critical ability—I mean here his power to decide what is important in history as a whole—is far in advance of his ability to manipulate and treat material from sources. The point is that his view is not unified, as he has a brief but clear insight into politics as proceeding from human acts, and has also inherited a view of politics where the right things (right for Greece) happen to people, since they cannot but happen. He is confused by two ideas, one that people are responsible for events, the other that, because events have already happened, they had to occur as they did.

In fact much of what he heard (particularly at Delphi) was

⁴³ Cf. note 32, above.

⁴⁴ Cf. Crahay on these oracles.

anti-historical, as we would think, although it met with sympathy in Herodotus himself, who was happy to see, in the downfall of tyrants⁴⁵ and the ruin of enemies of Greece, the working and fulfilment of divine powers. But he also saw why his subject was important for other reasons, the magnitude of deployed powers and the consequences of these for people. This fundamental insight was constantly betrayed by his notion of inevitability, which frequently led him to handle his subject in an external way (as it was probably already handled in his own sources). His remarks on Croesus in I, 5 would almost read like a criticism of the idea of Croesus (as accidental victim of the Heraclids), if it were not that he returns to that way of thinking several times.

A second account is required to explain the discrepancy between I, 46 and I, 71, where different motives are ascribed to Croesus undertaking war against Persia. From I, 46 we hear that Croesus mourned for his son for two years, and only relinquished his grief when he realized the growth of Persian power and decided to arrest the expansion before it had gone too far. The war envisaged is defensive, not imperial. A different version⁴⁶ is given in chapters 71 f. Croesus, encouraged by the oracle, decided to make war, hoping to destroy Cyrus and the Persian empire (he uses *καταρῆσθαι* whereas I, 46 has *καταλαβεῖν*). One of the reasons for his campaign against Cappadocia was a desire to obtain more lands for his kingdom (73). Clearly the war is now imperial in scope and purpose, no longer a defensive frontier action but as much a war of conquest as the campaigns against Ionia.

Herodotus clearly felt that an offensive war against Persia was an odd course to pursue. For whereas the conquest of Ionia brought a prosperous region under Lydian control, the Persians had nothing like the same advantages to offer a successful Lydian government (I, 71).

How then has the discrepancy come about?

We have seen that Herodotus, quite justly, thought of Croesus as establishing conditions in Ionia, which were taken over by

⁴⁵ Cf. How and Wells, II, Appendix xvi.

⁴⁶ Weissbach, *loc. cit.* combines the reasons for Croesus' campaigns.

Persia.⁴⁷ It was an attempt to apply those same conditions to mainland Greece which led to the Greco-Persian Wars. On the other hand, the subjection of Ionia to Croesus would be a slight injury compared with the prospect of the submission of continental Greece and Ionia to Darius or Xerxes. There was a sense in which Croesus could be regarded as fighting a defensive action on behalf of Greece⁴⁸ against the Persian empire, which was to be a more serious threat than Croesus to the liberties of Greece. The failure of Croesus is connected as a subject with the failure of Sparta to help him, which brings me to the main theme of this section.

Herodotus makes a special point of saying that the Spartans (as the strongest power in Greece) were allied to Croesus. Sparta is explicitly contrasted with Athens, then tyrant-ridden and weak;⁴⁹ together with Croesus, Egypt, and Nabuna'id, she was the first bulwark against Persian advance towards the Aegean. The insistence on this is designed to show the weakness and inadequacy of Spartan foreign policy compared with the energy of Athens in the Ionian revolt and elsewhere.⁵⁰ Just as Sparta failed to respond to Aristagoras,⁵¹ so she acted too late in response to the challenge of Cyrus and the appeal of her Lydian ally. The sympathy of Herodotus for Athens is well-known;⁵² even the account of Plataea is dominated by pro-Athenian views.⁵³ The counterpart of this is a hostility to Sparta, who is shown as less sensitive to Greek freedom. For this reason the concept of Croesus' defensive war is to be interpreted in close connexion with the failure of Sparta. Here is another case, like the Ionian revolt, where Sparta has let Greece down,

⁴⁷ Hence Radet based a description of Lydian rule on the conditions prevailing later under Persian rule.

⁴⁸ Croesus' contacts with Greece are assessed in Radet, pp. 221 f. and pp. 236 f.

⁴⁹ I, 59: . . . τὸ μὲν Ἀττικὸν κατεχόμενον τε καὶ διεσπασμένον ἐπυνθάνετο ὁ Κροῖσος. . . .

⁵⁰ V, 97. The expression ἀρχὴ κακῶν refers to the misery of war, without denying that the outcome was glorious for Greece.

⁵¹ V, 49 f., Aristagoras and Cleomenes.

⁵² Jacoby, *R.-E.*, cols. 237 f.

⁵³ E.g. such incidents as the movement of the Greek contingents, IX, 46 f.

in contrast to the attempts of Athens and her actual achievements throughout the Persian Wars.

It has been argued (some would say established) that the mention of Croesus' embassy to Sparta is a literary trick, a way of passing to an excursus on Athenian and Spartan history.⁵⁴ The motive of the invention is a mere doublet of the case of Aristagoras, which, whether true or not, was at any rate a traditional fact available to Herodotus. The technique is like that of the transitions in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, and was readily developed by the historian from the copious practice of epic writers.

In this way another lie has been fathered on to Herodotus for a purely formal reason. The alliance with Sparta, and the request for help, may be untrue, but the grounds argued are inadequate, especially if Herodotus himself is to be made the criminal. Why should the embassy not have been an "überlieferte Tatsache" just as much as the mission of Aristagoras? Besides there are numerous cases in Spartan history where she failed her allies at the time of crisis. We are hardly to suppose that they are all lies. Rather, this very striking feature of Spartan policy is exploited here to show how, in the sixth century, Sparta failed to help Croesus and Greece, whereas Athens of the fifth century had led the Greeks against Persia and been their mainstay in the Persian War itself. It is, if one likes, a literary motive, but literary motives can have a wider reference than just as technical devices. The description of Sparta's failure here is the other side of the historian's sympathy for Athens. It consorts with the idea of Croesus as the first hope against Persia. And although this idea is subordinate to the first picture of Croesus as conqueror of Ionia (and hence making the essential preconditions of the Greco-Persian Wars) it is still important for our understanding of Herodotus as in part pro-Athenian.

The importance of Croesus cannot be ascertained from examining all the various, traditional facts about him.⁵⁵ Even by the time of Herodotus, the chances of writing a history of Croesus were remote, as the traditional material was already contaminated by moral tales and examples. When Herodotus

⁵⁴ Jacoby, *R.-E.*, col. 383, citing also von Wilamowitz.

⁵⁵ Most readily consulted in Weissbach, *R.-E.*

writes about Croesus (in I, 5), he is concerned with his historical importance, without fully documenting it or exhausting the theme. Modern writers have sometimes adapted this view of Croesus to their own conception of Greek history. Thus Grote⁵⁶ saw in the failure of the Greeks of Asia Minor to resist Croesus, a symbol of Greek separatism and political isolation which culminated in the defeat of the Greek states by Macedonia. Others⁵⁷ have reiterated the Herodotean view, seeing in Croesus the full-scale conqueror, whereas his predecessors had merely raided and skirmished. Perhaps the most interesting line of study⁵⁸ is that which has interpreted Greco-Lyidian economic relations and the growth of tyranny in the states of Ionian Greece. Of these subjects the former was inconceivable for Herodotus, while tyranny was inadmissible. However, Herodotus' conception of the importance of conquest, which is central to his treatment of Croesus in I, 5 f., is sufficient evidence of his historical insight.

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⁵⁶ *History of Greece* (4th ed., 1872), III, pp. 84 f.: "And the ultimate subjection of entire Greece, under the kings of Macedon, was only an exemplification on the widest scale of this same principle" (viz. of the failure of separate autonomous cities to resist larger aggregates).

⁵⁷ As Hogarth, *C. A. H.*, III, pp. 517-20.

⁵⁸ Esp. Radet and Busolt.

TEXTUAL NOTES ON THE LESBIAN POETS.

Our best source of information about Lesbian poetry has long been rightly located in fragments of Sappho and Alcaeus written chiefly on papyrus. In 1955 Lobel and Page listed (L. P., pp. IX-XI) 42 such papyri. The two earliest of these were written in the third century B. C., while the others fall within our era, including two from the seventh century. It is to be noted that 300 B. C. is a boundary line in the history of the transmission of any classical text, separating a period of practical from one of scholarly activity; cf. Hoffmann/Debrunner, *Gesch. d. gr. Sprache*, I, pp. 63-5 (1953).

Our papyrus texts are sometimes *codices unici* in the strictest sense, at others the term is not literally applicable. Two papyri may partially overlap, or a quotation may have been made that coincides with part of one of them. The method of treating *codices unici* can be applied to them all.

Paul Maas says, *Textual Criticism*, § 3, that when we are dependent on a single witness: "*recensio* consists in describing and deciphering as accurately as possible the single witness."¹ For the Lesbians this seems to have been done in exemplary fashion—as far as a man without access to the originals can judge—by Lobel and Page in their edition (cited above).

Hoffmann/Debrunner, *loc. cit.*, believe that serious damage to a classic text could happen only in the Pre-Alexandrian period. I would not go further than saying that it is the time of greatest danger; but I would go along with them in condemning a belief that the Alexandrian texts must be identical with the texts of the poets: reconstruction of the Alexandrians must be our first step, but it must not be our last.

For the Lesbians, as for other authors, our heaviest handicap is the total lack of manuscripts from the earliest stages of the tradition. Two substitutes are suggested by Hoffmann/Debrunner as possible palliatives: contemporary inscriptions, and pre-Alexandrian quotations. Neither profits us much in a study of the Lesbians. A helpful procedure is also suggested in this

¹ I shall quote the translation by Barbara Flower (Oxford, 1958). After her death (1955), it was seen through the press by Maas himself.

book, a demand for metrical consistency. A splendid example of this is given by Maas, § 29: "In Sappho fr. 96.8 the tradition has *μήνα*, where the metre requires -- ; the synonym *σελάννα* satisfies this requirement.² Anyone who believes it possible that Sappho nevertheless wrote *μήνα* would have to believe that a modern poet, in a poem otherwise rhyming throughout would be capable of rhyming 'night' not with 'delight' but with 'joy.'" I should add as helpful a demand for linguistic consistency as understood in modern views about the development of language.

My first step would be to trace in meagre outline on the ground of reasonable probabilities the course taken by our tradition. The earliest manuscripts must have been written on Lesbos close to the lifetime of Sappho and Alcaeus, if not actually during their lives. These manuscripts were copied, and the copies copied sufficiently to meet the desires of the inhabitants of Lesbos. As a basic notion it is to be assumed, cf. Maas, § 6, "that each scribe consciously, or unconsciously, deviates from his exemplar, i. e., makes '*peculiar errors*.'" Beyond this, corruption of the text is not probable at this time. This activity attracted the attention of some Athenians who saw an opportunity to exploit it for their own profit. In the fifth century the making of copies of Lesbian lyric became an enterprise of the book publishers of Athens. Their workmen were rarely, if ever, native speakers of Lesbian. If their deviations were gross enough to interfere with sales, management might frown, but smaller errors could be allowed to pass unnoticed. Sales could be increased by providing in the margin glosses and explanations. It is not unlikely that collections and expansions of these were issued separately. These circumstances are not such as to justify the hope that the outcome will be a very trustworthy tradition of the text.

This is the material available to the Alexandrians; and, as Hoffmann/Debrunner, p. 64, says, much depends on the procedures they followed in using it. They collected copies of the text; I should add carefully and vigorously, to judge by the way they worked on the 'Homeric' poems.³ They are said to

² Schubart is credited with seeing this by Diehl and by L. P., but neither followed him. I may return to this passage.

³ I should leave it to the papyrologists to estimate their chance of getting manuscripts written in the fifth century.

have worked as philologists of the present day (1911-1953) work; and they are praised for a conservatism which makes them seek to establish a text supported by their manuscripts as far as possible, and to eschew all arbitrary deviations from the tradition. To me it seems that instances of unwise actions of both types can be found, and that those of the conservative type are the worst. They tend to divert attention from more or less obvious flaws in the tradition; while even a most intolerable conjecture provokes discussion and thus helps us to reach a decision.

An instance of over-conservatism is to be seen in a principle enunciated by Leaf. Even though he sees that a traditional form is intolerable, as conforming to the requirements neither of metre nor of epic usage, and though he knows the correction needed, he will print the corruption in his text, unless at least one manuscript contains at this place the correct form. He practices rigorously what he preaches. Von der Mühl follows in his footsteps, but with less rigor. I have printed the details, and a wise blast at this practice by Pasquali, in *A.J.P.*, LXIX (1948), pp. 211 f.

Sappho 1, 18-19 will furnish illustrations of both extremes. The ode was long known only from its quotation by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, which was somewhat hashed in our manuscripts of his work. Long did moderns cling to *μαι* without suspecting that it was a dittography. Diehl printed in 1936:

μαινόλαι θύμῳι. ‘τίνα δῆν’τε Πείθῳ
μαῖσ’ ἄγην ἐς σὰν φιλότατα, . . .’

Dr. Hamm in 1952 (when she closed her manuscript) recorded *μαῖσ’*?, pp. 123, 161, and called it “ganz unklar.”

These suggestions are about as good as any that can be expected from clinging to *μαι*; though Πείθῳ is obviously bad (as some had seen) either in syntax or morphology.

In 1952 was published *P. Oxy.* 2288 written in the second century of our era. It is a long sliver that contains a few letters from near the beginnings of lines 1-21. In line 19 it reads ·ψ. σαγην[which points clearly to ἄψ σ’ ἄγην. It has however a short mark (·) instead of a breathing over the α of ἄγην; and this annoyed L. P. As soon as one sees the papyrus he should

read: τίνα δηῦτε πείθω | ἄψ σ' ἄγην ἐς σὺν φιλότατα;. That is crystal clear.

But the lection sign (˘) has affected Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus*, pp. 9 f., most unfortunately: the only contribution from the papyrus (apart from ἄψ) that he can see is "new darkness."

He believes that emendation is needed; and after pointing out that taking ἄγην as a form of ἄγνυμι would lead to no tolerable meaning, plunks for ἄψ τάγην ἐς σὺν φιλότατα. This cannot be tolerated; for, while τάσσω and its kin are firmly fixed in western Greek, the earliest record in the east is found in Herodotus. This renders a date about 500 B. C. probable for their crossing the Aegean. Compare Wackernagel, *S. U. H.*, p. 222. Here is a case where the absence of a group of words from the Lesbians is really significant. *τάγματα*, Alc. 75, causes no difficulty. The L. P. index says of it *loco dubio*. That phrase now seems a fine example of litotes.

Intolerable as Page's emendation is, and reckless too, for it "recked not" of the times involved, it is far better than the "conservative" clings to *μαί*. These have led to nothing of value; while Page will lead others, I trust, as he has led me to a conviction that in line 19 the papyrus has reproduced the reading of the original. The merit is somewhat diminished by the fact that Page did not print the emendation in his text, where the influence it exerts would have been greater.

Debating the value of "conservatism" vs. "recklessness" seems to me less important than seeking to determine how the Alexandrians valued the variants and "variant-carriers" to be found in the material that had reached them. Of their method(s) no description has come to us; but I will start with Maas' description of how moderns have approached the problem. As he nears the close of his third chapter he says, § 20: "These methods of testing variants have now been more or less generally recognized in principle, *although only very recently*. (Italics are mine.) Previously the principle was to follow the vulgate (*textus receptus*) without troubling about the quality of the witnesses; or to follow the text of the majority of the witnesses, in spite of the fact that 100 manuscripts which derive from a single manuscript have less authority than this single manuscript, and have no more authority than one manuscript which does not go back to that single manuscript; or to follow the oldest, the most

complete, the best witness, just as if *every* scribe were not liable to error. This was all completely arbitrary, and there was never any attempt made at a methodical justification." Somewhere within this framework the Alexandrian methods must, I believe, have fallen.

Before finishing these preliminary remarks—notice of the after effects of the start of our tradition in an archaic system of writing is needed—I wish to deal with a group of passages in which the tradition includes in the text what must have started as a gloss.

I take as my first example Sappho, fr. 96, 8. Maas' irrefutable argument has already (p. 2) been quoted; it shows our need to follow Schubart in rectifying the tradition by putting *σελάννα* in the text and restoring the gloss *μηννα* (no accent before B. C. 300)⁴ to the margin. An Athenian writes his glosses in Attic of course, and I take his *μηννα* to be the acc. sing. of *μείς*. This implies that the writer of *μηννα* had a text with *σελάνναν*—a blunder that need cause no surprise. It is the sort of thing that Maas might call an "unconscious peculiar error" (cf. § 6) and to be expected of any scribe. The Alexandrians took over the text after *μηννα* had crawled into it. That compelled them to regard *μηννα* as a word that Sappho could have used. They knew an Ionic (LSJ) word *μήνη* and probably thought *μήνα* its Lesbian equivalent. Had this notion been challenged, they might—in their ignorance of multiple authorship—have pointed to T 374, Ψ 455. Moderns should know better.

Sappho, fr. 111 is known to us from several quotations. In 1925 Lobel printed in his Σμ. for line 5 in his commentary: "Fort. <γάμβρος> εἶσ' ἴσ' Ἀρεν legend." This is a splendid conjecture, and would have been better placed in the text. His primary wish was to secure metrical consistency with line 1: *ἴψοι δὲ τὸ μέλαθρον*; and secondarily to insist on the short quantity of *ἴσο-* in Sappho. For the latter the tradition had *ἴσος* or *ἴσος*. As late as 1936, Diehl printed *ἴσος*; however Dr. Hamm, p. 18, § 17 recognizes the correctness of *ἴσος*, and so heads the item in her Index. But I know of no one who has followed the

⁴ Accents were not regularly written before 300 B. C. I may note that our third century papyri of Sappho, fr. 2, and 98, have not a single accent mark.

substitution of εἶσ(ι) for the ἔρχεται or εἰσέρχεται of the tradition. Not until *Lang.*, XXXII (1956), p. 511, was the origin of the corruption explained. ἔρχεται, a semantic gloss on εἶσι, to call attention to its use as a present, which would not be normal in Attic, has been taken as a directive to correct; and so the gloss has secured entrance to the text.

In Sappho 1, 24, the codices of Dionysius' quotation point to κωῦκ ἐθέλουσα. This is obviously intolerable because it does not conform to Sappho's linguistic usage. Page, pp. 10 f., mentions a number of emendations that seek to cling to ἐθέλουσα as closely as possible; they are all intolerable.

The trouble started with a semantic gloss οὐκ ἀέκοισα· ἐθέλουσα. It was misinterpreted as a directive to alter the text, and thus our tradition was mastered by an intolerable reading.

We must read κωῦκ ἀέκοισα, cf. *Lang.*, XXXII (1956), p. 511.

Sappho, fr. 98a, 1 must be restored, cf. *A.J.P.*, LXXX (1959), pp. 276-87, as:

. .] . θος· ἀ δέ μ' ἐγέννα[τ' ἔφα πάλαι

in order to meet the requirement of the metre, even though our single witness reads γάρ for δέ.

Trying to convince my friends of the need for this led me to observe that a thoughtless (blundering) interchange of γάρ and δέ is hardly—if ever—made. Usually the scribe's motive is to restore the metre. Here that cannot be the reason. This leaves practically only the probability that here, as in the other examples now being adduced, a semantic gloss—something like ὁ δέ ἀντὶ τοῦ γάρ has been misinterpreted as a directive to change the text.

Alcaeus, fr. Z 35 has been saved for us by Demetrius Lacon. He quotes a phrase twice, with no great interval between his quotations.

κάτω γὰρ κεφάλαν κατίσχει (col. 64)

κάτω δὲ κεφάλαν κατίσχει (col. 66)

Diehl, LP, and Page, p. 317, follow the first quotation, which seems metrically superior. At that point they stop, while it seems to me that quite a problem remains untouched.

It should be evident that γάρ got into the text as a correction

of δέ for the purpose of conforming to the requirement of the metre. It follows that κάτω δέ reproduces a form of the tradition earlier than κάτω γάρ. There is a possibility that Demetrius had two manuscripts before him; but it is much more probable⁵ that he had one manuscript with κάτω δέ written in the text, and γάρ written between the lines or in the margin. Demetrius deserves our gratitude for his careful preservation of both variants.

Now κάτω δέ is for the original metrically intolerable. How then did it get into the tradition? In the earliest manuscripts ΔΕ would have been written; an ambiguous graph, being equal either to δή or δέ when the Ionic alphabet is employed. An Athenian μεταγραφάμενος in the fourth century (possibly in the second half of the fifth) made the wrong interpretation of the graph, writing κάτω δέ where Alcaeus wished κάτω δή to meet the requirement of the metre.

We thus obtain three points in the tradition: (1) κάτω δή at the start; (2) κάτω δέ the primary fault; (3) κάτω γάρ the secondary fault. The last two are attested by Demetrius, the first is obtained merely by interpreting the ambiguous graph Ε of the archaic alphabet in the way demanded by the metre.

At the moment I know of no other passage in the Lesbians where the shiftings in the tradition can be followed so completely. But Homericists can adduce many. The fourth chapter of Cauer's *Grundfragen der Homerkritik* (1921), pp. 72-98 will repay careful reading—note especially p. 74 for citation of Wackernagel's beautiful term "Restaurationstünche" for secondary corruptions; also p. 88 for a fuller description of the manuscripts at Ω 320. This line began originally

δεξιὸς ἀτίξας διὰ ἄστεος

found in a papyrus dating from shortly after the beginning of our era and in some manuscripts; some others wrote δι' ἄστεος. The bulk of the manuscripts (starting with the Syriac palimpsest (ca. 500 A.D.) have the 'whitewash' ὑπὲρ ἄστεος to which Ludwig (1907) clung.

I turn now to the fountain-head of our tradition—the manuscripts written on Lesbos before 500 B.C. Not one of them has

⁵ Cf. Maas, § 10, p. 8, for his judgment of a similar situation.

reached us, nor has any contemporary inscription from Lesbos. Still we can learn from them.

The outstanding fact is that any manuscript written at such a date must have been written in some⁶ archaic system of writing, and must later have been transliterated into the system that spread from Ionia over the Greek world. This fact was known to the Alexandrians, and used by them to some extent in dealing with Homer. Moderns have gone further, thanks largely to Herzog's treatment of the whole problem in his *Die Umschrift der älteren griechischen Literatur in das ionische Alphabet* (Basel, 1912); but I cannot, at the moment, recall any instance of its use by investigators of the tradition of the Lesbian poetry.

Herzog points out that in the absence of all evidence from Lesbos itself we may assume for its variety of archaic writing the presence of any feature found in all better attested varieties. The most important feature of that sort is writing in a *scriptio continua*. This means not only without division of the words, but also without any marks made upon the papyrus except the letters themselves—in short, with no "lection signs." The corollary is that when such marks appear in extant papyri, they are not part of the tradition but additions to it made by the Alexandrians. In Herzog's words, p. 6: "Diese Lesehilfen sind aber vom den Alexandrinern nach eigenem Ermessen in die Texte gesetzt, ihnen nicht überliefert."⁷

I shall rephrase this idea without making any substantial change. The lection signs are not a part of the tradition, they are something added to the traditional text by the Alexandrians at a time when the poets "had lain for centuries dead." In other words, the lection signs constitute an exegetic commentary on the text, much condensed and encoded in what may fairly be called a shorthand script.

The commentators seem to have been interested chiefly in leading their readers to "pronouncing" the text correctly, meaning thereby in conformity with Alexandrian practice and theory. We have vastly more copious records of the similar

⁶ There were local varieties.

⁷ He makes an unimportant reservation for paragraphos, heavy interpunctuation, short empty spaces.

work they did upon the epic poems; and early in this century there was discussion about its value.⁸ The upshot was that those who seek no earlier text than our modern vulgate, that goes back to *ca.* 150 B. C., may as well reproduce the accents transmitted with it, while one who seeks the text of (say) the sixth century should see that Alexandrian marks will have no meaning if they are transferred directly to it. A rather obvious solution seemed to be the printing of sixth century texts without accents. Then it was noted that the Alexandrian marks at times indicate in passing how the Alexandrians wished to construe the text. Then simply dropping the accents may cause a serious loss—maybe like throwing out occasionally a baby in order to be rid of the dirty water in which it was bathed. Thus it became a quantitative-problem—how big the risk?—and opinions differed.⁹

For the Lesbians the situation is quite different. The sources for our knowledge of their poems are in comparison with those for the *Iliad* so meager and mutilated that we cannot afford to risk throwing away anything that shows the slightest glimmer of helping us to a better understanding of the poems. However, all is not gold that glitters, as in colonial days our forefathers learned the hard way. At best the lection signs can give us only the opinions of Alexandrian scholiasts, and they cannot be regarded as inerrable revelations.

On the contrary, the great flaw in the Greek development of civilization was their failure to provide—primarily because of their confused identification of speech and writing—a rational, scientific approach to language, the most important of human activities. Consequently, even when the opinion of some Alexandrian or later Greek can be learned precisely, it must be examined in the light of Linguistics, the modern science of language. Bloomfield, *Language*, pp. 3-20, gives an excellent sketch of its development, which started near the time of the battle of Waterloo, and was the first important variation from, and valuable addition to, the Greek ideas. He has no reason to mention a fact that I cannot leave unmentioned, the reactionary

⁸ For more about this cf. *Language*, XXIII (1947), p. 30.

⁹ In my *Ilias Atheniensium*, p. 14, I expressed my opinion that Alexandrian accents have no place in a sixth century text; but also my decision to let them stand rather than pay the high cost of taking them out.

revolt of classicists against the new science. To quote the commandment: "Thou shalt know no Sanskrit," given to his pupils by Gottfried Hermann will characterize it sufficiently. The rift thus opened has never closed completely. Some classicists still cling to pre-Waterloo notions, and thus share with the Greeks the responsibility for our present plight. This has been described by Henry Hoenigswald in a few but very wise words.¹⁰

"The Greeks and Romans are certainly not unconnected with the peculiar anti-language tradition which is ours. To them language was hardly a phenomenon on a par with the phenomena of the physical world. They did not have the Hindus' preoccupation with sound and speech. No student of oriental dialects accompanied Alexander to the East, and concern with one's own language was either the 'lore of written marks' (γραμματική) or a restricted logic and metaphysics built on it."

The importance of applying Linguistics as a touchstone to the opinion of any Alexandrian—even one with as big a name as Apollonius Dyscolus—may be seen from two passages. As printed in LP, they are:

Alc. 313: $\delta\tau'$ ἄσφ' ἀπολλυμένοις σώοις

S. 149: $\delta\tau\epsilon$ πάννηχος ἄσφι κατὰγει

The correction of the first to $\delta\tau\alpha$ σφ' is ascribed to Bergk by Bechtel, *G. D.* I, 74. In the second Wackernagel (*Kl. Schriften*, pp. 13, 623) saw as long ago as 1887, that ἄσφι is a gloss brought into the text at the wrong place, and read $\delta\tau\alpha$ σφι πάννηχος κατὰγει. Solmsen, *Unters.*, p. 199, n. 2 dissents, but ineffectually.

Bechtel (*loc. cit.*) and Leumann, *Hom. Wörter*, p. 49, approve both changes. Schwyzer, *Gr. Gram.*, p. 601, says the traditional text is based on a false word-division; Dr. Hamm, p. 107, § 190a is of the same opinion. Brugmann-Thumb, *Gr. Gram.*⁴ (1913), p. 288, called both ἄσφι and ἄσφε doubtful; Thumb-Scherer, *Gr. D.*, p. 100, lists both without comment. In contrast, LP insist on the division they have made, and quote Apollonius Dyscolus for recognition of the words ἄσφε and ἄσφι.

The question is at rock bottom a question of what the editor

¹⁰ I quote from a preliminary announcement of a panel discussion on teaching Greek and Latin held at the 1959 meeting of the American Philological Association.

wishes to do. To make the first step to the Alexandrian text, and stop there; or to continue back to the earliest form of the tradition. Both goals can be justified; and each answer is right for its own goal. I am convinced the Alexandrians read $\delta\tau'$ $\acute{\alpha}\sigma\phi\epsilon$ and since no Linguist can suggest any origin for $\acute{\alpha}\sigma\phi\epsilon$ except the faulty analysis of the phrase $\delta\tau\alpha$ $\sigma\phi\epsilon$ I am convinced that $\acute{\alpha}\sigma\phi\epsilon$ was not in our tradition from the start, and is to be dated most probably as an error of the Alexandrians.

This is already—for some—a hard saying, but more is yet to be added. The opinion of the Alexandrian cannot always be fully determined from the marks now extant. He may not always have said all that we wish him to have said;¹¹ and the marks he did make may easily have suffered from scribal errors. Our attempts to undo his condensation may be at times most unsatisfactory. A far-fetched attempt to get at the meaning condensed behind a short mark may be seen in Page's dealing with Sappho 1, 19 (cf. above, pp. 153-4). It has led him into an emendation which shows clearly that the papyrus needs no emendation.

Herzog mentions two other features of the archaic writing: the habit of writing a single graph for a consonant where the Ionic writing uses two; and the absence from the archaic alphabet of H and Ω. I had planned to assemble and discuss all examples in which the *μεταγραφάμενοι* seem to have failed in the transliteration of these features. I see now that to do this would prolong this paper unduly. I have already had occasion to mention some, and shall close with a discussion of two passages.

The tradition reads in Alc., G 2, 26-7:

. []ον [π]όλεμον· στάσιν γὰρ
πρὸς κρ. [...]. οὐκ ἄμεινον ὀννέλην·

For the sake of the metre, this must be emended, as Page (pp. 206 f.) advocates, to οὐ κάλλιον ὀννέλην. He describes well the stages by which the corruption developed, to which I add the datings they suggest. First ΛΛ is miscopied as M, which was possible only after an Athenian *μεταγραφάμενος* had correctly transliterated an archaic Λ as ΛΛ. Some one thus confronted by a meaningless *ουκαμιον* whitewashed it (to use Wackernagel's

¹¹ The difference is between the end and the beginning of a development that spread over centuries, cf. B. L. Laum, *Das Alexandrische Akzentuationssystem* (Paderborn, 1928).

term) and made οὐκ ἄμεινον. More probably he was an Athenian workman than a conservative Alexandrian scholar.

The preceding gap has been filled with an accusative plural by various scholars. Page, p. 207, had found no acceptable supplement, but still held to the syntax: "strife against [e.g. blackguards, tyrants, or the like]." In an effort to get better sense for the segment in which the prepositional phrase stands, I suggest that a genitive singular πρὸς κρέσσονος is needed: I decided to go into a most wretched exile, "for to kill our *στάσις* at the bidding of a mightier man was not the more honorable (choice)." For such a use of πρὸς cf. Schwyzler-Debrunner, p. 515 (top), where the first of Hector's forebodings about the fate of Andromache is quoted: καί κεν ἐν Ἄργει ἐοῦσα πρὸς ἄλλης ἱστὸν ὑφαίνους, Z 456.

Against the objection that κρέσσονος is one letter too long, I note Latte's supplement κρεσσονας in *Mus. Helv.*, IV (1947), p. 141, the writing explained p. 143, n. 8. Page, p. 206, calls it "an improbable misspelling." I regard it as most probable. A μεταγραφώμενος may have failed to transliterate the archaic writing of his exemplar, or it may be a simple haplographic blunder.

Our understanding of the passage is made difficult by two facts. (1) Views about the use of physical force to overthrow an established government were in Alcaeus' day far different from those professed today; (2) Alcaeus is speaking to a friend, Agesilaïdas, who—it may be assumed—was better acquainted with the circumstances than we can hope to be.

To put Alcaeus' statement in less rhetorical form, he is telling us: I could have come to terms with Myrsilus, had I been willing to follow his dictates. That can mean either that Myrsilus made him such an offer, which he refused; or that he is sure Myrsilus would have accepted such an offer, had it been made to him. Agesilaïdas could have chosen rightly between these possibilities; I can make no choice. Then there is the question of the time at which such bargaining took place. Did Myrsilus try to bribe Alcaeus and fail, before he succeeded with Pittacus? Of that success we hear in G 1, 13-14. Or was the bargaining after Pittacus' treachery had given the victory to Myrsilus? Agesilaïdas could have answered such questions.

Whatever the meaning we ascribe here to στάσις it is a *nomen actionis* inherited from IE. Now the literal killing of any action

is an impossibility, and so *στάσιν ὀννέλην* must be metaphorical. It thus falls in with a class of metaphors in which something literally impossible is asserted with the confident expectation that the hearer will take it metaphorically. Page's renderings: "Renounce rebellion," "getting rid of strife," simply "kill" the metaphors.

Dr. Hamm, p. 66, § 139, says of *στάσις* "Die Bedeutung ist 'Aufstand, Streit,' die auch nach A. als die älteste belegt ist (Thgn. Ai. Pi. Hdt.)." I should draw a somewhat different inference: that our records of relevant date are not sufficient to exclude the possibility of Alcaeus using the word with a different meaning (say) "party" or "faction."¹² I should choose according to the time of the bargaining: "uprising" if before; "party" if after the treachery of Pittacus.

At the opening of line 26, *φενγόντ]ων* seems a possible restoration. I accept the LP reading *]ον* but see in it only an error of some *μεταγραφάμενος*. On the genitive absolute without a subject cf. Schwyzler-Debrunner, p. 400.

In S., 31, 7 LP prints, and Page, p. 22, approves *ὥς γὰρ ἔς σ' ἴδω*. Unless it can be shown (I know of no attempt to do so) that in this respect Lesbian varies from Homeric usage, this correction of Longinus' *ὥς γὰρ σίδω* is impossible. I quote Wackernagel, *Kl. Schr.*, p. 1208 (= *Glotta*, XI [1921], p. 287): "Nach Aristarchs sich durchaus bewährender Regel können bei Homer (anders als im Attischen!) auf die Präpositionen nur orthotonische Wörter folgen." And again: "dem Gebrauche Homer ist *ὑπὸ δέ σφισι* gerade so gemäss, wie *ὑπὸ σφισι* bei ihm unerhört ist."

Correction is clearly needed for the sake of the metre. A number of proposals are quoted by Diehl. Of these Hermann's *ὥς γὰρ εἰσίδω* seems satisfactory. In this context—contrast S., 23, 3-6, as supplemented by Page, pp. 138-9—there is no need to express the object of *εἰσίδω*.

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¹² *Στάσις* is not found in the 'Homeric' poems. In Alc. Z 2, 1 (the only other example in the Lesbians) the meaning is similarly doubtful, cf. Page, p. 187.

THE CONCEPT OF *PHILANTHROPIA* IN PLUTARCH'S *LIVES*.

Philanthrōpia is a term that has aroused considerable interest among scholars of the last half-century, having been studied not only as a concept in Greek literature¹ but also in relation to the Latin *humanitas*.² Hirzel, in fact, has devoted a chapter to *philanthrōpia* in his volume on Plutarch, examining both the author's concept of the quality as well as the influence that this concept exercised over his political and social attitudes.³ Hirzel, however, because of the nature of his study has treated only the general idea, while our task will be to examine closely individual passages and then to draw conclusions from this investigation.

But to what extent, we might ask, was Plutarch's terminology determined by his sources? It is impossible, of course, to answer fully this question without a detailed examination of the problem,

¹ R. Hirzel, *Plutarch (Das Erbe der Alten, IV [Leipzig, 1912])*, Ch. IV, "Philanthropie"; S. Lorenz, *De Progressu Notionis φιλανθρωπίας* (Diss. Leipzig, 1914); V. Valdenberg, "La théorie monarchique de Dion Chrysostome," *R. E. G.*, XL (1927), p. 153; S. Tromp de Ruiter, "De Vocis quae est φιλανθρωπία significatione atque usu," *Mnemosyne*, LIX (1932), pp. 271-306; M. P. Charlesworth, "The Virtues of a Roman Emperor: propaganda and the creation of belief," *Proceedings of the British Academy*, XXIII (1937), pp. 106, 116; H. I. Bell, "Philanthropia in the Papyri of the Roman Period," *Hommages à Joseph Bidez et à Franz Cumont (Collection Latomus, II [1949])*, pp. 31-7; Marie-Thérèse Lenger, "La notion de 'bienfait' (philanthrōpon) royal et les ordonnances des rois Lagides," *Studi in onore di Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz*, I (1953), pp. 483-99; Glanville Downey, "Philanthropia in Religion and Statecraft in the Fourth Century after Christ," *Historia*, IV (1955), pp. 199-208; Downey, "Themistius' First Oration," *Greek and Byzantine Studies*, I (1958), pp. 49-69.

² I. Heinemann, *R.-E.*, Suppl. 5 (1931), cols. 282-310, s. v. *Humanitas*; F. Schulz, *Principles of Roman Law* (Oxford, 1936), Ch. X, "Humanity" (with additional bibliography); Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of European Thought* (translated by T. G. Rosenmeyer [Cambridge, Mass., 1953]), Ch. 11, "The Discovery of *Humanitas*, and Our Attitude toward the Greeks"; Heinz Haffter, "Neuere Arbeiten zum Problem der *Humanitas*," *Philologus*, C (1956), pp. 287-304 (with additional bibliography).

³ Hirzel, *op. cit.*

and in most cases we do not have the sources.⁴ Granted that in some instances Plutarch must have been influenced by the vocabulary of his sources, it does appear that in the majority of cases the wording is his own; for most of the categories of usage that we have recognized for *philanthrōpia* are represented by at least several and sometimes many examples selected from different *Lives*. Though the source varies, Plutarch's usage seems to remain constant.

When Plutarch is using Thucydides or Xenophon as a source, moreover, we can actually see that, though ideas may be similar, there is no uniformity of vocabulary. An example of this is afforded by two references of Plutarch to Thucydides' well-known statement concerning the character of the Athenian constitution under Pericles (II, 65, 9): ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή. Plutarch quotes this remark in *Per.* 9, 1: "Although Thucydides indicates that the constitution under Pericles was somewhat aristocratic, λόγῳ μὲν οὖσαν δημοκρατίαν ἔργῳ δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχήν, κ.τ.λ." But a little later in *Per.* 15, 1, Plutarch speaks of Pericles as ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ βασιλικὴν ἐντεινόμενος πολιτείαν. Only when he cited him by name and quoted him, did Plutarch employ Thucydides' vocabulary. In the selection from *Per.* 15, 1, there was no reference to δημοκρατία, and the Thucydidean idea of the rule of the leading man was expressed by Plutarch in completely different terminology.

Plutarch's handling of Xenophon is also instructive. Xenophon illustrates the simplicity of the mode of life of Agesilaus by saying (*Ages.* VIII, 7) that his daughter went down to one of the public festivals "in an ordinary public conveyance" (ἐπὶ πολιτικοῦ καννάθρου); but Plutarch mentions the same fact in these words (*Ages.* 19, 7): "And Xenophon says that his daughter's καννάθρον was 'not at all more stately' (οὐδέν τι σεμνότερον) than those of the others." Though actually naming his source, Plutarch has expressed the matter in his own style and vocabulary. It appears, therefore, that only when he men-

⁴ The forthcoming monograph (XIX) of the A. P. A. by Helmbold and O'Neil, *Plutarch's Quotations*, may shed considerable light on this problem. This article, however, was submitted before the appearance of the publication.

tions his source by name is Plutarch likely to borrow his vocabulary, and even then he may choose to change the wording of the author cited.

Tromp de Ruiter has cited from both the *Moralia* and the *Lives* numerous passages which well illustrate the variety and flexibility that are to be found in Plutarch's usage of *philanthrōpia*.⁵ Let us, therefore, begin our study with an attempt to establish the fundamental concept behind these many uses, so as to interpret the numerous and sometimes apparently unusual occurrences of the word in terms of this basic idea. A passage from the *Life of Cimon* (10, 6-7) will serve as an introduction. Plutarch there narrates that the generosity of Cimon surpassed even the *philoxenia* and *philanthrōpia* of the Athenians of old, and the next sentence lists the benefits which these two qualities prompted them to bestow on the other Hellenes: οἱ μὲν γάρ, ἐφ' οἷς ἡ πόλις μέγα φρονεῖ δικαίως, τό τε σπέρμα τῆς τροφῆς εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐξέδωκαν, ὑδάτων τε πηγῶν <ὀχετεῖαν> καὶ πυρὸς ἔναυσιν χρεῖζουσιν ἀνθρώποις εἰδείξαν, κ.τ.λ.

Although the text is uncertain at this point,⁶ the essential fact for our purposes is that the *philanthrōpia* of the Athenians is concerned with the origin and propagation of civilization among the Hellenes, with those things which raise men above the level of the beasts; and one immediately thinks of Aeschylus' Prometheus,⁷ who defied the will of Zeus to give man fire and teach him all of the τέχναι necessary to make him into a civilized creature. The parallel between the selection from the *Life of Cimon* and *Prometheus Vincit* is even more striking when we examine a few verses from Aeschylus. At the end of the prologue Prometheus in one phrase sums up the cause of the hatred of Zeus and the other gods for him (123): διὰ τὴν λίαν φιλότητα βροτῶν. Cratos had previously stressed the same point in his speech which opened the drama (8-11), when he proclaimed that Prometheus must be punished for his sin, so that he will learn to yield to the rule of Zeus and "to cease from his devotion to

⁵ Tromp de Ruiter, *op. cit.*

⁶ The emendation here used is that of Ziegler in the latest Teubner edition (1957).

⁷ Lorenz, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9. This dissertation is a very competent study, which traces the development of the word *philanthrōpia* from its earliest appearance in Aeschylus' *Prometheus* down to the time of Cicero.

mankind" (φιλανθρώπου δὲ πάνεσθαι τρόπου). Hephaestus uses the same terminology (28) when, after he has described to Prometheus his future agony, he adds that this is the profit gained from his "devotion to mankind" (τοῦ φιλανθρώπου τρόπου). The *philanthrōpia* of Prometheus is the same as that of the Athenians of old in so far as in both instances men received civilization as a result of this *philanthrōpia*.

We again find *philanthrōpia* and civilization closely connected with each other in *Pyrrh.* 1, 4, where Plutarch narrates that the kings of Epirus, the Pyrrhidae, though they were direct descendants of the Greek hero Achilles, soon lapsed into barbarism and obscurity; it was not until Tharrhypas endowed the cities with "Hellenic customs and letters and humane (civilized?) laws" (Ἑλληνικοῖς ἔθεσι καὶ γράμμασι καὶ νόμοις φιλανθρώποις) that the dynasty again acquired recognition. Noteworthy also is the relationship between Hellenism and *philanthrōpia* in this passage, a relationship encountered again in *Phil.* 8, 1. Here Aratus is credited with being the first to elevate the Achaeans from a humble state to prestige and power. He achieved this, moreover, by establishing them in cities and "setting up a civilized, Hellenic constitution" (πολιτευσάμενος Ἑλληνικὴν καὶ φιλόανθρωπον πολιτείαν). There is no stated contrast between *philanthrōpia* and barbarism in this selection, but the fact that both here and in the citation from the *Life of Pyrrhus* a deficiency of *philanthrōpia* is associated with obscurity brings the two passages into close connection. Plutarch seems to feel that before the time of Aratus the Achaeans, scattered about in villages, were living like *barbaroi*, just as the cities of Epirus were uncivilized before Tharrhypas brought them under the sway of Hellenism. It is only after the Achaeans receive this Ἑλληνικὴ καὶ φιλόανθρωπος πολιτεία that they begin behaving like other states of the Greek world, like civilized Hellenes, that they unite among themselves and conceive the ambition to form the whole Peloponnesus into a single political body (*Phil.* 8, 2-3).

These three concepts—*philanthrōpia*, civilization, Hellenism—seem almost inseparable for Plutarch.⁸ We see them all brought together in the person of Titus Quinctius Flamininus. In *Flam.* 5, 6-7, Plutarch narrates that the other Greeks, though

⁸ Cf. *Comp. Lyc. Num.* 1, 8-10; *Marc.* 1, 2-3; *Lys.* 27, 7.

they had heard from the Macedonians that Flaminius was the leader of a host of barbarians and was bringing destruction and slavery, were filled with good will toward him when they finally had personal contact with him (*ἀπαντῶντες ἀνδρὶ τήν θ' ἡλικίαν νέῳ καὶ τὴν ὄψιν φιλανθρώπῳ, φωνήν τε καὶ διάλεκτον Ἑλληνι*). Flaminius convinced the Greeks that he was no barbarian because he looked like a civilized man and spoke like a Hellene.

Although the reference is not to a person in *Lyc.* 16, 12, the usage does again bring out the basic idea that is contained in Plutarch's concept of *philanthrōpia*. Here he mentions that the Lacedaemonian youth had little contact with baths and ointments; only on a few days of the year did they partake of such a *philanthrōpia*. The bathing and anointing of one's body can be called a *philanthrōpia* because it is what a civilized man, in contrast to a barbarian, does.

The emphasis upon refinement in the two preceding citations perhaps justifies the translation "pleasant" in several passages. In *Aem.* 37, 2, Paulus has Perseus moved from the *carcer eis τόπον καθαρὸν καὶ φιλανθρωποτέραν διαίταν*. Though still a captive, Perseus will at least live in a manner more suitable for a civilized man, in this particular instance "more pleasant." The adjective has a similar force in *Cic.* 47, 7, where Cicero is described as having at Caieta a retreat that is "pleasant" (*philanthrōpos*) in the summer time, when the Etesian winds are most enjoyable. And Cleomenes, though he usually dined in the Spartan manner, served a *philanthrōpoteros* wine when he entertained foreigners (*Cleom.* 13, 4).⁹

With this basic relationship between *philanthrōpia* and civilized life as a background, let us now observe how the virtue manifests itself in the lives of Plutarch's heroes, considering first those instances where the term is employed to describe the manner in which these men associate with others in the normal routine of political life. A lack of this particular type of *philanthrōpia* can be a great detriment to a political figure in a period of crisis, as was the case with Nicias at the time of the contest of ostracism between him and Alcibiades. In comparing the two (*Nic.* 11, 2) Plutarch lists among the various factors contributing to Nicias' unpopularity *τῆς διαίτης τὸ μὴ φιλάνθρωπον*

⁹ Cf. *Sol.* 15, 2; *Caes.* 13, 4.

μηδὲ δημοτικὸν ἀλλ' ἄμεικτον καὶ ὀλιγαρχικόν. Just what does τὸ μὴ φιλόανθρωπον mean? τὸ μὴ δημοτικόν is a synonym for τὸ ὀλιγαρχικόν; and while these two expressions may have a nuance of austere personal behavior in them, they here seem to designate chiefly Nicias' political sympathies. His personal behavior toward other people is described by τὸ μὴ φιλόανθρωπον and τὸ ἄμεικτον ("unsociability"), so that the former phrase appears to mean little more than "rudeness." Nicias, in other words, refused to observe the common acts of courtesy that would help win him a following.

Cato, in Cicero's opinion, lost the consulship for the same reason (*Cat. Min.* 50, 2), since he would not condescend to indulge in the "courteous intercourse" necessary to ingratiate a candidate with the people (οὐδ' ὑπῆλθεν ὁμιλίᾳ φιλοανθρώπῳ τὸν δῆμον). And Plutarch agrees with Cicero in so far as the cause of Cato's defeat is concerned, as we can tell from the statement he makes in 49, 6, where he more fully explains what the phrase ὁμιλία φιλόανθρωπος means:

... he was not persuasive himself in canvassing for himself, but wished to preserve in his manners the dignity of his life, rather than to acquire that of the consulship by making the customary salutations; neither would he permit his friends to do the things by which the multitude is courted and captivated. He therefore failed to obtain the office.¹⁰

Similar acts of courtesy are also prominent in *Comp. Lys. Sull.* 5, 3, where Plutarch describes Sulla's reaction to an offer of an alliance from Mithridates: Sulla granted him οὐδὲν μαλακὸν οὐδὲ φιλόανθρωπον; he neither greeted him nor shook hands with him until Mithridates agreed to certain concessions. In strong contrast to the aristocratic austerity of Nicias and Cato the Younger is the sociability of Crassus. He acquires popularity by accepting legal cases that Cicero, Pompey, and Caesar reject (*Crass.* 3, 4), but his manners in public also gain him favor (3, 5): ἤρεσκε δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς δεξιώσεις καὶ προσαγορεύσεις φιλόανθρωπον αὐτοῦ καὶ δημοτικόν. Here again τὸ φιλόανθρωπον means only "politeness," "courtesy," or perhaps "pleasantness"; and Plutarch makes an interesting comment about the quality in the very next

¹⁰ Perrin, Loeb.

sentence: "There was no Roman so obscure or humble that Crassus did not greet him by name when he met him."¹¹

In the passage just examined as well as in the selection from the *Life of Nicias* τὸ φιλόανθρωπον was coupled with τὸ δημοτικόν.¹² The political inferences of the latter are obvious. *Philanthrōpia*, in fact, when it is used in this sense of "courtesy" or "pleasantness," is a quality that for Plutarch is often associated with the *popularis*, as was the case with that first great Roman *popularis*, Marcus Valerius Publicola, whose cognomen is supposed to signify his political beliefs. And his *philanthrōpia* was of great benefit to him in time of crisis, for a slave who had secretly overheard the details of a plot to restore the Tarquins made his way to Publicola (*Publ.* 4, 5), μάλιστα πως τοῖς κοινοῖς καὶ φιλανθρώποις ἐπαχθεῖς τοῦ ἀνδρός. Here it is κοινά that, instead of δημοτικά, seems to refer to the politics of Publicola;¹³ and we might perhaps translate τὰ κοινὰ καὶ φιλόανθρωπα as "his democratic and gracious manners." Plutarch then explains more fully the force of both adjectives: Publicola was accessible to all, having time and means both to converse with members of the lower classes and to relieve their needs.

Crassus too uses *philanthrōpia* to his advantage, at the expense of Pompey (*Crass.* 7, 3). Though both of them posed as *populares*,¹⁴ Pompey is here depicted by Plutarch as maintaining a very definite aloofness, almost rudeness, that reminds us of the aristocratic unsociability of Nicias and the Younger Cato: he avoids crowds, withdraws from the forum, gives aid to few and even then grudgingly. Crassus, on the other hand, is accessible and helpful to all. Plutarch sums up the contrast with this remark (7, 4): . . . τῷ κοινῷ καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ περιεγίνετο [Crassus] τῆς ἐκείνου [Pompey] σεμνότητος. For Crassus τὸ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ φιλόανθρωπον is a political weapon superior, at least from Plutarch's point of view, to Pompey's σεμνότης ("austerity"). Just as τὸ φιλόανθρωπον is closely related to τὸ δημοτικόν and τὸ κοινόν, so it is nearly the antithesis of σεμνότης in this particular passage;

¹¹ Cf. *Alex.* 58, 7-8; *Demetr.* 22, 1-2.

¹² Cf. *Ages.* 1, 5; *Comp. Cim. Luc.* 1, 5.

¹³ Cf. *Phoc.* 10, 7.

¹⁴ Lily Ross Taylor, *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949), Ch. VI, "Cato and the *Populares*."

and it is cause for comment that Gaius Gracchus maintains τὸ σεμνόν along with τὸ φιλόανθρωπον (*C. G.*, 6, 4).¹⁵

There are several examples of the adverb where the emphasis on courteousness and graciousness undoubtedly still exists¹⁶ but where the most prominent feature of the usage is an act of kindness or generosity. Antigonos treated the Lacedaemonians "in a humane manner" (φιλανθρώπως) when he captured their city: he did not insult the dignity of Sparta, but after restoring her constitution and sacrificing to the gods he departed on the third day (*Cleom.* 30, 1). Alexander's *philanthrōpia*, as did that of Antigonos, bordered upon "clemency" (*Alex.* 44, 3-5). When some barbarians stole his horse Bucephalus, he became angry and sent heralds to them with a threat to put them along with their wives and children to the sword if the horse were not returned; but when they brought back the horse and handed over their cities to him, Alexander treated them all φιλανθρώπως and gave a reward to those who had restored Bucephalus. In like manner Sextus Pompey appeared to treat Antony φιλανθρώπως because he gave refuge to Antony's mother, who fled to him along with Fulvia (*Ant.* 32, 1).¹⁷ It seems that there is always at least a nuance of graciousness and affability that accompanies any act of *philanthrōpia*, the term sometimes desig-

¹⁵ τὸ ἱλαρόν ("cheerfulness") also occurs in juxtaposition with τὸ φιλόανθρωπον: *Caes.* 4, 8; *Cleom.* 13, 3 (ἱλαρῶς and φιλανθρώπως). Eberhard F. Bruck, "Ethics vs. Law: St. Paul, The Fathers of the Church and the 'Cheerful Giver' in Roman Law," *Traditio*, II (1944), pp. 97-121, often has occasion to refer to ἱλαρότης, pointing out that "cheerful giving" was a Stoic concept. Although there is no occurrence of any act of generosity in the passage from the *Life of Caesar*, the mention of οἱ χεῖστοι ("the needy") in the selection from the *Life of Cleomenes* does indicate that there was some benefaction involved in the latter case. Since one of the principal expressions of *philanthrōpia* is generosity (*vide infra*), the association between ἱλαρότης and *philanthrōpia* in the *Lives* may be due to Stoic influence. There are, however, to my knowledge only these two examples of the combination.

¹⁶ For the adverb in the sense of "courteously" or "graciously" *vide Flam.* 6, 2; *Demetr.* 9, 2; *Thes.* 36, 4; *Eum.* 13, 4 (only affected civility being involved here).

¹⁷ Cf. *Luc.* 32, 6; *Brut.* 26, 2; *Them.* 31, 7; *Aem.* 39, 9; *Per.* 20, 1; *Eum.* 9, 11; 17, 2; *Demetr.* 52, 6; *Dem.* 22, 4.

nating mere politeness and on other occasions indicating courtesy plus real kindness.¹⁸

Marcellus, who was by nature *philanthrōpos*, exercises this union of kindness and affability in his dealings with Bantius of Nola (*Marc.* 10, 3-7). Bantius had fought with conspicuous bravery for the Romans at Cannae but had been won over to Hannibal by gifts and was trying to bring his city to revolt from Rome. Plutarch offers a delightful description of the manner in which Marcellus regained the loyalty of Bantius, who became Marcellus' staunchest supporter (10, 6):

Marcellus thought it wrong to put to death a man so illustrious in his good fortune who had taken part with the Romans in their greatest conflicts, and, besides his natural kindliness, he had an address that was likely to win over a character whose ambition was for honour (*πρὸς δὲ τῷ φύσει φιλανθρώπῳ καὶ πιθανὸς ὢν ὁμιλία προσάγεσθαι φιλότιμον ἥθος*). One day, therefore, when Bantius saluted him, he asked him who he was, not that he had not known him for some time, but seeking occasion and excuse for conversation with him. For when he said, "I am Lucius Bantius," Marcellus, as if astonished and delighted, said: "What! are you that Bantius who is more talked of in Rome than any of those who fought at Cannae, as the only man who did not abandon Paulus Aemilius the consul, but encountered and received in his own body most of the missiles aimed at him?"¹⁹

There is something of the gentleman in this combination of kindness and sociability; particularly interesting is the studied civility with which Marcellus initiates the conversation.

The same stress on the manner in which a civilized man acts is to be found in *Aem.* 28, 1, where Plutarch tells of Aemilius Paulus' tour of Greece after his victory over Perseus: "He gave his army a rest, αὐτὸν δὲ πρὸς θέαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἔτρεψε καὶ διαγωγῇν

¹⁸ A passage from Aulus Gellius (XIII, 17) is perhaps worth mentioning in this connection. He distinguishes two usages for *humanitas*, one corresponding to *philanthrōpia* and the other to *paideia*. The former usage is described as that, *quod vulgus existimat quodque a Graecis φιλανθρωπία dicitur et significat dexteritatem quandam benevolentiamque erga omnis homines promiscam*. The two words *dexteritas* and *benevolentia* possibly cover respectively the affability and kindness present in Plutarch's *philanthrōpia*. Vide Haffter, *op. cit.*, p. 299, and *T. L. L.*, s. v. *dexteritas*.

¹⁹ Perrin, Loeb.

ἔνδοξον ἅμα καὶ φιλόανθρωπον." In the course of his "illustrious and humane tour of Greece" Paulus relieved the distress of the people, restored their constitutions, and gave them grain and olive oil from the defeated Perseus' treasury. The *philanthrōpia* of Paulus happens to be not dissimilar to philanthropy in the modern sense of the word—that is, benefits and gifts conferred on a worthy cause by a wealthy individual; yet for Plutarch *philanthrōpia* has a very broad and extensive usage, designating almost any type of act that behooves a civilized and cultured being. It is this same basic idea that leads Plutarch to censure the ancient Spartans for forcing the Helots to drink much unmixed wine and then bringing them into the symposia, so that the young Spartans could see what drunkenness was (*Demetr.* 1, 5): ἡμεῖς δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐκ διαστροφῆς ἐτέρων ἐπανάρθωσιν οὐ πάνν φιλόανθρωπον οὐδὲ πολιτικὴν ἡγούμεθα, κ.τ.λ. This was not civilized statecraft!²⁰

Let us conclude our survey by examining several cases where the noun *philanthrōpia* itself appears or its equivalent τὸ φιλόανθρωπον. In *Caes.* 34, 7, Domitius, besieged in Corfinium by Caesar, regrets having ordered his physician to give him poison when he hears that Caesar "practices a wondrous clemency" (θαυμαστῇ τινι φιλανθρωπία χρησθαι) toward captives. And it is a deed of kindness that is involved in *Sull.* 31, 7, where Plutarch remarks that Sulla added to the proscription lists anyone guilty of the *philanthrōpia* of aiding someone already proscribed, be he brother or son or parent.²¹

There is a close connection between *philanthrōpia* and generosity in *Pel.* 3, 1-3, where Plutarch first narrates that Pelopidas used his fortune to assist worthy men and then observes that of his friends only Epaminondas did not avail himself of this ἐλευθεριότης and *philanthrōpia*. Here we can see the exact relationship between "generosity" and *philanthrōpia*. The ἐλευθεριότης of Pelopidas refers to the actual sharing of his wealth with his friends, while *philanthrōpia* has the more extensive function of designating the gracious and kindly spirit with which the gifts were made. ἐλευθεριότης, then, is a particular type of *philanthrōpia*. When *philanthrōpia* is used indepen-

²⁰ Cf. *Phoc.* 27, 6.

²¹ Cf. *Cat. Min.* 29, 4; *Alex.* 29, 9; *Alc.* 16, 6.

dently, it can emphasize especially the notion of liberality, which is, however, only an aspect of the total concept; in these cases, therefore, the translation "generosity" or "liberality" is perhaps justifiable for want of the exact English equivalent.²² We are, however, concerned with acts of generosity in *Sol.* 2, 1, where Plutarch states that, according to Hermippus, Solon's father diminished the family estate *εἰς φιλανθρωπίας τινὰς καὶ χάριτας*.²³

It would be well now to summarize what we have learned about *philanthrōpia* in the *Lives*.²⁴ It is inseparable from civilization, particularly Hellenic civilization. In short, it is the virtue *par excellence* of the civilized, educated man; and it manifests itself in any manner that is proper for such a man, be it affability, courtesy, liberality, kindness, clemency, etc. The *philanthrōpos* is gracious and considerate toward all with whom he associates, he is generous toward the needy, he is also merciful and clement toward his enemies. An inanimate object—a law, a constitution, a person's appearance, a building—can even be called *philanthrōpos*, if it is suitable for this civilized man that we have just described.

The great flexibility and variety in the usage of *philanthrōpia* throughout the history of Greek civilization are competently and thoroughly illustrated in the studies of Lorenz and Tromp de Ruiter, and valuable examples from the Roman period are to be found in the articles by Bell and Downey.²⁵ Though it is not the purpose of this study to examine the history of the term but only to consider its nature in Plutarch's *Lives*, I would like to suggest that possibly this basic relationship between *philanthrōpia* and civilization is the single root from which all of the multiplicity has sprung, not only in Plutarch's time but at

²² For a discussion of *ἐλευθεριότης* and *liberalitas* vide Bruck, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 100-2, 111-14.

²³ Cf. *Cleom.* 32, 5 (*φιλανθρωπία* and *μεταδόσεις*); *Cat. Min.* 26, 1 (*φιλανθρωπία* and *χάρις*).

²⁴ *Philanthrōpia* and its adjectival and adverbial forms occur in juxtaposition or close connection with the corresponding forms of *πραότης* (*Rom.* 7, 5; *Fab.* 17, 7; *Cat. Min.* 23, 1; *Pyrrh.* 11, 8; *Arist.* 23, 1), *ἐπιείκεια* (*Brut.* 30, 6; *Comp. Phil. Flam.* 3, 4; *Comp. Thes. Rom.* 2, 3; *Cor.* 30, 7), *εὐγνωμοσύνη* (*Marc.* 20, 1; *Cleom.* 24, 8; *Demetr.* 5, 4; 17, 1), *χρηστότης* (*Demetr.* 50, 1; *Luc.* 18, 9; *Comp. Dem. Cic.* 3, 3), and *δικαιοσύνη* (*Comp. Lyc. Num.* 1, 9; *Luc.* 29, 6).

²⁵ Vide bibliography cited in note 1.

other periods as well. This seems to be the basic idea in the first appearance of the word in Aeschylus' *Prometheus Vincetus*, and Downey²⁸ has pointed out that the fourth century rhetorician Libanius felt a close connection between *philanthrōpia* and Hellenic civilization.

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²⁸ Glanville Downey, "*Philanthropia* in Religion and Statecraft in the Fourth Century after Christ," p. 204: "At the same time, Julian's friend Libanius looked upon *philanthropia* as one of the greatest qualities which both the emperor and his subjects might possess, and it is indicative of the significance which was attached to the word that Libanius writes that Julian was *philanthropos* because he was a Hellene and ruled over Hellenes. This, to Libanius, would have been the highest form of civilized statecraft."

EURIPIDES, *MEDEA*, 1415-19.

Attention has often been drawn to the fact that these lines, which end the *Medea*, are, with the exception of the first, identical with those which close four other plays of Euripides, the *Alcestis*, *Andromache*, *Bacchae*, and *Helena*, in all of which the first line of the clausula reads *πολλὰ μορφὰι τῶν δαιμονίων* instead of *πολλῶν ταμίας Ζεὺς ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ*. Many have commented on them, generally to the effect that they are either inappropriate or insignificant. For example, of the recent Oxford editors of Euripides, D. L. Page writes that "here (*sc.* in the *Medea*) they seem a little inapposite"; A. M. Dale (on *Alcestis*, 1159 ff.) describes them as "singularly inapt" for the *Medea*; and E. R. Dodds (on *Bacchae*, 1388 ff.), while accepting the suggestion of the scholiast on *Andromache*, 1284 that they are appropriate to any play having a marked *περιπέτεια*, concludes that "this is not the place to look for deep significance," the clausula being mainly a device used by the dramatist to get his chorus out of the orchestra. But there have been dissentients to this view: Verrall, having criticised them as "quite inappropriate" in his first edition of the *Medea*, later saw their possibilities if applied to his own theories about Euripides and recanted, producing the characteristic explanation that they were intended by Euripides to point an ironical contrast between the realism of the drama as a whole and the purely conventional "supernaturalism" of the dénouement;¹ more recently, J. Mewaldt has seen them as a mark of Euripides' "tragic resignation" and authentic evidence that his creed had not changed throughout the last thirty years of his life, in which, roughly speaking, these plays were written²—in other words, they are a sort of trademark or signature-tune. *Alii alia*. . .

It would seem that there are three questions which need to be asked about the clausula: (i) Has it any significance in relation to the dramatic art of Euripides? (ii) Is it inapposite to the *Medea*? (iii) Why is the first line changed there?

¹ E. g., in *Euripides the Rationalist*, p. 77; cf. *Four Plays of Euripides*, pp. 120 ff., where he maintains that in the *Helena* the tag has "a new and witty application."

² "Heroischer Weltanschauung der Hellenen" in *Wiener Studien*, LIV (1936), pp. 12 f.

(i) First to be considered is the suggestion that the clausula is little, if anything, more than a means of getting the chorus out of the orchestra, remembering Hermann's claim that "the words were liable to be drowned by the clatter of departing spectators."³ A glance at the clausulae of the surviving plays will arouse serious doubts as to the truth of this claim: in five of them,⁴ it must be admitted, the clausula contains an explicit instruction or exhortation to depart, but in each case the departure is, from the point of view of the action, a direct outcome of what has preceded it and is itself accompanied by a brief comment on the dramatic circumstances; in four others⁵ the clausula is devoted to the same kind of reflexion both on the action of the play and on life in general that we have in the *Medea*; there are three plays⁶ which probably ended with a brief prayer for victory, an anticipation of the cruder *plaudite* of Roman Comedy; there is one which ends with a palpable interpolation;⁷ and there are the five which end, *mutatis mutandis*, with the clausula under discussion.⁸ The general impression which one forms is that, while one ought not to look for profundity at this point in the play, the clausula is no mere stage device but is expected to make some contribution to the interpretation of the action, except in the three cases where, if the accepted text is correct, the playwright is making an appeal through his mouthpiece, the chorus, for the award of the prize. Yet, although these three instances serve to show us that Euripides had no hard and fast rule which he was following, it is they perhaps that make us most suspicious of Hermann's suggestion: no playwright is going to bother to address a prayer for victory to the gods, if he already knows that the audience is unlikely to hear it anyway but rather drown it by the hubbub

³ The paraphrase is taken from Dodds' note on *Bacchae*, 1388 ff. Hermann went on: "Eo factum ut illis chori versibus parum curae impenderetur."

⁴ *Hecuba*, *Heraclidae*, *Rhesus*, *Supplices*, and *Troades*.

⁵ *Electra*, *Hippolytus*, *Ion*, and, possibly, *Heraclides*, though the latter rather falls between this group and the previous one.

⁶ *I. T.*, *Orestes*, and *Phoenissae*.

⁷ *I. A.*

⁸ The *Cyclops* is disregarded for the purpose of this discussion; in any case, the ending of the satyric play would have been the most likely to act as a signal for general movement on the part of the spectators.

of their own ill-mannered departure; in fact, why they should be departing at all after seeing only the first play of the trilogy is something of a mystery!

At the same time, the prayer for victory, if genuine, may well help us to remember that a prayer is by no means an inappropriate ending for a Greek tragedy. Despite all that has been said and written about the origins and background of Greek Drama, we still tend to minimize its essentially religious nature and to forget that there are many surviving traces of early ritual in its performance. It may well be that as a formal analogy liturgical practice is more illuminating than the habits of the modern theatregoer, if it is these habits that Hermann had in mind; today his suggestion recalls the London cinema rather than the Athenian theatre. Consider, for example, the methods employed to get a surpliced choir and clergy back into the vestry at the end of an Anglican church service: whether this is done by a recessional hymn or an organ voluntary, neither of these is to be regarded as a mere device or stopgap; on the contrary, they almost invariably tend to be related in content to the service which has preceded them and to be integrated with the liturgy as a whole. But the outside observer unacquainted with the liturgy might well miss the significance of the "clausula" and dismiss it as a piece of ecclesiastical frippery.

It would be wrong to press such an analogy too far, but it is not altogether irrelevant to a consideration of the suggestion that the clausula of Euripides' plays was robbed of all significance by its position and by the fact that it accompanied the retirement of the chorus. After all, it was Euripides who, by his use of the *deus ex machina*, drew special attention to the place of the divine epiphany towards the end of the play, and it ought not to surprise us to find him in the great majority of his plays making some final comment upon the action. Let us now examine the possible dramatic significance of the clausula which appears at the end of the *Alcestis*, *Andromache*, *Bacchae*, and *Helena*, before turning to that of the *Medea*.

Alcestis in the play of that name dies in place of her husband but is brought back to life by Heracles, after he has wrestled with Death, and is restored *praeter spem* to the mourning Admetus; thus the totally unexpected is achieved by the intervention of Heaven, and Zeus, through Heracles, finds ways and

means to effect the un hoped for. In the *Andromache* the heroine, cast off by Neoptolemus and hunted by Hermione, is rescued by Peleus and promised by Thetis as wife to Helenus, King of Molossia, and so the unexpected is again brought to pass. This time the prime mover is Thetis; it is she who implements and explains the will of Zeus—*Ζηνὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ τάδε*.⁹ In the *Bacchae* Agave and her companions tear Pentheus to pieces in the mistaken belief that he is a lion-cub, and it is a god, this time Dionysus, who has found a way to bring about such an unexpected result; he makes a personal appearance to explain the sorrows inflicted on the royal house as the will of Zeus—*πάλαί τάδε Ζεὺς οὐμὸς ἐπένευσεν πατήρ*.¹⁰ In the *Helena* the real Helen is at last enabled to make her escape from Egypt with Menelaus by the intervention of the prophetess-sister of King Theoclymenus; when the latter wishes to avenge himself on his sister, he is prevented by the Dioscuri, who assure him that all has happened by the will of Zeus—*Ζεὺς γὰρ ὧδε βούλεται*.¹¹ In each of these plays the clausula not only acts as a final piece of ritual might act but is also peculiarly apposite as a reflexion on the action and, in particular, on the *περιπέτεια*. Indeed, the only noticeable difference in the technique employed by Euripides to bring home his lesson is that in the *Alcestis*, the earliest of the four plays, he does not seek to emphasise that the dénouement is the will of Zeus by putting an explanation to that effect in the mouth of the agent. But the emphasis, for all that, is not on the "tragic resignation" of the poet¹² but on the supremacy of the deity, who assumes various shapes to perform the unexpected—whether or not the moral is genuinely inspired by religious sentiment or, as many prefer to believe, a sly gibe by the "Rationalist" is beyond the scope of this paper.

(ii) If it is accepted that the clausula is not inapposite to the other four plays and must not be summarily dismissed as

⁹ *Andromache*, 1269.

¹⁰ *Bacchae*, 1349.

¹¹ *Helena*, 1669.

¹² One may indeed doubt if Mewaldt's "tragic resignation" properly describes the poet's mood in these plays: after all, in only one of them is the issue not a happy one at least for the heroine of the piece, and even in this, the *Bacchae*, Pentheus gets his deserts, as Cadmus points out to Agave (1377 f.).

a mere stage device, this is no less true of its application to the *Medea*: Medea, murderess of the king and his daughter and subsequently of her own two children, seems marked down for the vengeance of Jason or the kinsmen of the royal house or both; Jason even anticipates her doom when he calls on Erinyes and Justice to destroy her (1390-1), but she only mocks him for expecting the gods to avenge a man who has betrayed his own oath and cheated his host into the bargain. Zeus, she has already reminded him (1352-3), knows full well how he has treated his own wife in return for her love and kindness. In other words, the winged chariot in which she makes her escape is a mark of the favour in which she is held by the gods; she is not hated by Heaven, as he fondly imagines (1324). This is a *περιπέτεια* second to none, and every line of the clausula is apt and packed with significance; the contrast which it makes, however, is not, as Verrall thought, between the realism of the play and the "supernaturalism" of its ending but between the expectations of men and the dispensations of Heaven.¹³

(iii) Finally, then, what of the first line of the clausula in the *Medea*? Is there any reason for the change, ruling out the possibility of interpolation, or is it as arbitrary as the actions of Euripides' gods? There would seem to be a very simple and obvious reason: Aristotle may indeed be referring to the winged chariot when he criticises the *Medea* for its use of the *μυχανή*,¹⁴ but this particular *μυχανή* is unlike most in that, though sent by a god, it does not contain one; if we remember that no deity appears in the *Medea*, we shall not find it hard to explain the replacement of the first line of the clausula. In other plays which we have examined Heracles, a demi-god, Thetis, Dionysus, and the Dioscuri are all the active and visible instruments of the will of Zeus, and their role is underlined, except in the case of Heracles, by their own admission; they are the "many shapes of divinity." But the *Medea* has no divine epiphany, and the first line of the clausula used in the other four plays would

¹³ Cf. H. D. F. Kitto's remarks in *Greek Tragedy* (1st edition), pp. 198 f.

¹⁴ *Poetics* 1454 b; it is to be questioned whether A. Rostagni's extension of the meaning of *μυχανή* here so as to include the intervention of Aegeus is as justifiable as it is ingenious (see his note on p. 86 of his second edition of the *Poetics*).

therefore be most inappropriate to it. The actual first line is less vivid, more banal, but nevertheless quite in keeping with what has gone before and what follows: "Zeus in Olympus dispenses much from his store"—yes, much that is good, much bad, and much totally unexpected; nothing could be more unexpected than the manner of Medea's escape from *human* justice.

For, whether or not H. D. F. Kitto is right in suggesting that it was on the orderliness of *divine* justice that Sophocles was often most concerned to lay stress,¹⁵ it is certainly on its unexpectedness that Euripides wishes to say the last word not only in the *Medea* but also in the other four plays discussed—and indeed in other plays where he uses a *deus ex machina*. If his comment is naive,¹⁶ it is the none the less true for all that; it is a moral which finds a way straight to the human heart and awakens a quick and poignant response there even in these sophisticated days, as the briefest glance at popular entertainment will show. Athenian Drama, despite its religious background—unless one should rather say because of it—was above all popular entertainment of the most enlightened kind; the audience was composed not of metaphysicians, as some editors seem to imagine, but of ordinary people,¹⁷ who never fail to find a grim satisfaction in the tragic commonplaces of human existence—birth, love, and death, and the unpredictability of the ways of God with men. With such an audience a moral as aptly pointed as that of the *clausula* of the *Medea* might hope to carry as much, or as little, weight as the more mundane prayer for victory. Clearly it was a *clausula* that pleased Euripides, and, having altered the first line as used in the *Alcestis* to suit the plot of the *Medea*, he did not hesitate to return to his original choice in the three later plays, since they, unlike the *Medea*, had a divine epiphany.

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¹⁵ *Sophocles, Dramatist and Philosopher*, p. 49 and *passim* in ch. III.

¹⁶ As R. P. Winnington-Ingram concludes, after discussing the application of the tag to the *Bacchae* (see *Euripides and Dionysus*, pp. 148 f.).

¹⁷ P. D. Arnott in his recent book, *An Introduction to the Greek Theatre*, well reminds us of this fact (see especially pp. 55 ff.).

THE ILLUSION OF PROSPERITY IN SOPHOCLES AND GREGORY OF NYSSA.

The fourth stasimon of Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1186 ff. is perhaps one of the most stirring in all of Greek tragedy. Oedipus has just realized the mystery of his birth and the awful tragedy of his incestuous marriage. As he goes off with a monstrous cry of pain, the Chorus of Theban γέροντες, now alone in the orchestra, begin to sing:

Ah, generations of mankind!
I count you as nought even as you live.
Who, what mortal ever enjoyed more prosperity
than was mere seeming,
Who, after his illusion, did not
fall into a decline?¹

The last four lines of this passage are crucial:

τίς γάρ, τίς ἀνὴρ πλέον
τᾶς εὐδαιμονίας φέρει
ἢ τοσοῦτον ὅσον δοκεῖν
καὶ δόξαντ' ἀποκλίνει;

The phrase τοσοῦτον ὅσον δοκεῖν "(more prosperity than) was mere seeming," or as Liddell-Scott-Jones translates it (*s. v.* ὅσος I. 8), "so much as is enough for appearance," never seems to have given trouble to the commentators, even though there are, to my knowledge, no exact parallels for it in classical Greek. ὅσος is used with the infinitive almost like ὥστε, and together with τοσοῦτον has a restrictive connotation, "only so much," "merely enough," almost as though μόνον were understood (the μόνον is indeed expressed in Xen., *Anab.*, VII, 3, 22).²

¹ The verb ἀποκλίνω often implies a falling away from a high point, as for example of the sun setting: cf. the note of Jebb *ad loc.* (*Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments. I. The Oedipus Tyrannus* [Cambridge, 1902]). The imagery may perhaps be connected with the waxing-waning metaphor in the curious Tychê passage, *O. T.* 1080-5. It is *s. v.* ἀποκλίνω that F. Ellendt, *Lexicon Sophocleum* (Regimontii Prussorum, 1835; editio altera by H. Genthe, 1958), offers his version of the passage: "ubi sibi visus aliquis felix sit, statim ad exitium vergere."

² For this use of ὅσος, see also W. W. Goodwin, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb* (Boston, etc., 1890), § 759; H. W. Smyth, *Greek Grammar* (revised by G. M. Messing, Cambridge, 1956), § 2497.

Before approaching the problem of the meaning of *δοκεῖν* in the passage, it may be well to recall that the following *δόξαντ'* merely resumes the thought of *δοκεῖν* in the same sort of construction as we find, for example, in *O. T.* 1404: *ἐφύσατ' ἡμᾶς καὶ φντεύσαντες*. The verb could, indeed, have almost been resumed with "and afterwards (declined)." ³ What is important is the fact that the form *δόξαντ'* (agreeing with, e.g., *ἄνδρά τινα* understood, though the nominative might normally have been expected) points perhaps to the usage of *δοκεῖν* in the *personal* sense. This will be important for our discussion farther on. For in the Sophoclean passage the personal construction of *δοκεῖν* seems obligatory precisely because of the sense of the following participle.

Jebb, like most editors since Dindorf, Erfurdt, Blaydes, and many others, would seem content to interpret *δοκεῖν* in our passage as simply "to seem, sc. *εὐδαιμονεῖν*." This is, substantially, the almost unanimous view of the commentators, and ultimately derives from the anonymous scholion that the Laurentian manuscript has preserved on the line: *ὅσον δοκεῖν· ὅσον δόξει εὐδαίμων εἶναι*.⁴

Thus, to summarize schematically the various meanings of the verb that might possibly have relevance for our passage, we have:

- A) *The personal use*: of a person,
 1. to think, or to imagine (to oneself);
 2. to seem, or to pretend; to give an impression to others (truly or falsely);
- B) *The impersonal use*: of a thing,
 1. to seem to be, as opposed to reality;
 2. to seem good, to suit one's whim or pleasure.

The two generic uses of *δοκεῖν* become a commonplace in Greek; cf., for example, the Guard's complaint in the *Antigone* 323:

ἦ δεινόν, ᾧ δοκῇ γέ, καὶ ψευδῇ δοκεῖν,

where we are not sure whether we ought to read, in the last

³ This use of the repeated verb is discussed by Ewald Bruhn in *Sophokles erklärt* von F. W. Schneidewin und A. Nauck. Stes Bändchen: *Anhang* (Berlin, 1899), p. 136, § 230.

⁴ *Scholía vetera*, ed. P. N. Papageorgios (Leipzig, 1882).

place, *δοκεῖν* with the Scholiast and many recent manuscripts (a reading indeed preferred by most modern texts), or *δοκεῖ* with L.⁵ Applying this to our text, we have the following possibilities:

- (a) the man in question thinks or imagines he is happy;
- (b) he seems to be happy—that is, others think he is happy, but he is not;
- (c) his happiness (following sense B 1) is mere illusion, not reality.
- (d) by a combination of all three senses: his happiness is an illusion, in which the man both deceives himself and others.⁶

I myself feel that the demarcation between the personal and impersonal constructions was hardly so strict as to exclude, in this particular case, meanings (c) and (d) above.

Now it may seem hazardous to some to use a fourth-century Christian text to explain a passage in Greek tragedy; yet there is quite a unique parallel in one of the commentaries of Gregory of Nyssa that has thus far remained unnoticed by the lexicographers. An analysis of the Gregorian passage may perhaps throw some light on the meaning of the phrase in Sophocles. The work which we know as the *Commentary on the Song of Songs* was composed towards the end of Gregory's life, perhaps in the years 390/5. A course of sermons that Gregory had delivered in his own church at Nyssa on the Song of Songs had been taken down by members of the congregation;⁷ and from these transcriptions Gregory made up the present collection of fifteen homilies during one Lenten season, and sent the manuscript with a covering letter⁸ to the young widow Olympias,

⁵ Cf. the discussion of the line in Jebb's edition of the play (Cambridge, 1900), *ad loc.*; see also Plato, *Theaet.* 158E.

⁶ Cf. also the edition of the play by Schneidewin-Nauck (11te Auflage, besorgt von Ewald Bruhn, Berlin, 1911), p. 177, *ad loc.*: "so viel, dass er den Wahn [*illusion*] haben und bei andern hervorrufen kann, dass er glücklich sei." For Bruhn, the shift from infinitive to participle suggests "das rasche Ineinandergreifen des Glücks und Unglücks," the swift succession of fortune and misfortune; but I do not think that the context necessarily implies this.

⁷ See the edition of J.-P. Migne, *Patres Graeci*, XLIV, 764 B.

⁸ Printed now as the *proemium*, Migne, *ibid.*, 755-764 C.

friend of John Chrysostom and Gregory of Nazianzus, and later to be consecrated deaconess at Constantinople. Despite Gregory's final revision, the work still retains its homiletic character. The text that concerns us occurs in the fourth homily, in which Gregory is discussing the nature of love as we find it expressed in the Song 2.4-5. There should, says Gregory, be an order or hierarchy in love; and he contrasts the true love of the Song with the negligent attitude of most men towards God and their fellow-man:⁹

νῦν δὲ συγκεχυμένην ἔστιν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἄτακτον ἐπὶ τῶν πολλῶν τὴν ἀγάπην διὰ τῆς ἀκαταλλήλου ἀναρμοστίας πεπλανημένως ἐνεργουμένην. οἱ χρήματα μὲν καὶ τιμὰς καὶ γυναῖκας, ἂν τύχωσι θερμότερον πρὸς αὐτὰς διακείμενοι, ἐξ ὅλης ψυχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως ἀγαπῶσιν, ὥς καὶ τὴν ζῶην ἂν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐβέλῃσαι προσέσθαι· θεὸν δὲ τοσοῦτον ὅσον δοκεῖν· τῷ δὲ πλησίον μόλις ἂν ἐπιδείξαιτο τὴν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀφορισθεῖσαν ἀγάπην. ἡ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς μισούντας οὐχέτις ἐστὶ τῷ μείζονι κακῷ τοὺς προλελυτηκότας ἀμύνεσθαι.

We may render this:

In most men, however, we see a love that is disordered and dissipated, functioning in a confused way through lack of order and harmony. If, as it happens, they are passionately attached to money, honor, women, they love them with all their soul and with all their strength, so much so that they would be ready to give their life for them; whereas they love God only for appearances (θεὸν δὲ τοσοῦτον ὅσον δοκεῖν). As for their neighbor, they barely show him the love they owe their enemies; and as for their enemies, their regular attitude is to pay back those who have hurt them with an even greater injury.

It would be interesting to speculate whether the phrase τοσοῦτον ὅσον δοκεῖν in Gregory is a reflection of current idiomatic usage or simply a reminiscence, a semi-deliberate quotation of the *Oedipus*-passage. The rarity of the expression would lead one to suspect that it is a quotation; and yet the ordinary audience at Gregory's sermons would hardly be expected to understand a purely pedantic reference, a phrase that was not intelligible in itself. In either case, we must consider the phrase in its Gregorian context before drawing any conclusions about the relationship of this passage to the chorus of Sophocles.

⁹ Migne, *ibid.*, 848 A; cf. H. Langerbeck, *Gregorii Nysseni in Canticum Canticorum (Opera, ed. W. Jaeger, VI [Leiden, 1960])*, p. 122, 11-12, p. 123, 1.

In Gregory our crucial phrase is *adverbial*, qualifying the verb ἀγαπᾶσι understood from the previous clause; it expresses the *way* in which most men love God, as opposed to their way of loving money, honor, etc., things in which they are passionately involved. But what is the exact meaning of the idiom in this passage? To go back to our outline of the meanings of δοκεῖν quoted above, we have the following possibilities:

A) In the personal use:

1. men think or imagine they love God;
2. they pretend, or seem to others, to love God;

B) in the impersonal use:

1. their love is merely an illusion (δοκεῖν), as opposed to the reality; it is merely for appearance, external;
2. they love God merely as it pleases them, according to their own good pleasure.

Indeed, it is difficult to be certain, but the whole trend of the passage would seem to suggest that the impersonal use (and, in particular, sense B 1) is being emphasized. True love is love "with all their soul and with all their strength"; it is in a readiness, as Gregory suggests, to give one's life. But this real, committed love is reserved for their worldly goals. The only thing left, then, is the love that is merely external, for appearances, for show. It is the way of externality, false and superficial. But even here, though the emphasis would seem to rest on sense B 1, the others are not thereby excluded: for the love Gregory speaks of is both a pretence and a self-deception, consisting mainly in externals; it is a love according to their good pleasure.

Let us see then whether this analysis can throw any light on the *Oedipus*-passage. In Gregory the phrase is used as an adverb; in Sophocles it is substantival, as object of φέρει. In the Sophoclean context, as we have seen, the personal meaning seems to predominate, especially because of the following δόξαντα; in Gregory of Nyssa, the subject of the infinitive is unexpressed, and it is likely that the impersonal meaning predominates, but not, of course, to the exclusion of the other connotations. In both passages there are two levels, the level of pretence or illusion, and the other, which we may call the level of truth. In

Sophocles the level of pretence is occupied by that which men normally call prosperity, *εὐδαιμονία*; the second level he leaves unexplained, but reiterates the Solonic dictum, "Call no man blessed till he is dead." The difference between the two levels is not a matter of human choice, but is rather the result of the divine will and *Dikê*. In Gregory, on the other hand, the level of pretence (*δοκεῖν*) is occupied by men's love of God (*ἀγάπη*); their real love is directed towards worldly pleasures. But, by a peculiarly Greek irony, Gregory suggests by the language he uses in the passage that what men think true happiness is, wealth, honor, and the like, is false; and that they would enjoy true happiness only when their *real* love ("with all their soul and with all their strength") is directed towards God. The Christian author is, I feel, implicitly defining what Sophocles leaves unspoken.

By way of summary it should be said that though the Gregorian parallel (be it quotation or independent usage) does not change our fundamental interpretation of the choral ode, it forces us to examine it in a new light. The precise connotation of the idiom, *τοσοῦτον ὅσον δοκεῖν*, still remains difficult; and though our analysis may suggest that Sophocles' statement is somewhat more philosophical than has been hitherto understood, yet his tantalizing reticence prevents us from carrying the discussion much farther. In any case, the general meaning of the fourth stasimon remains the same; and the lines we have discussed underline one of the pervasive themes of the entire play: the polarity between light and darkness, the blindness of Oedipus and the vision of Teiresias, illusion and truth.¹⁰ When all is said, it is a terrifying vision that Sophocles offers us through the sufferings of his tragic heroes: a world in which most *εὐδαιμονία* is merely *τὸ δοκεῖν*, and the generations of men are but a cipher, *τὸ μηδέν*, in the sight of the gods. For Sophocles, only this awareness, the recognition of man's true place in the world, can bring an *ἔλθος* untouched by catastrophe.

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¹⁰ For a discussion of the light-darkness theme, see my earlier article, "Sunken Imagery in Sophocles' *Oedipus*," *A. J. P.*, LXXVIII (1957), pp. 46-8.

THE LAODICE INSCRIPTION FROM DIDYMA.

One of our few precious documents illustrating the governmental organization of the early Seleucid empire is the letter of Antiochus II found at Didyma.¹ This letter instructs one of his subordinates, Metrophanes, to transfer to Laodice the village of Pany, part of the royal land near Cyzicus. The stele from Didyma contains three letters, the second and longest one being Antiochus' instructions to Metrophanes to have the transfer carried out, registered, and published. The third, a report on the survey of the estate, seems certainly to come from the hyparch . . . crates, who oversaw the survey on the spot. It has always been assumed that the letter at the top of the stele, which lacks its salutation, represents the king's orders, as conveyed from Metrophanes to the hyparch by some intermediary. This intermediary, and hence the author of the first letter, would have been Nicomachus, mentioned as *οικονόμος*, 'steward,' in the hyparch's report.

It would seem, however, that there is certainly a better explanation for the first letter of the stele. The extant part does not contain any orders about the survey, though this would be the major subject of a letter to Nicomachus. Instead, the writer merely tells his correspondent to set up two of the five steles ordered by Antiochus and to pay for them from the royal purse.² These will go to two cities close to each other on the Asia Minor coast, Ephesus and Didyma. It is this very geographic fact that

¹ B. Haussoullier, *Rev. Phil.*, XXV (1901), pp. 8-39; *Milet et le Didymeion* (1902), pp. 76-110; *O.G.I.S.*, 225; T. Wiegand, *Abh. Berl. Akad.*, Anhang, Abh. I, 1908; C. B. Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period* (1934), Numbers 18-20 (referred to hereafter as Welles).

² Actually, the whole tone of the letter suggests that sale, survey, and registration are already complete (cf. lines 13-16: *ἐπεστάλαμεν δὲ καὶ Τιμοξένῳ τῷ βυβλιοφύλακι καταχωρίσαι τὴν ὥνῃν καὶ τὸν περιορισμὸν εἰς τὰς βασιλικὰς γραφὰς τὰς ἐν Σάρδεσιν*, "We have written to Timoxenus the archivist to file the deed of sale and the survey in the royal records at Sardes" [Welles' translation]). Furthermore, we can hardly assume that much has been lost from a stele of 70 lines. Schliemann's Ilium inscription (Welles, 10-13) contains only 75.

holds the key to the letter. If it were addressed to an *οικονόμος* living near enough to the Hellespontine region to relay messages to a hyparch near Cyzicus, it would mean that the stelae would have to be carried more than one-hundred fifty miles overland, or even farther by sea.³ We have, then, two strong arguments against Nicomachus as the officer addressed in the cover letter. First, there is the negative evidence that the letter lacks the very instructions which the hyparch says Nicomachus conveyed. Secondly, we face the unlikelihood of Metrophanes' sending orders to any Hellespontine officer to have a six-ton stele shipped across the Asia Minor peninsula.

Instead, then, of the cover letter sent by Metrophanes to Nicomachus, it seems that we have a later note to some royal representative in the area of Ephesus or Miletus.⁴ The writer would logically be either Metrophanes himself or Nicomachus. The chief purpose of the letter is exactly that stressed in the extant portion: to convey instructions for the publication of the deed of sale (*πράσις*) and the survey report (*περιτοπισμός*) in two of the five appointed cities.⁵ There is no implication that royal funds paid for only two of the stelae; it is only that we have

³ I have been able to estimate the size of the stele only very roughly. Wiegand's fragment measures 59 cm. in breadth, 19.5 cm. in thickness. The 24 lines of the fragment cover a height of 53 cm., suggesting a total length of at least 1.7 m. for the inscribed block of 70 lines. This volume of marble could hardly weigh less than six tons, assuming a specific gravity of 2.8.

⁴ The error would probably have been avoided if all the extant stone had been found in the original excavations. As it was, Haussoullier found and published the portion of the inscription containing the major part of the royal letter, plus the hyparch's report complete. From the latter he reasoned sensibly that there must have been two lost letters in the series, an order from Nicomachus and a letter from Metrophanes. It was his belief that these letters, in the order mentioned, had preceded the king's on the stone. Five years later the rubble of some Byzantine walls yielded a half-metre slab of marble which fit the top of the truncated inscription (Wiegand, p. 37). The new fragment confirmed so many of Haussoullier's predictions, including the salutation of the royal letter, that Wiegand can scarcely be blamed for assuming him right about the partially preserved letter at the top. He called it the second half of Metrophanes' orders to Nicomachus. This assumption has never been questioned by scholars, concerned as they were with the historical questions of wider importance raised by the text.

⁵ Welles, 19, line 7.

found the order for these particular inscriptions. Presumably similar orders were sent to officials in Samothrace, Ilium, and Sardis;⁶ these may even be the unidentified ἄλλοι of our inscription.⁷ If we should ever be fortunate enough to find fragments from the publication in the other sites, we should expect to find the king's letter and the hyparch's report in the same form, but preceded by a different cover letter.

In his manner of publication, our hypothetical official in the Ephesus-Miletus area has followed the best examples of his time. We think of the Meleager text from Ilium, with its cover letter.⁸ Here the copies (*ἀντίγραφα*) of the three pieces of royal correspondence have been published in chronological order of composition. But at the head of the inscription stands Meleager's advice to the city about publication.⁹ This is thought to represent the normal sequence in Seleucid correspondence: all official letters are attached in chronological order, except for the last. This is always placed at the top of the collection. If the first section of the Didyma text is assumed to be Metrophanes' instructions to Nicomachus, all chronology is destroyed. The correspondence would run, chronologically: (a) King to Metrophanes; (b) Metrophanes to Nicomachus; (c) hyparch's report. But the inscription places letter (b) first, ruining either straight chronology (a, b, c) or regular Seleucid form (c, a, b). If, on the other hand, we call this a cover letter sent to an official of Ephesus or Didyma, we can see him publishing the letters in the traditional Seleucid manner. The transfer is followed by the survey report (straight chronology), but both are preceded by the cover letter.¹⁰

⁶ Timoxenus, the bybliophylax, does not seem to have taken care of the Sardis inscription.

⁷ Welles, 19, line 3. This would confirm the contrast of the *σὺν οὖν* of Welles' restoration.

⁸ Welles, 10-13.

⁹ Cf. also Welles, 36-37, which contains only one letter preceded by a cover letter.

¹⁰ The unnamed addressee is an individual in the service of the king and not the *βουλή καὶ δῆμος* of the Ilium inscription, for example. There is, in fact, a vivid contrast between the polite *καλῶς δ' ἂν ποιήσαιτε* of the Meleager letter and the cooler imperative of our letter's *ποιήσαι καὶ σύνταξον ἀναγράψαι* (line 6). Of all the offices mentioned by Bickerman

We can, then, recreate the flow of correspondence that lies behind the Didyma inscription:

(1) The king writes to Metrophanes, the Hellespontine satrap, calling for the survey and publication of the sale. (Letter preserved, Welles, 18.)

(2) Metrophanes writes to the *οικονόμος* to handle the matter (whether because of his office or because he is nearer to Pany's is hard to say). (Letter not extant.)

(3) Nicomachus, the *οικονόμος*, relays the orders to the *ὑπαρχος*, presumably in Cyzicus, Zeleia, or some other point near to the actual estate. (Letter not extant.)

(4) The hyparch sends a copy of his survey report, presumably to his immediate superior, Nicomachus. (Report preserved, Welles, 20.)

(5) Nicomachus sends this report on to Metrophanes. (Letter not extant.)

(6) Metrophanes reports to the king that his will has been carried out. (Letter not extant.)

(7) Someone, whether the satrap or the *οικονόμος*, submits the king's letter and the hyparch's report to Timoxenus, *βιβλιοφύλαξ*,

(*Institutions des Seleucides* [1938]), *διοικητής* seems most likely for three reasons:

1. Such an officer existed under Antiochus II at Anaea (*S.E.G.*, I, 366, line 17, an inscription from Samos).

2. In Nysa, around the turn of the next century, the term is found in a fragmentary inscription (Welles, 43-44), which could be restored to resemble this situation. The decree concerns the publication of letters and the scrap of royal letter could be ordering the *διοικητής* to attend to the matter.

3. Its meaning is conveniently general, "manager," yet it often bears financial connotations (Welles, p. 328). We note that our official has access to the treasury, *basilicon* (line 11).

Though the *διοικητής* seems, under Seleucus, to have been a mere trouble-shooter sent out by the king (Memnon, fr. xi), in the Samian inscription he seems rather to be permanent. He is contrasted with the *φρούραρχος* who is merely stationed in the city: *πρὸς τὸν ἐν Ἀναλίοις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τεταγμένον φρούραρχον καὶ πρὸς τὸν διοικητήν*. If our multiple assumptions will permit us to create a *διοικητής* as a permanent local representative of the king, he would fulfill our requirements.

'archivist,' in Sardis, for filing in the royal archives. (Letter not extant.)

(8) The same man sends word to some official in four of the five cities where the report will be published to have the inscriptions made. Since Ephesus and Didyma lie so near to each other, one official can oversee both. (One of the four letters preserved, Welles, 19.)

(9) Each officer sends a final report of his publication to the same official. (Letters not extant.)¹¹

This closes a financial manoeuvre involving more than a dozen letters, carried to and from offices in half as many cities, yet delivered in as little as eight months.¹² The king had asked that it be done with dispatch (*εὐθέως*),¹³ and it was.

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¹¹ Cf. Welles, 19, line 13.

¹² Unfortunately, the year for both the king's letter and the cover letter have had to be restored. Whether the year should be Seleucid 59 or 60, we can now see that the entire transaction took place between Dīus and Daesius, the first and eighth months of the year. The choice of year depends on whether or not we believe the harvest of the fifty-ninth year (Welles, 18, lines 9-10) had yet been gathered when the king wrote.

¹³ Welles, 18, lines 34-5.

A NOTE ON THE ΠΙΣΤΕΙΣ IN ARISTOTLE'S
RHETORIC.

The word *πίστις* has the meaning of "pledge of good faith" in *Rhetoric* 1375 a 10.¹ This meaning is of no relevance to Aristotle's rhetorical theory.

It is used in two other senses:

(a) It means "the state of mind produced in the audience." Examples of this usage are 1367 b 29, 1377 b 25, and 1394 a 10.

(b) It has the meaning of "the means whereby the state of mind called *πίστις* is produced in the audience." When *πίστις* is used in this sense I shall translate it by the English word "proof." It bears this meaning in 1354 a 14, 16; 1355 a 4, 27; 1355 b 35; 1356 a 1, 14, 21; 1358 a 1; 1363 b 5; 1365 b 20; 1366 a 18, 27; 1375 a 22; 1377 b 12; 1388 b 30; 1391 b 26; 1393 a 22, 23; 1403 b 7, 9; 1414 a 37; 1414 b 8, 9, 10, 11; 1416 b 33; 1417 b 20; 1418 a 18; and 1418 b 7, 9, 23.

The meaning of *πίστις* is doubtful in 1356 b 6, 1366 a 9, and 1377 b 19. In these passages the word can mean either (a) or (b).

Grimaldi² is of the opinion that *πίστις* is used in a third sense which is relevant to Aristotle's theory of rhetoric. According to him it also means "source material, or the subject-matter capable of inducing in an audience a state of mind called *πίστις*, or belief, if employed correctly."³ This third meaning which he gives to *πίστις* is expressed by him also in the words "source material for demonstrative proof,"⁴ "sources for inducing belief,"⁵ and "sources for rhetorical demonstration."⁶

Nowhere in the *Rhetoric* is *πίστις* used unambiguously in this sense. As examples of this usage Grimaldi refers to 1355 b 35, 37 ff.; 1356 a 1, 13; and 1356 a 21.⁷ But the word can bear the

¹ I shall be referring throughout this article to the text of Immanuel Bekker (Berlin, 1873).

² William M. A. Grimaldi, S. J., "A Note on the *πίστεις* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, 1354-1356," *A. J. P.*, LXXVIII (1957), pp. 188-92.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

meaning (b) in all these passages. When Aristotle wants to refer to "source material" or "sources" he uses (1) a circumlocution, as in 1358 a 1, 17; 1359 a 28; 1360 b 1, 2; 1365 b 20; 1366 a 19, 26; 1368 a 34, 36; 1368 b 2; 1377 b 16, 19; 1388 b 29; and 1403 a 22; or (2) the word *τόπος*, as in 1358 a 12, 31, 32; 1376 a 32; 1380 b 31; 1403 b 15; 1416 b 1, and 1419 b 19; or (3) the word *εἶδος*, as in 1358 a 31, 34; and 1403 b 14.

πίστις has the meaning (b) in the expression *πίστεις ἄτεχνοι* (1355 b 36, 1375 a 22, 1377 b 12) and *πίστεις ἐντεχνοι* (1354 b 22, 1355 b 36). Some proofs are inartificial in the sense of not being provided by the speaker and being already available to him. The inartificial proofs are five in number: laws, witnesses, contracts, torture, and oaths (1375 a 24). The speaker has only to use them. Artificial proofs on the other hand have to be invented by the speaker. It is to these proofs that Aristotle seems to be referring when he speaks of the "proofs provided by the speech" (1356 a 1).

There are three kinds of artificial proofs. The first kind, which I shall call "ethical," depends on the character of the speaker (1356 a 3). The speaker persuades by moral character when his speech is delivered in such a manner as to render him worthy of confidence (1356 a 5; cf. 1377 b 24 ff.). This confidence should be due to the speech itself and not to any preconceived opinion about the speaker's character (1356 a 9). The second kind consists in the production of a certain disposition in the hearer (1356 a 3; cf. 1377 b 24 ff.), i. e. in the hearer being roused to emotion by the speech (1356 a 15). I shall call this kind of proof "emotional." The third kind of proof, which still remains to be considered, I shall refer to as "logical."

The logical proofs consist in showing or demonstrating, by *ἐνθύμημα* and *παράδειγμα*, the truth or falsity of a proposition about the subject-matter of the speech. In a court of law, for instance, the litigant has nothing to do *ἔξω τοῦ δείξαι τὸ πρᾶγμα ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ γέγονεν ἢ οὐ γέγονεν* (1354 a 28; cf. 1404 a 5-7). The exciting of emotions has no connexion with *τὸ πρᾶγμα* and is directed towards the judge (1154 a 19). Aristotle says in 1358 a 39: *σύγκειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ λόγος, ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ περὶ οὗ λέγει καὶ πρὸς ὃν, . . .* It is with *περὶ οὗ λέγει* that the logical proofs are concerned.

Grimaldi excludes both *ἐνθύμημα* and *παράδειγμα* from the

logical proofs. He writes: "The entechnic pisteis, in Aristotle's words, are ἥθος, πάθος, and not ἐνθύμημα, but rather, ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ (1356 a 13).⁸ All three kinds of πίστεις ἔντεχνοι are furnished by the λόγος in the sense of "speech" (1356 a 2, 10, 15). For the purpose of distinguishing the logical from the ethical and emotional proofs it would be better to translate λόγῳ in 1356 a 4 by "argument" rather than by "speech."⁹ For the same reason I think that λόγων in 1356 a 19 should also be translated by "arguments."

One of Grimaldi's reasons for excluding ἐνθύμημα from the logical proofs seems to be that "Aristotle nowhere in the *Rhetoric* explicitly identifies enthymeme as he does ethos and pathos with the πίστεις ἔντεχνοι."¹⁰ But he implies that ἐνθύμημα is included among the πίστεις ἔντεχνοι; for he writes in 1354 b 22: περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐντέχνων πίστεων οὐδὲν δεικνύουσιν. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅθεν ἂν τις γένοιτο ἐνθυμηματικός.

The logical proofs consist in demonstration, as is apparent from the text: αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ, διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι (1356 a 4). The verb δεικνύναι is used again in 1356 a 20: διὰ δὲ τῶν λόγων [πιστεύουσιν], ὅταν ἀληθὲς ἢ φαινόμενον (ἀληθὲς) δείξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα πιθανῶν (1356 a 19-21). Aristotle refers indirectly to the three kinds of πίστεις ἔντεχνοι in 403 b 11-13: ἢ γὰρ τῷ αὐτοῖ τι πεπονθέναι οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ τῷ ποιούς τινας ὑπολαμβάνειν τοὺς λέγοντας, ἢ τῷ ἀποδεδείχθαι πείθονται πάντες. This passage implies that the third kind of proof consists in demonstration.

That demonstration consists in ἐνθύμημα and παράδειγμα is clear from 1356 b 6-8: πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστεις ποιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι, ἢ παραδείγματα λέγοντες ἢ ἐνθυμήματα, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν. ἐνθύμημα is associated with demonstration in 1355 a 6-7; and both ἐνθύμημα and παράδειγμα are associated with it in 1394 a 10. Grimaldi is right in saying that "παράδειγμα is the correlative of enthymeme as a method of demonstration,"¹¹ but wrong in excluding them both from the logical πίστεις.

One of Grimaldi's objections to referring to the first two kinds

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

⁹ The opposite of ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ (1356 a 3) seems to be ἔξω τοῦ λόγου (1415 b 6); here λόγον cannot be translated by "speech."

¹⁰ Grimaldi, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

of *πίστεις ἔντεχνοι* as “non-logical” and to the third kind as “logical” is that “we have the strange inconsistency of Aristotle damning the ‘non-logical’ *pistis* on one page of his text (1354) and incorporating it with the ‘logical’ shortly later.”¹² But there may be no inconsistency. He perhaps means that *ἦθος* and *πάθος* are *ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος* in the sense of falling outside the subject-matter of the speech, and not in the sense of falling outside the subject-matter of rhetoric. Rhetoric is the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion regarding each subject (1355 b 26). Only *πίστεις* fall within the *τέχνη* of rhetoric (1354 a 14). Some of them are inartificial, others artificial. Logical proofs are only one kind of artificial *πίστεις*.

Grimaldi's explanation of the reference to the enthymeme as *σῶμα τῆς πίστεως* (1354 a 15) is that “it is the container, that which incorporates, or embodies, the *pisteis*: *ethos*, *pathos*, *pragma*, imposing form upon them so that they may be used most effectively in rhetorical demonstration.”¹³ I prefer Cope's interpretation.¹⁴ The enthymeme is the body of proof in contrast to other things which are *προσθήκαι*, “mere ‘adjuncts’ or ‘appendages,’ like dress or ornaments to the body.”¹⁵

In this note I have tried to establish the following propositions:

(a) There is no clear instance in the *Rhetoric* of the use of *πίστις* in the sense of “sources for rhetorical demonstration.”

(b) In the expressions *πίστεις ἀτεχνοί* and *πίστεις ἔντεχνοι* the word *πίστις* has the meaning “means whereby the state of mind called *πίστις* is produced in the audience.”

(c) Aristotle includes both *ἐνθύμημα* and *παράδειγμα* in the third kind of *πίστεις ἔντεχνοι*.

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¹² *Ibid.*, p. 188, note 3; cf. p. 191.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

¹⁴ Edward Meredith Cope, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle* (Cambridge, 1877), I, pp. 5-6.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

REVIEWS.

J. BOMPAIRE. Lucien écrivain, imitation et création. Paris, E. de Boccard, 1958. Pp. 794. (*Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, fasc. 190.)

This is a rather ponderous tome. We are not yet accustomed to associating French scholarship with copious notes (the fine print in this book averages between a half and a third of every page), elaborate bibliographies, and the other apparatus of what we consider Germanic classical research. In a way it is disappointing that this book is so long; because it would be very useful to have a good, modern, short book on Lucian to recommend to our graduate students, and this is only good and modern. But let us be grateful for what we have.

Bompaire in his introduction tells us that he was inspired to begin work on this book by a chance conversation on the island of Delos, while he was a member of the French School at Athens. This gives me a kind of special qualification to review it, since I once wrote a (much slimmer and less learned) book on Lucian, largely while I was a fellow of the American School of Classical Studies in Athens, in part even on the island of Delos (though twelve years earlier than Bompaire's visit). M. Bompaire does me the honor of quoting my little thesis on numerous occasions, and the even greater honor of disagreeing with some of my wilder speculations. But now let us look at his book.

It is divided into three parts: I, on the Doctrine of Mimesis—undoubtedly the best account of this available anywhere; II, on Rhetorical Creation—again an outstanding treatment, containing a great many bits of information I had to learn for myself with great difficulty; and III, on Literary Creation. The chapter titles of part I are: I, Nature and Art; II, Philosophy and Mimesis; III, Literary Instruction and Mimesis; IV, the Authority of the Ancients; V, the Doctrine of Literary Mimesis; VI, Mimesis and Culture; VII, The Doctrine in Lucian. In the second part, after an introductory discourse on the two meanings of rhetorical creation, we have I, The Rhetorical World, dealing with favorite rhetorical characters and places as they appear in Lucian; II, Rhetorical Composition, giving a classification and analysis of many of Lucian's works; III, Rhetorical Themes, dealing with the various plots and ideas shared by Lucian and other sophists; IV, Rhetorical Elements of Style, on the use of quotations, proverbs, figures, and anecdotes by Lucian; and V, *Actualité ou pseudo-actualité*, discussing the important question of the extent to which Lucian gives us information about his own period and about himself. This is followed by a brief discussion of the Positive Aspects of Rhetorical Creation and a longer Appendix on Mechanical Creation.

The chapter titles of Part III are: I, The Lucianic Dialogue, Contamination and Transposition; II, *La récréation comique*, Irony,

burlesque, parody;¹ III, Fantasy; and IV, The Ecphrasis, the Synthesis of Art and Literature. A brief *Conclusion Générale* concludes the book. After the Table of Contents there is a thorough two-part bibliography (pp. 755-70), first listing the 95 most important works in alphabetical order, then, after a list of editions and translations (of Lucian and of other ancient authors), a separate bibliography for each chapter of the book. There is a complete Index Nominum (pp. 771-94) in five parts: modern authors, ancient authors, mythology, etc., ancients other than authors, and geography. Unfortunately there is no index for references to the individual works of Lucian.

There is scarcely a subject mentioned in those chapter-headings to which Bompaire does not provide the most recent and best documented treatment (often, indeed, the only accessible treatment). Students not only of Lucian, but of the second sophistic and Greek literature of Roman times in general, will be eternally indebted to him. All our libraries should have this book, all our Ph. D. candidates should read it. The only disquieting fact about it (as about progress in literature in general) is that never again will anyone have (as I had) the pleasure and profit of making for himself numerous discoveries of these simple but important facts by going to the sources. What remains to be discovered (and there is always something which remains) is no longer simple or obvious. It's a pity, in a way, that we can't keep our graduate students in full ignorance of all scholarly literature (including commentaries on texts) until they have spent two years or so extracting the absolute maximum from the ancients themselves (authors, inscriptions, papyri). What you discover for yourself is so much more real than what you are told by another.

Here are a few points of detail that struck me as especially good; others are sure to find different ones. On pp. 183-4, Bompaire observes that all the famous Cynics mentioned by Lucian are identical except for their names. While not absolutely novel (Bompaire cites Piot), this is still a useful observation. Bompaire's unwillingness (p. 370) to ascribe to a Menippean source everything that might chronologically have been found in Menippus is also laudable. Lucian's knowledge of ancient Greece, as Bompaire rightly observes (p. 525), is not based on any original research, but just random memories of readings and lectures. The point (p. 578) that it is an error to interpret Lucian's mythological dialogues as anti-religious propaganda is worth making, though not new, since this error is occasionally made even today.

These are all minor points; it would be easy to add a dozen more, but they would be irrelevant, since the main virtues of the book lie not in individual details but in the broad aspects of scope and treatment. Of these I will offer no criticism, but there are other small points where I am impelled to disagree, however respectfully, from Bompaire.

¹It is interesting to note that the English word "humour" has acquired in French the very specialized sense of burlesque and irony, including the general idea of the light and witty treatment of serious themes. English, from which the word was borrowed, has no single word to translate it back again.

First in regard to parody. Though Bompaire is familiar with my dissertation, which he cites frequently, and with one, at least, of my articles on Lucian, he appears not to have read my article on parody,² or he would not (I hope) so consistently assume that ancient parody (including Lucian's) has as its primary purpose in most instances an implied criticism of the author and passage being parodied. This attitude appears, e. g., on pp. 85, 589, 599, 601, and 676. The passage of Demetrius to which he refers in the first two of the above places does not contain the word *παρωδία* at all, and seems quite clear in its implication that such critical use of parody was not (as indeed it is not) the normal thing. It is perfectly all right to use modern critical ideas in discussing an ancient author, so long as one realizes clearly that they *are* modern; this Bompaire seems not to have done in this instance. What we mean by "parody" is one thing; what Lucian or his contemporaries meant by *παρωδία* is another.

Bompaire's criteria for sifting the dubia from the spuria are sometimes unclear. For instance, on page 125 (note 2) he lists *Charidemus*, *Nero*, and *Philopatris* as spuria, but counts *Amores*, *Lucius or the Ass* (cf. also pp. 676-7), and *Demosthenis Encomium* merely among the dubia. I have no doubt that all of these are spuria, and cannot determine Bompaire's reasons for hesitation. Conversely, on p. 281, he classifies *de Saltatione* as dubious in a manner which implies that he is morally sure it is spurious; but it certainly has more chance of being genuine than (e. g.) *Amores*, which could have been written by Lucian only if he had a thorough-going split personality (including a different way of writing Greek). It is possible, I think, to have a slightly better ear than this, and be slightly more confident in judging authenticity—though perhaps Bompaire is a bit overbold in his assurance (e. g. p. 473, n. 2) that the *Macrobi* is false; the case here is like distinguishing your grocery list from my grocery list, unless you can be sure that Lucian would never be caught dead with any grocery list.

Similarly, though Bompaire occasionally criticizes other scholars (including myself, pp. 153, 522, 639-40) for what he judges to be unwarranted guesses, he is not above making or at any rate approving guesses himself. E. g. p. 567 on possible influences of satyr-plays, p. 616 on the thaumaturge Tianos (in the *Alexander*) as an allegorical allusion to Apollonius of Tyana. In some cases he adds such expressions as "avec certitude" (p. 458, on the source of the first group of tales in *Philopseudes*), or "il nous semble assuré" (p. 508, on Latin sources for details of the *Nigrinus*). The assumption in the latter case appears to be that all the satirical and moral literature written at Rome in the imperial period was in Latin, none of it in Greek. This seems to me far from certain—in fact quite unlikely.

The passages on pp. 52, 527 (note 1), and 638-40 alluded to above involve a complete acceptance of Delz's criticism of my article on "The Mock Decrees in Lucian" (*T. A. P. A.*, LXXI [1940], pp. 199-216), apparently without reference to my review of Delz (*C. P.*, XLVII [1952], pp. 195-6). He is often critical of Delz, but occasionally seems to go too far (e. g. p. 495) in accepting references in Lucian as evidence of contemporary conditions. Like Delz, he is

² *C. P.*, XXXIX (1944), pp. 1-9.

apparently willing to assume much more independent invention of clichés than seems reasonable to me, even considering εἶπε τὴν γνώμην as an original Latinism (from *sententiam dicere*) of Lucian's, in spite of the Greek parallels. In general I think it may be safely said that no phrase in any language is entirely an independent invention, that almost everything said in prose or verse, even by writers of greater originality than Lucian, is, in whole or in part, a reminiscence or reshaping of something said or written by some predecessor. Such reminiscences are usually, of course, quite unconscious, but if we had anything like a total record of everything heard or read by a given writer, we could locate sources for every phrase in his production (given a suitable program for a battery of IBM machines). Oral epic is not the only art form based on clichés, it is just the form which uses them most obviously and with least modification. So if Bompaigne does not like the sources I proposed, he should either propose better ones or admit ignorance, not attribute things to "la fantaisie." In phraseology there is no such thing as a *chance* coincidence; coincidence means, however indirectly, a common source.

Bompaigne's strictures (pp. 240-2) on his predecessors (including myself) on the classification of rhetorical compositions (into μελέται, θέσεις, λαλῆαι, etc.) are in the main well founded, though I do not believe even Bompaigne has achieved perfect clarity and accuracy. The truth is that the rhetoricians themselves are not nearly as precise and consistent (with themselves or one another) as Bompaigne would like modern scholars to be.

On p. 559 Bompaigne objects to the classification of *Menippus*, *Piscator*, *Fugitivi*, and *Juppiter Tragoedus* as Menippean dialogues on the ground that Lucian uses only quotations and parodies, whereas Petronius and Seneca (for instance) have only original verse—presumably as Menippus himself did. The facts are, of course, correct, and I think we should in the main attribute them to Lucian's hesitation about composing verse. Nearly all the verse attributed to Lucian is surely falsely attributed or deliberately forged (Bompaigne agrees except for the *Podagra*, which relies heavily on parody and tragic clichés). This does not seem to me sufficient reason to deny the name "Menippean" to these works. We will never (barring an unlikely papyrus discovery) know the exact nature of Lucian's debt to Menippus, surely exaggerated by Helm and others, but we have Lucian's own repeated word that there was such a debt, and that it involved the mingling of prose and verse.

With some reservations Bompaigne (pp. 614-19) seems to accept Lévy's thesis that Lucian's *Alexander* and *Peregrinus* are parodies of a lost life of Pythagoras (or perhaps, according to Bompaigne, of the whole class of hagiographic or aretalogic literature). This is based largely on numerous similarities of incident (such as greeting the rising sun, claims of reincarnation, etc.). Neither Lévy nor Bompaigne seems to consider the possibility that the "parodist" in these matters was not Lucian, but Peregrinus (and Alexander). Though Bompaigne rejects (p. 620) the possibility that Lucian was influenced by the Pseudo-Callisthenes form of the Alexander romance, it is interesting to note how many incidents and elements of that work can be paralleled in the *Vera Historia*.

Bompaire's conclusion on the originality of Lucianic dialog (pp. 584-5) is well worth reading as a wholesome corrective to many exaggerated statements that have appeared in earlier books. It is possibly itself a wee bit exaggerated, but essentially right; Lucian's whole originality lies in his manipulation of words. There are probably some independent ideas, some sincere beliefs scattered through Lucian's work, but they are scarcely possible to detect, certainly impossible to demonstrate. His real greatness lies in the skill with which he can play beautiful variations on (frequently banal) themes provided by others.

The real mystery about Lucian (the mystery toward the solution of which some of my guesses criticized by Bompaire p. 153, n. 3 were directed) is why Lucian is not merely another Alciphron or Aelius Aristides. Bompaire's extremely thorough and valuable book does not, however, seem to give us any answer to the question, except to imply that it is due to some mystic inner greatness in Lucian. Certainly Lucian must have had some special strength of character to resist the overwhelming trend toward dead banality which all around him were bent on strengthening, but that does not seem a sufficient explanation. It is hard for me to believe that there was not also some external influence that supported Lucian in this effort, even if it was not perhaps the sole cause.

In any case, this must now be the first book for any serious student of Lucian to master; whatever its faults, it has no serious rival, and probably will not for many years to come.

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W. D. Ross, ed. *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1959. Pp. xiii + 206. \$4.00. (*Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis*.)

The Oxford Classical Text of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* has not been built up from new collations of any MSS but is essentially a revision of existing texts like that of Roemer in the Teubner series. The editor has drawn on the published suggestions of a few scholars, on the study of Aristotle's style and thought, and on his own vast experience with his author. The chief virtues of the volume seem to me to be its availability and the clarity of its format, not the text itself; Ross clarifies a number of passages, but muddies others at the same time.

Our knowledge of the text of the *Rhetoric* is dependent first of all on Parisinus 1741 of the tenth or eleventh century (A^c), revised in a small part by the original hand (A¹) and more extensively by a second and later hand (A²). Still another hand or hands made emendations in the vicinity of 1368a which Ross records in his apparatus but does not mention in the introduction. The text of A is excellent; an editor should think long and hard before departing from it. As Ross points out, the scribe's chief fault was a tendency

to be deceived by homoeoteleuton. In a few instances (there are about ten examples in book one) Ross prefers readings found in one or more of the lesser MSS, of which he makes use of eight and the fragment of a ninth. A reading of one of these becomes especially attractive if supported by the old Latin translation of William of Moerbeke: in about thirty-six additional places in book one Ross accepts readings of the lesser MSS which appear to be supported by this Latin translation. Although many of these are no doubt correct, Ross' faith in the translation seems to me excessive considering the poor knowledge of the text to which he admits and the difficulty of identifying the word or form which William was trying to translate. In his introduction Ross points to 1374a16 and 1379a22 as passages in which William has preserved the correct text, but in some fifteen instances in book one alone a reading supported only by the Latin translation is accepted. Thirteen of these are departures from Roemer's text, and it seems to me that all thirteen are probably steps in the wrong direction.¹

All the MSS, including A and the MS which William of Moerbeke used, are derived from a single archetype. Although Ross convincingly argues against Roemer's hypotheses of lacunae in thirteen places, he nevertheless exhibits more distrust of this archetype than have most editors. There are some forty-nine places in book one, forty-five in book two, and fifty-eight in book three where he adds or omits words solely on his own authority, often against the united evidence of all MSS and the Latin translation and frequently in passages where earlier editors have felt no difficulties. The changes needless to say have some contextual or grammatical excuse and if necessary on such grounds are often palaeographically possible. Many of them are short words, particles, conjunctions, pronouns, and the like, easily lost or mistakenly added. Readers will have to consider each on its own merits, and Ross' extensive experience with Aristotle's style and habits of thought gives him a decided advantage in a feeling for the small subtleties. In some cases he derives support from other scholars who have carefully studied Aristotelian usage. For example, he appears to accept the results of Wilson² and Eucken³ on the use of particles; Eucken concluded that Aristotle's text should be emended to remove $\tau\epsilon$ if it could not be justified as a connective and apodotic $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ except with a demonstrative or after $\epsilon\iota$, advice which I am not sure I would have followed. There are at least two cases in the *Rhetoric* (1355a10 and 1364a9) and one in the *Politics* (1278a32) where the MSS have $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ after a temporal clause. A temporal clause is much the same thing as a conditional clause in Greek grammar. How many swallows do make a summer?

¹ The fifteen instances are 1354b9, 1355a32, 1356a30 (accepted by Roemer with the note *omissus in libris omnibus praeter Tr., cuius tamen in hac re auctoritas est nulla*), 1356b19 (supported by Dionysius), 1360a13, 1361a32, 1361b5 (accepted by Roemer), 1362a8, 1362a26, 1364a25, 1364b2, 1364b17, 1369b26, 1370a25, 1376a16 (cf. the omission of $\kappa\alpha\iota$ in 1376a1).

² Cf. J. Cook Wilson, "On the Use of $\delta\lambda\lambda'$ η in Aristotle," *C. Q.*, III (1909), pp. 121-4.

³ Cf. Rudolf C. Eucken, *De Aristotelis dicendi ratione* (Göttingen, 1866), pp. 15 ff.

It is a pity that Ross could not have been more complete in describing the authorities for the text and in reporting at least twentieth century emendations. He seems oblivious of the existence of Marciianus 214 of the thirteenth century, which contains the beginning of the *Rhetoric* up to 1356a3 and has been regarded as of independent value.⁴ The Arabic version or versions⁵ are not mentioned, nor are Latin translations other than that of William of Moerbeke.⁶ He cites many but by no means all of the emendations of Bywater,⁷ Richards⁸ and Wilson.⁹ He does not appear to have used Roberts,¹⁰ Cooper,¹¹ MacKay,¹² or the most recent edition of the *Rhetoric*, that by Antonio Tovar.¹³ The amount of space such citation would take is negligible, and since an Oxford text, good or bad, is necessarily regarded as a standard, an editor incurs an unusual obligation in undertaking to edit one. *φαίνεται γὰρ ἅρτα καὶ τοῖς παραληροῦσιν* (1356b36).

Apart from misprints and small irregularities¹⁴ some specific points which may be of general interest are:

1. p. vii, lines 19-20. The statement is made that the scholiast Stephanus is perhaps the same one who wrote the *Rhetorica in Alexandrum*. Surely Ross does not mean that Stephanus was

⁴ Cf. K. Horna, "Beiträge zur Überlieferung der aristotelischen Rhetorik," *W.S.*, LI (1933), pp. 31-56 and Antonio Tovar, *Aristoteles: Retórica* (Madrid, 1953), p. xli.

⁵ Cf. Tovar, *op. cit.*, p. xlii.

⁶ Cf. Br. Giles, "Mediaeval Latin Translations of Aristotle's *Art of rhetoric*," *T.A.P.A.*, LXV (1934), pp. xxxvii-xxxviii and Marvin T. Herrick, "The Early History of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in England," *Ph.Q.*, V (1926), pp. 242-57.

⁷ Cf. I. Bywater, "Aristotelia III-V," *J.P.*, XVII (1888), pp. 53-74, XXVIII (1903), pp. 241-53, and XXXII (1913), pp. 107-22.

⁸ Cf. H. Richards, "Notes on the Rhetoric of Aristotle," *J.P.*, XXXIII (1914), pp. 172-81.

⁹ Cf. J. Cook Wilson, "Difficulties in the Text of Aristotle," *J.P.*, XXXII (1913), pp. 137-65.

¹⁰ Cf. W. Rhys Roberts, "Notes on Aristotle's 'Rhetoric,'" *A.J.P.*, XLV (1924), pp. 351-61.

¹¹ Cf. Lane Cooper, "Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.16.1417b16-20," *A.J.P.*, L (1929), pp. 170-80.

¹² Cf. L. A. MacKay, "Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, III, 16, 11 (1417b12-20)," *A.J.P.*, LXXIV (1953), pp. 281-6.

¹³ Cf. *supra*, n. 4 and "Notas críticas a la *Retórica* de Aristóteles," *Emerita*, XXII (1954), pp. 1-54.

¹⁴ P. vi, line 7, read II for I; p. viii, line 8, read xxi for xxxi; p. viii, the references to the scholia seen disordered; p. xiii, perhaps the Sigla should contain the Basel edition which is variously referred to as *Bas.* (p. 51), *Basil.* (p. 55) and *ed. Basil.* (p. 80); p. 2, app. line 1, read 1354 for 1385; 1355a28, read *ὥσπερ* for *ὥσπερ*; p. 8, the line numbers are out of agreement with the Berlin edition and app. line 4 seems to imply that the codd. read *καὶ ὅτι καὶ*, which I do not believe to be true; p. 54, app. line 10, read 10 for 1C; p. 62, app. line 2-3, two readings are attributed to Γ. Is one a correction? 1388a29 read *οἱ* for *οἱ*; p. 130, line 15 is omitted in the margin; p. 143, app. line 4, should *οὐχ* be *οὐχ*? 1412b27, read *μὴ* for *μὴ*.

the author of the work known as the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, of which everything except the introductory epistle (and maybe that) was written in the fourth century B. C. As far as I know there is no work entitled *Rhetoric against Alexander*.

2. 1356b3-4. The number of certain errors in Dionysius of Halicarnassus' quotations do not make him a very sound authority for the text. Here he has unnecessarily filled out the thought.
3. 1357b15. Roemer's apparatus reports different readings, as does Tovar's. What is the reading of A?
4. 1358b36. οὐδ' seems quite sensible to me. The orator proves that an act is expedient. He does not *also* undertake to prove that it is *not* unjust. The statement would apply to the Athenians on Melos.
5. 1382b31. ἀν παθεῖν should be attributed to Richards.¹⁵
6. 1388b10. εἶναι should be attributed to Richards.¹⁶
7. 1397b14 ff. In this passage a longer and a shorter version of the text is preserved. Ross follows the reading of the lesser MSS for 14-16 with the seemingly unnecessary addition of ὑπάρχον. He then adopts the longer version of A for lines 16-19 with three small changes: a γε of his own invention, the transposition of εἰ, and the addition of ὑπάρχει. The passage is still unsatisfactory as Ross' *dubitanter* admits.
8. 1398a9. οἶον should be attributed to Richards.¹⁷
9. 1398b26. δ, which Ross prints in the text, appears to be an emendation by Bywater¹⁸ for the τὸ of the codices.
10. 1401b4-5. Ross' conjectural addition helps the clarity of the passage, but seems unnecessary.
11. 1408b32-33. The reconstruction of this passage should be based on the statement in Demetrius, *De elocutione*, 42: ὁ μὲν ἡρώος σεμνὸς καὶ οὐ λογικός, ἀλλ' ἡχώδης. Bywater¹⁹ and Wilson²⁰ are on the right track, but perhaps best would be σεμνὸς καὶ οὐ λεκτικός, ἀλλ' ἀρμονίας δεόμενος, "dignified and not suitable for speaking, but requiring a harmony."
12. 1411b10. The reading of the MSS should be preserved; the article is part of the quotation. Cf. the translation of John Henry Freese, "the inanimate becomes animate."²¹
13. 1412b25 ff. The omission of ἡ . . . ἡ makes a considerable improvement in the sense and the other changes in the passage are also probably sound.
14. 1415a20. Ross has profited from the suggestions of Spengel and Richards.²²

¹⁵ Cf. *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 8), p. 175.

¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 177.

¹⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 178.

¹⁸ Cf. "Aristotelia V," *J. P.*, XXXII (1913), p. 117.

¹⁹ Cf. *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 18), pp. 120-1.

²⁰ Cf. *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 9), pp. 138-47.

²¹ Cf. John Henry Freese, *Aristotle: the "Art" of rhetoric* (London, 1926) (Loeb Classical Library), p. 403.

²² Cf. *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 8), p. 180.

15. 1417b7 ff. This is one of the places in the *Rhetoric* where the imperative suddenly appears, perhaps a sign that material is being adapted from the *Theodectea*. If there were only εἰσαγε to dispose of I would be tempted by εἰσάγειν on the basis of the reading εἰσάγει in A. But ποίει in the next line confirms the imperative and Ross' ὅτι δὲ ῥάδιον, ὅρα could easily have led to the ὅτι δὲ ῥάδιον, ὁρᾶν δεῖ and ὅτι ῥάδιον ὁρᾶν δὲ of the MSS. The presence of the imperatives may seem to support Ross' ἔστω in line fourteen, but the meaning is thrown off by such a change. Aristotle is not saying "let narrative be concerned with things done," but "narrative will necessarily be concerned with what has been done in order that reminded of those events the audience may better resolve about the future." The genitives of the participles which Ross then conjectures seem impossible. Whom would the speaker be slandering or praising? The present tense indicates something coincident to the adjacent verb and the reading of all MSS may be retained if the passage is interpreted to mean "whether they reject or approve the object of the speaker." Ross' interpretation of the passage has further caused him to doubt the correctness of the next clause, but it seems quite possible for Aristotle to remark that "in that case" (the τότε is perhaps partly influenced by the preceding future tense) "the speaker will not be fulfilling the function of an adviser (but of some other kind of speaker)." Thus the readings of the MSS may be retained throughout the sentence. The next sentence, however, one of the most frequently discussed in the work,²³ requires some sort of repair. Ross' solution has the merit of making sense with simplicity. In the ὥς which he suggests for the MSS οἷς he is unwittingly following Jebb²⁴ and the solution is as satisfactory as any proposed. I find it difficult to believe that διαδάττειν is right, but I do not know what is.

These passages may help to give an impression of the kind of text which Ross has constructed. Bold and imaginative, but not definitive and probably not distinguished.

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GABRIELE GIANNANTONI. I Cirenaici: Raccolta delle fonti antiche, traduzione e studio introduttivo. Firenze, G. C. Sansoni, 1958. Pp. 520. L. 6000.

"In philosophy I am a Cyrenaic or egoistic hedonist, and regard the pleasure of the moment as the only possible motive of action." So wrote A. E. Housman, in the last year of his life.¹ Hedonism has

²³ Cf. Cooper, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 11) and MacKay, *op. cit.* (*supra*, n. 12).

²⁴ Cf. Richard C. Jebb, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle: a Translation* (Cambridge, Eng., 1909), p. 190.

¹ A letter (1936), quoted by G. Richards, *Housman, 1897-1936* (New York, 1942), p. 271, n.

not often been frankly adopted as a philosophical position, though there must be very many who have silently followed its precepts as a guide to life, or who would admit their adherence only in assured privacy. Hedonism is often qualified or diluted, as among the British Utilitarians, where it is associated with, and to an extent modified by, the principles of equality and sympathy. Again, the fierce quest for pleasure and the restriction to short-term goals which have often been characteristic of periods of danger or social disorganization are frequently coupled with a disillusionment that betrays a deeper allegiance to other ideals. But in ancient and modern times alike the adherent of "the selfish philosophy" has been under a cloud of social disapproval which has made it difficult to judge impartially the merits of his philosophy or to follow accurately the course of its history and the extent of its influence.

Valuable assistance will be given to the understanding of ancient hedonism by Gabriele Giannantoni's new compilation of the source-material on the Cyrenaics. The collection is generous in the inclusion of relevant material, even that whose pertinence to the Cyrenaics has been contested. The Greek passages are printed according to modern editions, well arranged, carefully indexed, and provided with an Italian translation on the facing pages.²

Because of the nature of the tradition, most of the material on the school in general is given in the first chapter, along with that on Aristippus; seven much shorter chapters deal with his successors. The four sections of chapter I give (A 1-185) testimonia on the life and writings of Aristippus and the foundation of the school, (B 1-79) the doctrines of the school, (C 1-6) "imitations" (the pseudo-Aristippus letters and a Syriac fragment), and (D 1-44) an "appendix" of passages, mostly from Plato and Aristotle, of doubtful reference to Aristippus. The footnotes provide a selection of "variants of special interest," references to the comment on each passage in the introductory chapters, and some references to parallels and modern discussions.

The "introduction" is in reality hardly an introduction to the Cyrenaic philosophy as a whole, being devoted entirely to the question whether Aristippus can justly be regarded as "the theoretician of the Cyrenaic school" and whether he in fact founded "una vera e propria scuola filosofica" (p. 71). These questions Giannantoni answers in the negative. Aristippus was hardly more than a spirited and independent man about town, he thinks, a devotee of high living attracted to the company of Socrates by curiosity. To show this, he first studies the evidence on the life and personality of the man, and then turns to what few purported fragments and doxographical statements there are. He emphasizes the scantiness of the contemporary or near-contemporary evidence for Aristippus' philosophical activity, and inclines to the belief that he first became a full-fledged philosopher by courtesy of the "succession-writers," historians of the Hellenistic period who wished to provide everyone

² No comment on the translation will be made here. Readers may now consult A. Grilli's review, *Rivista critica della storia della filosofia*, XIV (1959), pp. 343-51 and Giannantoni's reply in the same journal, XV (1960), pp. 63-72, where a large number of corrections are proposed and adopted.

with a place in an orderly succession of masters and pupils. Finally, he examines a number of passages on hedonism in works of Plato and Aristotle which have been thought by some to refer to Aristippus, without naming him.

Although it is valuable to have the fact brought out forcefully, in the case of the Cyrenaic as well as the other philosophies of the period, that the received historical tradition must not be accepted uncritically, it is doubtful whether Giannantoni can be said to have established a strong case for expelling Aristippus from the history of philosophy.

In the first place, the picture of Aristippus' non-theoretical temperament, alluded to above, is itself largely conjectural, being based mainly on the anecdotal tradition. To be sure, Xenophon, who was also an associate of Socrates, represents the Cyrenaic in the *Memorabilia* (II, i; cf. also III, viii) as living intemperately and as being taken to task by Socrates for that, and does not have Aristippus reply with a developed hedonistic theory. But Xenophon's purpose throughout this book is to defend Socrates and put him in the best possible light—and by no means primarily as a theoretician. As a matter of fact, the careful statement and refutation of a hedonistic doctrine would be more surprising than what we find.

It is true that there is an embarrassing paucity of fragments and contemporary evidence, and that doxography is hard to disentangle from anecdote. In particular, Giannantoni seems right in insisting that the various Platonic passages, especially from the *Theaetetus* and *Philebus*, which are quoted and carefully analyzed here, cannot provide positive evidence for Aristippus' philosophy. But there may be more of a substantial character than he would admit.

When Aristotle speaks against hedonism in *Nicomachean Ethics* X, he mentions the name of Eudoxus but not that of Aristippus. Our author seems to place more reliance on this very dubious *argumentum ex silentio* than on the two passages in which Aristotle does mention Aristippus by name. One of these is of the anecdotal type; it shows him in an attitude of reverence to Socrates and of rivalry to Plato (*Rhet.* B 23, 1398 b 29). The other quotes him as depreciating mathematics on the ground that it has nothing to say about good and bad (*Met.* B 2, 996 a 32). While not very revealing, this surely seems to show him in a philosophic context. We must also reckon with the facts that he was known as a teacher, and taught for money (it is nowhere stated that he was independently wealthy, as Giannantoni follows Zeller in assuming), that he wrote books, that the questions of "the good" and of pleasure were much discussed in his day by persons with whom he associated, and that he became known at an early date as a sponsor of pleasure.

That Speusippus and Stilpo the Megarian both wrote dialogues entitled *Aristippus* cannot in itself be taken as indicative of the extent to which he should be regarded as a "theoretician" or the founder of a school. When taken together with the facts, however, that both took strong positions in the discussion of the highest good for man (Speusippus maintaining that pleasure is not a good at all, Stilpo that the good is *apatheia*), and that the former also wrote a separate book *On pleasure*, may we not suppose that Aristippus' ethical ideas inspired them to write on him?

In regard to the Cyrenaic theory of knowledge, we are largely dependent on a passage in Plutarch's essay *Against Colotes* (24, 1120 B), in which he chides the Epicurean for misunderstanding the Cyrenaic position. Here Giannantoni makes much of the fact that Colotes was arguing in this section of his book, according to Plutarch, against contemporary philosophers, i. e. against Cyrenaics more than a century later than Aristippus. This fact cannot prove, however, in itself, that Aristippus did not hold similar views; in fact the Cyrenaic arguments reflected are just such as might have been advanced by a contemporary of Protagoras, Democritus, and Plato.

Giannantoni's attention seems concentrated too narrowly on the question of the origin of a "school" with a clearly defined and systematically developed doctrine. When hedonism appears in the history of thought it is often a result or symptom of an effort to clear away what is regarded as unnecessary philosophical lumber, superfluous religious or metaphysical assumptions, and get back to a "realistic" view of the basic springs of human behavior. This is surely the reason why philosophical hedonism, saying that it is reasonable and right that man seek pleasure, is so often closely associated with psychological hedonism, which states that people in fact do this. It was natural under the circumstances that Aristippus should display a somewhat more informal attitude to the problems of philosophical analysis, and that his successors should, in the developing polemic of the Hellenistic period, work out the details of the system more completely.

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B. L. HIJMANS, JR. "ΑΣΚΗΣΙΣ. Notes on Epictetus' Educational System. Assen, Van Gorcum and Comp., N. V., 1959. Pp. 109. Hfl. 12.50. (*Wijzgerige Teksten en Studies*, No. 2.)

It is a paradox of modern scholarship that Arrian's *Discourses of Epictetus*, by far the most authoritative of all the extended presentations of Stoicism that have been preserved from antiquity, no longer figures prominently in reconstructions of the Stoic system. There was a time when (in the ethical sphere at least) Epictetus and Stoicism were all but synonymous. In 1599 Guillaume Du Vair wrote of his work, *La Philosophie Morale des Stoïques*, "ce n'est autre chose que le même Manuel d'Épictète, que j'ai mis en pièces, lesquelles j'ai transposées selon l'ordre que j'ai jugé le meilleur" ("Au Lecteur Français," as republished by J. Vrin [Paris, 1946], with notes by G. Michaut). But the historical approach, which currently dominates studies in Stoicism, relegates Epictetus to a late and relatively unimportant position in the school. It has therefore become the custom to search through the *Discourses* and the *Manual* not so much for insights into Stoicism as for those peculiarities which characterize Epictetus as an individual and place him in his proper historical niche.

Hijmans' study is an example of the current tendency. He is interested in Epictetus chiefly as an individual, and only incidentally

as a Stoic. In Chapter I, "Epictetus, the Man and his Aim," he is reluctant even to call Epictetus a philosopher. A philosopher, he holds, must be able to admit that he might be wrong, whereas Epictetus accepts Stoic truth without reserve, in a manner reminiscent of "Newmanian certitude" (p. 12). Indeed, Hijmans doubts (pp. 21-2) whether there ever existed in the Stoic school the truly philosophical attitude of self-criticism, and he sees (pp. 50-1) in its excessive dogmatism a major cause of Epictetus' failure as a teacher and of the eventual death of the school. It is thus not surprising that Hijmans attaches no great significance to the philosophical content of Epictetus' teaching.

Again in Chapters II ("General Problems of Education in Epictetus") and III ("The *Askesis*") there is a negative approach to the *Discourses*. Because of their chance character and complete informality, Hijmans believes that they were not part of the regular teaching program in Epictetus' school. In addition to the *Discourses* there must have been formal lectures (p. 48), while "the real psychagogical work" (p. 84) of the school must have been carried on in private interviews. Yet these suppositions do not do justice to the versatility of the Epictetan diatribe. *Discourses* such as I, 1 and I, 4 (if we may trust Arrian's report) owe nothing to chance; they present their topics as efficiently as a formal lecture would. And at the other extreme, it is difficult to imagine that personal guidance given in private to the father of a sick child would have differed greatly from the admonitions contained in *Diss.*, I, 11. It is evident that even a conversational form of instruction, when employed by a teacher as skillful as Epictetus, gives him the means of saying all that he wants to say in the order in which he wants to say it. Behind the informality of the diatribe lies a great deal of art.

The description in Chapter III of Epictetus' educational method includes comparisons with Democritus, the Pythagoreans, the Sophists, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle; but again, in my opinion, the distinctive features of Epictetus' Stoicism do not receive clear formulation. At one time Hijmans recognizes (p. 91) that Epictetus' *askesis* is "wholly rational"; at other times he calls it "psychagogy," a term regularly applied by the ancients to irrational attraction of one kind or another. He sees in Epictetus' use of rhetorical techniques a tie with the Sophists, yet he finds no recognizable rhetorical scheme in most of the *Discourses*. Again, in comparing Epictetus with Aristotle (p. 63), he seems to overlook the vast difference between the habit of acting rationally, which Epictetus attempts to inculcate through the study of philosophy, and Aristotle's good habits, which belong to the moral rather than the intellectual virtues and properly precede philosophical inquiry into ethics and politics.

Finally, Hijmans points out a number of ways in which Epictetus himself failed to live up to the rational ideal of Stoicism. There is nowhere in the book any attempt to convict Epictetus of faulty reasoning. But sometimes Epictetus allowed his reason to be overcome by *πάθος*, according to a footnote on p. 30. (It should be observed that Miss Stellwag, to whose dissertation Hijmans refers in this note, did not interpret the passages under discussion in this way, but rather as evidence of an underlying eudaemonistic principle in Epictetus; see p. 138 of her dissertation.) And in Chapter IV,

"Epictetus and his Pupils," it is argued that Epictetus permitted himself to feel concern for the welfare of his students and to experience disappointment at his failure to turn them into good Stoics. That Epictetus did fail is inferred from his harshness toward his students, his self-criticism, and the fact that none of his students, so far as we know, became eminent as a philosopher. Yet one might reply that harshness was a recognized educational technique (cf. Philod., *De Lib. Dic.*, frag. 7: τῷ σκληρῷ χρήσεται τῆς παρησίας εἶδει); self-criticism was inevitable in any Stoic who did not claim to be a sage; and Arrian, at least (*Letter to Gellius*, 7), credited Epictetus with considerable success in making his listeners more attentive to reason. Nor is it inconsistent for a Stoic teacher to have a concern for his students' welfare, so long as welfare is defined as adherence to the principles of Stoicism. The concern that Epictetus expresses in *Diss.*, II, 8, 15, quoted by Hijmans (p. 45) as evidence that Epictetus feared that "some young man will run into all sorts of harm, while he is away from school for a short while," is in fact the fear that the student will not act rationally after leaving the school. As reason is the supreme good, the Stoic may legitimately dedicate himself to the cultivation of it in himself and in others. The Stoics held that the faculty of reason forms a natural bond among all rational creatures; and there is no indication in the *Discourses* that Epictetus' attachment to his pupils was of any other kind.

So much for Hijmans' characterization of Epictetus and his teaching. There remain some lesser points. Typographical errors in references and in Greek quotations are numerous and sometimes misleading. The English is not that of a native speaker. A conspicuous omission in the bibliography is F. Schweingruber, "Sokrates and Epiktet," *Hermes*, LXXVIII (1943), pp. 52-79, which might have been used with profit in the discussion of Epictetus' portrayal of Socrates (pp. 75-6). The sentence quoted from *Diss.*, II, 17, 23 (p. 13) is not an expression of religious or philosophical doubt, but of fear of failure. Contemplation has a more important role in Epictetus than that assigned to it on p. 22; it consists of the observation of God and his works (*Diss.*, I, 6, 19; II, 14, 23-9). Epictetus' attack on the Epicureans for destroying friendship (p. 29, note 1) does not rest on a misunderstanding but on a conviction that by denying the natural bond among men the Epicureans destroy the basis of friendship (cf. Cicero, *De Fin.*, I, 65, for a similar attack); of course the Epicurean doctrine does not alter the fact that the natural bond exists and that friendships do occur, even among Epicureans. The admonition to read Chrysippus as one reads Latin does not, as Hijmans thinks (p. 35, note 2), indicate that some of Epictetus' students had difficulty with Greek, but rather that Chrysippus is as difficult to read as a foreign language. Bonhoeffer's view, quoted on p. 37, note 4, that for Epictetus "die Physik die notwendige Grundlage, die Quelle der Ethik sei," is so clearly true that one wonders why Hijmans raised any question about it; see for example *Diss.*, I, 6; I, 9, 4-6; I, 14. The climactic order that Hijmans sees in the list of virtues in *Diss.*, IV, 9, 11 (p. 96) is an illusion; the fact that τὸ εὐσχημον guided Socrates' conduct on his last day (*Diss.*, IV, 1, 163) shows that εὐσχημοσύνη is not a virtue "for which no special philosophy is required."

One of the more surprising remarks in the book is that "Epictetus by nature abhorred all formalism" (p. 90). This about a teacher who would have us approach ethical problems as we do problems in mathematics!

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UGO COLI. Il diritto pubblico degli Umbri e le Tavole Eugubine. Milan, Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, 1958. Pp. 98. (*Circolo toscano di diritto Romano e storia del diritto*, I.)

The author of this monograph is professor of the history of law at the University of Florence, and his primary interest in the Iguvine Tables is that of a historian of law, not that of a historical linguist. Yet he makes it clear in the preface that the differences of opinion among even the most recent scholars on the interpretation of specific passages are so great that he has been unable to avoid (to use his own words) "l'invadere l'hortus conclusus della glottologia."

Naturally no clear dividing line exists between those problems in the Iguvine Tables which have a relation to legal and constitutional matters and those which have no such relation, and actually Coli treats a wide variety of problems, so that his work is in fact a welcome addition to earlier studies which, without being complete editions, nevertheless constitute major groups of selected studies.

Coli, like others, recognizes the importance of the Etruscans as the intermediaries through whom certain important features of Greek culture reached central Italy. It is common belief that several Greek words reached Latin in this way, and the notion that Umbrian should also show some Greek words in Etruscan dress is plausible enough in principle, but no student of the Iguvine Tables, to my knowledge, has ever gone so far as Coli in assigning Greek origin to Umbrian words for which he is seeking a new interpretation. A few particularly bold examples will suffice, for which it will not be necessary to give page-references, since the book has a good word-index: eikvasese corresponds to ἐνοκέσσις, so that eikvases-e atiedier means "in apparatibus Atiediiis," while eikvasatis is a participle meaning "paratis, instructis." The change ἐνο->είσ- offers no great difficulty, but the change of *s* to *h* and its subsequent loss before the *k* is by no means easily explained.—Acc. pl. iuka is to be connected with εὐχάς rather than with OHG *jehan*. Its semantic value, it is true, agrees closely with that of εὐχάς, but the usual connection with L. *jocus* is easy on phonological grounds, and the Latin restriction to facetious utterances represents a specialization of meaning.—*tremnu* and *tiçel* are taken from τέρεμνον and δίκηλον respectively.—*puni/poni*, the name of a substance of uncertain identity, whose use in ritual is prescribed sometimes as an alternate to that of wine, sometimes to the exclusion of wine, is here taken as from φόνος in the sense "sanguis in caede effusus." The representation of *ç* by Umbrian *p* presents no difficulty; he compares the similar treatment in L. *Poenus*, *puniceus*, but one might wonder why the Umbrians should borrow a foreign word for "blood" and if

so, why *φόνος* rather than *αἷμα*, even if it does mean "blood shed in slaughter," and finally why an *i*-stem should have been substituted for the *o*-stem.—Scarcely better is *uerfale* taken as a compound of two members corresponding respectively to *ἀρῆρ* and *ψαλῖς* and having the sense of "volta aerea." Actually the connection of *uerfale* with L. *verbale* on phonological grounds is simple, while its use to designate the augural *templum* is natural enough if we think of it as a euphemistic expression based on the *conceptis verbis* used in defining the *templum*.—*perca* is not a ceremonial wand, as taken by most, nor a kind of toga, as by some, but a leather bag for carrying the paraphernalia of the sacrifice, being derived from *πήρα* or *pēra*, with a *k*-suffix: here there is no special difficulty, but it is no positive improvement over the other two interpretations.—*admune* (*Ārmune*) is compared with *ἀσμένως*, intended as an expression of good omen to the families named in the passage immediately preceding; Coli denies the existence of the root *ar-/ars*—generally admitted as source of *arsmor*, *arsmatia*, and certain other words associated with priests and priestly functions, and explains the words otherwise.—*sihitu* and *ansihitu* are those armed with the *ξίφος* and those not armed with the *ξίφος* but with the spear; the *t* is of the same origin as in *hostatu* and words of the type of L. *hastatus*, *barbatus*, but in general the less said about the phonology the better.—It is not always clear whether the author intends the Umbrian words to be taken as loans from Greek or as cognates based on common inheritance, as is the case, for example, with *peturpursus*: *τετράποσι* (example mine). "corrisponde a" or "io paragono" suggest the latter, but in practically every case it must actually be borrowing that he has in mind, for in most of the instances in question the phonetic equations would be impossible if the relationship were based on common inheritance. The same vagueness in matters of phonology appears also in other places: so, for example, *fratrexs* is taken as a compound whose second member is from the root seen in L. *ago* (cf. *rem-ex*). The argument that a formation equivalent to L. **fratricus* would not imply the necessary notion of leadership of the corporation is good, but how can we explain the *c* in *fratreca*, *fratre cate*, in place of the expected *g*? Possibly through analogy with the nominative singular, where *g* became unvoiced before the *s*, but in view of the history of *g*-stems in Greek and Latin this would not be a very plausible explanation.

These criticisms should not lead one to suppose that there is not much of real value in the monograph. The name of the third gate, for example, which is *veheies/uehieir* is interpreted as "porta plaustraria" or "porta carraja." Taken in connection with the gloss Fest., *Ep.*, 506, 3 *veia apud Oscos dicebatur plaustrum*, this seems a decided improvement over the traditional connection with the remote city of Veii. For the difficult passage in VIb 51, where *parfa* appears without the names of the other three augural birds, he has again found a solution which is, so far as I know, original and which appears very tempting: it is simply one of several passages in which only the opening words of a formula are given. His discussion of the nations named in the curse against the enemies of Iguvium is helpful: *nomen* is used of the Tuscan, Narcan, and Iapudic peoples but not of the Tadinat people because the last, though enemies of

Iguvium, fell under the same *nomen* and were presumably co-members of an Umbrian league. The curse is again brought in at the end of the monograph in connection with the date of the tables: the archetype of the earlier and later tables must have been composed before the incorporation of Iguvium under Rome's protectorate (which he places between 295 and 225 B. C.), because after this time Iguvium could not have engaged in wars of its own with its neighbors. Since the curse as we actually find it appears in tables acknowledged to be of late date, I suppose we should have to assume that the names of the nations cursed no longer had any reference to the contemporary political situation.

Coli's discussions of the political and social organization of Iguvium and his attempts to arrive at a precise demarcation of the meaning of terms are especially valuable. In general he shows a marked tendency to emphasize the military aspects of the organization, while his denial of the distinction of civil and priestly assemblies which Devoto sees in *nerf arsmo* goes hand in hand with his refusal to recognize any root *ar-/ars-* as common basis for *arsmo*, etc. For him *arsmo* is the same as L. *arma*, an equation which on linguistic grounds is highly questionable. *nerf* is to *uiro* as L. *vir* to *homines*; here he follows Dumézil's study in *R. E. L.*, XXXI (1953), pp. 175 ff. *nerf* when contrasted with *iouies* is not *principes* but rather mature warriors contrasted with youthful front-line troops, and *poplo totar iouinar* is the total armed force of the state, a sense of *poplo* for which he finds certain parallels in early Latin before the contrast with *senatus* became dominant. The lustration thus becomes for him in effect a lustration of the army with little if any agricultural character.

For persons untrained in historical linguistics extreme caution should be recommended in the use of this book. Apart from such reservations it is an important addition to the works of Rosenberg, Camporeale, and others who have investigated the magistracies and organization of the ancient Italic states, and it certainly deserves the careful attention of all future scholars who devote serious study to the Iguvine Tables.

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B. A. VAN GRONINGEN. *Pindare au banquet*. Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff, 1960. Pp. 132.

Professor van Groningen prefaces his commentary on the scolia of Pindar with an account of their main characteristics and their position among the seventeen books ascribed to Pindar. He points out that Aristophanes of Byzantium, who compiled the first "édition scientifique" of the poetry of Pindar, made no mention of scolia, although Suidas referred to them and Pindar himself gave this name to fr. 107 (Bowra). The author then explains what Aristophanes meant by the term, *encomia*, which he gave to one of the seventeen books, and concludes that the scolia, because of their similarity to the latter and because of their small number, were included among the *encomia*. He defines the scolia as follows: "Il semble que c'est le ton

badin qui a souvent fait préférer le terme de scolie à cet autre, plus prétentieux, δ'ἐγκώμιον. Les scolies de Pindare se distinguent, si nous pouvons nous fier à ce qui en subsiste, par l'absence de toute gravité. Ils sont destinés à des fêtes joyeuses et le ton est léger et enjoué." He wisely refuses to speculate on the derivation of the term, scolion.

The importance of this book lies chiefly in the detailed discussion of frs. 107-9 (Bowra). In v. 5 of fr. 107 the MS of Athenaeus gives νοήματι ποττάν Ἀφροδίταν, which is one syllable too long. Hermann changed this to νόημα ποττάν Ἀ., and was followed by the editor of the Oxford text. Boeckh, however, read πρὸς τάν in place of ποττάν. van Groningen compares the uses of πρὸς and ποτί in Pindar and discovers that the latter is never elided except in *Olym.* 7, 90, where the repetition of the preposition explains the anomaly. Thus if the article is retained ποττάν must be changed to πρὸς τάν, but the author correctly argues that the article is not necessary and that if it is omitted the MS reading νοήματι need not be altered. He believes the corruption may be explained by the fact that Athenaeus adopted the reading of Chamaeleon, who wrote before the Alexandrian period and whose text was probably the one in use in Corinth at that time. A Corinthian text would normally use ποτί in place of πρὸς, and the article was included to satisfy the metre.

van Groningen also gives the first convincing explanation of v. 16 of the same poem. This gnomic expression, as often in Pindar, probably serves as a transition from one topic to another. Here it seems to end the discussion of the girls and to turn to Xenophon, whose Olympic victory is doubtless mentioned in the lacuna following v. 16. The phrase means that Pindar knows the true *aretê* of these girls and his praise of them, which surprises the Corinthians, is the result of his poetic insight into their real worth. His *sophia* is a true touchstone.

In v. 19 van Groningen argues that ἐκατόγγιον probably refers to an indefinite number, because Athenaeus several times speaks of a large and indefinite number of girls who participated in these rites.

Two passages which van Groningen comments on in fr. 108 deserve special mention. He retains the MS reading, ψυχράν, of v. 6 and translates as follows: 'ou bien il se laisse emporter par l'impudence des femmes sur une route qui n'offre que froideur, humble serviteur qu'il est.' Many editors reject the MS reading because of ψυχρά in v. 4, but, as the author points out, "cold" serves as a contrast to the "heat" of the sun in the following verse. One man who incurs the disfavor of Aphrodite toils away making money, the other devotes himself only to heterosexual love and consequently is dominated by women. He finds no real passion, only coldness.

The second passage is vv. 9-10. All previous editors have either emended the text rather drastically or indicated a lacuna after νιδόν, but van Groningen suggests that if Χάρις were changed to χάρις' we would have satisfactory sense. Although this verb is rarely found in the active and then only in late authors, it is the best emendation that has been suggested, but for reasons which may perhaps be better felt than explained, I find it difficult to accept it without reserve.

In fr. 109 his most important contribution is his interpretation of v. 2. He punctuates after πέμπω and makes γλυκερόν modify μεταδόντιον.

The remaining fragments which van Groningen discusses are 110-13 (Bowra) and 132a (Turyn). As in his treatment of the three longer poems he gives the source of the fragment, its text, a commentary, general discussion, and very brief metrical survey. Throughout van Groningen displays the learning and sound scholarship for which he is renowned. His detailed examination of these enigmatic and baffling fragments is a valuable contribution to the study of Pindar, and the procedure which he follows in his discussion of these fragments could only have been improved by the addition of a translation. The printing is large and clear and the misprints are few. I have noticed only the following: p. 52, line 6, for *ἡλικία* read *ἀλικία*; p. 81, line 14, for "sey" read "sei"; p. 94, n. 1, for p. 29 read p. 19; and p. 99, line 21, for *à* read *a*.

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SIR JOHN L. MYRES. *Homer and his Critics*. Edited by Dorothea Gray. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul (U. S. A., Essential Books, Fair Lawn, N. J.), 1958. Pp. xii + 302; 8 pls. \$5.80.

The history of Homeric criticism, to a severe judge outside the charmed circle, may appear a deplorable record of human extravagance and obstinacy; to more indulgent natures, it is a perennial fountain of exuberant fancy and tireless ingenuity. Sir John Myres, himself a man of great energy and ingenuity, was interested in any sincere attempt to understand the poems more fully, and this collection of essays, ably edited and supplemented by Dorothea Gray, is a lively and reasonably full account of secular changes in the approach to Homer and the interpretation of his work. Myres' contribution, three-fourths of the book, brings the story from Herodotus to Murray and Wilamowitz; the editor has added a substantial chapter on the contributions of Myres and his contemporaries, and a rapid survey of developments in the last decade, with a few amplifications of detail in the earlier chapters where more recent work modifies or supplements the conclusions there expressed, and has supplied footnotes throughout.

The nature of the material and its reworking results in a distribution of emphasis that is sometimes unexpected; but one may doubt whether in any case it would have been substantially different. Myres' chief interest was in the critics for whom, as for himself, Homer was not a text, a dead body for dissection, but a living force, from whose study we may acquire not only a knowledge of "how he has himself attained to his own art and mystery of craftsmanship, to that outlook over things which he communicates to us, to that mastery of what lies under his hand which makes all things new when that hand has passed over them," but also "an enlargement, disentanglement and articulation of our own experience and the training of our own native ability" so that "we may begin to see things as Homer or Shakespeare saw them, and be, in our own outlook and our rendering of it in expression, ourselves more Homeric, more Shakespearean, more

nearly master-craftsmen in the supreme art of living well, in the twentieth century."

The account begins with a sensible and perceptive chapter on the achievements and limitations of Greek criticism; Bentley, Wood, Wolf, Gladstone, Schliemann, Wilamowitz are reference points for a survey of the fascinating cycles and epicycles of Homeric criticism in the days before Milman Parry did for Homeric scholarship what Kepler did for astronomy. The traveler, the poet, the archaeologist receive an appreciative treatment that is a welcome enlargement of the narrower stream of academic speculation. The contributions of Chapman and Pope to the English Homeric tradition are justly acknowledged; we may check our surprise at the attention given to Gladstone by reflecting that to most Greeks of the Great Age the opinions about Homer of a statesman concerned with education might have seemed more important than those of any sophist.

The excitement of successive archaeological discoveries and their impact on theory are vividly recaptured, and there is often judicious recognition of the contribution made to the solution of Homeric problems by theories later shown to be partly or wholly erroneous. The presumption of philologists comes in for some sharp comment, particularly when they are discussing "discrepancies between the conjectural compositions of imaginary poets." Much Homeric criticism has indeed been less remarkable for precision of method or soundness of judgment than for uncompromising audacity and devoted exploration of even the most improbable hypotheses. If many theories seem to spring from the perhaps unconscious assumption that the theorists were themselves better poets than most of those that they supposed had worked on the Homeric corpus, it would not be false to the kindlier aspects of Myres' account to suggest that these scholars were not so much attempting to criticise as to produce works of poetry; the facility which the Muses had denied them in their own tongues they hoped to liberate by the championship of kindred spirits discovered in the confused freedom of antiquity; if some of them achieved by indirection minor poetry instead of major scholarship, the world of letters is not necessarily the poorer for that. Few literary critics have had the explicit creative daring of Matthew Arnold (whom Myres does not mention).

How much the earlier chapters owe to the editor, the dexterity of the editorial work makes it impossible to tell; they certainly retain the decisive vigor and individual freshness that mark Myres' other writings. The last chapters, on Myres' own contributions to Homeric studies, and on more recent investigations, are succinct and full of matter, willing, while recognizing the limitations of evidence, to take a definite stand on what evidence there is. Appropriately, indeed necessarily, they lay marked emphasis on archaeology, retaining too a unity of tone by occasional touches of deft acerbity.

This volume will not take the place, and was not intended to take the place, for research students, of doggedly academic surveys; but anyone interested in the impact and understanding of great literature, whether a professional Homerist or not, may read it with pleasure and advantage.

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CHARLES MUGLER. Dictionnaire historique de la terminologie géométrique des Grecs. Paris, Éditions Gauthier-Villars, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1958. Pp. 456. (*Études et Commentaires*, XXVIII and XXIX.)

According to the preface, this "Dictionnaire historique" is intended to give "une vue d'ensemble de la langue des géomètres grecs et de son évolution des présocratiques au VI^e siècle de notre ère." The subsequent introduction (pp. 7-32) "La langue des géomètres grecs" is therefore to be considered a summary of the results obtained from the composition of the dictionary. Five additional pages give a list of 59 concepts, beginning with "Premiers principes," "Définitions," etc., and ending with "Éllipsoïde de révolution"; thus the reader can find corresponding entries in the dictionary. The latter gives for each Greek term a translation into Latin, French, German, and English (usually one word for each language), followed by pertinent passages, French translation, and discussion. Within each article the arrangement is chronological, from Euclid to Proclus. Pre-Euclidean usage is given in a second paragraph and the Platonist will be pleased to hear that the master is the main source of this section. I have no doubt that this work will be a much quoted reference work for many years to come.

The first question one will ask while leafing through a dictionary of this type concerns, of course, the selection of sources. Two observations of basic importance will be made: (a) the subject matter is essentially restricted to geometry (as stated in the title) and (b) the mathematical works used are mainly the *Elements* of Euclid, the *opera* of Archimedes and Apollonius (Heiberg), the *Collections* of Pappus (Hultsch), and Proclus' commentary to Euclid I; of astronomical works Autolycus, Aristarchus, and occasionally Geminus. Several other authors are cited here and there but obviously no attempt has been made to survey in any detail the terminology of what I would estimate as more than half of Greek mathematical literature, even if restricted to "geometrical" terminology.

This restriction in itself is unsound. Everybody knows that the Greeks spoke of "squares" and "cubes" of numbers, that much in Euclid's *Elements* corresponds to a theory of irrational numbers, that operations with fractions were represented geometrically, and so forth. Why should only Euclid's version for these operations enter a dictionary, but slightly looser form (and thus historically of primary importance) in Diophantus or Heron be excluded? To quote only one example, ἀφαίρειν is explained as "opération consistant à retrancher d'une grandeur géométrique un grandeur du même ordre, c'est-à-dire une ligne d'une ligne, une aire d'une aire, un volume d'un volume." But Diophantus does not hesitate to add and subtract areas and line segments, thus following the main stream of mathematics which connects the ancient Near East with the Arabic (and thus the modern) development. Similar is the case with δύναιμι: to ignore Diophantus means to ignore an important source of later development. Disregard of Heron or of Nicomachus means to eliminate many interesting terms, even if one emphasizes only geometrical or philosophical implications.¹

¹ A good glossary for Nicomachus with many parallels from Dio-

It must be equally harmful for a study of Greek mathematical terminology to consider neither astronomy nor mathematical geography nor geometrical optics as sources of primary importance. It does not help to include Autolyceus and Aristarchus but to ignore Euclid's *Phaenomena*, the spherics of Theodosius, all of Ptolemy, and many others. Even Proclus is quoted (*s. v.* πεντεκαίδεκάγωνον) for the obliquity of the ecliptic from his commentary to Euclid when a more interesting passage would have been available in the *Hypotyposis*. We are told (p. 376) that σιγμή was replaced "à la suite de l'épuration des fondements de la géométrie par Platon et son école" by σημεῖον; but both terms have a quite interesting later history in astronomy. The word ἀνάλημμα is absent and so all the terms which are related to the most interesting methods developed in connection with the theory of sundials or with stereographic projection in the theory of the astrolabe. Needless to say, there is no trace of a recognition of the humble contribution of papyri to our knowledge of practical technical terminology and, of course, no word reflecting the influence of geometrical terminology on astrological concepts. Geography is ignored; thus under ἀντικείμεθα no mention is made of the use of this term by Marinus, known to us from Ptolemy's *Geography*, I, 15. Under ὀρθός no reference is made to the σφαῖρα ὀρθή which plays such an important role in spherical astronomy. We find *s. v.* βάθος a long discussion about Plato's interest in dimensionality, but no mention is made of the fact that this term represents eventually the anomaly of epicyclic motion—a process for which, e.g., Plutarch, *De Facie*, 937 could have been cited,² beside such early instances as the inscription of Kesikinto³ where βάθος probably means a sidereal epicyclic anomaly. Ptolemy's interest in the number of διαστάσεις of the space⁴ is not mentioned nor his statement that a certain construction cannot be performed διὰ τῶν γραμμῶν⁵—a statement of great principal interest.

All this is, of course, nothing but a small sample of illustrations for what must happen as the result of the arbitrary exclusion of major parts of disciplines which the ancients considered as a unit and which represent the most advanced and fruitful field of ancient science.

Turning to the individual articles, I can find no sense in the quadrilingual headings. The Latin is of course the Teubneriana Latin and thus of no interest for the terminology. And who is helped by "εἶναι, habere, avoir, haben, to have," etc., not to mention such awkward translations as "superficial extent" for area or "bruchstrecke" for gebrochene Linie?⁶

The principle of selection of words belonging to "la terminologie

phantus and Boethius by M. L. D'Ooge, F. E. Robbins, L. C. Karpinski is available in the *Michigan Humanistic Series*, XVI (1926).

² In Halma, *Tables manuelles*, I, pp. 62 f. βάθος is misread as βάθμος.

³ P. Tannery, *Mém. Sci.*, II, p. 491.

⁴ *Opera*, II, p. 265.

⁵ *Opera*, I, I, p. 42, 20. Also expressions like ψηφοφορία γραμμικῶς / ἀριθμητικῶς are not mentioned (*Opera*, II, pp. 165 f.).

⁶ It would have been useful to remark that νεῦσις has been rendered in German by "Einschiebung" (not Neigung).

géométrique" often remained dark to me. How could a Greek mathematician avoid the use of $\alpha\epsilon\acute{\iota}$, $\alpha\mu\alpha$, $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$, $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$, $\epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu$, $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$, $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}$, etc.? Completeness in trivialities does not benefit the reader, in particular when completeness of fundamental source material is sadly absent.

It would be unjust to see only the defects of the work under consideration. It will always be useful to have the glossary of several important works collected and competently discussed.⁷ It would be equally unjust to blame all the defects on the author. The lack of indices in many editions (e.g., Ptolemy) shares much of the responsibility. Most of all, however, it is the weight of a tradition which sees in Greek mathematics only the outcome of the pronouncements of the philosophers, carried out by their obedient pupils. Somebody educated in this myth looks at Greek mathematics as Winkelmann and Goethe looked at Greek art. He will never see some of the most elegant, some of the most fruitful, and some of the most charming aspects of ancient mathematical thought which had a long prehistory and was still part of Byzantine civilization long after Proclus.

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CARL W. BLEGEN, CEDRIC G. BOULTER, JOHN L. CASKEY, MARION RAWSON. *Troy, Volume IV: Settlements VIIa, VIIb and VIII. Part 1, Text: pp. xxvi + 328; Part 2, Plates: pp. xxix; 380 figs. (including 61 plans and sections). Princeton, Princeton University Press for the University of Cincinnati, 1958. \$36.00.*

For most people, except the small group of professional prehistorians, interest in Troy is centered in its Homeric connections, in the Trojan War. To this larger group, the publication of the first three impressive volumes, describing the remains of the successive towns that occupied the site from roughly 3000 B. C. to about 1275 B. C., was but a prelude to the presentation of "Homeric" Troy in this fourth and last volume. In the technical terminology of the excavators, "Homeric" Troy is Troy VIIa, a town that was built immediately after the destruction by earthquake of Troy VI, on top of the ruins of the earlier town and using its system of fortifications, again made serviceable by repairs. It is mainly these fortification walls, on the south and east sides of the citadel, and the many small houses adjacent to the inside of the walls, as well as a few outside, that comprise the preserved section of Troy VIIa. Unfortunately the higher terraces, which probably held more pretentious houses and the palace and sanctuaries, were all removed when the large Roman temple terrace was formed. Just inside the walls, the town was much more crowded than its predecessor, the

⁷ In the case of *συνεχής* it is misleading to speak of "considérations infinitésimales" and "continuité mathématique sous ses différents aspects" since the modern term "continuity" implies functional relations which are absent in Greek mathematics.

houses were smaller and less well built, often of material salvaged from the earthquake debris. Party walls were now common; great storage jars sunk flush with the floor were characteristic. Apparently there was need to bring many more people within the protection of the citadel; that this protection was inadequate is abundantly clear from the signs of violent destruction found everywhere in the severely damaged and burnt remains of Troy VIIa. The town did not last long, perhaps not more than half a century. A little imported Mycenaean ware, and many more imitations of such pottery, suggest to the excavators a date from 1275 B. C. to 1240 B. C., plus or minus a decade. The combined evidence from the excavations of Troy VIIa shows "that the town was subjected to siege, capture and destruction by hostile forces at some time in the general period assigned by Greek tradition to the Trojan War, and that it may safely be identified as the Troy of Priam and of Homer" (p. 13). The excavators' case is solid and convincing; it is supported by a very careful report of the excavation of the various areas of Troy VIIa and of the material found in them, following the scheme familiar from earlier volumes of *Troy*. Would that we had the more important upper part of the citadel!

Each successively higher town in the mound of Troy was increasingly subject to destruction through the building activities of classical times, through depredations by foragers for building material in more recent times, through disturbance by vegetation on the surface, especially since the excavations of Schliemann and Dörpfeld, as well as by these excavators' removal of upper levels in their attempt to reach earlier and deeper remains. Thus even less was found of Troy VIIb than of VIIa, and that in worse condition; again, it was restricted to areas along the walls; more remarkable, two phases in the history of this town were recognized. In both, Troy was still fortified, still a terraced citadel, thickly settled. Dwellings may have been larger than those of VIIa; an orthostate course is a new architectural characteristic, especially in VIIb 2, a phase characterized as well by the appearance of *Buckelkeramik*. By and large, however, there is considerable cultural continuity from VIIa to VIIb, to the extent that VIIb 1 would seem to be a reoccupation of the site by survivors of the destruction by the Greeks. It is the second phase of VIIb which shows several new cultural traits, enough to indicate that new people had come to rule over Troy, living alongside a considerable native element that continued many aspects of the material culture known in VIIa and VIIb 1. The settlers of VIIb 1 still imported Mycenaean ware, of the Granary class. This implies a date perhaps a little before and not much after 1200 B. C. The excavators suggest a date around 1100 for the end of phase VIIb 2.

After this, Troy was abandoned for about four centuries, until the eighth—the Greek—settlement was founded about 700 B. C. With so much of this settlement cut away in Roman times, remains occur only on the periphery of the site, and even these were much damaged by Roman construction. Yet careful searching has revealed several areas of Troy VIII, in the most important of which were two sanctuaries used from the early seventh century B. C. The ceramic

remains are in general more important than the architectural. The pottery is largely, but not exclusively, East Greek; it implies a Greek settlement in touch with much of the Greek world. Both sanctuaries continued to be used in Hellenistic and Roman times, beyond the scope of this volume, and their late periods are considered separately in an appendix. No other structures of Troy IX are here described; they will be published in a supplementary monograph, while other supplements will present objects of the late period, such as terracottas and coins.

This fourth volume of *Troy* completes the major publication of the results of seven campaigns of excavation undertaken by the Cincinnati expedition from 1932 to 1938. The task of searching for uncontaminated deposits of several periods in a site already much disturbed by earlier excavations, and by erosion and growth of vegetation in the forty years since those excavations, was not an easy one. The highly skilled staff is responsible for outstanding success both in this search and in the subsequent digging of these areas. That many members of the expedition served in all the campaigns, and then in the preparation of the publication, is in large measure responsible for the high quality of both. Despite the long interruption due to World War II, during which the staff was otherwise occupied, the first volume appeared in 1950, and the last only eight years later. This is a remarkable achievement, and an enviable one. The publication of *Troy* has set a standard of excellence for archaeological reporting that will long be emulated by others. Professor Blegen and his team richly deserve our thanks. *Troy* is now, more than ever, one of the most important Bronze Age sites in the Aegean.

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FRANCESCO GIANCOTTI. *Il preludio di Lucrezio*. Messina-Firenze, Casa Editrice G. D'Anna, 1959. Pp. 332. (*Biblioteca di Cultura Contemporanea*, LXIII.)

This is a valuable and stimulating book. As the author explains in the introduction, the extensive and intensive analysis of 145 lines at such length is justified by his view that they constitute not only the proemium of Book I, but a general prelude to the *De Rerum Natura* as a whole, a microcosm in which the major concepts and emphases of the poem emerge. Inevitably the discussion takes much material from other parts of the whole into account, but the focus determines the selection and weight accorded such material, providing its own perspective.

Following the introduction and the text of the 145 lines, there are seven chapters. In the first, the relation of Lucretius' concept of the function of poetry to Epicurus' view of the arts is considered. Examination of the evidence and the conflicting interpretations of scholars leads Giancotti to the conclusion that Epicurus had not condemned art in so far as it contributed to the Epicurean goal; it is not

necessary to postulate a later change in aesthetic theory, such as has been attributed to Philodemus; Lucretius consistently looks upon the function of poetry as didactic, the implications of *lepos* (I, 28 and 934) being shown to transcend mere euphony and to embrace the higher intellectual pleasure in which the utilitarian and hedonistic become one. Thus Lucretius' avowed and implicit purposes, his whole view of his art including its medium, language, are in harmony or at least reconcilable with the basic views of Epicurus. Happily, however, his poetic *taste* transcends his theory, as the tributes to Homer, Empedocles, and Ennius, carefully analyzed, reveal.

The second chapter takes up the poet's audience: Memmius, the general public, and the poet himself. Identification of the first with C. Memmius, the politician and recipient of Cicero's letter (*ad Fam.*, XIII, 1) is accepted as on the whole plausible but unverifiable. The similarity of Memmius' "profile" to that of the more general public addressed by the poet is noted: inexperienced in Epicureanism, beset by reluctance, doubts, even a touch of *religio*, involved in political concerns. Proceeding to the more subtle and complex problems of Lucretius' own need for confirmation, his profound involvement, the "Antilucretius" within, he sees the poet himself as his own audience. The discussion is sane and perceptive, and has important bearing later on the interpretation of the invocation.

Conjectures as to the possible date of composition, the next topic, are linked with the problem of the Epicurean attitude to involvement in politics and the famous advice *λάθε βιώσας*. The argument is concise and to the point: the Epicurean abstention from political concerns is a means, not an end, and must be relative to the individual's situation, there being times when concern is not only legitimate, but in the long view, imperative. Insisting that the prayer of line 40 is for the maintenance of peace rather than its future achievement, the year 62 B. C., following the suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy, is tentatively suggested.

With the next chapters we move into the heart of the book and its central concern, the interpretation of Venus and its implications for the whole proemium. The invocation and prayer, the "true" theology of lines 44-9, the problem of lacunae, the structural relation of the different parts and the order of their presentation, the major images and their relation to the basic concepts, are all treated in considerable detail. A long survey of previous interpretations is marked by meticulous concern to clarify the contributions of predecessors and the points at which the author's own views diverge. This survey is valuable in itself as an interesting chapter in the history of Lucretian scholarship. To summarize briefly, Giancotti insists on the centrality in Epicurean theory of the cosmic forces of creation and destruction, operating within the larger equilibrium of *isonomia*, on Venus as the personification of the creative force only (not to be identified with *natura* in its totality, nor with *ἡδονή* which is rather an aspect; he believes recent stress on the distinction between "kinetic" and "static" pleasure in this context exaggerated, while granting its validity within limits); Mars then personifies the opposite destructive force. The creative force, Venus, is a vital, ever-operating principle in which man too participates, the peace that is

the object of the prayer *depends* on man, the invocation and prayer are thus a summons to the creative principle immanent in man, for (*enim*, line 44) he cannot look to the gods of the *intermundia* for what he can and must procure for himself, as Epicurus himself said. No lacuna and no problem of transition remain to trouble us after 43. He does, however, believe a lacuna must be assumed between 49 and 50, to achieve the shift in tone and focus, and suggests its probable or possible tenor. This bare summary, abstracted from the extensive discussion, fails to do justice to the perceptive and illuminating analysis. Much that is not new in itself achieves a fresh orientation and new insights. Treatment of the images of Epicurus and Iphigenia is exceptionally stimulating and persuasive. Chapter VI includes a long stylistic analysis, stressing the inter-relationship of sound, rhythm, and imagery with the themes, and the interweaving of the more purely didactic sections with those of high imaginative power. Much of the earlier discussion, including that on poetic theory, takes on added relevance here.

The interpretation throughout vigorously insists on the deep human involvement of the poet, the "humanistic" as dominating the "cosmic" outlook, despite acknowledgement of the poet's cosmic vistas. An interesting brief conclusion raises the issue of an ultimate impasse inherent in Epicureanism between the ethical and cosmic views, unresolved and according to Giancotti, unresolvable, a question that he notes would carry him beyond the limits of his subject. Its statement, however, clarified a question in this reader's mind: does the basic assumption that the proemium is the "microcosm" of the entire poem lead to a disproportionate emphasis on the personal, subjective aspects in Lucretius' work that find here such eloquent expression? The answer itself must inevitably be subjective in part, but will play a role in the reader's assent to some of the arguments. (Essentially the same issue of the impasse inherent in Epicureanism itself is raised, in a different focus, by De Lacy in the article "Process and Value: an Epicurean Dilemma," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVIII [1957], pp. 114-26, not noted by Giancotti.)

The volume, paper-bound, is well printed and carefully proof-read. There is no index, which, in view of the author's method, is understandable, and the table of contents at the end is admirably detailed. Quotations from the Greek are translated into Italian. A bibliography of books and articles cited would be very serviceable, especially as the mere *op. cit.* with no reference to the first citation results in many an exasperating search. The presentation is clear, fluent, and often eloquent. It is an interpretation which, whether or not it proves persuasive, must command the attention of Lucretian scholars.

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THE PLAGUE UNDER MARCUS AURELIUS.

The great epidemic which occurred in the reign of Marcus Aurelius has a conspicuous place among the misfortunes of antiquity.¹ It is "not less celebrated," we read, than "the plague of Athens described by Thucydides."² It has the distinction of being associated with two great figures, being sometimes called the Antonine plague, sometimes the plague of Galen. Moreover, scholars whose opinions deserve respect have regarded it as a turning point in the whole history of the Empire. Niebuhr wrote, "This pestilence must have raged with incredible fury; and it carried off innumerable victims. As the reign of M. Aurelius forms a turning point in so many things, and above all in literature and art, I have no doubt that this crisis was brought about by that plague. . . . The ancient world never recovered from the blow inflicted upon it by the plague which visited it in the reign of M. Aurelius."³ Another great scholar, Otto Seeck,

¹ The fullest and best collection of references is in J. Schwendemann, *Der historische Wert der Vita Marci bei den Scriptores Historiae Augustae* (Heidelberg, 1923), pp. 54-62, 67-9. Also deserving mention are J. F. K. Hecker, *De peste Antoniniana commentatio* (Berlin, 1835); H. Haeser, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Medicin und der epidemischen Krankheiten*,³ III (Jena, 1882), pp. 24-33; K. Buresch, *Klaros* (Leipzig, 1889), pp. 67-78; Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte*, I¹⁰, p. 31; W. Zwickler, *Studien zur Markussäule*, I (Amsterdam, 1941), pp. 54-5; D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, II (Princeton, 1950), p. 1533, n. 8.

This paper was completed at the Institute for Advanced Study, where I had the privilege of spending the academic year 1958-1959.

² *Enc. Brit.*, XXI, p. 693 (11th ed.).

³ *Lectures on the History of Rome*², III (London, 1849), p. 251 (Lecture CXXI).

asserted that over half of the Empire's population perished; the settlement of Germans which followed led to fundamental changes of lasting importance.⁴ In a standard work of our own time H. M. D. Parker writes, "Sweeping over the Roman world it left many districts almost depopulated and contributed perhaps more than any other factor to the decline of the Empire."⁵ A. E. R. Boak presents essentially the same thesis in his important *Manpower Shortage and the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West* (Ann Arbor, 1955). Even when no such far-reaching results are ascribed to it, it is often represented as an unexampled disaster of great dimensions, perhaps in vague but extravagant phrases. The rather rhetorical description in the usually sober *Cambridge Ancient History* will serve as an example.⁶ Other scholars, of course, have been less impressed by it and have assigned it no significant role in the history of the ancient world in the second and later centuries.⁷

But it is not my intention to write an essay on the part that the plague has played in modern historiography. I propose, rather, to present a summary of our sources and comment on some. They vary considerably in date, quality, and character, and should be used with caution and discrimination. Those that deserve the least credit are among those most often quoted or copied, probably because they contain the most comprehensive and impressive statements. I will survey first the literary evidence, which remains much the most important, and will then consider certain inscriptions, papyri, and coins that have been connected with the plague. I will also discuss the settlement of barbarians within the Empire by Marcus Aurelius, since this has been taken as evidence of depopulation resulting from the plague. There will be a brief conclusion but no attempt to

⁴ *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt*, I³ (Stuttgart, 1910), pp. 398-405.

⁵ *A History of the Roman World from A. D. 138 to 337* (London, 1935), p. 20 (unchanged in 2nd ed. of 1958).

⁶ XI, pp. 348-9 (W. Weber): "Only remnants returned. To the god-ridden East and the terrified soldiers it seemed as though the divine powers of the country punished, where men had failed, the presumptuous invader, the perfidious destroyer of Seleuceia. The troops carried with them into Syria the fell disease. . . . Spreading misery and death . . . it carried desolation through the peoples of the Empire."

⁷ Gibbon is an obvious example. Another is Rostovtzeff.

provide an extended account of the epidemic. To anticipate, there is not enough evidence to identify satisfactorily the disease or diseases responsible,⁸ to trace the epidemic's origin and spread with much accuracy, or to determine even approximately the number of those who died during it from year to year and region to region. The most important question to be kept in mind is that of the dimensions of the plague: whether we should think of it as an earlier Black Death, destroying a fifth or even half of the Empire's population, or as a major epidemic of uncertain but probably much more limited impact, more nearly comparable to its many predecessors in the ancient world.

1.

There is relatively little information in contemporary authors; one would hardly expect much considering those that survive. Galen is the most influential and important, especially for historians of medicine and writers on epidemics.⁹ His references to it, however, are scattered and brief, and in the vast *corpus* of his writings there is nothing to correspond, for example, to the accounts of Thucydides, Boccaccio, or Defoe. He was not writing for later historians or the general reader. There is, in fact, not even a full, direct description of the disease itself. He was in Rome when the plague reached the capital in 166, but left soon after, perhaps in consequence.¹⁰ The one specific episode that

⁸ H. Haeser, *Lehrbuch*, III, pp. 24-33 concluded that the disease was probably smallpox. H. Zinsser, who discusses the effects of this and other epidemics in antiquity, concurs; *Rats, Lice and History* (Boston, 1935), p. 137. A. Castiglioni, *A History of Medicine* (New York, 1941), p. 244 suggests, without conviction, exanthematous typhus or perhaps bubonic plague. Clearly it is best for laymen to leave the question entirely open, as does George Sarton, *Galen of Pergamon* (Lawrence, 1954), p. 22. The experts continue to differ in their diagnosis of the plague at Athens, despite Thucydides' careful description. It should not be taken for granted that every mention of *lues*, *pestilentia*, or their Greek equivalents anywhere in the Roman Empire from around 161 to 192 must refer to the same disease; or that if *pestilentia* is mentioned at intervals, it must have been active during the years in between.

⁹ The passages were collected and quoted by Hecker and Haeser (above, n. 1). See also J. Ilberg, *Neue Jahrbücher*, XV (1905), pp. 293-6, 303.

¹⁰ XIX, p. 15 Kühn = *Scripta Minora*, II, p. 96 Mueller. He returned

he records is the outbreak among the troops concentrated at Aquileia during the winter of 168/169, when he was present.¹¹ Losses were heavy. He refers to the plague as a great one and, what is most significant, as persisting for a long time.¹² It may be noted that he was quite satisfied with his own ability to deal with the disease.¹³ It did not, however, play an important part in his practice,¹⁴ nor was it one of his chief interests. It is uncertain how many cases he saw after the winter at Aquileia. Marcus Aurelius seems to allude to the plague once in his *Meditations*.¹⁵ Lucian speaks of it possibly twice. In *Quomodo hist. conscr.*, 15 he describes the work of an imitator of Thucydides who in his history of Verus' Parthian War wrote of a plague in Nisibis.¹⁶ This had begun in Ethiopia, descended into

to his native Pergamum. Here and in other passages the plague is identified as *ὁ μέγας λοιμός*.

¹¹ XIX, p. 18 K. = *Scripta Minora*, II, pp. 98-9 M. The two emperors with a few soldiers fled to Rome, presumably regarded as a healthier spot at the time. Galen remarks that there were more deaths because the pestilence occurred in the middle of the winter. He later declined an invitation to accompany Marcus on his expedition against the Marcomanni, on the plea that Aesclepius forbade him to go.

¹² V, p. 115 K. = *Corp. Med. Graec.*, V, 4, 1, 1, p. 76; X, p. 360 K.; XVII, 1, pp. 709, 710 K. = *Corp. Med. Graec.*, V, 10, 2, 1, pp. 144, 145; XVII, 1, p. 885 K. = *Corp. Med. Graec.*, V, 10, 2, 2, p. 53. In the second passage the plague is spoken of as great and continuing; in the others, as very long (*μακρότατος, πολυχρονιώτατος*) but now ended. These come from *De atra bile* and the commentaries on Hippocrates, *Epidem.*, I and III, written apparently around the end of Marcus' reign or the beginning of Commodus'; the second passage is from Book V of the *De methodo medendi*, written a little earlier, under Marcus. For the dates see E. Wenkebach, *Abh. Sächs. Akad.*, XXXIX (1928), No. 1, p. 47, n. 1 and *Corp. Med. Graec.*, V, 10, 2, 2, p. ix; F. E. Kind, *R.-E.*, XIII, col. 2415; W. de Boer, *Wiener Stud.*, LI (1933), p. 60.

¹³ XVII, 1, p. 710 K.; XIX, p. 524 K.

¹⁴ See Ilberg, *loc. cit.*, p. 303.

¹⁵ IX, 2. He mentions pestilence in order to say that corruption of mind is worse. See the commentary in A. S. L. Farquharson's edition, II (Oxford, 1944), pp. 791-2.

¹⁶ The historian is Crepereius Calpurnianus, for whom see Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.*, II B, no. 208 and Kommentar, p. 629. Jacoby writes, "Crepereius hatte von der gefährlichen ausbreitung noch keine kenntnis, was bei der schnelligkeit, mit der diese historiker produzierten, nicht verwunderlich ist." Evidently Lucian was no better informed. At any rate, the point that interests him is Crepereius' slavish imitation of his

Egypt and into most of the King's country, and there remained doing good work. Lucian's attitude encourages us to be skeptical about the Thucydidean itinerary, but there is less reason to doubt that an epidemic actually occurred in the besieged city. If so, there is no way of telling whether the disease responsible was the same as that encountered by the Romans during the winter of 165/166 at Seleucia, where later writers state that the great plague began. In *Alexander*, 36 we find that this charlatan's practice included plagues, conflagrations, and earthquakes. A verse of his "which he dispatched to all the nations during the pestilence . . . was to be seen everywhere written over doorways."¹⁷ Lucian adds that it was particularly these houses that were depopulated. Aristides records an epidemic at Smyrna probably in the summer of 165. The date makes it at least uncertain whether this was part of that associated with Verus'

model, not the epidemic itself. The *Historia Augusta*, cited below in n. 27, also speaks of the great pestilence spreading through Parthia. The chronology of the campaign is obscure. But probably the siege of Nisibis occurred in 165 and the sack of Seleucia at the very end of the same year or a little later. The epidemic at Seleucia then may have broken out around January, 166. For a recent summary of evidence see W. Schur, *R.-E.*, XVIII, 4, col. 2025; also R. H. McDowell, *Coins from Seleucia on the Tigris* (Ann Arbor, 1935), p. 234. It is especially hard to date the siege of Nisibis, which is sometimes placed in 164, but see C. H. Dodd, *Num. Chron.*, 4th ser., XI (1911), pp. 257-8. Lucian's dialogue appears to have been written in the spring or summer of 166. He refers to events in Media, but the triumph celebrated on October 12, 166 had not taken place (30-1). Cf. Helm, *R.-E.*, XIII, col. 1744.

¹⁷ The translation is A. M. Harmon's in the Loeb edition. On the oracle see O. Weinreich, *Ath. Mitt.*, XXXVIII (1913), pp. 66-7. The plague is mentioned only in passing, and one would not gather that it was the great event of Lucian's and Alexander's age. This obviously is not a point to press. The dialogue was written after Marcus Aurelius' death. In *Dialog. mort.*, 4 Charon tells Hermes that he will be able to pay his debts if λοιμός τις ἢ πόλεμος should send down more passengers. This group of dialogues has been dated between the Parthian and Marcomannic Wars because of the present dialogue, in which peace is mentioned, and reference to the contemporary situation has been seen; see Helm, *R.-E.*, XIII, cols. 1738-9. If so, Charon's specific statement that he had few passengers might be offered as more reliable evidence than most of what we have for the death rate ca. 166-67. But from long experience Charon could expect an increase of income every few years owing to war, pestilence, or famine. In other words, it seems doubtful whether any particular war or pestilence is being referred to.

expedition, though it is generally taken to be. Aristides, as usual, is preoccupied with his own health, but he does say that disease was widespread in the city and its environs.¹⁸ On the other hand, the great disaster of this generation at Smyrna appears to have been the earthquake of around 178, not an epidemic, whether general or local. Aristides describes the city as flourishing before the earthquake.¹⁹

¹⁸ *Orat.*, XXXIII, 6; XLVIII, 38-9; L, 9; LI, 25 K. On the chronology of Aristides' life and writings, which appears now to be firmly established, see A. Boulanger, *Aelius Aristides et la sophistique dans la province d'Asie* (Paris, 1923), pp. 461-95; and J. H. Oliver, *Trans. Amer. Philosoph. Soc.*, XLIII, 4 (1953), p. 886, n. 1 (other references); on the plague, see Boulanger, pp. 146, 480-1. Aristides had the unfortunate habit of dating events by years of his illness, and his private chronology has been variously related to better known systems. One result is that outbreak of pestilence in the East has sometimes been placed in 162 even in some authoritative recent works; so Friedländer, *loc. cit.* (in n. 1); W. Hüttl, *Antoninus Pius*, II (Prague, 1933), p. 42; and H. Mattingly, *Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum*, IV (London, 1940), p. cii. This date depends first on accepting a certain chronology for Aristides (now outmoded) and secondly on identifying the epidemic that he mentions with that known at Seleucia. If Aristides' epidemic belongs to the summer of 165, as it apparently does, it is tempting to connect it with that which became widespread in the following years. In that event, however, the commonly repeated account of the pestilence beginning in Mesopotamia at the end of Verus' campaign must be modified or rejected. Further, Aristides' description of the disease does not correspond very well to Galen's occasional remarks about the great plague, though the account of neither is full or quite satisfactory; see J. Keil and A. von Premerstein, *Denkschr. Akad. Wien*, LIII, 2 (1908), p. 11. It may be observed that in the *Peregrinus* Lucian makes no mention of the plague in his description of the gathering at the Olympic Games of 165, to adopt the date most commonly accepted for the dialogue. Almost certainly he would have taken notice of a large epidemic; cf. the reference to the diseases ended by Herodes Atticus' provision of water (19).

¹⁹ For the earthquake, for which there is considerable evidence, see Aristides, XVIII-XXII Keil; Boulanger, *Aristides*, pp. 325-9, 385-91; C. J. Cadoux, *Ancient Smyrna* (Oxford, 1938), pp. 279-83. The point of interest here is the contrast which Aristides repeatedly draws between Smyrna's thriving state before the calamity and the ruin and desolation which followed. This is in keeping with accepted rhetorical principles. Still, if the earthquake had been a second great disaster and if serious depopulation following a plague already existed, he might have mentioned the fact in his appeals for aid. Further, another oration (XVII)

Unfortunately we do not have Dio Cassius' account of the plague under Marcus Aurelius.²⁰ However, there is his interesting statement that the pestilence that broke out in Commodus' reign around 189 was the greatest of which he himself had knowledge; in this often two thousand persons died in Rome in a single day (LXXII, 14, 3-4). Whether he was accurate or not, Dio was in a far better position to judge and compare the severity of the epidemics under Marcus Aurelius and Commodus than were later authors.²¹ Philostratus, his contemporary, reports that the Athenians when complaining to Marcus Aurelius about Herodes Atticus exclaimed: *μακάριοι οἱ ἐν τῷ λοιμῷ ἀποθνήσκοντες*.²²

The remaining writers all belong to the fourth or fifth century. The biographer of Marcus Aurelius mentions the pestilence four times: the substance of his somewhat repetitious but essentially credible account is that many thousands died in Rome, includ-

probably delivered in 176 and addressed to the emperor describes the city as flourishing. No one will doubt that it is stylized rhetoric. On the other hand, after reading these orations it is difficult to believe that anything approaching the Black Death occurred in Smyrna during the decade beginning in 165.

²⁰ Xiphilinus contains a passage stating that many soldiers were lost through famine and disease on the way back to Syria from Seleucia and Ctesiphon (LXXI, 2, 4). See Boissevain's note at the beginning of the fragments of this book of Dio.

²¹ Herodian, I, 12, 1 also mentions the outbreak under Commodus as occurring in Italy and especially Rome. It affected animals as well as men and accompanied a famine. Dio was praetor in 194 and hence was born not later than 164, and possibly several years earlier. If the later stages of the epidemic under Marcus Aurelius were widespread and serious, Dio might well have had some recollection of them, aside from what he heard from others and found in his sources. He was in Rome throughout Commodus' reign. It is not certain that the disease causing the epidemic of 189 was the same as that supposedly brought back by Verus. Despite good reasons for taking Dio seriously, his statement is the sort that even a responsible historian would be tempted to make, if at all possible; cf. n. 82. What other epidemics he had in mind in writing *μεγίστη ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα* is not clear; presumably at least the last two decades or so were covered. His phrase reminds one of those Herodotus used when he turned from myths to Croesus (I, 5-6).

²² The episode took place at Sirmium ca. 173 or 174; see Zwickler, *Markussūle*, pp. 199-201. Heavy losses of life have been assumed but without further direct evidence. See C. Wachsmuth, *Die Stadt Athen im Altertum*, I (Leipzig, 1874), p. 702; J. H. Day, *An Economic History of Athens under Roman Domination* (New York, 1942), p. 196.

ing many prominent men;²³ that many thousands of soldiers died;²⁴ that extraordinary measures were taken in enlisting recruits;²⁵ and that Marcus referred to the pestilence on his deathbed.²⁶ In the life of Verus we are told that the pestilence arose in Seleucia in a temple of Apollo when a *spiritus pestilens* was released from a golden casket.²⁷ It then spread among the Parthians and throughout the world, following Verus all the way back to Rome. Ammianus Marcellinus gives a similar story, stating that the pestilence spread to the Rhine and Gaul.²⁸ The *Epitome de Caesaribus*, 16, 3 mentions *lues crebrae* along with earthquakes, floods, and locusts. Eutropius states that a very large part of the population throughout the Empire perished, as well as whole armies,²⁹ and Jerome says substantially the

²³ . . . *Tanta autem pestilentia fuit, ut vehiculis cadavera sint exportata serracisque. tunc autem Antonini leges sepeliendi sepulchrorumque asperrimas sanxerunt, quando quidem caverunt ne quis ut vellet fabricaretur sepulchrum. quod hodieque servatur, et multa quidem milia pestilentia consumpsit multosque ex proceribus, quorum amplissimis Antoninus statuas conlocavit. tantaque clementia fuit, ut et sumptu publico vulgaria funera iuberet ecferi . . .* (S. H. A., Marc., 13, 3-6).

²⁴ . . . *Bellum Marcomannicum . . . cum virtute tum etiam felicitate transegit, et eo quidem tempore quo pestilentia gravis multa milia et popularium et militum interemerat* (17, 2).

²⁵ *Instante sane adhuc pestilentia et deorum cultum diligentissime restituit et servos, quemadmodum bello Punico factum fuerat, ad militiam paravit, quos voluntarios exemplo volonum appellavit. armavit etiam gladiatores, quos obsequentes appellavit. latrones etiam Dalmatiae atque Dardaniae milites fecit. armavit et diognitas. emit et Germanorum auxilia contra Germanos* (21, 6-7).

²⁶ "Quid de me fletis et non magis de pestilentia et communi morte cogitatis?" (28, 4).

²⁷ *Fuit eius fati, ut in eas provincias, per quas redit, Romam usque luem secum deferre videretur. et nata fertur pestilentia in Babylonia, ubi de templo Apollinis ex arcula aurea, quam miles forte inciderat, spiritus pestilens evasit, atque inde Parthos orbemque complesse . . .* (S. H. A., Ver., 8, 1-2).

²⁸ . . . *Ex adyto quodam concluso a Chaldaeorum arcanis, labes primordialis exsiluit, quae insanabilium vi concepta morborum, eiusdem Veri Marci et Antonini temporibus, ab ipsis Persarum finibus ad usque Rhenum et Gallias, cuncta contagiis polluebat et mortibus* (XXXI, 6, 24). The adytum was in a temple of Apollo.

²⁹ *Bellum ipse unum gessit Marcomannicum, sed quantum nulla memoria fuit, adeo ut Punicis conferatur. nam eo gravius est factum,*

same thing.³⁰ Orosius, who depends on him in part, describes great devastation everywhere and stresses losses in the army.³¹

No contemporary Christian writer seems to mention the plague,³² but a passage from Tertullian may be cited as being possibly relevant. In *De anima* 30 (ca. 210-213) he argues at length that the population of the world has long been increasing and still was in his day: *certe quidem ipse orbis in promptu est cultior de die et instructior pristino . . . summum testimonium frequentiae humanae. . .*³³ He is obviously concerned with theological controversy not with demography, but at least

quod universi exercitus Romani perierant. sub hoc enim tantus casus pestilentiae fuit, ut post victoriam Persicam Romae ac per Italiam provinciasque maxima hominum pars, militum omnes fere copiae languore defecerint (VIII, 12).

³⁰ *Lues multas provincias occupavit Roma ex parte vexata* (*Chron.*, p. 205 f Helm, A. D. 168); *tanta per totum orbem pestilentia fuit, ut paene usque ad interuicem Romanus exercitus deletus sit* (p. 206 h Helm, A. D. 172, evidently inserted by Jerome himself).

³¹ *Secuta est lues plurimis infusa provinciis, totamque Italiam pestilentia tanta vastavit, ut passim villae, agri atque oppida sine cultore atque habitatore deserta in ruinas silvasque concesserint. exercitum vero Romanum cunctasque legiones per longinqua late hiberna dispositas ita consumptas ferunt, ut Marcomannicum bellum, quod continuo exortum est, non nisi novo dilectu militum, quem triennio iugiter apud Carnuntum Marcus Antoninus habuit, gestum fuisse referatur* (VII, 15, 5-6; cf. 27, 7). Zangemeister in his edition in the Vienna Corpus cites Jerome and remarks: "plurimis pro multis more suo Orosius." One can feel confident that the process of exaggeration did not begin with Orosius. He needed no particular stimulus to present the plague in the strongest language possible, but it should be noted that the passage follows an account of persecutions of Christians. Cf. the sequence of disasters, including 30,000 deaths from pestilence, which he regards as the consequence of the Neronian persecution (VII, 7, 11-8, 2).

³² E. g., Eusebius in the *Hist. Eccl.* seems to have found nothing to correspond to Dionysius' account of the epidemic in the mid-third century. *Orac. Sibyl.*, XII refers to famine and pestilence under Vespasian (line 114) and famine under Domitian and Trajan (lines 134, 157) but mentions no such calamity under Marcus Aurelius (lines 178-86). These Jewish-Christian texts contain many references to real or anticipated famines and pestilences; cf. Luke, 21, 10-11 and Matthew, 24, 7.

³³ See the commentary of J. H. Waszink in his edition of the *De anima* (Amsterdam, 1947), pp. 370-6. In *Apol.*, 40, 13-14 he claims that from the time the world received Christians, its troubles became lighter.

if a fifth or half of the population of the Empire had been lost during and after the plague, Tertullian either did not know or ignores the fact.

2.

A number of Greek inscriptions have been connected with the plague. In none of them, however, is the connection entirely certain or necessary. Some have actually turned out to belong to a later period,³⁴ but others are possibly or probably Antonine in date.³⁵ One of those most often cited is addressed to Meles, a river-god at Smyrna.³⁶ Another is the epitaph of a Spartan who

³⁴ Schwendemann, p. 57, following earlier scholars, states that the cult of Telesphorus was introduced at Athens as the result of the plague. This appears to be an unfounded conjecture. Kaibel, 1027, which mentions Telesphorus and contains the phrase *βαρναλγῆς νοῦσος* (taken by Schwendemann to be the plague under Marcus Aurelius), is not earlier than the third century; see the more recent edition, *I. G.*, II², 4533. Liddell-Scott-Jones cites the phrase as appearing in Kaibel, 228 = W. Peek, *Griechische Vers-Inschriften*, I (Berlin, 1955), 970 (Ephesus, first century A.D.) and in Kaibel, 803 = *Inscr. de Délos*, 2388. The other two inscriptions which Schwendemann cites as connecting Telesphorus with the plague are also later: *I. G.*, II², 2127 (194/195) and 2227 (ca. 224/225); for the dates see J. Notopoulos, *Hesperia*, XVIII (1949), pp. 30-1, 46.

More recently, another Athenian inscription was thought to contain evidence for the plague, on what seemed to be good grounds. A new fragment, however, showed that the pertinent section should be dated ca. 226. See J. H. Oliver, *Hesperia*, V (1936), pp. 92-3, 102, 108, 121 and *T. A. P. A.*, LXXI (1940), pp. 306-9; W. K. Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LIX (1938), pp. 343-5; Notopoulos, *loc. cit.*, p. 33.

³⁵ One is Kaibel, 375 = Peek, 607 (Aezani, Phrygia). Kaibel emended the copy he used to read a phrase occurring in Alexander's oracle (above n. 17). Another copy discovered later provides a different reading. An inscription from Tutludja in southern Mysia mentions *ἀργαλέην νοῦσον*, which was taken to be the great plague by Kaibel, *Rh. Mus.*, XXIV (1879), p. 199 and K. Buresch, *Aus Lydien* . . . (Leipzig, 1898), pp. 139-40. This is possible but uncertain; see n. 42. A third text, from Rome, dated by Peek as second or third century mentions plague with interesting details. See G. Jacopi, *Bull. Com.*, LXVI (1939), pp. 23-4; J. and L. Robert, *R. E. G.*, LIV (1941), p. 268, No. 182; Peek, 993.

³⁶ *C. I. G.*, 3165 = Kaibel 1030; cf. Cadoux, *Ancient Smyrna*, p. 11, n. 7, who saw the original in 1930. It reads: Ὑμῶ θεὸν Μέλητα ποταμὸν τὸν σωτήρᾱ μου, παντὸς δὲ λοιμοῦ καὶ κακοῦ πεπαυμένον. From Boeckh's time the lines have been repeatedly dated in Marcus Aurelius' reign, on the assumption presumably that pestilence and other such ills did

died probably during Verus' campaign.³⁷ The most interesting and important, as showing the concern of communities, are three oracles found at Caesarea Trocetta,³⁸ Pergamum,³⁹ and Callipolis (Gallipoli).⁴⁰ All may have been delivered by Apollo Clarius.⁴¹ The first two, which are better preserved, refer to famine as well as disease. Possibly the occasion for one or all three was the great plague, but this should not be regarded as established, as it commonly is; in fact, there are positive reasons

not occur at Smyrna in other periods. R. Herzog has suggested that the author may be Aelius Aristides; *S. B. Berlin Akad.*, 1934, pp. 768-9. W. M. Ramsay, *J.H.S.*, III (1882), p. 57, stated that the form of the letters indicated the end of the second century B.C. This may very well be wrong; so Buresch, *Klaros*, p. 75. But apparently no one since Ramsay who has seen the stone has expressed an opinion.

³⁷ *I. G.*, V, 1, 816; cf. 817, 818. He died at Hierapolis on his return from a successful campaign against the Persians. Some scholars have connected this and related inscriptions from Sparta with Verus' Parthian expedition, others with that of Caracalla. (Several of the texts are collected in Dessau, *I. L. S.*, 8878.) Spartans are known to have taken part in both. Premerstein presented persuasive arguments for the first possibility in *Klio*, XI (1911), pp. 358-66, and suggested that the man dying at Hierapolis may have been a victim of the plague (p. 364), which is possible. But the cause of death is not stated.

³⁸ *I. G. R. R.*, IV, 1498. Trocetta is south of the Hermus, near Kassaba. The inscription was first published by Buresch, *Klaros*, pp. 1-29, 67-8. A better edition is that of Keil and Premerstein, "(Erste) Reise . . .," *Denkschr. Akad. Wien*, LIII, 2 (1908), pp. 8-12. The oracle speaks of failure of crops and famine as having occurred and pestilence as anticipated. This is the convincing interpretation of Keil and Premerstein. See below n. 42.

³⁹ *C. I. G.*, 3538 = Kaibel, 1035 = *I. G. R. R.*, IV, 360. The titles of the city date the text between Trajan and Caracalla. The oracle provides measures against famine and pestilence, usually identified since Boeckh with that under Marcus.

⁴⁰ Kaibel, 1034; J. H. Mordtmann, *Ath. Mitt.*, VI (1881), pp. 260-4. Discussed by Buresch, *Klaros*, pp. 81-6; see also Weinreich, *Ath. Mitt.*, XXXVIII (1913), pp. 64-72. The text is fragmentary and obscure, but it does instruct that a statue of Apollo, *λοῦποι ὑποσεναρρήρ*, be set up. Inscriptions said to be from Gallipoli often actually come from somewhere else; see J. and L. Robert, *Hellenica*, IX (1950), p. 85. But this at least was not brought there for the antiquities trade. Two *archontes* and two *tamiai* are named, who may some day be identified and dated.

⁴¹ That from Trocetta is Clarian without question; so also that from Pergamum, as demonstrated by C. Picard, *B. C. H.*, XLVI (1922), pp. 190-7. Buresch's case for that from Gallipoli is less conclusive.

to doubt the connection.⁴² Oracles were active throughout the second century, and it would not be surprising if many of the cities that regularly consulted them experienced a famine and epidemic every generation or so which resulted in an appeal for divine guidance.⁴³ In any event, at present these texts seem to add little to our information about the intensity and impact of the plague under Marcus Aurelius.

At first glance at least a group of Latin inscriptions⁴⁴ would appear to be more instructive. They concern the army, which is said to have been particularly affected by the plague, and contain figures which possibly have some relevance, though most are

⁴² Keil and Premierstein, who are the only ones who have considered the question carefully and paid close attention to what the oracles seem to say, were inclined to regard those from Trocetta and Pergamum as referring to local famines, which gave rise, or threatened to do so, to sickness and death among animals and men, in a familiar pattern (pp. 10-11). (They do not deal with the fragmentary lines from Gallipoli.) Their study is too often ignored. Schwendemann does not refer to it, and Picard who cites only them for the Trocetta text still writes, "On sait précisément qu'en 166 ap. J.-C., au moment de la grande peste, la ville de Caesarea Trochetta . . ." (*loc. cit.*, p. 193). Magie did pay proper attention to their conclusions, *Roman Rule*, II, p. 1534, n. 9. They suggest that a local epidemic in the mid-second century may also be the explanation of the text from Tutludja (above n. 35).

⁴³ Provision is made for consultation on questions of public health in the decree concerning the oracle of Apollo Coropaeus (*S.I.G.*³, 1157, lines 11-13; Demetrias, shortly after 116 B.C.). See the study of L. Robert, *Hellenica*, V (1948), pp. 16-28, especially p. 21. Cf. Plutarch, *De Pythiae orac.*, 408 c for Delphi in his time. For famines during the first two centuries in Asia Minor and elsewhere see Rostovtzeff, *Soc. Econ. Hist. Roman Empire*,² II, pp. 599-600, n. 9; pp. 700-1, n. 21. Especially interesting is the famine which Galen describes. It lasted several years and was attended by severe and often fatal maladies. As Keil and Premierstein note, the circumstances would fit well the situation in the oracles. He made his observations in Asia, possibly before his first stay in Rome, which began in 162. See VI, pp. 749-52 K. = *C.M.G.*, V, 4, 2, pp. 389-91; cf. also VI, 620, 623, 686 K. = *C.M.G.*, V, 4, 2, pp. 305, 307, 347-8. For an earlier epidemic in Ephesus, ended by Apollonius of Tyana in remarkable fashion, see Philostratus, *Vita Apoll.*, IV, 4 and 10.

⁴⁴ The Latin inscription most often cited is *C.I.L.*, III, 5567 (Noricum, 182), which names four members of a family *qui per luem vita functi sunt*. The date makes a connection with Verus' epidemic possible but not at all necessary.

merely approximate and all are quite ambiguous. These are chiefly texts listing legionary veterans at the time of their discharge. They may be tabulated as follows:

<i>Text</i>	<i>Legion</i>	<i>Province</i>	<i>Enlisted</i>	<i>Discharged</i>	<i>Number</i>
<i>C. I. L.</i> , III, 6178	<i>V Macedonica</i>	Moesia Inf.	108/109	133 (?)	ca. 200
<i>A. E.</i> , 1955, 238	<i>II Traiana</i>	Egypt	132/133	157	136
<i>C. I. L.</i> , III, 8110	<i>VII Claudia</i>	Moesia Sup.	134/135	159 (?)	239
<i>C. I. L.</i> , VIII, 18067	<i>III Augusta</i>	Numidia	140/141	166	ca. 250
<i>C. I. L.</i> , III, 6580	<i>II Traiana</i>	Egypt	168	194	ca. 100
<i>C. I. L.</i> , III, 14507	<i>VII Claudia</i>	Moesia Sup.	169	195	240+
<i>C. I. L.</i> , VIII, 18068	<i>III Augusta</i>	Numidia	173	198	ca. 330

With only seven scattered figures, averages and other calculations would be of doubtful value even if most of the figures were not themselves estimates.⁴⁵ One might assume tentatively, however, that around 100 men who had enlisted in any year could ordinarily be expected to survive to be discharged some twenty-five years later. (It will be noticed that in the first four inscriptions men enlisted during two years were discharged together.) The assumption requires that three cases out of seven be regarded as exceptional. The number of men discharged in 157 is low; ⁴⁶ that of those discharged in 195 and 198 is high in each case. Of particular interest here are the last three figures, those of men enlisted between 168 and 173.⁴⁷ The first is approximately average, and if it represents the survivors of a normal number of recruits, they were not much affected by the plague. The last two, as already stated, are high. One possible explanation

⁴⁵ Of the last four figures that for 195 is very close to being exact. The others are based at best on the number of names preserved in two or three cohorts only, and must be used with caution. That for 166 is based on two incomplete cohorts (at least 23 and 25 being discharged); that for 194 on three complete cohorts (10, 12, 6) and one incomplete (8+); that for 198 on two complete cohorts (32, 33).

⁴⁶ For comments on this point see J. F. Gilliam, *A. J. P.*, LXXVII (1956), p. 359, n. 3. If the date of the text were 167, not 157, it would probably be used as evidence to show the effect of the plague. On the life expectancy of Roman soldiers see A. R. Burn, *Past and Present*, No. 4 (1953), p. 10.

⁴⁷ The men discharged in 166 were released in the first part of the year, before the emperors became *Imp. IV*. In fact, a date in December 165 might be possible. In any event, the plague could not yet have reached Africa.

is that the heavy recruiting in 169 and 173 was made necessary by losses suffered in action and especially through the plague.⁴⁸ Certainly the figures can reasonably be connected with the Marcomannic War, and in the case of the *III Augusta* also with a serious revolt of the Moors around 173.⁴⁹ But they would not be at all surprising if there had been no plague; during any war enlistments would be expected to rise sharply.⁵⁰ The only certain fact is that a larger than usual number of veterans remained to be discharged and, obviously, had not themselves been carried off by plague in the years from 169 to 198.

There is similar evidence for the praetorians, which has been collected by M. Durry.⁵¹ He calculates that in the second century the mean figure for discharged veterans was five a year from each *centuria*. This figure falls to two in a list from 172. Evidently there were heavy losses in which the plague may have played some part. But whether it is a considerable factor is quite uncertain, and with smaller figures any conclusion must be somewhat tentative.

In all discussions of such texts, including that in the preceding paragraphs, it is assumed that the number of recruits taken into a unit remained relatively stable from year to year, in the absence

⁴⁸ See F. Ladek, A. von Premerstein, and N. Vulić, *Jahreshefte*, IV (1901), Beibl., cols. 82, 93; so also Schwendemann, pp. 68-9. The *VII Claudia* had seen action; some of the surviving veterans had been decorated. See Ritterling, *R.-E.*, XII, cols. 1622-3.

⁴⁹ The legion sent a detachment to take part in the campaigns on the Danube, and had earlier contributed men for Verus' expedition; see Ritterling, *R.-E.*, XII, cols. 1622-3. For the revolt, which involved a raid into Baetica, see R. Cagnat, *L'armée romaine d'Afrique*,² I (Paris, 1913), pp. 50-1. Schwendemann, p. 89, connected the large number of recruits with the revolt.

⁵⁰ Aside from losses suffered during campaigns, at the beginning of a war heavy enlistments would probably be required to prepare legions for combat. See e.g. Fronto on the condition in which Verus found the Syrian legions: *Princip. hist.*, p. 206 Naber = p. 195 van den Hout.

⁵¹ *Les cohortes prétoriennes* (Paris, 1938), pp. 84-5. This should be compared with the comments and corrections of A. Passerini, *Le coorti pretorie* (Rome, 1939), pp. 60-1; see also Zwickler, *Markusskizze*, pp. 223-4. The cohorts took an active part in the war; two of their prefects fell in combat. The discharge of some of those released in 172 had been delayed, and others may have been retained still longer, either in the cohorts or e.g. as legionary centurions.

of developments such as war or plague. The assumption becomes more difficult to make when we examine the rosters of the *cohors XX Palmyrenorum*.⁵² These contain, e. g., the following number of men enlisted in the years 200-206: 12, 94, 27, 75, 109, 45, 11; and in 213-218: 0, 119, 40, 129, 3, 0. Some of this fluctuation can be related to war or other known events, fiscal policy, and the like, but the explanation in other cases is not clear. We should expect less fluctuation in a legion; for one thing, it was a larger unit. However, there probably was considerable irregularity, not all of which we could expect to predict or explain. To a certain extent, such fluctuation might tend to be self-perpetuating. For instance, the number of veterans discharged from the *III Augusta* in 198 might have resulted in an unusually large number of recruits being enlisted in that year. In turn, these same veterans as recruits in 173 had replaced men enrolled around 148/149, in the middle of a difficult war in Mauretania,⁵³ when very probably there were heavy enlistments.

In short, the most impressive figures, those for legionaries discharged in 195 and 198, may reflect in part losses from plague suffered a generation earlier. But since we have other quite adequate explanations, the role of the plague may have been quite small.

Two groups of papyri have been related to the plague.⁵⁴ The

⁵² See the summary and comments of R. O. Fink in *Excavations at Dura-Europos, Final Report V, part 1: The Parchments and Papyri* (New Haven, 1959), p. 34.

⁵³ See Cagnat, *L'armée romaine*², I, p. 50.

⁵⁴ Another pair of texts may also be mentioned. E. J. Knudtzon has explained the differences between the lists of the priests of Soknobraisis in 171 and 188 as the result of plague in those years; *Bakchiastewte* . . . (Lund, 1946), pp. 84-5. There are eight priests under sixty in the earlier list, none of whom Knudtzon thought survived in 188. But the first three men in the second list, very possibly those who had served longest, have the same names (very common ones) as three in the first (*P. Bacchias*, 5 and 2). There are discrepancies in the ages given, ranging from one year to six. But one of the three in question in the first list is said to be 33 on August 11, while on June 14 of the same year he is put down as 35 (*P. Bacchias*, 2 and 19). After seventeen years even more confusion about ages may have developed, and from one to three of the eight priests may have survived. For the texts designated *P. Bacchias* see E. H. Gilliam, *Yale Class. Stud.*, X (1947), pp. 179-281.

first is a set of documents from the Mendesian nome in the Delta. One of a more general character states that villages which had formerly been populous were now reduced to a few men. The situation had been brought to the attention of a prefect when he visited the nome in 168/169.⁵⁵ The year 169/170 is mentioned in a fragmentary line below; it may be the date of this document, and is at least the approximate date of the whole series. The other texts are reports by village-secretaries, each for one village.⁵⁶ They follow essentially the same pattern. The secretary reports that the men registered in the village had for the most part disappeared (ἐγλελοιπέναι); a figure is given for an earlier, unspecified date (τὸ πάλαι) and another that is current (νυνεὶ δὲ εἰς μόνους κατηγνηκέναι ἄνδρας —), of whom some have fled (ἀνακεχωρηκέναι). The figures preserved include the following: formerly 55, now 10, of whom 8 have fled; 27, 3, 3; 54, 4, 4. A summary of taxes assessed on the villages concludes the documents. Ulrich Wilcken studied the first three texts published from this group and explained the impressive drop in the figures as the result of the plague.⁵⁷

More recently, A. E. R. Boak has estimated the population of Karanis in the years 171-174 as between 2160 and 2560, on the basis of tax-records of various kinds.⁵⁸ Another document gives the totals of the poll tax and pig tax collected at Karanis in the ninth year of an emperor not named.⁵⁹ On palaeographical grounds the editors concluded that the year was either 145/146 (preferably) or 168/169. The figures for the two taxes do not result in exactly the same number of tax-payers, but the difference is not great (958 and 1093). Boak, following the same formulas as in his earlier study, arrives at a minimum total

⁵⁵ *B. G. U.*, 903. The prefect, Bassaeus Rufus, had left office by January or February, 169; see A. Stein, *Die Präfekten von Ägypten in der römischen Kaiserzeit* (Bern, 1950), pp. 93-5.

⁵⁶ *B. G. U.*, 902; *Sammelbuch*, 8; *P. S. I.*, 101, 102, 105.

⁵⁷ *Festschrift zu Otto Hirschfelds sechzigsten Geburtstage* (Berlin, 1903), pp. 123-30.

⁵⁸ *Historia*, IV (1955), pp. 157-62. This interesting and valuable study also contains observations on other towns in the Fayum in the Roman and Byzantine periods.

⁵⁹ *P. Rylands*, 594. Discussed by Boak in *Historia*, VIII (1959), pp. 248-50.

population of 3636 and a maximum of 4063. Thus there is a loss of about 40 percent between 145/146 and 171-174. This he attributes to the plague, citing Wilcken's study, and concludes, "The above evidence shows the plague inflicted on Egypt a population loss from which it would have taken many generations to recover . . ." (p. 250).

One may begin by observing that apparently none of our sources, except Crepereius, states that the great plague extended to Egypt; at least none is cited. It is entirely possible, perhaps even probable, that it did visit Egypt. But epidemics do not spread in a uniform, entirely predictable manner, and it would be reassuring to have positive evidence that the cause existed before explaining situations as its results.

As regards the texts from the Mendesian nome, it was a natural inference that the reduction in the number of tax-payers was owing entirely or largely to deaths. But the texts do not say so; in fact, the explanation given for the currently continuing decrease is ἀναχώρησις. The Mendesian papyri are no longer unique. There are now a number of documents which reflect the same phenomenon in other periods, notably the middle of the first century. One may be quoted as employing practically the same phrases, giving in addition the reasons: . . . ἀπὸ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν πολυανδρούντων ἐν ταῖς προκειμέναις κώμαις νυνεὶ κατήνησαν εἰς ὀλίγους διὰ τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἀνακεχωρηκέναι ἀπόρους, τοὺς δὲ τετελευτηκέ[ναι] μὴ ἔχοντας ἀγχιστεῖς . . . (P. Graux, 2 = *Sammelbuch*, 7462, A. D. 55/59).⁶⁰ It is not necessary to consider the problem

⁶⁰ Published by H. Henne, *Bull. Inst. Fr. Arch. Or.*, XXI (1923), pp. 189-214. On pp. 200-4 he discusses the Mendesian texts, explaining them as the result of developments similar to those reflected in his papyrus. The editors of *P. Rylands*, II, J. de M. Johnson, V. Martin, and A. S. Hunt, who published another group of papyri from the same find at Thmuis (in the nome of Mendes), had earlier expressed doubts about Wilcken's explanation (pp. 290-2). For other discussions of depopulation in Egypt at various periods, often local or temporary, see Rostovtzeff, *Soc. Econ. Hist. Roman Empire*,² II, p. 677, n. 52; J. G. Milne, *J. R. S.*, XVII (1927), pp. 1-13; H. I. Bell, *J. R. S.*, XXVIII (1938), pp. 4-8; XXXVII (1947), p. 19; and *Roman Egypt from Alexander the Great to the Arab Conquest*, (Oxford, 1948), pp. 77-8. On the fiscal aspect of ἀναχώρησις see S. L. Wallace, *Taxation in Roman Egypt from Augustus to Diocletian* (Princeton, 1938), pp. 137-40. For an interesting and pertinent general study of Roman Egypt in

at length here. The essential explanation appears to be the relentless exploitation of the peasants by the state and the principle of communal responsibility for taxes and other obligations. Once a few villagers began to run away to avoid their responsibilities, the burdens for those remaining steadily and rapidly became greater, as did consequently the temptation to run away in turn. We have in the Mendesian texts the last stages of such a process. It should be noted that Wilcken himself, when *P. Graux*, 2 was published, gracefully and completely abandoned his own explanation that the plague was responsible.⁶¹

The reduction in taxes collected and in tax-payers which is found at Karanis should probably be explained in substantially the same manner. Under Antoninus Pius there was a good deal of unrest in Egypt, involving runaway peasants.⁶² We have evidence from the Fayum in 162 of peasants who had fled and were presumably avoiding taxes.⁶³ The revolt of the *Βουκόλοι* took place around 172 or 173. In short, the tax-records of Karanis in 171-174 might be expected to reflect the long-continuing difficulty in dealing with recalcitrant peasants and perhaps also something of the state of mind and problems that led to revolt in the Delta. This was serious enough to require the intervention of Avidius Cassius and Syrian troops, and it quite possibly did not make tax-collecting easier elsewhere.

4.

The evidence of the coins deserves brief mention, and though no one would expect them to provide vital statistics, a closer study than has yet been made might prove rewarding. The imperial coinage, however, appears to pay little attention to the plague and contains no clear reference to it.⁶⁴ To be sure, the

the first two centuries see C. Préaux, *Chron. d'Égypte*, XXXI (1956), pp. 311-31.

⁶¹ *Archiv f. Papyrusf.*, VIII (1927), p. 311.

⁶² The edict of Sempronius Liberalis in 154 (*B. G. U.*, 372 = Wilcken, *Chrest.*, 19) deals at length with disturbances and peasants who had left their villages; cf. S. H. A., *Ant. P.*, 5, 5.

⁶³ *P. Berl. Leihg.*, 7.

⁶⁴ Schwendemann, pp. 54-5, deduces from a medallion (Cohen, no. 872 = F. Gnechi, *I Medaglioni Romani*, I [Milan, 1912], p. 33, no. 49) struck early in 166 that the plague was already wide-spread. It shows

types of Pietas and Salus⁶⁵ are found in these years as so often, but there is nothing so explicit and unambiguous as the appearance of Apollo Salutaris on coins in Gallus' reign. Without the literary evidence it seems doubtful whether the most expert and imaginative numismatists would have suspected a great epidemic under Marcus Aurelius. It is certainly best to conclude simply that this shows a limitation of the coins, despite their great value in so many respects, but at the same time some may find it a little harder to believe that the plague was as overwhelming and deeply felt an event as the Black Death.

The local coinage in the East perhaps might prove more instructive, particularly as suggesting more precisely where the epidemic existed or threatened, and some of the coins which have been connected with it may turn out to furnish pertinent and useful evidence.⁶⁶ There are, however, at least two problems.

Victory and Minerva confronting each other across an altar, on which is coiled a snake which Minerva is feeding. Schwendemann is evidently following W. Froehner, *Les médaillons de l'Empire Romain* (Paris, 1878), p. 89. H. Mattingly refers to the medallion as "not explained," *B. M. C. Roman Empire*, IV, p. cxlvi. On the type see also J. M. C. Toynbee, *Roman Medallions* (New York, 1944), p. 141. Several medallions of Marcus struck before 161, while Caesar, also portray Minerva feeding a snake; see Gneecchi, *Medaglioni*, II, p. 35, nos. 64-6; cf. also III, p. 32, no. 105. So reference to the plague in the later medallion seems doubtful.

⁶⁵ H. Mattingly and E. A. Sydenham thought that "the type of Pietas possibly alludes to the outbreak of the plague"; *The Roman Imperial Coinage*, III (London, 1930), p. 200. Mattingly later believed that Salus on coins of 168-169 suggests "anxiety over the ravages of the plague and the war"; *B. M. C. Roman Empire*, IV, p. cxxxvii.

⁶⁶ Schwendemann, p. 56, n. 2 lists a number which have as types Apollo, Asclepius, or the like. The first cited is *B. M. C. Thrace*, p. 116, no. 4, showing an Apollo Propylaeus, like that which the oracle found at Callipolis directed should be set up. But it dates under Antoninus Pius, when Marcus was Caesar. Asclepius and other such deities are common on coins both before and after the plague, and nothing much is proved by citing isolated examples from this period.

Ph. Lederer in *Deutsche Münzblätter*, LVI (1936), pp. 201-11 published an Alexandrian coin of 167/168 representing a "theoxenion." Among the deities on the couch is Sarapis. This was connected with the plague and Marcus' *lectisternium* in Rome; so also Zwikker, *Markus-säule*, I, p. 55, n. 11 and p. 63. But the scene is repeated on a later coin published by Lederer, *Num. Chron.*, 5th ser., XVIII (1938), pp. 75-9. There seems to be no need to see a reference to the plague. For

One is the exact date of issues, often not easy to determine, and the other is to what degree types such as Asclepius are peculiar to or more numerous in the period of the plague. The second in particular would require a broad study.

5.

Indirect evidence for the effects of the plague has been seen in certain measures taken during the campaigns on the Danube. This view is well stated by Boak: "Most enlightening on the state of population is the shortage of recruits for the army in the time of Marcus Aurelius. That prudent emperor had to resort to settling conquered Marcomanni within the Empire as landholders under the obligation to supply soldiers to the Roman forces. Apparently, he had no trouble in finding vacant lands on which to place them."⁶⁷ Such considerations certainly existed in the third and especially fourth centuries.⁶⁸ and it would be rash to deny that they were not present at all in the second century. But a number of observations are called for, both general and specific.

In the first place, quite obviously no one would assume in all periods of antiquity a constant, direct relation between the total population and the number of men that might be mobilized or were in practice subject to service even in emergencies; there were many complicating factors, as in our own time. During the Empire the number of recruits drawn from different regions did not necessarily correspond at all to population. Provinces might increase in population and steadily provide fewer men. Or compare the forces raised in Italy during the Hannibalic War and during the civil wars at the end of the Republic with the contributions the same region made in the second or third century A. D. The differences must be explained by fundamental changes of several kinds, political, social, and moral among

such banquets in the cult of Sarapis see M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, II (Munich, 1950), p. 663, n. 5; H. C. Youtie, *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XLI (1948), pp. 9-29.

⁶⁷ P. 18. Similarly, Seeck, *Untergang*, I², pp. 339-403; Parker, *Roman World from A. D. 138 to 337*, p. 23.

⁶⁸ E. g., . . . *Franciae nationes . . . avulsus ut in desertis Galliae regionibus conlocatae et pacem Romani imperii cultu iuvarent et arma dilectu* (*Panegyrr.*, VI, 6, 2 Baehrens; Constantine).

others, and only in small part by depopulation. One point to remember is that recruits would not be enlisted for a campaign or for the duration of the war but for a period of some twenty-five years; in other words, for service in the standing, professional army.⁶⁹ No doubt during a war especially there was a scarcity of men willing to volunteer on these terms, or whom the government was prepared to conscript, but for every Marcomannus taken into the army there were dozens or hundreds of men of military age within the Empire who remained civilians. Augustus himself had resorted to rather desperate measures.⁷⁰ In fact, Pliny's account of his problems, both in substance and in coloring, sounds rather like that which we are expected to accept for Marcus' reign: . . . *iuncta deinde tot mala, inopia stipendii, rebellio Illyrici, servitiorum dilectus, iuventutis penuria, pestilentia urbis, fames Italiae* . . . (*N.H.*, VII, 149). The *mala* were real, but practically everyone would agree that under Augustus the number of both citizens and peregrines was steadily increasing.

Secondly, settlement of barbarians within the Empire in itself was nothing new; it is mentioned several times in the first century.⁷¹ Conditions had changed in various ways, and a superficially similar act might have had a quite different significance. But one need not assume a general depopulation of the Empire

⁶⁹ In a very difficult crisis Vitellius offered better terms: *dilectum quoque ea condicione in urbe egit, ut voluntarius non modo missionem post victoriam, sed etiam veteranorum iustaeque militiae commoda polliceretur*, (Suet., *Vitell.*, 15, 1).

⁷⁰ He enlisted freedmen, in fact slaves freed for this purpose, on two occasions. See the discussion of K. Kraft, *Zur Rekrutierung der Alen und Kohorten an Rhein und Donau* (Bern, 1951), pp. 90-3. For an Antonine account of the principles of Roman recruitment see Aristides' *Roman Oration*, 74-87, with J. H. Oliver's commentary, *Trans. Amer. Phil. Soc.*, XLIII, 4 (1953), pp. 934-41. For an interesting recent essay on the whole subject of recruitment see E. T. Salmon, *Trans. Royal Soc. Canada*, third ser., LII, ii (1958), pp. 43-57. Cf. too the important remarks of A. Alföldi, *Historia Mundi*, IV (Bern and Munich, 1956), pp. 260-71.

⁷¹ Under Augustus 40,000 Getae are said to have been settled south of the Danube; Strabo, VII, 303. A governor of Moesia in Nero's reign brought more than 100,000 barbarians across the river into his province; Dessau, 986. More examples could be given. See Rostovtzeff, *Soc. Econ. Hist. Roman Empire*², II, p. 739, n. 18 and Seeck, *loc. cit.* (n. 67).

in order to make room for fifty thousand Germans, if there were that many, scattered over several areas.⁷² It may be worth recalling, too, that when these barbarians were settled, Marcus Aurelius was probably contemplating the creation of two new provinces beyond the Danube. The Empire was still vigorous and prepared to expand, as it had just done in the East. The settlement need not be regarded as the act of an enfeebled state. Further, Pannonia, one of the areas involved, probably suffered considerably, but Pannonians played a very conspicuous part in sustaining and defending the Empire during the next century and more. Whatever depopulation occurred there at the time as the result of war and disease does not seem to have seriously affected the supply of recruits in later generations.

Thirdly, the employment of recent enemies as auxiliary troops occurs too often in Roman history, in the second century and earlier,⁷³ to indicate declining population without further argument. The primary reason was presumably always to obtain useful and inexpensive troops. But the practice was also a way of controlling potentially troublesome groups.⁷⁴

Finally, the sources cited do not seem to state that Marcus Aurelius' purpose in settling Germans within the Empire was to obtain recruits,⁷⁵ and there seems to be no evidence that any

⁷² No figures for their number are given, though the *Historia Augusta* speaks of *plurimi* and *infiniti* (*Marc.*, 22, 2 and 24, 3). There may not have been 10,000 families in all. Dio Cassius, LXXI, 11, 4 reports that barbarians were given land in Dacia, Pannonia, Moesia, Germany, and Italy. It is easy to think of other reasons for dispersing them, but one possibility is difficulty in finding large blocks of land. A. Landry is another recent writer who interpreted the settlement of these Germans as evidence of depopulation; *Rev. historique*, CLXXVII (1936), p. 16.

⁷³ One example is the *numeri Brittonum* found in Germany from about 145. See E. Stein, *Die kaiserlichen Beamten und Truppenkörper im römischen Deutschland unter dem Prinzipat* (Vienna, 1932), pp. 245-58; H. T. Rowell, *R.-E.*, XVII, cols. 2537-8; E. Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army* (Kendal, 1953), p. 44.

⁷⁴ See e. g. A. Alföldi, *Zu den Schicksalen Siebenbürgens im Altertum* (Budapest, 1944), pp. 73, 75.

⁷⁵ Dio Cassius, LXXI, 11, 4, in writing of certain unnamed barbarians distinguishes between those used as soldiers (*οἱ μὲν ἐστρατεύσαντο ἄλλοσέ ποι πεμφθέντες*) and those who received land in the Empire. It is not certain that the first group was enlisted in the Roman army. They may have been employed as allies of some sort; cf. the statement in the

appreciable number were enlisted in the Roman army. As a matter of fact, much the most conspicuous additions to the army at this time were two legions, *II* and *III Italicae*, recruited in Italy itself.⁷⁶ Probably no one would maintain that this shows a rapid rise in the population of the peninsula.

6.

What may be concluded from the evidence which has been summarized above? Some of its deficiencies are immediately obvious. The lack of accurate or extensive statistical data is only what we would expect. But there is no account of the plague which is comprehensive, precise, and reliable. Much of the evidence which is regularly cited is of doubtful value; some of it is probably not relevant. Perhaps in time inscriptions, papyri, and even coins will provide much more information, but at

Historia Augusta quoted in n. 25: *emit et Germanorum auxilia*, which suggests subsidized tribal forces, not regular Roman units. Valerius Maximianus, after being honored with *militia quarta*, was made *praep. equitib. gent. Marcomannor. Narist. Quador*, in the force sent against Avidius Cassius (*A. E.*, 1956, no. 124). These *gentiles*, too, may not have been fully incorporated in the Imperial army or employed for more than a few years. No *numeri* or other regular units enrolled from these tribes seem to be recorded.

⁷⁶ The exact date of their creation is unknown, but it now appears probable that recruiting at least continued after the Parthian campaign, i. e., after the pestilence had reached Italy. See Ritterling, *R.-E.*, XIII, cols. 1300-1, 1532: *ca.* A. D. 165; Weber, *Cambridge Ancient History*, XI, p. 352: A. D. 168; Zwicker, *Markussäule*, I, p. 55: 166/167; R. Egger, *Gnomon*, XVIII (1942), p. 329: shortly before 169. See also the important new inscription *A. E.*, 1956, no. 123 and H. G. Pflaum's commentary, *Libyca*, III (1955), pp. 123-33. It would seem a little strange that new legions were created if existing ones were seriously below strength.

On Sarmatians settled by Marcus Aurelius in Britain see I. A. Richmond, *J. R. S.*, XXXV (1945), pp. 15-29. This does not prove depopulation in the island any more than the settlement of *Brittones* on the continent a generation earlier indicates overpopulation. On the *cohortes Aureliae* probably raised during the war see A. von Premerstein and N. Vulić, *Jahreshefte*, III (1900), Beiblatt, pp. 151-2; W. Wagner, *Die Dislokation der römischen Auxiliarformationen* . . . (Berlin, 1938), pp. 108-9, 129-32, 179-80, 182. The explanation that Wagner, p. 182, offers for the *cohortes Sacorum* is doubtful; cf. Alföldi, *Zu den Schicksalen Siebenburgens*, p. 76.

present they contribute disappointingly little. We must rely primarily on the literary sources. An examination of them shows that the most striking, sweeping statements about the plague are found in fourth or fifth century writers. This may be largely explained by the fact that we have no earlier accounts of the period that are intact, but passages in several contemporaries or near-contemporaries make it harder to accept the statements of Eutropius and Orosius as they stand. One may suspect that the fame of the plague is owing in part to accident and, even more, to exaggeration. For example, if Galen had lived under Augustus,⁷⁷ Nero,⁷⁸ Titus,⁷⁹ or possibly Hadrian⁸⁰ and had described one of the epidemics which occurred in their reigns, modern histories of medicine would include another section and another great plague, and that under Marcus Aurelius would be less conspicuous. As it is, it often follows directly after the Thucydidean plague as if no other had intervened. The interests of historians and biographers, on whom we largely depend, suggest that not nearly as much would have been made of the plague if it had not been connected with major wars, in which emperors took command, and if it had not affected Rome itself. One obviously should hesitate before accepting literally all of their statements about Verus' campaign and the pestilence that followed. A good deal of rhetoric and exaggeration must be suspected in those who wrote the first accounts; certainly one would assume so after reading Fronto and Lucian. Some of the later writers depending on them were probably no more restrained.⁸¹ Orosius, in particular, does not deserve implicit trust.

⁷⁷ Dio Cassius, LIII, 33, 4: LIV, 1, 2 (B. C. 23-22).

⁷⁸ Tacitus, *Ann.*, XVI, 13: . . . *omne mortalium genus vis pestilentiae depopulabatur. . . domus corporibus exanimis, itinera funeribus complebantur; non sexus, non aetas periculo vacua; servitia perinde et ingenua plebes raptim extinguere, inter coniugum et liberorum lamenta, qui dum adsident, dum deslent, saepe eodem rogo cremabantur. equitum senatorumque interitus, quamvis promiscui, minus flebiles erant, tamquam communi mortalitate saevitiam principis praevenirent.* Cf. Suet., *Nero*, 39, 1.

⁷⁹ Suet., *Tit.*, 8, 3: . . . *pestilentia quanta non temere alias.* Cf. Dio Cassius, LXVII, 23, 5.

⁸⁰ S. H. A., *Hadrian*, 21, 5.

⁸¹ It is worth noting that the *Historia Augusta*, with its more circumstantial account, is really less extravagant than Eutropius or Jerome,

Descriptions of pestilence in any period are likely to be highly colored and extravagant.⁸² Like battles, they tempt writers to display their talents and make the most of their material, following established patterns. If the passages in the *Historia Augusta*, for instance, are compared with that cited from Tacitus (n. 78), there may seem to be less reason to regard the later epidemic as unique in character and its effects.

Nevertheless, after making due allowance for distortion and rhetorical convention, it is quite clear that there was a great and destructive epidemic under Marcus Aurelius. It seems probable, though by no means certain, that it caused more deaths than any other epidemic during the Empire before the middle of the third century.⁸³ On the other hand, infectious diseases were undoubtedly a very important factor in the high death rate of the ancient world in all periods. Great epidemics were nothing new. A reader of Livy, for example, will have the impression, probably quite correct, that the Roman Republic developed and expanded during a constant succession of pestilences.⁸⁴

not to mention Orosius (cf. n. 31). Careless compression, their own or their sources', may help explain the exaggerated, sweeping statements found in the late compendia.

⁸² They tend to sound very much alike, just as descriptions of battles do, or just as plague scenes in paintings are likely to resemble one another. One could probably collect from historians a considerable number of plagues, each of which was described as the greatest up to that time. A few examples are Dion. Hal., *Ant.*, X, 53 (451 B. C.); Zosimus, I, 26 (Gallus) and 37 (Gallienus). Cf. Dio and Suetonius above, nn. 21 and 79. They had of course a conspicuous model in Thucydides, II, 47, 3. Apparently no one, not even Orosius, is recorded as having made such a statement about the plague under Marcus Aurelius, at least until modern times.

⁸³ It is natural to assume that the losses from epidemics were greater from 165 to 190 than from 65 to 90, since we have good evidence that those in the later period were wide-spread and protracted. But there seem also to have been wide-spread epidemics under Domitian (Dio Cassius, LXVII, 11), and those cited above in nn. 78 and 79 need not have been confined to Italy. There was disease during the Jewish War in Palestine (e.g. Josephus, *B. J.*, IV, 361), which of course otherwise involved heavy loss of life.

⁸⁴ Dionysius in the passage cited in n. 82 informs us that nearly all the slaves and about half the citizens died. In the second century, where one can have more faith in his sources, Livy speaks of pestilence in XXXIX, 41; XL, 19, 6-8 and 36, 13-37, 7; XLI, 21, 5-10. There was

The essential question is how many died in the plague under Marcus Aurelius. It has been compared in its effects with the Black Death. Vastly more is known about this, though its dimensions and consequences remain a matter of controversy. One estimate, lower than many, is that about twenty percent of the population of England died of it during the three years 1348-1350, and that by 1400 the population had been reduced by half.⁸⁵ Are we justified in assuming that anything like twenty percent of the population of the Roman Empire, beyond the ordinary mortality of these years, were lost because of plague during any three years of Marcus Aurelius' reign, or during all of it? One percent, on a low estimate of the total population, would allow for at least 500,000 deaths; and two percent, a million deaths. I do not see that there is necessity or authority for assuming that there were more. The one pertinent figure that we have is Dio's two thousand a day⁸⁶ in Rome in 189 in an outbreak described as greater than any earlier one known to him, which certainly should include that under Marcus Aurelius. Until much more substantial evidence is presented, there seems insufficient reason for concluding that the plague was really comparable to the Black Death in its severity and its demographic effects and was a major turning point in Roman history. Perhaps it is unfair to maintain that the burden of proof rests on those who stress its importance, but it does seem reasonable that proof should be provided before unique disasters, extraordinary

occasionally difficulty as a result in filling quotas for military service. As is well known, the state religion provided various means for dealing with epidemics; see e.g. J. Gagé, *Apollon Romain* (Paris, 1955), pp. 69-83, 148.

⁸⁵ J. C. Russell, *Speculum*, XX (1945), p. 158, n. 1 and p. 167. The article is cited by Boak, who in general follows Russell as his authority for the period, for good reasons. See now Russell's "Late Ancient and Medieval Population," *Trans. Amer. Phil. Soc.*, XLVIII, 3 (1958). He discusses our epidemic briefly on p. 37.

⁸⁶ Higher, if perhaps more doubtful, figures are found: 10,000 a day for many days in Rome under Vespasian (Hieron., *Chron.*, p. 188 h Helm; perhaps the date is wrong and this refers to the epidemic under Titus); 5,000 a day under Gallienus (S.H.A., *Gall.*, 5, 5); 10,000 a day in Constantinople under Justinian (Procop., *Bell. Pers.*, II, 23, 2). Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte*, I^o, pp. 30-1 mentions a number of other pestilences recorded for Rome itself during the Empire from Augustus on and compares figures in more recent times.

developments, and basic changes in fundamental patterns are accepted. The "decline" of the Empire may well have been under way by Marcus Aurelius' time; from several points of view it can be argued that it was. But even if one agrees that depopulation became an important aspect of the process in the third century and later, he may doubt whether this plague contributed significantly and was a decisive factor in a long continuing development.

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LATENT TRAGEDY IN *AENEID* VII, 1-285.

The time-honored statement that the first six books of the *Aeneid* are Vergil's *Odyssey*, the second six his *Iliad*, carries an unfortunate suggestion that his epic has only chronological unity.¹ More courteously, recent scholarship has tended to show the integrity of Vergil's imagination. In 1950 Pöschl brilliantly demonstrated the metaphorical unity of the *Aeneid* by tracing certain major themes through related symbols and representative figures; for instance, Dido and Turnus exhibit a similar rebellion of passion against reason.² Along more structural lines, Duckworth's two complementary divisions of the *Aeneid*, into halves, "with an alternating rise and fall of tension and with each book of the second panel balancing that of the first" (I-VII, II-VIII, etc.), and into thirds (I-IV, V-VIII, IX-XII), have helped break down the barrier imagined by many readers between VI, 901 and VII, 1.³ Both approaches, the synthesizing and

¹ The following commentaries will be referred to: *Servii Grammatici qui feruntur in Vergilii Aeneidos Libros VI-VIII, recensuit* G. Thilo (Leipzig, 1883); G. Gossrau, *Publii Vergilii Maronis Aeneis* (Quedlinburg, 1876); K. Kappes, *Vergils Aeneide* III (2 Aufl., Leipzig, 1877); C. Anthon-W. Trollope, *The Aeneid of Virgil* (London, 1881); J. Conington, *P. Vergili Maronis Opera* III (3d ed., London, 1883); J. Henry, *Aeneidea* III (Dublin, 1889); J. Mackail, *The Aeneid* (Oxford, 1930). The text used is that of F. Hirtzel (Oxford, 1900).

The *Iliad*—*Odyssey* distinction must have been a commonplace of Roman schoolteachers, as of their successors; cf. Servius *ap.* Thilo, p. 124: *ut et in principio diximus, in duas partes hoc opus divisum est: nam primi sex ad imaginem Odysseae dicti sunt, quos personarum et adlocutionum varietate constat esse graviores, hi autem sex ad imaginem Iliados dicti sunt, qui in negotiis validiores sunt.*

² V. Pöschl, *Die Dichtkunst Vergils* (Vienna, 1950), sees the *Aeneid* as presenting a conflict on three levels—individual, political, and cosmic—between the forces of light and darkness, idea and passion, order and chaos, spirit and nature; thus Jupiter is opposed to Juno, Augustus to Antonius, Aeneas to Dido and Turnus, and (p. 41) "in the two parts of the *Aeneid* *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are bound together in a higher unity." Pöschl also draws specific parallels (pp. 214 ff.) between the tragedy of Dido and that of Turnus. His great predecessor, R. Heinze, in his *Vergils Epische Technik* (Leipzig, 1903), pp. 425-50, tended to emphasize the unity of particular books and sections of books, and of the groups I-VI and VII-XII, at the expense of the whole.

³ For the division into halves, see G. Duckworth, "The Architecture

the analytical, show Vergil's *maius opus*, Books VII-XII, to be, not a new and separate work, but rather an extension in larger letters (to use the Platonic metaphor) of Books I-VI.⁴ The present paper will demonstrate the intricate relationship of VII, 1-285 both to Book I in particular and to the block, I-IV, in general. By this view VII becomes, like VI, a key book, pointing both backwards, to Troy and Carthage, and forwards, to the Latin wars, the death of Turnus, and the future greatness of Rome.⁵

Aeneid, VII, 1-285 is generally considered the calm before the storm. Aeneas, his Trojans, and the Latins enjoy an apparent respite from troubles before Juno's arrival (line 286).⁶ But Juno is no *dea ex machina*, and the storm which she conjures up would be dramatically unconvincing were we not prepared

of the *Aeneid*," *A. J. P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 1-15, expanding and refining a suggestion of R. Conway, *Harvard Lectures on the Vergilian Age* (Cambridge, Mass., 1928), pp. 139-40; for specific correspondences between Books I and VII, see note 7, below. For the division into thirds, see G. Duckworth, "The *Aeneid* as a Trilogy," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVIII (1957), pp. 1-10 (following suggestions of various other scholars; cf. p. 4, notes 13-15). Duckworth preferred (pp. 4-5) to characterize the three parts as tragedy of Dido—destiny of Rome (epic core)—tragedy of Turnus, rather than, as Pöschl, *op. cit.* (note 2, above), p. 279, had suggested, dark—light—dark. The idea of a "trilogy" is strongly supported by B. Fenik, "Parallelism of Theme and Imagery in *Aeneid* II and IV," *A. J. P.*, LXXX (1959), pp. 1-24, who demonstrates the close unity of I-IV through the figure of Aeneas, the theme of tragedy and deceit, various images and symbols, and parallelism between the fates of Dido and Priam. The present paper will show Vergil's methods in relating VII, 1-285 to I-IV to be similar.

⁴ Just so, Verg., *Ecl.*, 4, 1, *paulo maiora canamus*, heralds the extension and glorification of the pastoral world, not its abandonment.

⁵ W. Camps, "A Note on the Structure of the *Aeneid*," *O. Q.*, n. s. IV (1954), pp. 214-15, argues that the centre of the *Aeneid* lies in VII, 25-285: "at the point thus emphasized by the poet we are invited to look both backward and forward." But the same might be said of Books VI or V or VIII, any one of which is, in a sense, a "keystone book"; cf. E. K. Rand, *The Magical Art of Virgil* (Cambridge, Mass., 1931), p. 380, on the unifying function of Book VI.

⁶ Even Heinze, *op. cit.* (note 2, above), p. 318, tends to overemphasize the shock-value of the *peripeteia* in VII, 286 at the expense of its motivation in VII, 1-285; his remark (p. 326) that Iris and Juturna are only sparks to light psychologically prepared fires in V and XII applies equally well to Juno and Allecto.

for it by a complex foreshadowing of tragedy in Latium. First, a sense of foreboding hangs over Aeneas' arrival. Secondly, the invocation to Erato (VII, 37-44) recalls and directly reaffirms earlier prophecies of the Latin war. Thirdly, the obscure situation of Latium is associated with the known tragedies of Troy and Carthage through parallelism of incident: the happy landing of the Trojans, their feasting at night and exploration at dawn, the embassy, the address of Ilioneus, the monarch's kindly welcome, and the exchange of gifts, all have tragic connotations from Books I and II.⁷ Fourthly, Latinus is associated with Dido and Priam, Lavinia with Dido and Helen, and Latium with Carthage and Troy, by means of an elaborate symbolic web of verbal and imagistic echoes from Books I-IV.⁸

1. The Landing

The *Argonautica* of Apollonius Rhodius breaks neatly into two halves. At the end of Book 2 Jason lands at Phasos, and Book 3 starts afresh with an invocation to Erato. For better continuity Vergil saves Aeneas' arrival at the Tiber's mouth until Book VII. Just before he traverses the last, moonlit lap of his journey, his old nurse, Caieta, dies; one feels that she, like Palinurus and Misenus, is a kind of scapegoat for his success, and her loss a part of the heavy cost of fame to come.⁹

⁷ Of these parallels, most commentators noticed only the two temples and the reappearance of Ilioneus (cf. Gossrau, p. 345; Kappes, p. 71; Anthon-Trollope, p. 369); but Conington, pp. 12-27, further noted the parallelism of the speeches, the association of kingdoms offered, and the gifts. Some specific correspondences between I and VII were observed, but not elaborated on, by E. Fraenkel, "Some Aspects of the Structure of *Aeneid* VII," *J. R. S.*, XXXV (1945), p. 3, and Pöschl, *op. cit.* (note 2, above), pp. 47-51. Duckworth, "Architecture" (note 3, above), p. 12, notes the parallelism of the Trojans' arrival in a strange land; their being already known; friendship offered; Ilioneus the spokesman, and omens and prophecies aiding their reception.

⁸ Vergil is here building upon his earlier association in I-IV of Priam and Dido, Troy and Carthage, for which see Fenik, *op. cit.* (note 3, above), pp. 18-21.

⁹ Fraenkel, *op. cit.* (note 7, above), p. 2, finds the lines about Caieta expressive of "the two souls within the poet's breast: while the Italian patriot rejoices at the long and glorious history of his country's towns and monuments . . . the sage . . . strikes a note of mellow resignation." Henry, pp. 465-6, seems correct in seeing in *si qua est ea gloria* a depre-

Also troubling is the appearance of Circe.¹⁰ Her animals are not the tame ones seen by Odysseus; from a safe distance, Aeneas hears them snorting and growling and roaring, for to Vergil their brutalization is only an outward sign of the mastery that passion has over its slaves. Eluded but never really solved, the problem of dehumanizing passion re-awaits Aeneas.

Nowhere in the *Aeneid* is there a more joyful scene than Aeneas' sailing into Tiber in a glowing dawn to the accompaniment of a choir of birds. At last he has reached the promised land where "the fates hold out a quiet resting-place" (I, 205-6). Yet there is latent symbolism of war in his entering the dark womb of the river (*fluminis alveo . . . fluvio succedit opaco*). The metaphor becomes more explicit later, when Juno describes the advent of the Trojans (VII, 303): *optato conduntur Tiburis alveo*. The two spheres of meaning of *condere*, "to bury" and "to found," interpenetrate each other throughout the *Aeneid*: *conduntur alveo* calls to mind the Greek warriors hidden in the womb of the Trojan horse, which gives birth through them to the destruction of Troy; this destruction in turn is parent to the greatness of Rome (*condere urbem*).¹¹ The divine economy provides for an isonomic balance of creation and destruction: for one nation to rise and one man to succeed, other nations and men must fall and die.¹² Since, therefore, the symbolic

ciation of fame in relation to the dead. Also, if Caieta was the nurse of Aeneas, her death adds to the growing loneliness of his maturing.

¹⁰ F. Eichhoff, *Études Grecques sur Virgile* (Paris, 1825), p. 5, notes the fusion of Circe and Calypso in Vergil's picture. Conington, p. 3, remarks on the difference between these wild animals, including bears and boars, and those tamed by Circe in the *Odyssey*. For the allegorical interpretation of Circe as a *meretrix* or figure of triumphant sensuality, see Hor., *Epist.*, I, 2, 24-7.

¹¹ Cf. IX, 152, *neq̄ equi caeco condemur in alvo*, which marks the connection between Aeneas' activities in Latium and the Trojan horse pregnant with armed men (II, 38, 52, 238, 243, 258-9, 328-9); compare also the *gremium*-imagery (note 25, below), III, 94-6, and 509, *sternimur optatae gremio telluris*.

¹² A key principle of the *Aeneid*, *isonomia* deserves more attention than it has received. Vergil is indebted for its use to Lucretius, in whose epic the apparent mutability of creation and destruction is ultimately founded on the orderly laws of nature. More easily seen in the *Georgics* than in the *Aeneid*, this *isonomia* is only part of what R. Brooks, "Discolor Aura," *A. J. P.*, LXXIV (1953), p. 263, calls "that particular dualism which is the essence of the *Aeneid*."

conception of Rome threatens ancient Latium, Aeneas' arrival can hardly be innocuous, and he himself may be cast shortly as a treacherous invader.

Only now, in shocking contrast to Aeneas' peaceful landing, but not to its implicit symbolism, comes the direct statement of war in Vergil's invocation (VII, 37-44):

Nunc age, qui reges, Erato, quae tempora, rerum
quis Latio antiquo fuerit status, advena classem
cum primum Ausoniis exercitus appulit oris,
expediam, et primae revocabo exordia pugnae.
Tu vatem, tu, diva, mone. Dicam horrida bella,
dicam acies actosque animis in funera reges,
Tyrrhenamque manum totamque sub arma coactam
Hesperiam.¹³

To understand this proem we must think backwards. Lines 41-4 recall prophecies and hints by Jove (I, 263-4), Helenus (III, 458), Dido (IV, 615-20), and Anchises (III, 537-43, V, 730-1, VI, 890-2), but more precisely, *horrida bella* echoes the Sibylline prophecy (VI, 83-4):

bella, horrida bella
et Thybrim multo spumantem sanguine cerno.

There will be a second Simois and Xanthus, said the Sibyl; new Greek camps, another Achilles goddess-born; Juno will never let the Trojans out of her sight; Aeneas will be a helpless suppliant; and (VI, 93-4):

causa mali tanti coniunx iterum hospita Teucris
externique iterum thalami.

The projected marriage-alliance between Aeneas and Lavinia will provide the fuel for Juno to kindle into a raging fire. By cruel illogic, Aeneas will be viewed both as an invader, with

¹³ *Tempora* (on which *rerum* does not depend; cf. Henry, pp. 479-81) deserves further comment. Latinus rules, like Saturn, in peace and tranquillity (VII, 202-4; cf. VIII, 324-5), almost in a kind of lingering Golden Age; cf. K. Reckford, "Some Appearances of the Golden Age," *C. J.*, LIV (1958), pp. 84-5. But Aeneas is proclaimed of the stock of Jove (VII, 219-20), and Jove expelled Saturn from Olympus (VIII, 319-20) and, for Stoic reasons, put an end to the Golden Age on earth (*G.*, I, 121 ff.). However, Aeneas at times prefigures Augustus, who will restore the Golden Age (I, 291-6; VI, 791-4).

his *advena exercitus*, and as a second Paris, a treacherous cause of war; and the innocent maiden, Lavinia, will be forced into the role of a second Helen, to destroy *Latium antiquum* as Troy, that *urbs antiqua* (II, 363), was destroyed.¹⁴ More recently, Dido's love for Aeneas had symbolically engulfed Carthage in flames, having first unfortified it (IV, 86-8):

Non coep̄tae adsurgunt turres, non arma iuventus
exerces portusve aut propugnacula bello
tuta parant. . . .

Dido also was a *coniunx hospita Teucris*, and we shall see how Vergil calls upon the tragedy of love in Books I and IV to enrich and deepen the tragedy of impending war in Book VII. Surely Vergil's invocation of Erato, the Muse of love, was no idle borrowing from Apollonius; is it not rather a two-way signpost, pointing backwards to the road taken (Troy and Carthage) and forwards to that lying ahead?¹⁵

2. Latinus and Lavinia

At the time of Aeneas' arrival Latium is almost anachronistically at peace. Latinus and his people hold to Saturnian

¹⁴ W. Anderson, "Vergil's Second *Iliad*," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVIII (1957), pp. 17-30, shows how Juno, Turnus, and Amata are self-deceived in thinking that the pattern of the Trojan War is repeating itself, and so in associating Aeneas with Paris (or Hector) and Turnus with Menelaus and Achilles; ironically, as it turns out, the Italian forces will fail like the Trojans, Turnus like Paris and Hector, Amata like Hecuba, Latinus like Priam; Aeneas will be the Achilles of the Sibyl's ambiguous prophecy (VI, 89-90). The total destruction of Troy is symbolically concluded—in the death of Turnus!

¹⁵ Most commentators have followed the opinion of Servius *ap. Thilo*, p. 129; *pro Calliope vel pro qualicunque Musa ponit*. See, however, Anthon, p. 358: "The Muse of amatory poetry is invoked . . . in allusion, probably, to the union of Aeneas and Lavinia, on which turns the *dénouement* of the poem." This idea is considered but rejected by Conington, p. 5. F. Todd, "Virgil's Invocation of Erato," *C. R.*, XLV (1931), pp. 46-8, saw that Vergil called upon Erato to tell "the love-story of Lavinia and Turnus and Aeneas," but he wrongly disassociates her from the *horrida bella* in so far as her special function is concerned. On the tragic associations of passion for Vergil see W. Jackson-Knight, *Roman Vergil* (London, 1944), p. 114, and Pöschl, *op. cit.* (note 2, above), p. 120.

ways (VII, 203-4), but Jupiter has long since ascended the throne of Olympus. Politically, Latinus' rule is unstable, for his son died young and all now depends upon his only daughter: *tantas servabat filia sedes*.¹⁶ Like Dido, Lavinia is beset by suitors. Outstanding among these is Turnus, for whom the royal queen already has an unbridled passion (suggested in VII, 56-7). Alone in Latium Turnus is *potens*, and he is cast as Aeneas' rival.

The natural compact between Latinus and Turnus is forestalled by the gods, upon whom therefore falls some responsibility for what follows. At the sacred laurel (Priam had one also) and at the altar divine portents appear. The reader of *Aeneid* I-VI hardly requires an official interpretation. The swarm of bees settling on the laurel is both a favorable and an unfavorable omen: it signifies the ascendancy and triumph of Roman civilization and the invasion of Latium by foreigners from across the sea.¹⁷ As Henry showed, it may also suggest "that Latinus and his Latins would be driven out of their settlement of Laurentum by strangers, as bees are driven out of their hive." The image recalls those happy, busy bees, Dido's subjects, who were symbolically invaded by the Trojans; soon war will smoke out the bees of Latium (XII, 587-92). The portent is therefore isonomic, reflecting the fatal necessity that creation be balanced by destruction.

The fire-portent has a similar meaning (VII, 71-80):

Praeterea, castis adolet dum altaria taedis,
et iuxta genitorem adstat Lavinia virgo,
visa, nefas, longis comprehendere crinibus ignem
atque omnem ornatum flamma crepitante cremari,

¹⁶ Vergil here dispenses with a tradition according to which Amata killed or blinded her two sons because they favored Lavinia's marriage to Aeneas; cf. Servius *ap.* Thilo, p. 130. *Tantas servabat filia sedes* might perhaps suggest to the Roman reader the problem of the Succession at home: Augustus too had only one daughter! But one partial allusion does not make an allegory.

¹⁷ For the bees as a favorable or unfavorable omen, see H. Boas, *Aeneas' Arrival in Latium* (Amsterdam, 1938), pp. 135-7. As Gossrau, p. 335, noticed, Vergil's language in VII, 65-6, *liquidum trans aethera vectae obsedere apicem*, supports the Latins' interpretation of the bees (68-70) as invaders from across the sea. For the bees driven out of the hive, see Henry, p. 485.

regalisque accensa comas, accensa coronam
 insignem gemmis; tum fumida lumine fulvo
 involvi ac totis Volcanum spargere tectis.
 Id vero horrendum ac visu mirabile ferri:
 namque fore illustrem fama fatisque caneant
 ipsam, sed populo magnum portendere bellum.

This flame is clearly akin to the one atop Iulus' head in II, 681-6, a symbol of the destined greatness of Rome and the Julian race that would spring from the ashes of Troy:

namque manus inter maestorumque ora parentum
 ecce levis summo de vertice visus Iuli
 fundere lumen apex, tactuque innoxia mollis
 lambere flamma comas et circum tempora pasci.
 Nos pavidi trepidare metu crinemque flagrantem
 excutere et sanctos restinguere fontibus ignis.¹⁸

But Lavinia's flame is less optimistic in its symbolism. Instead of light, it gives off a dark smoke; it is violent rather than holy; and far from licking her hand gently, it seems to "consume" the princess and to spread uncontrollably throughout the palace. Clearly, Vergil means to emphasize the destructive aspect of the portent; it is reminiscent of the hidden fires earlier externalized in the burning of Troy and in Dido's funeral pyre. Furthermore, the language here employed alludes unmistakably to Euripides' *Medea*, in which Creon's daughter and the king himself are consumed by the fiery robe and crown sent to the princess by Medea as a wedding gift of vengeance and destruction.¹⁹ Not only, then, as the Latin interpreters perceive, is

¹⁸ B. Knox, "The Serpent and the Flame," *A. J. P.*, LXXI (1950), pp. 380, 395-7, showed that the flame on Iulus' head (II, 681-6) was the ultimate and most definitive appearance of the serpent-image pervading Book II, until then purely a symbol of destruction: light-giving, harmless and holy, "the flame . . . is a portent of Troy's rebirth," and Jupiter himself confirms this interpretation by thunder and a shooting star. Note the contrast between the flames of II, 681-6 and VII, 71-80: *nefas* vs. *sanctos*, *fumida lumine* vs. *fundere lumen*; *cremari*, *accensa*, *involvi* vs. *innoxia*, *mollis*, *lambere*.

¹⁹ See the messenger's speech in Eur., *Medea*, 1136-1230; I noted the parallel independently of Eichhoff, *op. cit.* (note 10, above), p. 10. Vergil borrows the burning of head and body by the *ornatus* (*kosmos*) and *corona* (*stephanos*); the crown is thus poetic in origin, not Etruscan, as Boas, *op. cit.* (note 17, above), p. 172, thinks. VII, 78 translates

glory for Lavinia counterbalanced by war for the Latin nation, but also, as we know from Books I-IV, the rise of Rome must be offset by the fall of other nations and by every kind of individual sacrifice and loss. It is as though the vengeful ghost of Dido, and behind her the ghosts of fallen Carthage and fallen Troy, were hovering over Lavinia and Latium, waiting for destiny to repeat itself.

The meaning of the two equivocal portents is confirmed by an ambiguous oracle of Faunus (VII, 96-9):

‘ Ne pete conubiis natam sociare Latinis,
o mea progenies, thalamis neu crede paratis:
externi venient generi, qui sanguine nostrum
nomen in astra ferant . . . ’

Sanguis here denotes the Roman progeny of Aeneas and Lavinia, culminating in the divine Caesars.²⁰ But at the same time it suggests the bloodshed (line 318, *sanguine Troiano et Rutulo*) necessitated by the creation of Roman glory. And *thalamis neu crede paratis* may hint, not only that the Turnus-Lavinia marriage is no longer a reasonable prospect, but also that there is something deceptive about the substitute marriage proffered by the gods themselves: it will produce unimaginable destruction.

3. Aeneas

The scene now reverts to the Trojans, but not before *Fama* has been loosed again (104-5), still the malignant parasite that preys on reputation. Vergil has *Fama* in mind when, in line 105,

Medea 1202, transposing the two halves of the verse. Vergil suggests the father's involvement by *iuxta genitorem* and the downfall of the house by *spargere tectis*, whereas Euripides has a "stream" of fire. The fact that the hubristic pride of Creon's daughter is not to be found in Lavinia makes her fate all the more dreadful.

²⁰ Like the comet in II, 692-700, *in astra* alludes to the apotheosis of Julius Caesar and perhaps also to the expected apotheosis of Augustus; cf. I, 259-60, 287, IX, 641-2, XII, 794-5, and especially the confirmation of the creative-fire portent in VIII, 680-1:

geminas cui tempora flammās
laeta vomunt patriumque aperitur vertice sidus.

But the flame of Aeneas' triumph, springing from the apex of his helm, appears to the Latins as a bloody comet or disease-bringing star (X, 261-75).

he describes the Trojans as *Laomedontia pubes*, King Laomedon embodying the treachery of which enemies would like to convict Aeneas. Once previously the Trojans were characterized as "children of Laomedon," by the Harpy Celaeno, who foretold their "eating of the tables."²¹ Aeneas had prayed to Jupiter to render the portent harmless, Helenus had given reassurances, and seemingly, Aeneas' prayer is answered in the episode of the cake-plates and the laughter of Ascanius; yet how account for the tone of VII, 112-15,

Consumptis hic forte aliis, ut vertere morsus
exiguam in Cererem penuria adegit edendi
et violare manu malisque audacibus orbem
fatalis crusti patulis nec parcere quadris . . . ?

Why is the nullification of Celaeno's threat described in terms better applied to some major sacrilege, like the slaying of the cattle of the Sun by Odysseus' crew?

Once more Aeneas prays: to the local nymphs (as did Odysseus), to Earth, the unknown rivers of Italy, Night and her stars, Idaean Jove, Cybele, and "the two parents in heaven and in Erebus" (or does *duplicis parentis* suggest deception?). The juxtaposition, *Tellurem Nymphasque*, is rather unfortunate, recalling Dido's naturally sanctified "marriage" to Aeneas (IV, 165-8). The *auspiciu*m sent by Jupiter is clear enough: thunder and a blazing cloud portend success for the Trojan cause, but success in war, not in peace.²² The light of revelation is confined to a cloudy background, and the lightning-fire that favors Aeneas will be shown in Books IX-XII to be capable of

²¹ Celaeno knew more than she was telling. Her sarcastic words to the Trojans perhaps had hidden reference to Latium (III, 248-9):

Laomedontiadae, bellumne inferre paratis
et patrio Harpyias insontis pellere regno?

Moreover, she reveals herself as *furiarum maxima* and as such is not unrelated to Tisiphone and Allecto; is it she who tortures sinners in Tartarus (VI, 605-7)?

²² The lightning takes on the specific form of blazing arms in VIII, 528-9, to drive Aeneas into the role of the ferocious hero. In VIII, 622-3 his breastplate is compared to a blazing cloud. See C. H. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 132 ff., on the symbolism of lightning-flashes and other fire-portents in the *Iliad*.

great destruction. One cannot, unfortunately, fight for *sedes quietas* and enjoy them too.

As in Book I, the Trojans feast at night and explore the country at daybreak, and an embassy is sent, without Aeneas, to the reigning monarch. The description of the embassy as it sets out (154-5),

ramis velatos Palladis omnis
donaque ferre viro pacemque exposcere Teucris,

carries suggestions of treachery, for the "veiling," the name of Pallas, and the bringing of gifts recall Greek wiles in Book II. Aeneas is not, of course, a Sinon; he is forced into the role of deceiver against his will and, at first, without his knowledge. But while the embassy moves off in search of peace, he fortifies his first camp on Latin soil (157-9):

Ipse humili designat moenia fossa
moliturque locum, primasque in litore sedes
castrorum in morem pinnis atque aggere cingit.

From the *sedes quietae* the little walls of Aeneas rise, humble (by transference of epithet) as the ditch around them; but the reader knows that they herald the longed-for *altae moenia Romae*. Romulus slew Remus in defence of the sanctity of just such "defenceless" walls. The juxtaposition of the wall-building and the lines about the embassy just preceding suggests that Aeneas' walls are rising in direct opposition to the *augusta moenia* of Latinus, and we know from Books I-IV that, according to the isonomic law of history, only one set of walls may prevail. Neptune overthrew the walls of Troy, which he himself had helped build, to make room for the Roman future; and the walls of Carthage, which Dido's people had been erecting like so many happy bees, hung unfinished after the arrival-attack of Aeneas. *Tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem!*

4. Aeneas (Ilioneus) and Latinus

Vergil frequently represents the Latin war as being necessary to the conquest of savagery by civilization, a theme elaborately depicted in the story of Heracles' victory over the monster Cacus (VIII, 193-267). But the war appears tragically wasteful for many reasons, and especially because Latium seems, at least in

the first third of Book VII, a civilized country as well as a peaceful one. The young Latins seen exercising outside the palace gate are like Aeneas' own band of Trojan youths, and the temple of Picus anticipates, in its very Roman appearance, the forum of Augustus with its temple to Mars Ultor, which was under construction when Vergil was writing.²³ The predicted ferocity of Italy is not yet apparent, although it is perhaps significant that Picus himself, the grandfather of Latinus, was transformed into a bird by Circe.

Latinus is highly civilized, like Priam and Dido, with whom he is implicitly compared. A *rex longaevus*, like Priam, he sits like Dido on a throne in the midst of his temple-palace. Like Dido, he welcomes the stranger calmly and courteously; like her again, he has heard of Troy and the Trojans; he asks the reasons for their coming; he offers the sympathy of one not ignorant of misfortune, and he welcomes the Trojans as his guests: *ne fugite hospitium*.

The following exchange of speeches and gifts is packed with tragic associations from Books I-IV. As before, Ilioneus presents himself as a suppliant (VII, 229-30):

dis sedem exiguam patriis litusque rogamus
innocuum et cunctis undamque auramque patentem.

The irony is apparent to us but not to Latinus: the Trojans have not been uprooted so many times and pushed on so painfully towards Italy only to obtain an insignificant piece of shore. Aeneas is even now building his walls. Nor is their coming innocuous, despite the praised *pietas* of their leader (VII, 231-40):

Non erimus regno indecores, nec vestra feretur
fama levis tantique abolescet gratia facti,
nec Troiam Ausonios gremio excepisse pigebit.
Fata per Aeneae iuro dextramque potentem,
sive fide seu quis bello est expertus et armis:
multi nos populi, multae (ne temne, quod ultro

²³ For resemblances between the statues of VII, 170-89 and those placed in the forum of Augustus, still mainly in the planning stage, see H. T. Rowell, "Vergil and the Forum of Augustus," *A. J. P.*, LXII (1948), pp. 261-76. Mackail, p. 265, notes that *augustus* appears twice in this section (lines 153, 170) and nowhere else in the *Aeneid*.

praeferimus manibus vittas ac verba precantia)
 et petiere sibi et voluere adiungere gentes;
 sed nos fata deum vestras exquirere terras
 imperiis egere suis.²⁴

Ne temne, indeed! These lines recall by thematic echoes the promise that Aeneas made to Dido (I, 609),

semper honos nomenque tuum laudesque manebunt,
 and even more unmistakably (IV, 335),

. . . nec me meminisse pigebit Elissae.

Dido's fame, too, was not *levis*. The sexual metaphor implicit in *gremio excepisse* suggests her physical and emotional surrender to Aeneas, brought on partly by her embrace (I, 718, *gremio fovet*) of Cupid disguised as Ascanius.²⁵ This personal bond and what Dido regarded as her marriage to Aeneas were accompanied on the national level by her attempt to merge the two races of Trojans and Carthaginians (*adiungere gentes*); on both levels her hopes and those of Juno were frustrated, and implicit in her personal destruction was the fall of Carthage as a dominant nation.²⁶ In the flickering light of these memories evoked by echoes of theme and sound, Ilioneus' reference to the fidelity of Aeneas, as symbolized by *dextra*, is not entirely a happy one. Finally, *imperiis egere suis* (an exact echo of VI, 463) reminds us of how Aeneas' coming to Hesperia involved, by the "fates of the gods," the desertion of Dido and her subsequent death.²⁷

²⁴ The promise of *fama* is ill-omened. *Fama* in Book IV was a catalyst of destruction, and Book VII opens with the theme of fame won through death; cf. note 9, above.

²⁵ Compare also I, 685, *gremio accipiet*.

²⁶ Henry, p. 523, notes the allusion in *multi nos populi* to Aestes and Dido. Juno had suggested joining Trojans and Carthaginians in peace through marriage (IV, 99-104, *pactosque hymenaeos*); Venus knew better (IV, 105-14). The parallel imagery of besieged queen—besieged town is discussed in relation to other "amatory" images by F. Newton, "Recurrent Imagery in *Aeneid* IV," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXVIII (1957), pp. 31-43. Pöschl, *op. cit.* (note 2, above), pp. 123-5 (and 125, note 1, on a parallel in Callimachus), also discusses the interdependence of the fates of Dido and Carthage.

²⁷ Conington, p. 27, catches the echo.

Our growing forebodings that history is repeating itself are strengthened by the description of the gifts sent to Latinus (VII, 243-8):

Dat tibi praeterea fortunae parva prioris
munera, reliquias Troia ex ardente receptas.
Hoc pater Anchises auro libabat ad aras,
hoc Priami gestamen erat cum iura vocatis
more daret populis, sceptrumque sacerque tiaras
Iliadumque labor vestes.

In these gifts we may sense a multiple warning. First, after the episode of the wooden horse, any gifts offered by one people to another should be suspect. Secondly, the libation-cup, sceptre, tiara, and robes once worn by Priam may carry with them something of Priam's particular fate, great glory and happiness ending in ruin and despair. Thirdly, we might recall the gifts brought by Cupid to Dido (I, 647-56),

munera praeterea Iliacis erepta ruinis,

a robe stiff with gold and an embroidered veil, both worn by Helen (!), a sceptre of Ilione, a necklace, and a jeweled, golden crown.²⁸ Like Creon's daughter, Dido was "enflamed" by these gifts, according to the orders of Venus (I, 659-60):

donisque furem
incendat reginam atque ossibus implicet ignem.²⁹

It follows that, just as a Greek gift spelt ruin for Priam and Troy, and Trojan and Greek gifts contributed to the fall of Dido and Carthage, so the gifts here offered to Latinus conceal the destructive flames "escaped" at Troy (and Carthage).

Latinus does not answer Ilioneus at once. He bends his head in meditation, pondering the fate of his daughter and the por-

²⁸ The description of the *ornatus* includes a subtle warning to Dido (I, 650-2):

ornatus Argivae Helenae, quos illa Mycenis,
Pergama cum peteret inconcessosque hymenaeos,
extulerat. . . .

As Helen destroyed Troy by "a marriage not allowed," so Dido will destroy Carthage. For the parallelism, see also Pöschl, *op. cit.* (note 2, above), p. 243, and Fenik, *op. cit.* (note 3, above), p. 21.

²⁹ As in *Medea*, the gifts are brought by the hand of a child. Compare the flame-gift imagery of I, 673-4 and 713-14.

tents of the gods. When he prays to the gods to confirm their omens, he casts partial responsibility for what follows upon them. Only then does he assent. Like Dido, he expresses a desire that Aeneas himself come (*si iungi hospitio properat*—the double marriage again!), and like Alcinous, he offers his daughter to the stranger.³⁰ He also sends him gifts. Dido, it will be remembered, sent animals to the Trojan ships (I, 633-6). Latinus gives the Trojans white horses, picked from the royal three hundred, with a special pair, of divine origin, for Aeneas. Another ambivalent portent! On the one hand, the three hundred white horses symbolically complement the thirty white pigs that Aeneas will meet (VIII, 81-3); pigs and horses together stand for the thirty years of Ascanius' destined reign and the three hundred years' rule of the kings of Alba Longa, the descendants of Aeneas and Lavinia.³¹ But a horse's head buried in Carthage was Juno's sign of victory in war (I, 443-5), and white horses were seen by Anchises as a portent of war as well as a sign of peace (III, 539-43). The pair given to Aeneas are far from tame. They breathe fire, a sign of victory; they are descended from heavenly stock "stolen" from the Sun-god by Circe. This is, not so coincidentally, the third appearance of that witch in VII, 1-285; and it may be significant that Aeneas will receive a present from her hands, however indirectly. Once war commences, will he keep control of his passions?

The first part of Book VII now concludes (284-5):

Talibus Aeneadae donis dictisque Latini
sublimes in equis redeunt pacemque reportant.

A few last ironies have been added. Does *talibus* . . . suggest the famous earlier lines (II, 195-6),

Talibus insidiis periurique arte Sinonis
credita res . . . ?

Troy was taken by god-prospered guile, not by the strength of

³⁰ With his usual keen ear, Eichhoff, *op. cit.* (note 10, above), p. 22, caught the resemblance of VII, 268-70 to *Od.*, VII, 311 ff.; so also Gossrau, p. 348. Like Nausicaa, Dido was earlier compared to Diana (I, 496-503); cf. Pöschl, *op. cit.* (note 2, above), pp. 101-13.

³¹ The white pigs of III, 388-93 and VIII, 81-3 are symbols of creative fertility without the concomitant destructive possibilities of the white horses.

men. The followers of Aeneas are puffed up, *sublimes*, by gifts and words of whose tragic implications they are unaware; they only carry back a semblance of peace on their now Trojan horses.

The stage is now set—all the props are ready—for the entrance of that actress whose malevolent presence we have sensed behind the scenes, withheld for the sake of dramatic suspense. Wrath and rhetoric follow. At the end of her soliloquy, Juno sums up her dread purpose in words which explicitly draw together some of the principal metaphors already noted (VII, 317-22):

Hac gener atque socer coeant mercede suorum:
sanguine Troiano et Rutulo dotabere, virgo,
et Bellona manet te pronuba. Nec face tantum
Cisseis praegnas ignis enixa iugalis;
quin idem Veneri partus suus et Paris alter,
funestaeque iterum recidiva in Pergama taedae.³²

Her plan is twofold. First, the marriage of Aeneas and Lavinia, the foundation of the Roman race, will be a source of almost total destruction. There is little doubt about this *sanguis*, blood spilt as the marriage-price, the penalty for trying to unite (*coeant*) the two nations. It is an ironic commentary on the isonomic movement of fate that Venus, the divine figure of creativity, gives birth here to the flame of destruction.³³ Still more insidiously, Juno has cast Aeneas and Lavinia as a second Helen and Paris. By breaking the bonds of hospitality and

³² *Gener atque socer* alludes to Pompey and Caesar; cf. VI, 826-35. The war between Trojans and Latins takes on aspects of the Social War and of the civil wars of Pompey and Caesar, Antony and Octavian; cf. Pöschl, *op. cit.* (note 2, above), p. 26. *Bellona pronuba* recalls *pronuba Iuno* (IV, 166) from the relevant context of Dido's "marriage"; Kappes, p. 16, notes the irony of Juno's allowing herself to be ousted here from her rightful function.

³³ See the excellent discussions of *ignis iugalis* and *taedae* by Conington, pp. 34-5, and Henry, pp. 530-5. The contrast of marriage-torch and funeral-flame, like that of marriage-song and funeral-dirge, is a commonplace of Greek tragedy; Vergil seems especially to have been influenced by Euripides' portrayal of the torch-bearing maenad, Cassandra, who revels in the idea that she is a second Helen, doomed to ruin the house that takes her in (Eur., *Troiaides*, 353-406, 424-61). Jackson-Knight, *op. cit.* (note 14, above), pp. 94-6, has shown how Vergil similarly "fused" Helen and Cassandra in VI, 517-19.

stealing a bride, Aeneas will renew the Trojan war; and Juno expects, or hopes against hope, that the misfortune of the Trojans will recur in Latium. Such, too, is the insane hope of Turnus provoked by Allecto.

As usual, Juno is wrong. Her logic is false; Aeneas is not guilty in fact, but only in appearance. As a recent critic has shown, the pattern of analogies gradually reverses itself in Books VII-XII: Aeneas becomes identified with Achilles, the Trojans with the Greek victors, the Latins with the Trojan losers, and Turnus with Paris and Hector; his death corresponds symbolically to the ending of the "name of Troy" by divine consensus.³⁴ Accordingly, although the flames of destruction seem to pursue Aeneas, as Dido had wished (IV, 384, *sequar atris ignibus absens*), they are powerless to harm the Roman future. Turnus cannot even burn the Trojan ships in IX, 69-122. Instead, Lavinia and her family are consumed in the flames of tragedy, and Turnus, like Dido, is destroyed by the self-defeating *fax* of overwhelming passion.³⁵ The fire of destruction recoils upon the Latins, who are smoked out of their hive in XII, 587-92. If Juno succeeds at all in hurting Aeneas, she does so through his growing consciousness of the tragedy that he has brought with him to Italy, as to Carthage. Only in this way is Dido's curse fulfilled (IV, 661-2):

³⁴ See the analysis by Anderson, *op. cit.* (note 15, above).

³⁵ My friend, Michael Putnam, suggests that when Allecto throws her firebrand at Turnus (VII, 456-7),

Sic effata facem iuveni coniecit et atro
lumine fumantis fixit sub pectore taedas,

she carries out Juno's plan both practically and metaphorically, for her blazing *fax* is both Turnus' jealousy of Aeneas (which blazes forth like the wrath of a second Achilles) and Aeneas himself, the *fax* with which Venus was pregnant (VII, 319-22).

It is instructive to follow the imagery of destructive *faces* and *taedae* in further detail. *Faces* are the weapons of *furor* (civil strife) in I, 150. Dido is destroyed by *taedae* (IV, 338-9, 505) and wishes in vain to pursue Aeneas with *faces* (IV, 566-7, 604, 626); Juno sends the *faces* of *furor* against the Trojan ships (V, 636-7, 640, 661-2). To delay the *taedae* of Aeneas and Lavinia (VII, 388), Amata brandishes a blazing pine-torch and sings a marriage-song for Lavinia and Turnus (VII, 397-8); Turnus bears *faces* and *taedae* against the Trojan ships, in vain (IX, 71-6); the mourning Arcadians bear funereal *faces* (XI,

Hauriat hunc oculis ignem crudelis ab alto
Dardanus, et nostrae secum ferat omina mortis.³⁶

The chief purpose of all the echoes in VII, 1-285 from Books I-IV should by now have become clear. Situational, verbal, and imagistic, they help define Vergil's epic hero as a carrier of tragic contagion wherever he goes. Two important conclusions follow. First, Book VII plays a more significant part in unifying the *Aeneid* than has hitherto been recognized. Secondly, the reader of Books I-IV should not regard the first third of Book VII as a section of pure "light."³⁷ If there is happiness it is deceptive, and latent and imminent tragedy, which encourages false hopes, is worse, if anything, than tragedy here and now. Not postponed, Juno's intervention would be less sad.

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143), and Aeneas finally wields *faces* against Latinus' city (XII, 573, 656).

³⁶ Cf. Pöschl, *op. cit.* (note 2, above), p. 88: the heroism of Aeneas is to walk on when passion overwhelms his heart; his pain—to be overcome—is that others must suffer from the commands of fate imposed upon him. So also W. Alexander, "Maius Opus," *Calif. Publ. in Class. Phil.*, XIV (1951), p. 208, sums up the events of Books VII-XII: "Thus Aeneas is estopped from happiness, whether he wins or loses; that in his basic tragedy."

³⁷ Pöschl, *op. cit.* (note 2, above), pp. 293-5, rightly argues that Book VII moves from "light" to "dark," but I cannot agree with his statement that light reigns in the first third, the counter-movement only setting in with the advent of Juno. Pöschl (p. 279) qualifies his statement that in general Books I-IV are dark, V-VIII light, and IX-XII dark, by saying that "in individual instances the light is always somewhat overshadowed by darkness, and out of the darkness light always breaks forth again"; pain and joy, victory and defeat, interpenetrate each other. A similar reservation must clearly be applied to the statement of Conway, *op. cit.* (note 3, above), p. 141, that "the books with odd numbers show what one may call the lighter or Odyssean type; the books with the even numbers reflect the grave colour of the *Iliad*." We will do better with Duckworth, "Trilogy" (note 3, above), p. 2, to see "an alternating rise and fall of tension" in Books I-II, III-IV, etc.

MISPLACED PASSAGES AT THE END OF
ARISTOTLE'S *PHYSICS*.

The Eighth Book of Aristotle's *Physics* deals, like the three which precede it, with problems relating to the phenomenon and the concept of Movement. For Aristotle Movement is the central fact of the entire physical world; yet Book VIII leads us in effect beyond that world. Aristotle's objective in this Book is to establish the existence of the Unmoved Mover, his God, who is the cause and fountainhead of all movements in the Cosmos.

Chapters 1-9 have taken us very close to Aristotle's goal. They have proved that Movement is eternal and have refuted the doctrine that everything is at rest as well as the opposite that everything is in motion.¹ They have hammered home the thesis that "everything that is moved is moved by something" and have used it as a stepping stone toward the concept of the "First Mover."² In the course of a very elaborate disquisition this First Mover has been shown to be himself Unmoved.³ In addition we have learnt what kind of movement he directly causes. The movement produced by the First Mover must be continuous, i. e. eternal, and it must be the first and most perfect of all movements. From a comparative evaluation of the main types of movement circular locomotion emerges as that which fulfils these requirements.⁴ And although Aristotle does not say it directly, we understand that he is thinking of the revolution of the outermost Heaven which is in fact inspired by his Unmoved Mover.⁵ All these points, and several more which occurred on the way, have been settled in the first nine chapters of our Book, and for the last chapter only one, though a very essential, proposition remains. It must still be shown that the Unmoved Mover is "partless" (*ἀμερές*) and that he has no ex-

¹ Chs. 1-3.

² 4; 5, 256a4-b3. The First Mover is here sometimes designated as "self-mover" (a 21; b 1 ff. τὸ αὐτὸ κινούμενον). For the necessity of positing a First Mover see also VII, 1.

³ 256b24 and *passim*.

⁴ Chs. 7-9.

⁵ This outermost Heaven is the *πρῶτον κινούμενον* of 6, 259b33.

tension (μέγεθος).⁶ This means in effect that he is immaterial and non-physical.

We need not review the specific arguments which Aristotle employs in the course of this proof, but must understand the main idea of his procedure. It is a relatively simple idea. To make sure that his First Mover has no physical extension Aristotle shows that he can be neither of finite nor of infinite size; when these propositions have been established it follows that he has no size at all.⁷ Actually, however, the proposition that he cannot be of infinite size need not be proved in this chapter; for Book III has settled once for all that no infinite body can exist and that an *ἄπειρον* in the sense in which it figured in the physics of Anaximander and other Presocratics is a misconception. Thus Aristotle here contents himself with a reference to what "has been proved on an earlier occasion" (δέδεικται πρότερον).⁸ In the last but one sentence of the work he combines this conclusion of Book III with the newly deduced doctrine that no body of finite size can have infinite power or produce an eternal movement and decides that the only possibility left for his Mover is to be "partless" and have no size at all.

All, then, that really must be proved is that no body of limited size can perform the work of the First Mover. For this two proofs are presented, one in the section 266a10-23 which shows that nothing finite can produce a movement continuing for infinite time (*scil.* like the eternal revolution of the celestial globe), the other in 266a23-b6 where it is argued that nothing of finite size can possess an infinite δύναμις.⁹ As the First Mover

⁶ 10, 266 a 10 f.

⁷ *Ibid.* 267b17-26. The argument is briefly recapitulated by Aristotle at *Metaph.* Δ, 7, 1073a5-11.

⁸ *Ibid.* 21 f. Cf. III, 5 f.; 8.

⁹ A close analysis of these proofs is not necessary for our purpose. To put it briefly, Aristotle proves the former proposition with the help of the fact that infinite time is not commensurable to finite and by showing that as long as finite body works on finite body the time too must be finite. For the second he uses ratios (but this term should not be pressed) between the effect of finite and infinite forces. What a finite force would do in a certain time an infinite would do in "no time"—but there is no such thing as "no time." Yet the time employed by the infinite force cannot be finite either since for every finite time one could find a finite force capable of doing the same work.

is meant to cause the eternal revolution of the celestial globe and as nothing short of infinite power would suffice for this task, it should now be settled that he cannot be conceived as an entity of finite size. For good measure Aristotle adds in 266b6-24 a proof that nothing of infinite size can have finite power. This proof is a complement to the preceding one and one may understand that Aristotle felt tempted to work it out even though it is neither relevant to the topic of the Prime Mover nor "useful" for any other purpose since (as we have seen) he does not admit the existence of anything *ἄπειρον*.¹⁰

We know, then, what Aristotle wishes to prove in this last chapter of his *Physics* and how he goes about it. But what are we to think of the other topics discussed in this chapter? The proof that nothing of finite size can fulfil the functions of the Prime Mover is completed at 266b27 (even the complementary and as we have seen purely "theoretical" question regarding the *δύναμις* of an infinite body has been settled). Yet it is only at 267b17 that Aristotle brings this conclusion together with the results of Book III and makes his final point: as the Prime Mover can neither be a finite nor an infinite entity it is clear that he cannot be anything physical at all. Between 266b27 and 267b17 three other sections have been transmitted in our MSS—and were read by the commentators—which have no bearing on the question whether the Prime Mover is of finite or infinite size, of a physical or a non-physical description. Each of these sections must now be considered more closely.

The first of these sections, 266b27-267a20 opens with the statement that it would be well to investigate a problem concerning τὰ φερόμενα. Actually what Aristotle has in mind is "things that are thrown" *ῥιπτούμενα*, and the problem—now sometimes referred to as the "problem of projectiles"—is this: how can an object that has been thrown keep up its motion even though it is no longer in contact with the person who threw, i. e. moved it? It is hardly necessary to mention that Aristotle did not know the law of inertia; what matters is that he knows another "law," having committed himself to the doctrine that in every kind of movement the mover and the object moved by

¹⁰ Cf. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Physics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary* (Oxford, 1936), p. 722.

him are "in contact" (*ἀπτόμενα*) or "together" (*ἄμα*).¹¹ In the case of projectiles, to use this convenient word, this is clearly not true, or true only in the initial moment when the impulse is given. How then is their continued motion to be explained? Should it be said that by the act of throwing the air too has been set in motion and that movement is now being passed on from one portion of the air to the next and that the projectile is thus kept going by the air?¹² In the end Aristotle is willing to acquiesce in a solution of this kind but makes an additional stipulation. Every portion of air must cease being moved when its mover stops working on it but may keep the power of moving another object somewhat longer.¹³ However the "power of moving" must decrease as the distance from the original mover becomes greater, and in the end we reach a point where the next part of the air is only moved but does not acquire the capacity of moving something else. Here the whole movement must come to an end.¹⁴ Aristotle adds a few sentences to make clear that the movement cannot be called continuous (for a continuous movement must be kept up all the time by one and the same mover) and to reject an alternative (Platonic) explana-

¹¹ This theory has been established in VII, 2. For Aristotle's definition of "contact" (and other concepts of a similar kind, like "together," "contiguous," "continuous") see V, 3, especially 226b23 and 227 a18 ff. In this chapter too there have been later additions, probably by Aristotle's own hand. As we read the chapter, 226b26 f. and 227a7-10 cannot find a satisfactory place in it. Themistius read the latter passage before 226b23. This arrangement was introduced into the Loeb edition by Cornford (*Aristotle, The Physics . . .* by Philip H. Wicksteed and Francis M. Cornford, 2 vols. [London and Cambridge, Mass., 1923-4]). In addition Cornford suggested that 226b26 f. should be put immediately before 226b23 so that the sequence would be 227a7-10, 226b26 f., 226b23 ff. Both transpositions have been accepted by Ross (see note 10). It seems to have escaped these two eminent scholars that the text which they prefer violates the stylistic "form" of this chapter. For as the definitions here given by Aristotle invariably begin with the definiendum, the sentence 226b23 ff. whose first words are *μεταξὺ δὲ* (*scil. λέγω*) must introduce us to the *μεταξύ* and cannot be preceded by other sentences dealing with this concept.

¹² 206b30 ff. The advantage of this hypothesis is that the portions of the air would be "in contact" with one another. For the air-motif cf. *De Caelo*, III, 2, 301b22 ff.

¹³ 267a2-8.

¹⁴ 267a9-12.

tion of the phenomenon.¹⁵ As it stands, the section has no relation to the subject of the Prime Mover. Rather, as we have seen, its problem springs from Aristotle's conviction that *movens* and *motum* must be "in contact." This conviction is its ἀρχή. Is its τέλος the solution which we have reported? Or does Aristotle aim at something else—perhaps at something more significant? We are not yet in a position to answer this question.

At 267a21 Aristotle begins to discuss an entirely different question. As in the world movement must go on without interruption and as the movement to be truly continuous must be caused by one mover, should one think of this mover as moved or as unmoved? Two reasons tell decisively in favor of the latter alternative.¹⁶ 1) If the mover were moved he could not remain unchanged (which is desirable since only thus, we may suppose, can the order and regularity of the cosmic processes be maintained).¹⁷ 2) Some other entity would be needed to move him. For this other entity the question: moved or unmoved? would again arise, and in the end, as this *regressus* cannot go on indefinitely, we should arrive at an Unmoved Mover. We understand that we may as well dispense with the *regressus*.¹⁸ Where, then, should the Unmoved Mover be located if he is to cause an eternal and unchanging movement of the Cosmos (to wit, the celestial rotation)? Aristotle answers that the best place, from this point of view, must be at the circumference of the cosmic globe. It may be noted that this is the only passage in which Aristotle is so specific about the "place" of his supreme deity.¹⁹ Yet the question of his place stands in no relation to

¹⁵ This explanation is the so-called circular thrust (*ἀντιπερίστας*), for which see Plato, *Tim.* 79B-80C. The idea is most familiar from Lucretius' polemic I, 370-97.

¹⁶ 267a25-b5.

¹⁷ Cf. 6, 260a3-5.

¹⁸ The possibility that the moving entity might be a self-mover is here ignored. Ch. 5 has ruled this concept out of court. The *regressus* motif is handled in a very perfunctory fashion. For a similar, though not entirely identical use of the *regressus* see 5, 256a12-21.

¹⁹ In *De Anim. Motione*, 1-4 Aristotle contents himself with deciding that the Prime Mover who is at rest cannot be any part of the Cosmos which he moves.—I venture the opinion that if the Prime Mover is partless, non-physical, and divine, the question as to his place rests on a misconception. Our section has, however (as will presently be seen), no connection with the topic of his partlessness, and it is just

his extension and provides no argument for his "partlessness." And as for the conclusion that the First Mover must be unmoved, this is the topic, or the upshot, of chapters 5 and 6 where Aristotle makes the decisive step from the Platonic concept of the self-mover to that of the Unmoved Mover and with astonishing resourcefulness finds ever more arguments to convince us that the hypothesis of such a Mover is not only correct but inevitable. It is true that these arguments do not use the continuity of the first celestial movement as their premise.²⁰ In this respect they differ from our section. Still, why should Aristotle have left one proof of the ἀκίνητον for the concluding chapter where an entirely different aspect of the Prime Mover forms the subject of the inquiry?

This section comes to an end at 267b9. There follows an argument which is briefer than those of the two other sections and which materially resembles that of the second. It will nevertheless be well to separate 267b9-17 from 267a21-b9. Once more Aristotle wonders whether something that is itself in motion can produce one continuous uninterrupted movement, and once more he denies it. Such an entity would either have to work by giving a succession of impulses, pushing or pulling now from this place and now from that, or would have to pass on its moving power to something else, in which latter case, Aristotle says, the situation would be the same as with the "projectiles."²¹ Only an entity which is unmoved and in its relation to the moved object unchanged is able to cause a continuous movement. Thus we here again have a proof for the Unmoved Mover—in the chapter designed to establish the partlessness or immateriality of this Mover.

We may now say with confidence that none of these sections

possible that Aristotle after he had proved his Mover to be partless no longer wondered what place should be assigned to him.

²⁰ The existence, or possibility, of a continuous (συνεχής) movement has, strictly speaking, not yet been proved at that point. A premise employed in ch. 6 (259a15-17) is comparable to the first step of our argument, but the conclusion to which it leads (17-19) is quite different from that of our section. Cf. on the conclusion Jaeger, *Aristotle*, pp. 363-4. In fact the premises of our section are in content identical with the entire argument (premises and conclusion) of that passage.

²¹ 267b11-15. On this passage and its reference to our first section see below, p. 277.

has its legitimate place in the context where we find it. The question is not whether Aristotle could have "afterthoughts"—he certainly had many, and we have only just begun to spot them in his treatises—but whether he would put them just anywhere. We must not press the analogy of the forgetful professor who in the last lecture of a course suddenly remembers something that he ought to have mentioned a few days earlier. Even he would probably indicate where the forgotten item belongs. Granted that these sections represent Aristotle's afterthoughts and also that he would wish to preserve them, would he place them where they interrupt a coherent, clearly articulated, and straightforward argument and separate the first step of this argument (*scil.* that the Unmoved Mover cannot be a finite body) from the second (that he cannot be an infinite body)?²² Clearly, not Aristotle himself but later developments are responsible for the place which these sections occupy in the textual tradition.

Before we go farther we must try to find out whether the three sections have some connection with one another. For while afterthoughts may have occurred to Aristotle at any time, arguments conceived with reference to one another are not likely to have been put down in different years. In our case it is difficult to reach a clear-cut decision, especially regarding the relation of the second and third sections. In both of them it is pointed out that if the mover himself is in motion he could not keep up a uniform motion in the object which he influences—though it must be admitted that the *ὁμαλῆς κίνησις* of the second section is not quite the same as the *συνεχὴς κίνησις* of the third.²³ Yet

²² This awkward situation has, I believe, been overlooked by Ross (*op. cit.*, note 10, "Introduction," p. 93) who argues that the proofs before 266b27 "rest on the assumption that in order that a body may continue to be in movement the body that moves it must continue to be in contact with it." There is no evidence in 266a10-b24 that Aristotle is conscious of making this assumption, nor has the very specific problem of 266b27-267a20 any obvious connection with the topics of 266a10-b24. Moreover, Ross' explanation, if it were accepted for the first section, would still do nothing to justify the second and the third. We shall presently see that the first section looks forward to the third; the hypothesis that it looks back to earlier passages is gratuitous. The somewhat different explanation which Ross offers in the "Commentary" (p. 725) is open to the same objections.

²³ 267b3 ff. (note, however, *συνεχὴς* a21, 24); 9-17.

even if the arguments move for a time along parallel lines it cannot be maintained that either of these sections presupposes the other or owes to it its own conception. On the other hand, the first and the third section are definitely linked to each other. For we have seen that the latter refers back to the problem of the "projectiles" ὥσπερ πάλαι ἐλέχθη ἐπὶ τῶν ῥιπτομένων; and the first which investigates this problem begins with the words περὶ δὲ τῶν φερομένων καλῶς ἔχει διαπορῆσαι τινα ἀπορίαν πρῶτον.²⁴ πάλαι in the one passage and πρῶτον in the other indicate that the arguments were conceived with reference to one another. The first section was to prepare the ground for the third; the discussion of the projectiles enables Aristotle to work out one more proof that the First Mover must be ἀκίνητος. Aristotle may have left no clue, he may not even have decided in his own mind where the section about projectiles should be inserted; but it is clear that it was to have its place somewhere before²⁵ the new argument for the Unmoved Mover which avails itself of doctrines set forth in that section.

Can we make a guess how the three sections came to occupy their present place? If the editor of Aristotle's "papers" found no indication of Aristotle's own intentions, why, we may wonder, did he not incorporate these arguments in chapter 5 (or 6), alongside so many other proofs for the Unmoved Mover? The editor may have lacked the courage to put them there on his own accord²⁶—or he may have taken a different view of their

²⁴ 266b27 f.; 267b13. 267b13-15 is a recapitulation of points that were made in the first section.

²⁵ The use of the word πάλαι to refer back from 267b13 to 266b30 ff. (or to 267a20) has parallels elsewhere in Aristotle and need not cause misgiving; cf. *Pol.*, II, 4, 1262b29 (reference to a25), or *ibid.*, III, 10, 1282a15 (to 1281b1 ff.). Aristotle's own definition of πάλαι in the *Physics* (IV, 13, 222b14) as τὸ πρόρω σιλ. τοῦ νῦν should not influence us unduly.

²⁶ The question why the editor did not insert our sections in ch. 5 may seem far-fetched. To me it would seem legitimate even if there were not indications that in an analogous case the editor did incorporate Aristotle's afterthoughts in this chapter. The passage in question is 256b13-29; that it is an afterthought and badly placed was pointed out by Cornford (*op. cit.*, note 11, *ad* 258b9). I am not sure that Cornford has found the place where Aristotle himself would have put this passage nor do I think that with the removal of 256b13-29 all difficulties in this part of ch. 5 are cleared up. Still, the question which concerns us is

objective. If the sections had come down to us at the end of the Book, instead of nine lines before the end, we would not hesitate to regard them as notes which Aristotle had jotted down without, for the time being, worrying where they should be inserted. For the end of a book roll was the obvious and customary place for afterthoughts and other unconnected material.²⁷ Even as matters stand now, our best hypothesis is that the editor found these sections at the end of a roll. Did he shift them to a slightly earlier place because he did not wish to spoil the magnificent conclusion of the *Physics*? Or did he mean to leave them at the end and do they owe their present place to a misunderstanding of his intention or to some purely mechanical accident? It is probably idle to speculate about these alternative possibilities. The best we can do is to point out a reason why the editor would wish to keep the sections close to Aristotle's proof for the partlessness of the Unmoved Mover.

In the generation of Aristotle's pupils Eudemus of Rhodes did most to keep the study of τὰ φυσικά alive. From what we know of his own *Physics* it is evident that he went over the same ground as his master; how closely he followed him is shown by the fact that Simplicius often resorts to Eudemus' treatise to elucidate or illustrate a point in Aristotle's.²⁸ However, Eudemus while on the whole taking his stand on Aristotle's final conclusions would at times feel the need for further elaboration. He accepts the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover and like Aristotle holds him to be "partless," but the idea that a partless entity should originate movement causes him a good deal of worry: εἰ ἀμέρῃς, φησὶν (scil. Eudemus), ἐστὶν τὸ πρῶτως κινεῶν καὶ

whether Aristotle himself could have used the arguments of this section where the MSS have it. The observations which led Cornford to deny this are cogent. At 256b13 we are not yet prepared to learn about the ἀκίνητον; nothing has led up to it.

²⁷ Cf. Jaeger, *Studien zur Entstehungsgesch. der Metaphysik des Arist.* (Berlin, 1912), pp. 38 ff., 49 ff., 53 ff. To the instances mentioned by Jaeger I should be inclined to add *Phys.*, VI, 10, 241a26-b20. This section which embodies very important doctrines has no connection with the other topics of Book VI.

²⁸ Cf. especially Jaeger, *op. cit.* (note 20), pp. 365-6; K. O. Brink, *R.-E.*, Suppl. 7, col. 920 (s. v. Peripatos); Fritz Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, Heft VIII, *Eudemus von Rhodos* (Basel, 1955), p. 87.

μὴ ἀπτεται τοῦ κινουμένου, πῶς ἔχει πρὸς αὐτό; ²⁹ We can see what prompts him to raise this question. Aristotle, as we know, had laid down the rule that mover and moved object must "touch," i. e. be in contact with one another; yet a partless being has no parts with which it could touch.³⁰ Another testimony states Eudemus' difficulty more clearly and fully:³¹ "Eudemus does not like Aristotle wonder whether something that is in motion can produce a continuous movement" (*scil.* in another object; this is Aristotle's problem in our third section). "Instead ³² he wonders whether something unmoved can move. For, he says, we hold that what causes locomotion does so either by pushing or by pulling. And if these are not the only ways, it must in any case touch either directly or through one or several intermediaries. But what is partless cannot touch anything. For it has not one part as its beginning, and another as its end. How, then, shall it produce movement?" Eudemus tried to find a way out of this predicament by limiting Aristotle's rule that *movens* and *motum* must be in contact to movers who are themselves in motion. Unmoved movers, he decided, must move in a different fashion. Here, however, a new difficulty arises. The Earth too is at rest, or "unmoved," and when a ball is thrown upon it and thrust back we may speak of it as moving the ball. But this cannot be the fashion in which the Unmoved Mover

²⁹ Frg. 123a Wehrli. This fragment and the following are preserved in Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, VIII, 10. Note also the relation of frgs. 122a, b to our second section.

³⁰ For the "contact" motif see above, pp. 272-3. It is noteworthy that in this and the following fragment Eudemus takes his stand on the proposition that *movens* and *motum* must be in contact which Aristotle proves in VII, 2. And yet we have Simplicius' reliable testimony that Eudemus "ignored" Book VII (*παρελθὼν ὡς περιττόν*, frg. 109 Wehrli = Simplic., in *Phys.*, 1036, 14 f. Diels). We may suppose that Eudemus was familiar with the content of the Book yet disregarded it because he knew it not to represent Aristotle's final thought (cf. Jaeger, *op. cit.* [note 20], p. 297). Yet would a close pupil of Aristotle always and everywhere have to depend on the master's written treatises?—That partless objects cannot touch follows from the definition: ἀπρόμενα (*scil.* λέγω) ὅν τὰ ἄκρα ἄμα, V, 3, 226b23, since what is partless can have no ἄκρα. See also *De Gen. et Corr.*, I, 6, 323a3 ff., 10.

³¹ Frg. 123b Wehrli.

³² ἀντὶ τοῦτου seems to indicate that Aristotle's and Eudemus' ἀπορίαι were found in corresponding places of their treatises.

causes something to move; for as the ball was in movement even before it hit the Earth, Earth cannot in this instance be regarded as the first *movens*. This is the last that we learn of Eudemus' struggle with the problem.

What matters for our purpose is this. Wondering how a partless entity may move Eudemus finds it necessary to distinguish between movements caused by moved and by unmoved movers. The same differentiation is made by Aristotle in our second and third sections.³³ Eudemus states that a mover of the first type works by pushing or by pulling or through intermediaries. The same point is made in our third section and movement through intermediaries is investigated in the first.³⁴ For Eudemus these distinctions and differentiations have their importance in connection with the *ἀμερές*. Now Eudemus' treatise represented the state of physical research in the generation after Aristotle; the school must have known how close it kept to the master's thought, and it would be no more than natural if it was used as a kind of commentary on Aristotle's work.³⁵ When there was doubt about the arrangement of material, the editor would look to Eudemus' work for guidance. In our instance he would not look in vain. Eudemus had related the content of our sections to the *ἀμερές*. Clearly, then, they must be placed, or kept, close to the deduction of the *ἀμερές*. To assign them a place in an earlier chapter of the Book would be out of the question.

To arrange the material and settle other uncertainties of the text would in any case be the main task of the "editor" who wished to make the work ready for use in the school (*ἐκδόσεις* for the public at large being not to be thought of). For our hypothesis it is not at all necessary to assume that Eudemus himself was the editor. The evidence about his editorial activity is inconclusive.³⁶ It suffices that for the Peripatos he was an authority on *φυσικά*.

³³ 267a25 ff.; b9 ff.

³⁴ 267b11 ff. See above, p. 273.

³⁵ Cf. Wehrli, *op. cit.* (note 27), p. 88. H. Diels (*Abh. Berl. Akad.*, 1882, pp. 36 ff.) has drawn attention to some instances in which words used by Eudemus in his *Φυσικά* were interpolated into the corresponding passages of Aristotle's treatise.

³⁶ On Eudemus as possible editor of the *Metaphysics* see Jaeger,

Should not we too be guided by his authority? Should we not be prepared to discard the results of our analysis and admit that Aristotle's pupil must have known the context of thought to which the arguments of our sections belonged? The question is worth asking, but I think the answer is definitely negative. The "partless" has no place in the *ἀπορίαι* of our sections; it appears neither in the premises nor in the conclusions. We must stick to our decision that the sections aim at proving the necessity of an Unmoved First Mover, and, secondarily, at defining his cosmic place. Eudemus' *Physics* has shifted some of Aristotle's statements to a new context and used them for a new purpose.³⁷

To arrive at this conclusion it was enough to look at the text of our sections. If we do not limit ourselves to them, we *may* even go farther and assert that Eudemus' problem did not exist for Aristotle. In Aristotle's system the Unmoved Mover does not "touch" the outermost Heaven. As we learn in the *Metaphysics*, he *κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον*, as the object of desire,³⁸ by causing the First Heaven to emulate his perfection and to come as near to it as possible. The *Physics* says nothing about this kind of influence which is altogether outside its province. Although Aristotle himself has laid down the law that the mover and the moved object must be physically in contact, he does not apply it to the First Mover because this Mover is not a physical entity. Eudemus could not follow his master on his bold flight; he could not bring himself to ignore an important physical principle.

op. cit. (note 27), p. 175, but also the *praefatio* of his recent edition (*Aristotelis Metaphysica* [Oxford, 1957]), p. xi. For the *Eudemian Ethics* cf. Brink *R.-E.*, Suppl. 7, col. 924.

³⁷ It is reasonably certain that Eudemus knew our sections (his knowledge of the second is shown by frgs. 122a, b). What we cannot say is whether he found them in the same place which they occupy in our MSS.

³⁸ *Metaph.*, A, 7, 1072a24-b3. On this point Wehrli's comments (*op. cit.*, note 28, p. 111) are entirely correct. I wonder, however, whether his commentary on frgs. 123a, b ought not to include references to the Aristotelian passages mentioned in note 30. They seem to me indispensable for an adequate understanding of Eudemus' problem and its Aristotelian background.—See also *Phys.*, VIII, 5, 258a18-22, where Aristotle appears not yet to have reached the position of A, 7, and *De Gen. et Corr.*, I, 6, 323a28 ff., where the concept of "contact" is given a non-physical meaning.

Where Aristotle had availed himself of his right as genius and shifted the question to a metaphysical or supra-physical plane, Eudemus remained behind and began to spell out the problem, conscientiously but unimaginatively: how can a partless entity touch although it has no parts with which to do so? To be sure, he too decides in the end that Aristotle's law holds good if the mover is himself in motion, but when he has come thus far he brings in the Earth as instance of an unmoved mover although he must admit that the First Mover cannot behave like the Earth which thrusts back the ball. We do not know whether Eudemus in the end did struggle through to the *κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον* or whether he was too much of a physicist—and of a literalist. Our evidence shows him determined to think the matter through in physical terms. All good and honest positivists ought to praise him for this. Aristotle's meaning was better grasped by Theophrastus who not only realized that these questions transcend Physics but said so outright, and more frankly than Aristotle, urging that Aristotle's solution be understood as a step across the borderline between Physics and Metaphysics. In his own essay on Metaphysics³⁹ Theophrastus says that if the "ruling principle" is unmoved and thus cannot move other entities through its own motion it must work on them *ἄλλη τινὶ δυνάμει κρείττονι καὶ προτέρῳ*. Recognizing that the object of desire represents such a higher power, he endorses Aristotle's decision and goes on to say that the *λόγος* which makes this principle partless and non-quantitative "raises it absolutely into a better and more divine region" (*ἐξαίρων εἰς κρείττω τινὰ μερίδα καὶ θειοτέραν*). "For this is the account we ought to give rather than merely remove it from liability to division and partition."⁴⁰ Theophrastus knows that by thus interpreting Aristotle he is taking a "loftier" (*ὑψηλότερος*) view. Eudemus' worries must have seemed to him futile.

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³⁹ *Theophrastus Metaphysics with Translation*, etc. by W. D. Ross and F. H. Fobes (Oxford, 1929). For what follows see I, 5, 4b23 ff.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, I, 6, 5a9 ff. (I quote Ross' translation).

THE CHRONOLOGY OF BOOKS XVIII-XX OF DIODORUS SICULUS.

In Books XVIII-XX of his *Historical Library* Diodorus employs a system of dating based on the Athenian archon year in conjunction with the consular year at Rome and (every 4th year) the occurrence of the Olympic Games. For the present purpose only the first of these reckonings is taken into consideration, and in this one perennial difficulty emerges straightaway: whereas the narrative of events found by Diodorus in his main source¹ apparently reckoned by the "Julian" or "campaigning" year (i. e., winter to winter), the archon year at Athens ran instead from mid-summer to mid-summer. Since a source of the type mentioned would obviously have no occasion to pause midway through each season in order to record the yearly change of office in Athens, Diodorus had no point of reference by which to determine this datum and must perforce treat the (Julian) year by which events were distributed in his source as being equivalent to one or other of the Attic years which overlapped it. His choice, after a false start in the first half of Book XVIII (see below), fell eventually on the equating of any one archon year with the campaign year in which it took its beginning; thus, for example, all the events of the year 318 B. C. would be narrated by his reckoning under the archon for 318/17—the net result being the location of the happenings during the first six months of a Julian year consistently under the wrong archon. Four instances will suffice to demonstrate this process, taken from the years 302, 307, 308, and 316 B. C. respectively:

i) In the spring of 302 B. C. Lysimachus crossed from Thrace

¹There is little doubt that this was Hieronymus of Cardia, whose *Histories* covered the years 323—ca. 272 B. C. and formed the basis for the "good" tradition dominant in both Diodorus' and Arrian's account of Alexander's successors; they are represented also in Plutarch's *Eumenes* and *Demetrius* as well as in other secondary sources for the period. See e. g. Jacoby's article, *R.-E.*, VIII (1913), cols. 1540 ff.; H. Bengtson, *Griech. Gesch.* (Munich, 1950), p. 342. Diodorus may have employed a slightly worked-over Alexandrian version of Hieronymus (so Jacoby, *loc. cit.*), or an anonymous compilation (cf. Laqueur, *Hermes*, LXXXVI [1958], pp. 257 ff.), but his ultimate debt is to Hieronymus.

into Asia Minor to attack Antigonus; the date is fixed by the near-contemporary *Marmor Parium* and by Diodorus' own remarks elsewhere, as well as by inherent probability. Yet Diodorus sets the event under the archon of 302/1 B. C.²

ii) The instance for 307 B. C. is even better documented, thanks to Plutarch and, again, the *Marmor Parium*. Although Diodorus lists the descent of Demetrius Poliorcetes upon the Peiraeus under the archon year 307/6 (i.e., after mid-summer 307), we know from Plutarch that this actually took place in May-June, and from the *Marmor Parium* that it was in the course of the Attic year 308/7 B. C.³

iii) Once again from the *Marmor Parium*, and from internal probability, we see that the murder of Alexander's sister Cleopatra on Antigonus' instructions fell in the first half of 308 B. C., not in the second half as Diodorus implies by listing it among the events of the archon year 308/7.⁴

iv) According to Diodorus the surrender of Olympias, besieged in Pydna by Cassander, took place in the archon year

² Diodorus gives the archon change to 302/1 at XX, 106, 1; the crossing of Lysimachus a little later, *ibid.*, 107, 2. Against this cf. the M. P. for 303/2 (= *F. Gr. Hist.*, 239, B25); as well as Diodorus' express statement at XX, 2, 3 that Book XX goes down only to the winter of 302 B. C., confirmed *ibid.*, 113, 5. The events listed between XX, 106, 1 and the end of the Book are certainly in themselves enough to occupy the full course of the campaigning year of 302 B. C. Cf. too the mention of Demetrius' initiation at XX, 110, 1, fixed to April-May (Munychion) by Plutarch, *Demetr.*, 26, 3-4. Jacoby's tentative assignment of this to the spring of 301 B. C. rather than 302 (*F. Gr. Hist.*, IIIb I, p. 347, Comment. on no. 328 [Philochorus] F 69-70) is not seriously maintained, even by himself. The united testimony of Plutarch and Diodorus shows that the initiation preceded the campaign of 302 B. C. against Cassander.

³ Diod., XX, 45, 1-4; the arrival at the port is mentioned immediately after the archon change to 307/6. *Contra*, the M. P. for 308/7 (= *F. Gr. Hist.*, 239 B20) and Plutarch, *Demetr.*, 8, 5 (date of arrival: 26th Thargelion). This precision of Plutarch's almost certainly goes back to the Atthidographer Philochorus; cf. his frag. 66 in *F. Gr. Hist.*, 328, with Jacoby's commentary, *ibid.*, IIIb I, pp. 342-3.

⁴ See the M. P. for 309/8 (= *F. Gr. Hist.*, 239, B19). Diodorus gives the archon change to 308/7 at XX, 37, 1; the murder and funeral of Cleopatra, *ibid.*, 37, 3-6. As Beloch (*Griech. Gesch.*, IV, 1, p. 144, n. 2) observes, Cleopatra's attempt to join Ptolemy belongs obviously to the winter of 309/8 while the latter was on Cos, cf. the M. P., *loc. cit.*

316/15 B. C.; but his own notices in the narrative proper show beyond doubt that the event fell in the early spring of 316 B. C.⁵

So far then Diodorus' method is straightforward enough and the necessary corrections to his datings can be supplied automatically; indeed, were this trifling adjustment all that is needed to arrive at a true chronology year by year in these books the matter would hardly call for more comment than it has already received from Diodorus' editors and translators.⁶ In fact, however, there occur in Books XVIII-XX certain instances of much deeper confusion, three of which will repay consideration in detail; these cover the years 323-320, 317-316, and 313-311 B. C.

i) Since this displacement takes up the entire first half of Book XVIII,⁷ from the moment when Diodorus first transfers to Hieronymus as his chief source, the confusion is perhaps to be put down to an unsuccessful endeavour on Diodorus' part to make his alleged archon years coincide with the actual happenings from one summer to the next. He would be the more tempted to do this in that he had a clearly fixed starting point—the death of Alexander the Great in June 323 B. C.—which corresponded fairly closely with an actual archon change. At all events, he starts off well enough, giving the archon of 323/2, then the events for the latter half of 323, and so straight on into 322 B. C.⁸

⁵ Diod., XIX, 11, 5 gives Philip Arrhidaeus a reign of 6 years 4 months. Reckoning from the datum of Alexander's death in June 323, this puts the murder of Philip in October 317—with which indeed Diodorus agrees, setting it under the archon for 317/6. Immediately on the news Cassander passed into Macedon and besieged Olympias in Pydna, hence during winter 317/16 (cf. Diod., XIX, 35-36; 49-50, 7: espec. 49, 1—winter storms; 50, 1—spring beginning). Despite this clear evidence for winter 317/16, Diodorus puts the whole siege in 316/15, giving the archon change as far back as XIX, 17, 1—on which point see below in the text.

⁶ Cf. for example the remarks of Russel M. Geer, p. x of his introduction to Vol. IX of the Loeb edition of Diodorus (1947).

⁷ Capp. 2-43 inclusive out of a total of 75; cap. 1 consists of a new introduction—itself an indication of a transfer of source.

⁸ Diod., XVIII, 2, 1 (archon of 323/2 installed); the next change is recorded *ibid.*, 26, 1, actually at the start of 321 B. C. by a proper reckoning. Had Diodorus followed his normal usage he should have put the change at the beginning of the events of 322 B. C., i. e. at the start of cap. 15 approximately. If he wanted the true position, mid-

Unfortunately, in the absence presumably of any precise indication in his source, he found himself unable to halt at the appropriate spot to mention the archon change of mid-summer 322 but instead ran on without a break to the conclusion of the events of 322 B. C., where he hastily inserts the notice, six months late by a true reckoning, of the transition to the Attic year 322/1.⁹ After this the confusion grows worse confounded, for in place of narrating all the events of 321 and then mentioning the archon change of mid-summer 321 (which would at least have been consistent), he fails to differentiate at all between the events of 321 and of 320—even though his source apparently supplied him with at least an indication that two full campaigning seasons were covered by the events given.¹⁰ By this time Diodorus had reached the end of 320 B. C. by a proper count but was still in the Attic year 322/1 according to his chronographical notice; and at this point he seems to have decided to cut the Gordian knot and adopt what became his standard practice, for he begins his narration of the incidents of 319 B. C. by mentioning the installation of the archon for 319/18—the net result being of course that he omits completely the names of two archons and their accompanying data from Rome and Olympia.¹¹

summer 322, the change should have come after the sea-fight at Amorgus (early summer 322, cf. the M. P. [= *F. Gr. Hist.*, 239 B9], on which Beloch, *op. cit.*, IV, 1, p. 73, n. 1) but before Crannon (September 322, cf. Plutarch, *Camillus*, 19, 8; Dinsmoor, *Archons of Athens in the Hellenistic Age* [1931], pp. xiv and 429)—that is, somewhere between the end of XVIII, 15 and the opening of *ibid.*, 17.

⁹ Diod., XVIII, 26, 1, after the battle of Crannon, the surrender of Athens (20th Boedromion 322/1, i. e. Sept.-Oct. 322—cf. the M. P. for 322/1 [= *F. Gr. Hist.*, 239 B10]; Plutarch, *Phocio*, 28; *id.*, *Demosth.*, 28), and the incursion into Aetolia in winter 322/1 (cf. Diod., XVIII, 25, 1-2—winter season).

¹⁰ Diod., XVIII, 40, 1 mentions Antigonus' collection of his troops from their quarters, i. e., those taken for the winter of 321/0. Had Diodorus wished to insert the notice of the change to the archon of 321/0 at its historically correct spot (instead of omitting it altogether) it should have come between Eumenes' victory over Craterus (early summer 321; cf. Plutarch, *Eumenes*, 6—the corn was ripening in the fields) and the meeting at Triparadisus (prob. late summer 321); that is, somewhere between XVIII, 32 and *ibid.*, 39.

¹¹ Diod., XVIII, 44, 1—the installation of Apollodorus; the archons Archippus (321/0) and Neaechmus (320/19) are omitted, together

ii) Under the archon for 316/15 Diodorus lists not only all the events of 316 B. C.—his normal usage—but also certain items which seem in fact to belong to the preceding year, 317. Thus, as already noticed,¹² the surrender of Pydna (real date: early spring 316 B. C.) is given under the archon of 316/15; but so too is the beginning of the siege, which belongs rather to the very end of 317, as soon in fact as Cassander could get to Macedon from Greece on receipt of the news of the murder of Philip Arrhidaeus in October 317.

Likewise, the last campaign of Eumenes in Asia and his death at the hands of Antigonus are given by Diodorus under this same archon of 316/15 B. C.¹³ The death, it is true, may well have fallen just inside 316—the battle that ended the struggle was fought in the dead of winter¹⁴—but the whole preceding campaign also falls, incorrectly, into the same year by Diodorus' reckoning, though by his own evidence it covered a whole season from spring to winter.¹⁵ Here then there appear to be special difficulties needing a special solution.

One might say that in the case of the siege of Pydna the beginning came so late in 317 B. C. that the whole might not improperly be listed under the events of 316, which year saw its conclusion. The same applies to the very last battle between Antigonus and Eumenes, for which the troops had to be roused from their winter quarters. This is not, however, a satisfactory explanation for the inclusion of the events of the entire previous summer as well, and here, tentatively, one may assume that Diodorus has fallen into confusion through a misreading of his source, an error which led him to anticipate by a year the archon change of 316 B. C.

with the Roman consuls for these years and the winner of the foot-race in the Olympic Games of 320 B. C.

¹² Cf. n. 5 above.

¹³ Archon change to 316/15: Diod., XIX, 17, 1. The campaign between Eumenes and Antigonus, up to the winter of 317/16, takes up capp. 17-34.

¹⁴ Diod., XIX, 37, 3 records that Antigonus began his march through the desert from Gadamarga "about the time of the winter solstice."

¹⁵ The battle at the River Copratas took place just after the rising of the Dog Star, i. e., late June (317 B. C.); cf. Diod., XIX, 18, 2-7. It was preceded, in the same year, by a lengthy march on the part of Antigonus from Mesopotamia and Eumenes' dispositioning of his troops along the line of the river—*ibid.*, 17, 2-18, 1.

It so happens that the passage immediately preceding Diodorus' mention of this archon change deals with an episode unrelated to the main thread of events—namely, the efforts of Docimus and his companions to escape from their imprisonment in a mountain fortress in Asia Minor while their captor Antigonus was preoccupied with his distant warfare against Eumenes in Upper Asia. At the end of his notice Diodorus remarks that it took more than a year for Antigonus' forces to recover the fortress.¹⁶ In this may lie the explanation of Diodorus' premature insertion of the archon change of 316/15; carelessly perusing his source he has failed to note that this incident is simply a digression to which has been added for completeness' sake the duration of the siege. Instead, he has hastily assumed that an entire year has passed in all theatres of operations and has accordingly marked the imagined passage of time by intruding here the change to another year.

iii) Lastly, the events of 313-311 B. C. This is an especially important period in that during it fell the decisive battle of Gaza—to be exact, during the course of 312 B. C. This event Diodorus lists among the happenings of the archon year 312/11, and he further declares that for it Demetrius had to summon his troops from winter quarters.¹⁷ The latter notice led Beloch to assume that the season of the battle was early spring 312 B. C.; as indeed by Diodorus' normal practice in dating it well might be. But in this instance there is strong independent evidence that the battle did in fact fall after the middle of the summer of 312.¹⁸ Since, in view of the multiplicity of events between the battle and the Peace of 311, the spring of 311 B. C.

¹⁶ Diod., XIX, 16, 5; the archon change follows immediately at 17, 1.

¹⁷ Archon change to 312/11: Diod., XIX, 77, 1. Recall of troops from winter quarters: *ibid.*, 80, 5. Battle of Gaza: *ibid.*, 81-4.

¹⁸ See Beloch, *op. cit.*, IV, 1, p. 129, n. 1. The M. P. (= *F. Gr. Hist.*, 239 B16) puts the battle in 312/11, the archonship of Polemo. Castor (*F. Gr. Hist.*, 250 F12) and Porphyrius (*ibid.*, 260 F32, 4) both assign it to Olympiad 117, i. e. to a point after mid-summer 312 B. C. Jacoby in his commentary on the M. P. (*F. Gr. Hist.*, II BD, p. 700, n. 10) suggests that the placing in 312/11 is due to interest being concentrated on Seleucus' return to Babylon rather than on the actual battle; but later (*ibid.*, pp. 869/70) he appears tacitly to accept a date later than spring 312 for the battle by calling attention to Diodorus' use of the verb 'ὑπομένειν' at XIX, 80, 5.

is impossibly late, even if it were not ruled out by Diodorus' method of dating, the only feasible alternative, giving full weight to all the evidence, is that the troops were called out not in the spring but in the autumn of 312, when they would likewise be found in winter quarters.¹⁹ This explanation has the further advantage that it does not necessitate dating to the year 313 the events listed immediately before and as preliminaries to the battle when Diodorus himself states unequivocally that they belong to 312/11.²⁰ As to the events which followed the battle—Ptolemy's occupation of Syria, the return of Seleucus to Babylon, the defeat of Ciltes, and Antigonos' coming down from Celaenae²¹—these would run straight on without a pause through the winter of 312/11; and later developments still—the expedition against the Nabataeans, the exploration of the Dead Sea, and Demetrius' abortive raid on Babylon²²—should be regarded rather as falling early in 311 than still in 312 B. C. This is admittedly a breach of Diodorus' usual practice in dating, even if in fact it leads him for once to narrate the events of the first half of a year under the correct archon. The fact that winter quarters had to be abandoned in the press of events almost as soon as they had been taken up in the autumn of 312 B. C. would serve to explain Diodorus' failure to observe in the usual way the opening of a new season;²³ in any case some such

¹⁹ The original (Hieronyman) source would appear to have passed from one theatre of events to another and back again within the same season; when this process coincided with irregularity in the taking of winter quarters Diodorus' last landmark for the passage of a year's events was gone and his insertion of the archon change more than usually wild.

²⁰ The events narrated in Diod., XIX, 77, 1-80, 2. They include Polemaeus' operations in Greece (narrated in two parts: 77, 2-4 and 78, 2-5), Antigonos' balked attempt at crossing into Europe (77, 5-7—late in the season, cf. 77, 7), the revolt of Cyrene (79, 1-3—early summer? cf. 79, 1), and Ptolemy's descent on Cyprus, Cilicia, and North Syria (79, 4-6)—quite enough to occupy all the antagonists until well into the late summer of any one year.

²¹ Diod., XIX, 85-86.

²² Diod., XIX, 94-100.

²³ Diod., XIX, 80, 5 indicates, if the chronology proposed here is correct, that Demetrius withdrew his troops from quarters just after they had gone into them; *ibid.*, 77, 7 shows that Antigonos too had taken winter quarters early, only to be roused again by the news of

redistribution of events is necessary, regardless of the point in 312 B. C. at which we place the battle of Gaza, for when Diodorus does eventually signify the archon change of 311/10 the only event he has to relate for the new year is the signing of the Peace of 311, together with its terms—in all amounting to no more than a single chapter.²⁴ It looks indeed as though Diodorus has here once again overrun his normal halting place at the start of a new season's events, as we have suggested that he did in his experimental essay towards an accurate chronology in the first half of Book XVIII.

In general then, and subject to occasional vagaries due to unsuccessful experimentation or to the failure of his source to provide a clear indication of a break between successive seasons, it can be said that Diodorus' principle in dating his events is to equate his alleged archon years with what were in reality campaigning years; and that so treated his chronology in Books XVIII-XX emerges as reasonably accurate and consistent.²⁵ Such major displacements as do occur, on the other hand, have to be treated individually on their merits, and particular explanations be sought for particular instances of error—no general corrective principle can be laid down to cover all cases.

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Gaza before winter ended—or so I would interpret the notice at Diod., XIX, 93, 4, recording his departure from Celaenae (mentioned also at Plutarch, *Demetr.*, 6, 5), always a favourite wintering spot for him, cf. Diod., XVIII, 52, 1; XIX, 69, 2.

²⁴ Diod., XIX, 105—the last in the Book to deal with Greek and Macedonian affairs.

²⁵ Recent attempts by E. Manni to uphold the archon datings given by Diodorus (*Rend. Acc. Lincei*, IV [1949], pp. 53-61; *Demetrio Poliorcete* [Rome, 1951], pp. 70-81) break down in my view through their failure to explain those cases where Diodorus has manifestly described under a particular archon events which in fact preceded his installation, cf. pp. 283-5, above. Manni's further hypothesis to account for special difficulties, namely that Diodorus' archon year is not really the Attic one from one July to the next but a "Macedonian" one running from October to October (*op. cit.*, pp. 70-1) appears to have little to recommend it in the way of independent evidence or of any gain in clarity, the net result being that the majority of the events given by Diodorus have to be advanced by a year beyond their true dates; to this extent the accepted chronologies (such as e.g. Beloch, *op. cit.*, IV, 2, pp. 624 ff.) are still preferable.

ARISTOTLE ON PLATO'S RECEPTACLE.

1. Aristotle¹ finds that Plato identified the four following notions: matter (ἕλη)—or, more precisely, prime matter—space (χώρα), place (τόπος), and void (κενόν) (209b11-17, 214a13; *De Gen. et Corr.* 329a24). Aristotle distinguishes several different conceptions of place and void. Which of these various conceptions is he attributing to Plato?

Aristotle says that "there are just four things of which place must be one" (211b6-7). It must be either form (εἶδος) or shape (μορφή) (209b3), matter, the boundaries of the vessel (τὰ πέρατα τοῦ ἀγγείου, 212a13), or some sort of extension (διάστημα τι) between these boundaries (211b7-8). It is this last conception that Aristotle attributes to Plato. This is clear from the paragraph that precedes *Phys.* 209b11. Aristotle gives two further descriptions of this conception of extension. It is "an extension which is always there, different from, and over and above, the extension of the thing which is displaced" (212a 3-5). "It is not only the boundaries of the vessel which seem to be place, but also what is between them, regarded as empty (ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ ὡς κενὸν <δν>)" (212a13-14). Aristotle's own view is that "there is no such extension" (211b18). If it existed, it would be a subject of which magnitude (μέγεθος) could be predicated. That is, it would be the matter of magnitude (209b6-11). In Aristotle's philosophy there is no magnitude apart from bodies: the matter of magnitude and the matter of bodily substance (ἕλη οὐσίας σωματικῆς) are the same (*De Gen. et Corr.* 320b22-25).

We may also distinguish several different conceptions of void in Aristotle. Aristotle's use of the word κενόν is, to begin with, ambiguous. κενόν sometimes means "place, either empty or full"; and it sometimes means "empty place." We find both uses in a single passage at the beginning of Aristotle's discussion of κενόν: "For those who hold that the void exists regard it as a sort of place or vessel which is supposed to be 'full' when it

¹ All references to Aristotle, where no work is named, are to the *Physics*. The Oxford translation of the *Physics* and Cornford's translation of the *Timaeus* have been used, although not without some modifications.

holds the bulk which it is capable of containing, 'void' when it is deprived of that—as if 'void' and 'full' and 'place' denoted the same thing, though the essence of the three is different.”² Aristotle is saying here that there is both void void and full void: both *κενόν* and *πλήρες* are meaningful predicates of *τὸ κενόν*. There is thus a genus void that has a species void. Aristotle also points out that, in the generic sense of “void,” “void” and “place” name the same thing although they would be defined differently: the words are not quite synonyms. How they would be differently defined is not clear. The recurring definition of “void” given by Aristotle is “place deprived of body” (*τόπος ἐστερημένος σώματος*, 214a17). This is a definition of “void” in the specific sense. If we compare this definition with the one given in the passage above, we see that Aristotle is *using* “void” in the generic sense and “place” as synonyms. Aristotle does not use “void” in the generic sense often, but one other passage in which the word has the broad sense is found at *Phys.* 216a26-b16. Aristotle points out that if a cube is submerged in water, an equal volume of water will be displaced. But, he says, “in the void this is impossible; for it is not body; the void must have penetrated the cube to a distance equal to that which this portion of void formerly occupied in the void, just as if the water or air had not been displaced by the wooden cube, but had penetrated right through it” (216a33-b2).³ If void pervades the cube, there must be a full void as well as a void void. So “void” here must mean “place, empty or full.”

The generic sense of “void” is equated with “space” (*χώρα*) at *De Gen. et Corr.* 326b18-21: “It is absurd . . . to think that

² οἷον γὰρ τόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀγγεῖον τὸ κενὸν τιθέασιν οἱ λέγοντες, δοκεῖ δὲ πλήρες μὲν εἶναι, ὅταν ἔχῃ τὸν ὕγκον οὗ δεκτικὸν ἔστιν, ὅταν δὲ στερηθῇ, κενόν, ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν ὂν κενὸν καὶ πλήρες καὶ τόπον, τὸ δ' εἶναι αὐτοῖς οὐ ταῦτ' ὂν (213 a 15-19).

³ ἐν δὲ δὴ τῷ κενῷ τοῦτο μὲν ἀδύνατον (οὐδὲν γὰρ σῶμα), διὰ δὲ τοῦ κύβου τὸ ἴσον διάστημα διεληλυθέναι, ὅπερ ἦν καὶ πρότερον ἐν τῷ κενῷ, ὥσπερ κ. τ. λ. The Oxford translator is here supplying *τὸ κενόν*, which is the understood subject of the phrase *οὐδὲν γὰρ σῶμα*, as the subject of *διεληλυθέναι* and of *ἦν* and taking *τὸ ἴσον διάστημα* and *ὅπερ* as accusatives of extent. This is also the construction adopted by Ross (*Aristotle's Physics*, p. 382). The Loeb translator (incorrectly, I believe) construes *ὅπερ* . . . *κενῷ* as the subject of *διεληλυθέναι* and *τὸ ἴσον διάστημα* as the object of *διὰ* giving the passage a radically different sense.

'the void' means anything except space of a body; so that it is clear that there will be a void equal in cubic capacity to every body."⁴ There cannot be a void equal in cubic capacity to every body unless bodies occupy void. So "void" must here have its generic sense. And, finally, this passage should be compared with Aristotle's statement that "the void is meant to be, not body but rather extension of body" (τὸ γὰρ κενὸν οὐ σῶμα ἀλλὰ σώματος διάστημα βούλεται εἶναι, 214a19-20). Since "extension" is one possible meaning of "place," "void" must here again bear the sense of "place, either empty or full." It thus follows that "void" (κενόν), "place" (τόπος), "space" (χώρα), and "extension" (διάστημα) are all synonyms if taken in one particular way. It is thus quite natural for Aristotle to equate Platonic matter with void (214a13) once he has equated Platonic matter with place in the sense of extension (209b6 ff.). Further, there is no contradiction between the statement that Platonic matter is void and the statement that, according to Plato, there is no void (*De Gen. et Corr.* 325b32-33) if Aristotle is using "void" in the sense of "space" in the former statement and in the sense of "empty space" in the latter.

There are two species of void in the sense of empty space (κεχωρισμένον κενόν, 214a19) (217b20-21). First, there might be a void outside the whole bodily universe that leaves the bodily universe itself a plenum. Or, secondly, there might be, as Leucippus and Democritus suppose, little pockets of void inside the bodily universe (213a33-b2, 216b30-31). Now in the passage in which Aristotle says that Plato denies there is a void (*De Gen. et Corr.* 325b30-33) Aristotle is contrasting Plato's explanation of coming-to-be and passing away with Leucippus': Leucippus uses the notion of void in his explanation; Plato does not. So it follows that when Aristotle says that Plato denies there is a void, what he means is that Plato denies there is empty space.

Aristotle also talks about an inseparable void (ἀχωριστὸν κενόν, 214a19) (216b33-217a10). This notion is extremely obscure. Aristotle may even have intended more than one thing by it. However, we need notice but one comment of Aristotle's: those

⁴ γελοῖον . . . τὸ κενὸν ἄλλο τι οἶσθαι λέγειν πλὴν χώραν σώματος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι παντὶ σώματι τὸν ὅγκον ἴσον ἔσται κενόν.

who make void the matter of body made void inseparable from body (214a13-15). This sort of void is a subspecies of void in the sense of space. Space may be either empty or full, and full space may be either emptiable (*χωριστόν*, 213a32) or unemptiable (*ἀχωριστόν*). If void is the matter of body, it is unemptiable full space. Thus when Aristotle says that Plato makes void the matter of body, he means simply that he makes space the matter of body; and this does not contradict his statement in *De Gen. et Corr.* that Plato denies there is *empty* space.

Aristotle's interpretation of Plato's receptacle is thus quite clear. On the one hand, the receptacle is void in the sense of extension or space; on the other, it is matter. Plato in the *Timaeus* does not use *ἔλη* in the Aristotelian sense nor does he use *κενόν* in the sense of extension or space.⁵ What, then, in the *Timaeus* does Aristotle base this interpretation on? (I am assuming here that his interpretation is not based upon private information.) The identification of the receptacle with void rests upon Plato's use of the words "space" (*χώρα*) and "place" (*τόπος*) at *Timaeus* 52 (209b11-16, 214a13-14). The identification of the receptacle with matter rests upon Plato's use of the gold metaphor at *Timaeus* 50 A-B (*De Gen. et Corr.* 329a14-24).

What reasons does Aristotle assign to Plato for holding that place or extension or void is the matter of body? One reason is assigned explicitly (209b6-12) and another, implicitly (211b 29-36). The explicitly assigned reason is this. If one abstracts the form from a body, the matter is what remains. Plato believed that when this abstraction is performed, what remains is extension or void (214a12-13). So, according to Plato, matter is extension or void. The implicitly assigned reason is different. The way in which body is related to place is similar to the way in which form is related to matter: place must be distinguished from body because two bodies may occupy the same place at different times (208b1-8); matter, on the other hand, must be distinguished from form because two contrary forms may char-

⁵ The word *ἔλη* occurs at 69 A 6. See A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, p. 493. The word *κενός* occurs at 58 A 7, 60 C 1, 79 B 1, and 80 C 3. At 58 A 7 it is implied that there are two species of space (*χώρα*), empty (*κενή*) and full (*πλήρης*): the circuit of the whole "allows (or tends to allow) no room to be left empty" (*κενήν χώραν οὐδεμίαν ἐᾶ λείπεσθαι*).

acterize the same matter at different times (211b31-33). And because matter and place are *similar* in this respect, they may seem to be the *same*. (One can, we might add, imagine cases in which change of place is indistinguishable from change of form. One moment the magician has an egg in his hand; the next, a full-grown chicken. Was it change of place or change of form? In order to prove that it is the former, one must show that the egg and the chicken occupy different places at the same time. But if the magician is clever enough to keep us from seeing any place except that defined by the vessel of his hand, we may very well be unable to distinguish change of place from change of form.)

Finally, we may ask, what was Aristotle's objection to Plato's receptacle? Aristotle is quite explicit here. Plato has con-founded the two distinct notions of place (τόπος) and matter (ἕλη) (Δ, 2). Place is separable from body but matter is not (209b23-24). (A body can change its place, but it cannot change its matter.) Thus the receptacle is both separable (χωριστόν) from body and not separable (οὐ χωριστόν) (214a13-16). According to Aristotle, then, Plato's notion of the receptacle is self-contradictory.

2. Has Aristotle interpreted Plato correctly? This question can only be answered by giving one's own interpretation and comparing the two.

Plato begins the second part of the *Timaeus* by distinguishing three factors (εἶδη, γένη, 48 E 3-4) in the universe, and he gives three different lists of these three factors. He says that we must distinguish the paradigm (παράδειγμα, 48 E 5) from its copy (μίμημα παραδείγματος, 48 E 6) and both of these in turn from the receptacle of becoming (πάσης γενέσεως ὑποδοχή, 49 A 6). Or, to put it another way, "we must conceive three things; that which becomes (τὸ γιγνόμενον); that in which it becomes (τὸ ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται); and that whence and in whose likeness that which becomes is born (τὸ ὅθεν ἀφομοιούμενον φύεται τὸ γιγνόμενον)" (50 C 7-D 2). Plato's briefest formula for the three is simply "Being (ὄν), Space (χώρα), Becoming (γένεσις)" (52 D 3). Whenever I need neutral terms, I will follow the order of the first list and speak of the first factor, the second factor, and the third factor.

Plato sometimes calls a paradigm an "intelligible form" (εἶδος νοητόν, 51 C 5). An appropriate name for the second factor, but one not used in the *Timaeus*, would be "sensible

form" (εἶδος αἰσθητόν).⁶ That Plato in the *Timaeus* distinguished these two types of forms is clear from an early passage in which he says that "whenever the maker of anything looks to that which is always unchanging and uses a paradigm (παράδειγμα) of that description in fashioning the form (ιδέα) and quality (δύναμις) of his work, all that he thus accomplishes must be good" (28 A 6-B 1). The paradigm here is clearly distinct from the form of the work. The next point to be established is that the second factor consists of such forms. To begin with, the second factor consists of copies of the paradigms (τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ μιμήματα). These copies are identified with the things that pass in and out of the receptacle (τὰ εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα) (50 C 4-5). And these in turn are implicitly equated with forms: the receptacle "is always receiving all things (τὰ πάντα), and never in any way whatsoever takes on any form (μορφή) that is like any of the things that pass in (τὰ εἰσιόντα)" (50 B 8-C 2). There are two other passages that are worth noting here. Plato refers to the receptacle at one place as "the nature that receives all bodies" (ἡ τὰ πάντα δεχομένη σώματα φύσις, 50 B 6), at another as "that which will receive in itself all forms" (τὸ τὰ πάντα ἐκδεξόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ γένη) (50 E 5). These two passages together suggest that *bodies* are simply forms. This is an important point to which I will return. Now Plato says that the second factor in the universe is sensible (αἰσθητόν, 52 A 5) and also that it comes into existence (γινόμενον, 52 A 6) and passes out of existence (ἀπολλόμενον, 52 A 7). Thus the second factor consists of forms that are sensible and mortal. I will call sensible forms "characters."

What is the correct interpretation of the third factor?

Is it space (χώρα)? The third factor is clearly identified with space at two places (52 A 8, D 3). This is the rock upon which we must build our interpretation. Now in these two places it is implied that there is only one space since there is only one receptacle. Thus "space" here must mean "all of space." But in most other places in the *Timaeus* "space" means "part of

⁶ This is the same distinction that Plato draws in the *Phaedo* (103 B 5) between the form in us (τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν) and the form in nature (τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει). Cornford points out that in the *Phaedo* *μορφή* and *ιδέα* are used interchangeably for the form in us and *εἶδος* is reserved for the form in nature, whereas in the *Timaeus* all three words are used for the form in us (*Plato's Cosmology*, p. 184 and footnote).

space" or "place" (τόπος). There are two passages in which this is particularly clear. In one, Plato mentions the view that "everything that is must be in a place (ἐν τινι τόπῳ) and occupy a space (κατέχον χώραν τινά)" (52 B 4-5). Here "place" and "space" are clearly synonyms. In the other, Plato, in speaking of the transformation of particles of one primary body into particles of another, says that "in the course of suffering this treatment, they are all interchanging their spaces (τὰς χώρας)" (57 C 1-2). Notice the plural. This implicit distinction in Plato turns up in Aristotle as the explicit distinction between public place (κοινὸς τόπος), "in which all bodies are," and private place (ἴδιος τόπος), which only the body in question occupies (209a 32-33). (The English word "space" has, of course, this same ambiguity. Compare the use of the word in these two sentences: "Space is infinite" and "Two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time.") When Aristotle says that Plato identifies space and place (209b15-16), he is thus half right: space in the sense of part of space is identical with place. (We have not yet answered the question, What is Plato's *conception* of space?)

Is the third factor matter? Well, it is called a plastic material (ἐκμαγεῖον, 50 C 2) and compared to a lump of gold that is molded into various shapes (50 A 5-C 6). This, as we have seen, was Aristotle's basis for identifying the third factor with matter. But must this metaphor be so interpreted? I think one should accept the following as a general principle of interpretation: the most consistent interpretation is the correct one. Now, as Aristotle has pointed out, Plato's conception of the third factor is grossly inconsistent if the third factor is matter. A body in moving from one part of space to another carries its matter with it, but it does not carry its space or place with it. Therefore, since the third factor is space, it cannot also be matter, unless Plato's conception is inconsistent. Following our general principle of interpretation, let us suppose that the third factor is not matter. How, then, is the gold metaphor to be interpreted? We can avoid the inconsistency if we take as the analogue of a body not the *shaped gold* but a *shape* of the gold and if we take the receptacle to be not matter but a medium—to use Cornford's excellent word (*Plato's Cosmology*, pp. 177, 194). A medium differs from matter in that bodies move *through* a medium: a body moves through the receptacle, on this

interpretation, as a ripple moves through water. The mirror metaphor is the one that best captures Plato's thought on this subject. A mirror provides a medium in which images appear and through which they pass. That this metaphor dominated Plato's thought is clear from numerous passages in the *Republic* (402 A-C, 509 D ff.), but it is no more than hinted at in the receptacle passage of the *Timaeus* (52 C 2-5). The third factor is never, in fact, called a mirror. If my interpretation is correct, Plato's philosophy differs from Aristotle's in this important respect: for Aristotle a body is a compound (σύνθετον, *Met.* 1023a31) of form and matter; for Plato a body is a form (character) alone. And we may say, further, that this is a difference that Aristotle himself is not aware of; for if he were, he would not have said that the receptacle is matter.

The conclusion we have reached is that the receptacle is a medium if the gold metaphor and the mirror metaphor hold at all. The next point to be proved is that these metaphors must hold to some extent. This is easily proved, for these metaphors play a central role in Plato's philosophy. There is one important problem that Plato is unable to solve except by means of them. This is the infamous problem of participation. The paradigms without the aid of the Demiurge are responsible for the existence of characters. Plato tells us that fire, earth, air, and water possessed vestiges of their nature *before* the Demiurge began his ordering (53 A 8-B 5; see also Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, pp. 453-4). The Demiurge is only a refinisher. How, then, does a paradigm give rise to a character? No unmetaphorical answer is given to this question. Plato is able to say simply that the paradigms cast reflections or leave imprints. In the one place where this problem is broached in the *Timaeus* Plato says only this: "the things that pass in and out are to be called copies of the eternal things, impressions taken from them in a strange manner that is hard to express (τυπωθέντα ἀπ' αὐτῶν τρόπον τινὰ δύσφραστον καὶ θαυμαστόν), we will follow it up on another occasion" (50 C 4-6; see Taylor's comment, *Commentary*, pp. 324-5). Aristotle's judgment here is certainly correct: "... the many existed by participation in the Ideas that have the same name as they" (*Met.* 987b9-10). "But what the participation or the imitation of the Forms could be they left an open question" (*ibid.* 987b13-14). "And to say that they are paradigms and that other things share in them

is to use empty words (*κενολογείν*) and poetical metaphors" (*ibid.* 991a20-22 = 1079b24-26). Even Cherniss agrees with Aristotle on this point although he tempers his agreement by pointing out that Aristotle's own philosophy rests ultimately upon the same metaphor: "... if Aristotle is justified in disallowing metaphor, he is justified in maintaining that ultimately no 'explanation' of participation as such is given" (*op. cit.*, p. 454). But Aristotle's "own account of the ultimate cause of all natural process is not only metaphorical but is at bottom the same kind of metaphor as that for which he criticizes Plato" (*ibid.*, p. 466). (What an excellent example of a *tu quoque*.)

We may conclude, then, that Plato intends the receptacle to function as a medium. I have gone to such pains to show the grounds of this fairly well accepted interpretation⁷ because if it is sound, it can be easily shown that Plato's notion of the receptacle is self-contradictory: the receptacle must both have a character and be characterless.

Since the receptacle functions as a medium, it must have a character: the character shared by all media and in virtue of which they are called "media."

There are four statements in the *Timaeus* bearing upon the characterlessness of the receptacle. Plato says, first, that "it is always receiving all things, and never in any way whatsoever takes on any character that is like any of the things that enter it" (*δέχεται τε γὰρ αἰεὶ τὰ πάντα, καὶ μορφήν οὐδεμίαν ποτὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν εἰσιόντων ὁμοίαν εἴληφεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς*, 50 B 8-C 2). He repeats the same statement in different words several lines later: "... if there is to be an impress presenting all diversities of aspect, the thing itself in which the impress comes to be situated, cannot have been duly prepared unless it is free from all those characters which it is to receive from elsewhere (*πλὴν ἄμορφον ὃν ἐκείνων ἀπασῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν ὅσας μέλλοι δέχεσθαι ποθεν*)" (50 D 4-E 1). Plato says, thirdly, that "that which is to receive in itself all characters must be free from all characters" (*πάντων ἐκτὸς εἰδῶν εἶναι χρᾶν τὸ τὰ πάντα ἐκδεξόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ γένῃ*, 50 E 4-5). This statement is also repeated in different words: "... that which is duly to receive over its whole extent and many times over all

⁷ Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*: "Thanks to this medium, Space . . ." (p. 194). Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*: "... space is not the matter implicit in the being of sensible things, but only the medium in which they come into being" (p. 233).

the likenesses of the intelligible and eternal things ought in its own nature to be free of all the characters (*πάντων ἐκτὸς . . . τῶν εἰδῶν*)” (51 A 1-3). Now the first two of these statements contain restrictive clauses. They do not say that the receptacle lacks all characters. They say only that it lacks all characters that enter it. This restrictive clause is dropped from the second two statements. Is there an inconsistency here? I do not think so. Plato is arguing like this. The receptacle cannot possess any character that it receives. It receives all characters. Therefore, it cannot possess any character at all. The first premise is asserted by the first two statements quoted; the second, by all four; and the conclusion, by the second two. If this interpretation is correct, we have Plato’s explicit statement that the receptacle is characterless and we have his argument supporting this statement.

Aristotle is thus correct in his assertion that Plato’s notion of the receptacle is self-contradictory, but the self-contradiction is in a different place from where he finds it. Plato’s difficulty is that none of his metaphors will do (if any hold, the receptacle must have a character); but, on the other hand, he cannot do without them.

Let us return to the beginning and the four conceptions of place considered by Aristotle. Which of the four comes closest to Plato’s conception of space—assuming that Plato’s discussion of the third factor is simply a discussion of his conception of space? The third factor is not matter since bodies pass through it. It is not form since it is either completely without form or else has only the form necessary to function as a recipient of form. It is not the boundary of the containing vessel, although the receptacle metaphor might suggest this, since there is no containing vessel. A containing vessel would be a body, and all bodies are *in* the third factor. Thus if these alternatives are exhaustive, the third factor is the fourth alternative, extension. Considered positively, there is this similarity between Plato’s conception of the third factor and extension; both extension and the third factor pervade a body but do not move with a body. Aristotle is correct in attributing the conception of space as extension to Plato. However, since the third factor functions as a medium, it must be something more than extension alone.

BOOK REVIEWS.

JAMES WILSON POULTNEY. *The Bronze Tables of Iguvium*. Baltimore, Md., American Philological Association, 1959. Pp. xvi + 333; 4 pls. (*Philological Monographs*, XVIII.)

The seven bronze tablets from Iguvium-Gubbio in the "Umbrian" language contain "instructions for the religious ceremonies of a college of priests known as the Atiedian Brothers who flourished in Iguvium during the period of the Roman republic. No other body of liturgical texts from pre-Christian Europe can compare with the Iguvine Tables in extent. They have therefore an extraordinary importance both for the linguistic and for the religious history of early Italy" (p. 1). Though there may be "no scarcity of editions" of them (p. vii), Poultney's new work is greatly to be welcomed for many reasons. Most of the older editions included quasi-Latin translations which reflected all too well the perils inherent in trying to make sense out of a very limited body of texts with the aid of a known language, Latin, which is similar but only that. Poultney's new translation into English is therefore more than merely a boon to those who read no Latin; along with Devoto's *Tavole di Gubbio* it symbolizes the requirement that the interpretation of the Tablets must stand on its own merits.

As for that interpretation, Poultney has again performed a greater service than is apparent from the reserved style of the commentary. After the two bold sallies of Devoto (in his earlier work; 2nd edition 1940) and Vetter (1953) now is the time to pause and consider. This Poultney has clearly done; but anyone who imagines it to be a matter of simple eclecticism should work through a selected, relatively self-contained passage like the famous beginning paragraph of VIa concerned with the taking of the auspices. VI is one of the tablets written in the Latin script. The parallel version (Ia) in the national (i. e. Etruscan-based) alphabet, engraved earlier and generally shorter, consists here of one sentence only, as compared with the eighteen lines of VIa. Even that sentence creates as many problems as it solves: to *pernaies pusnaies* 'those from in front, those from behind' (augural birds) there corresponds in VIa a different pair of adjectives, *dersua . . . merstu*, which has "defied all attempts at interpretation." Are they synonyms for the terms used in the shorter text? Do they mean as some have thought, 'permitting the ceremony' and 'favoring the ceremony,' respectively? Do they mean 'right' and 'left'? After a painstaking discussion, Poultney declares his preference for 'west' and 'east'—a solution which can be defended topographically, saves the parallelism with the shorter version, and can finally (and definitely not primarily!) be justified by an etymology. Etymological considerations are somewhat, but not very much more prominent than they were in Devoto's approach of which Poultney approves frequently (see p. ix)—a slight difference in emphasis which might be expected

from a scholar who not only offers text, translation, and commentary, but a full-fledged grammar, including an elaborate historical phonology, as well. Where Poultney deviates from Devoto he is especially careful to give his reasons, perhaps even with greater stress on the purely contextual criteria than where he agrees with him. His treatment of *stakmei stakmeitei* 'for this established ordinance'¹ as against Devoto's 'in hac superficie extensa (i. e. the templum)' is a good example: *-ei*, says Poultney, is more easily taken as a dative than as a locative; other datives precede; the templum has another name by which it is referred to a short while later. This accomplished, he is able to point out how well his choice fits in with a syntactic observation of Devoto's regarding a number of constructions which we translate by 'for.'

Much of Poultney's interpretive work—an overwhelming amount one feels sure—must have consisted in weighing and excluding unusable contributions. Occasionally the axe falls on Vetter. So in the passage under scrutiny. To Vetter *stiplo aseriaia* (from the augur to the priest) means 'I demand that you "observe," i. e. consider as important' rather than the usual 'demand (inv.) that I may observe,' and similarly for the reply of the priest in VIa4 (cf. *Glotta*, XXIX, p. 61). It is true that in general *aseria-* is what the priest does; the augur's own subsequent report (VIa17) on his actions is elliptic on the crucial point. But, after all, the augur is tabuistically paraphrased as 'he who goes to *aseriato* the messenger birds' in our passage, and Poultney must have felt that this outweighs Vetter's claim that only with *stiplo* taken as a first person form does the verbal exchange take on the true form of a Roman stipulation. This in turn disposes of Vetter's surprising explanation of *ef* (*aserio*) in VIa4 as 'I (observe),' a form corresponding to Oscan *iv* 'I,' with *-f* for Oscan *-v* "because **eu* would be ambiguous in the Latin alphabet." Thus *ef* means 'there,' although it is a little untypical in form as well as function: elsewhere the writing is *ife ife*, and (Latin etymology notwithstanding) the translation is 'eo,' not 'ibi.' On the old question whether *arsir* in *neip mugatu nep arsir andersistu . . . sue muieto fust ote pisi arsir andersesust* is to be understood as 'other' or as a case form of a word for 'dedicatio' or the like, Poultney offers full evidence and then translates 'no one shall make a noise nor shall any other person sit in the way . . . if a noise is made or any other person sits in the way, he will make (the ceremony) invalid.' Are there any serious possibilities of taking *arsir* as an adverbial form of the stem for 'other'? None of those I can think of are smooth enough, but if one could be found, the difficulty that the first *arsir* is not preceded by an indefinite pronoun would disappear: 'no one shall make a noise nor otherwise sit in the way (i. e. interfere) . . . if a noise or otherwise an interference is made. . . .' We should then have the syntactical advantage of the presumed *arsir* 'dedicationibus' without the semantic difficulty.

The texts provide some clues for their relative chronology, but

¹ Following R. G. Kent (*Lang.*, XIV, p. 215). Poultney's work is dedicated to Kent's memory; see Preface, pp. ix f.

these are not simple; "our problem is a twofold one: to determine the order in which the texts were composed, and the order in which the tables were engraved" (p. 23). This has been seen ever since Bréal made it evident that where we have two parallel versions, one written in Latin script and the other in the more ancient national script, the former is sometimes not copied from the latter but from a lost common source. Another factor that looms large in the discussion is the designation of the authenticating official, one and the same person serving as *kvestur* in Ib and IIa, but another individual bearing the title of *uhtur* in Va. The Latin loanword *kvestur* seems a sure sign of late Romanization, and it looks as though the *kvestur* had replaced an indigenous *uhtur* (etymologically probably = *auctor*); this in spite of the fact that the linguistic form of Va is in some ways more recent than that of Ib and IIa (all tablets which are written in the national script). The parallel phrasing *uhtretie-kvestretie* suggests strongly that this is indeed the story. The difficulty appears as we read III, 4, 7, 8 where the Atiedian Brothers are described as electing or appointing an *uhtur*. Vetter took this to mean that neither *uhtretie* nor the abbreviation *oht* found on one of the few other Umbrian inscriptions that exist (355 Co. 236 Vet.; Assisi) refers to an eponymous magistrate. He rendered both by 'auctoritate.'

A word might be said apropos of another probable instance of vocabulary change observable in the Tablets; an entire system of changes in fact. Involved are the words *sevakni-seuacni-*, *perakni-peracri-*, *perakri-peracri-*, *sakri-sacri-*, and *sakru-sacro-* (i.e. the *-o/ā*-stem). Devoto thought that *peracri-* supplants *perakni-* under the influence of *sakri-*, with which both *perakni-* and *peracri-* form antithetic pairs like *sakreu perakneu* Va7 but *peracris sacris* VIIb 52, 56. Even Vetter who is one of those who reject this view and assign different meanings ('anniculus'; 'praestans') to the two words must admit that *peracnio* is "miswritten" for *peracrio* in one passage, VIa54. The two words dovetail neatly otherwise: the form with *kn* occurs in II and Va (and in VIa), while *cr* occurs in Ib, VI and VII. What interested Devoto in particular was that Ib, in national script, goes here with the Latin-written tablets, as it frequently does. Vetter himself has collected the traits which indicate a relatively recent origin for Ib (without discriminating much between the chronology of the composition of the text and that of its execution). Poultney hesitates to follow Devoto, principally on etymological grounds. But then he appears to attach no importance to the fact that the mutual distribution of *sakri-* and *sacro-* is almost exactly parallel (p. 173):² there is *sakri-* (*sacri-*) in I, II, III, Va (and VIIb, in the formula *peracris sacris*), (*sakru-*) *sacro-* in VI and VII and, once again, in Ib! According to Devoto the specific meaning of the word, regardless of course of the stem final, is 'inherently sacrificial' as opposed to *perakni-peracri-* 'inherently

² On p. 92 Poultney says: "sakre acc. sg. beside the *a*-stem form *sakra sacra*, precisely like OL *sacrem*, etc., beside standard *-o/ā*-forms." Lat. *sacrēs* and *sacri* did archaically occur side by side, but can we think of them as synonymous? See below.

secular, requiring special action to become fit for sacrifice.' Used as a noun, it applies to sacrificial animals. The Latin *sacrēs porci* serves as a confirmation; but aside from being a technical expression it is an archaism (*olim*, Varro *R. R.*, II, 1, 20), and we may safely believe that the replacement of U. *sakri-* by *sacro-* in the later tablets, which must have taken place just a little after the alteration from *perakni-* to *peracri-*, reflects the influence of the prevailing Latin *o*-stem *sacer* (itself a different adjective with a more widely religious, non-technical meaning).³ Outright Latin loanwords may be few in the Tablets (p. 8; *kvestur* is a characteristic one) yet a subtler kind of progressive Latinization is a familiar aspect of Umbrian. The peculiar trend of Umbrian sound change may be one aspect of it; others have been discussed by Devoto, *T. I.*, p. 52. This leaves us with the problem of the relation between *perakni-* and *sevakni- seuacni-* (p. 180). This word may mean something like 'unblemished, perfect.' It occurs freely in II, III, IV, and VII, keeping its shape throughout. Its etymology and that of *perakni-*, as well as the possible relation of these two words to Lat. *sollemnis*, are indeed extraordinarily difficult problems (p. 243), but they are also problems such as should not be allowed to obtrude themselves too early in the discussion.

The position of Umbrian (and Oscan) in relation to Latin and the other Italic dialects which has just been touched upon has of course been the subject of much controversy. Poultney takes a realistic, middle-of-the-road attitude, discouraging over-dramatization (pp. 7-9). Proto-Italic (in any case an entity which never had an existence on Italian soil) can be no absolute, even to its proponents. Those, on the other hand, who reject that hypothetical intermediate stage between Proto-Indo-European and the recorded forms of speech (Oscan, etc., Umbrian; Latin with Proto-Romance, Faliscan; Venetic) ought not so much to emphasize the extent of the discrepancies between Osco-Umbrian and the rest as their antiquity. While Osco-Umbrian shares some innovations with non-Italic, "central" Indo-European languages like Greek and Germanic,⁴ it still has a great many others in common with Latin-Faliscan—by no

³ The formal distinction may follow an old pattern; cf. Gk. ἀκρὸς with Lat. *acer* (*ācri-*).

⁴ Some of the phonological isoglosses that have been named are worthless. As Poultney points out (p. 67) the labialization of the labiovelars is later than the syncope *-kt-* < *-gʷet-* in forms like U. *fiktu*, which in turn is probably later than the change from older *kt* to *ht*. The indisputable fact that in "the treatment of the labiovelars . . . the dialects agree with Greek (especially with Aeolic . . .) and with the Cymric division of Celtic" (pp. 8 f.) can therefore not be used for the purpose for which some scholars have tried to use it. On the other side of the ledger there is the merger of *eu* and *ou* into *ou* which has been and perhaps deserves to be listed as a Proto-Italic innovation (more cautiously Poultney, p. 41). Still, in *con-claudō* > *con-cloudō* > *con-clūdō* one would like to think that the first step in the (specifically Latin) "weakening" was *eu* (compare *parcō peperci*; Niedermann, *Historische Lautlehre*, p. 35, etc.); since there was no other *eu* to merge with, the subsequent change to *ou*, duplicating the earlier Proto-Italic development (?), is perhaps not unexpected.

means all secondary and diffusional in character. The Proto-Italic period may have fallen very early. We may even envisage it as a reasonably well-defined dialect area within a still cohesive Indo-European world.

Poultney's Grammar is a full and reliable repertory of earlier research, including his own valuable contributions. Naturally it differs from some of its predecessors not only in being more up to date but also in treating Umbrian by itself rather than primarily as one partner of the Osco-Umbrian group (although of course Oscan is taken as fully into account as one could wish). Poultney thinks it unsafe to attempt to reconstruct a phonemic system for the language as we have it, but he evidently and necessarily has rather firm ideas as to the consistency with which the spellings are used. As he conveys these ideas on the whole successfully, the implicit style does little enough damage. Only occasionally does one feel a little lost, for instance where it is stated that "final \bar{a} is altered in quality but keeps its quantity" (p. 44; so also Buck). This suggests the presence of some specific evidence of length, where all we seem to have are spellings with $-u$ $-o$ which according to the table on p. 32 (in which the optional devices for writing length are, incidentally, not fully represented) may stand for either a short or a long vowel. It is true that there is no *need* to posit a shortening of final $-\bar{a}$. But then there is reason to believe that the short vowel written $-u$ $-o$ had lower, more "ä"-like allophones than the long one (p. 42).⁵ Buck therefore cautiously ascribed an entity " \tilde{a} " to what we would now call the Umbrian phoneme inventory. I suspect that Poultney intends to do, in effect, the same. The point may be impossible to decide, and the same may be true for others of the same type. The particular question about final $-\bar{a}$ might not of course have ever been raised if it had not been for the Latin parallel, $-a$ for $-\bar{a}$ in the nom. sg. of the $-\bar{a}$ -stems and nom. acc. pl. of the $-o$ -stem neuters. In general there is somewhat more to the matter of vowel length than Poultney has wished to include in his phonology. Apparently he is dissatisfied (pp. 27; 63 f.) with Vetter's (and earlier) attempts to establish a relative chronology for the several tablets on the basis of "inverse" writings of h to represent original long vowels (*Handbuch*, pp. 183, 187 225—Ib is once more involved). On the other hand, the spelling *frateer* Vb16 (p. 43) has been regarded as very doubtful evidence by a number of scholars. Occasionally Poultney gives or implies his view on archaisms. *Vuc̣is* IIa44, as is not unusual, is emended to *Vuṿis* 'Lucius' and the spelling with *uv* interpreted as a family tradition (p. 169; cf. Oscan *Lúvkis*). Such customs are familiar in Italy: *Duilius*, transcribed *Βίλιος*, comes to mind. The present instance would throw an interesting light on the history of writing in Iguvium. It is a little more difficult to picture the preservation of intervocalic *s* in *asa* 'altar' and *eikvasese* 'the members of a priestly college (loc.)' as a "ritualistic archaism" as Poultney doubtfully suggests (p. 74), especially if it were thought that the archaism in question was one of speech and not one of writing.

⁵ See, however, p. 29 with the suggestion that the long mid vowels were progressively raised as the language developed.

Enough of small detail.⁶ The remainder of the Grammar is characterized by the same general regard for broad but critical reporting of scholarship. All in all, the new *Bronze Tablets of Iguvium* will greatly appeal to workers in many disciplines: to students of ancient history and of classical literature; to historians of religion who will in particular appreciate the careful array of parallels from Roman and Greek ritual with which the commentary is replete; to anthropologists; and most certainly to linguists.

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ARTHUR STANLEY PEASE. M. Tulli Ciceronis De Natura Deorum Libri III: Libri Secundus et Tertius. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 539-1257. \$17.50. (Bimillennial Edition.)

The second, concluding volume of Professor Pease's prodigious edition of Cicero's *De Natura Deorum* has followed quickly upon the first,¹ surprisingly quickly when one considers the difficulties encountered nowadays in the publication of scholarly works of such generous proportions. It contains the text and commentary for Books II and III of the dialogue, fragments preserved from Book III, several pages of Corrigenda and Addenda to both volumes, and an Index of nearly twenty pages. In its general appearance and format,² and in its method and procedure,³ it is the twin of its predecessor, so that what one had to say in praise or censure of the earlier volume as a whole might easily be applied with justice to the present one. There is the same respectful handling of the Latin text, the same learned and exhaustive annotation and interpretation awarded indiscriminately to all matters, important⁴ and unimportant,⁵ and the same serene and disinterested execution of the task that the author set himself.

⁶ How is the relation of *urfeta* to Lat. *rota*, Skt. *ratha*- pictured (p. 55)?

¹ See my review of Volume I in *A. J. P.*, LXXIX (1958), pp. 208-13.

² I must register again my objections to the form of presentation (see my remarks on Vol. I, *ibid.*). Instead of becoming reconciled, or at least resigned to the format, I confess that I find it ever more exasperating, even after considerable experience with it.

³ "... the citation of many passages *in extenso*, and such arrangement of them that, by reading them as they stand, the user may reach for himself a logical conclusion, without needless editorial verbiage" (Preface, p. vii).

⁴ Cf., e.g., the notes on the Underworld, pp. 550-2; on allegory, pp. 705-8; on the alphabet, pp. 1112-14.

⁵ The commentary to the section of Book II (120-32, pp. 851-94) on the wonders of vegetable and animal life abounds in the curious lore of natural history, peripheral at best. Pease begins his note on malodorous animals thus: "Since Cicero mentions *multae* and the example of the American Skunk was unknown to him, we may assume more than one animal as the source of the remark . . ." (p. 878).

Now that the completed work is before us, it will perhaps be asked whether this dialogue deserved such minute attention. Professor Pease might well answer, simply, that it was a task that attracted him, and that, as Housman told us long ago in his *Introductory Lecture*, is reason enough for doing one thing rather than another. It would then be irrelevant or impertinent to suggest that such an attitude today, in the words of Edmund Wilson,⁶ "... seems to imply that there is no difference in value between one department of learning and another or between the different points of view from which the various kinds of research can be conducted." But is the suggestion impertinent, when a distinguished scholar has devoted more than twenty years of his free time, when dozens of individuals, academic institutions, and libraries have been called upon for assistance (gratefully acknowledged), and when more than one Foundation have more than once granted subventions—all for the publication of yet another edition,⁷ three years in the printing and so expensive that few can afford to buy it, of a treatise which Cicero carelessly dashed off during a single summer and which, for all its influence in centuries past, is now in certain respects merely a curiosity and is for long stretches all but unreadable? This is not to say that there will not be many times when students of ancient philosophy will consult Pease's work with great profit, but there may be some who will be inclined to agree with Velleius (I, 23): *propter paucos igitur tanta est rerum facta molitio*.

In his Preface to the whole work Pease writes (p. vii): "Certain reviewers of the editions mentioned [the author's *De Divinatione* and *Fourth Aeneid*] have objected that the editor's own views were not at all times clearly revealed." He then goes on to quote Cicero (I, 10) to the effect that such critics are over-inquisitive. Despite being thus disarmed, I cannot but think that the complaint of the reviewers is just. Granted that it was chiefly his intention in the commentary to put before his readers, to make of them what they will, the pertinent ancient references and the views on each point of a host of modern scholars, surely the editor cannot be excused from the responsibility of stating the conclusion he must have reached after long study. When Pease does venture to give his opinion, it is couched very cautiously, often in the form of a question.⁸ About as close as he ever comes to assessing the enduring value of the *De Natura Deorum* is this statement in the Introduction (p. 51): "... the present work . . . perhaps with more reason than any other extant work of Greek or Latin literature may claim attention from those modern students who approach the philosophy of religion by historical and comparative methods."⁹ The problems of the work . . .

⁶ *The Triple Thinkers*, 2nd ed. (1948), p. 61.

⁷ In his Introduction, Pease lists some 250 since the *editio princeps*.

⁸ See, for example, p. 552 in Vol. II, at the end of his long note on the famous *quaeve anus tam excors inveniri potest* . . . : "Is Balbus perhaps here trying to show that the Stoics were no more superstitious about the underworld than were the Epicureans, though the latter posed as the advocates of advanced views?"

⁹ Guarded as this judgment is, it seems misleading if it is to be taken as implying that Cicero was using truly "historical and comparative methods" (as Pease indeed implies on p. 8). The core of the

are seldom unworthy of the study which has been (and may yet be) devoted to them by keen minds, and the exposition, in spite of careless and hasty composition, raises philosophical writing from the dull level into which it seems to have fallen among the Greeks to a literary form which may well arouse the admiration and challenge the imitation of modern popularizers in this field."

J. B. Mayor, whose three-volume edition of the *De Natura Deorum* was completed in 1885, was less circumspect. Devout Christian and proper Victorian, he declares in his Preface to Volume III: "Believing that the entrance of Christianity into the world is the central fact of man's history, the key to all that preceded and all that has followed it, I have always esteemed it to be the highest office of classical scholarship to throw light upon the state of thought and feeling in the two great nations of antiquity at the time of the birth of Christ. It is as a contribution to such an inquiry that the treatise on the Nature of the Gods seems to me to possess a unique interest and value. . . ." In his view, Book II (Balbus' presentation of the Stoic theology) prefigures Christianity, and so he terms it "perhaps the most important contribution to theological thought which has come to us from classical antiquity" (III, p. xviii). Pease, on the other hand, has striven for, and has achieved to an amazing degree, objectivity and timelessness. Although he refers in his Addenda to studies appearing as recently as 1958, his work, judged on its spirit, could well have issued forth from a philological seminar of Bismarck's Germany, or, for that matter, from the study of the Elder Pliny. Mayor was troubled by the impact of Darwinism on traditional beliefs;¹⁰ it would be difficult to discover from Pease not only that we are in the age of the exploration of space but that the world has changed appreciably since Mayor's day.

Such studied objectivity is very likely a virtue. What is definitely not a virtue in the present edition is the run-together character of the commentary. This feature is particularly annoying when one tries to follow Cicero's argument point by point and, in the present volume, to weigh Balbus' case for Stoic theology in Book II against the refutation which the Academic Cotta offers in Book III. Now it is true that in the course of his discussion of Cicero's sources for the treatise in his Introduction (pp. 36-51) Pease does divide and subdivide the text into sections and at various points in the commentary¹¹ he does consider problems of arrangement, but in the one instance the analyses are not especially useful or handy for study of the text, and in the other they deal with certain segments only and are indistinguishable from the mass of the notes. What we need but do not get here is a graphic confrontation of the argument in Book II with that in Book III, or at least some such analysis as

treatise is the presentation of contemporary Stoic theology, with everything else subservient, as H. A. K. Hunt makes plain in his *The Humanism of Cicero* (Melbourne, 1954), pp. 131 ff.

¹⁰ Cf. Vol. III, p. xviii: ". . . the general proof here given in Book II of a rationally ordered universe, and of a providential care for man can never lose its interest or value. It holds good against all theories of evolution, whether ancient or modern, which would make mind posterior to matter."

¹¹ E. g. in Vol. II, pp. 646, 894, 1050.

Mayor provided for each of the three books. I cannot think why this obviously helpful feature was not included. Possibly it is a case of the tyranny of the format.

This is actually not a minor criticism, although it may appear to be. The bulk of modern scholarship on this treatise has centered upon the question of Cicero's sources (as one can see from Pease's review in the Introduction). The argument of the dialogue is neither novel nor original, but its provenience is important to the student of Hellenistic philosophy, since the writings upon which Cicero was drawing have largely been lost. For the scholar interested in reconstructing the work, say, of Panaetius or Posidonius, Cicero's treatises are of prime value.¹² Furthermore, Cotta's ostensible refutation in Book III of the Stoic position has, at many points, very little reference to Balbus' argument in Book II. Hence the question arises: Did Cicero have recourse to sources for Book III that were completely independent of those used for Book II, and very likely from different periods in the development of Stoicism? A summary outline of the points made in these books would have been useful for considering this question, especially in an edition that is intended to be exegetical.

Concerning this lack of correspondence in the argument Pease writes in his Introduction (p. 48): "Whether Book 3 should be (more logically) arranged to match the divisions of Book 2 or Book 2 so arranged as to be more conveniently refuted in Book 3 is the dilemma which apparently confronted Cicero. . . ." But whether or not the "dilemma" exercised Cicero, it should have received a somewhat more profound treatment from an editor who is always ready to devote columns of notes to such tangential matters as the flooding of the Nile.¹³ In his review of Hunt's book (see note 9, above), Solmsen¹⁴ remarked of the "lack of real contact between *De Natura Deorum* II and III": "I am ready to believe with Hunt that the authors on whom Cicero relied in Book III did not know or at any rate did not criticize those whom he follows in Book II." The probability that this was so increases, it seems to me, when one considers the following: 1) Accustomed by long experience in the courts to looking at both sides of a case, Cicero might well have been the first to undertake in a single work an examination pro and con of Stoic theology; 2) Cicero had no intention of departing to any extent from his sources; 3) accordingly, in Book II he presented the case (others had made) for the Stoic views, and in Book III the case (others had made) against them: neither pro or con need be predicated upon the other as here given.

¹² See, e.g., M. van Straaten's *Panētiūs* (Amsterdam, 1946). Pease, curiously, seems not to know this book although it contains a long and interesting review of the problem of the sources for Book II of the *De Natura Deorum* (pp. 240-55).

¹³ Pp. 886-8. For all the richness of the commentary, one is occasionally surprised to discover that an important parallel passage has not been cited: e.g. pp. 571-2, s. v. *capite velato* one might expect a reference to the splendid and nearly contemporary passage in Lucretius (V, 1194-1203). But probably Pease decided that Lucretius does not supply any information about the Roman practice of veiling the head during sacrifice.

¹⁴ *A. J. P.*, LXXVI (1955), pp. 430-2.

Faced as he was with a work whose arrangement is at best untidy and poorly integrated, Pease must be commended for his sound handling of the text. He has resisted the temptation to transfer whole sections to places where they might be thought to contribute to a more logical development of the argument. For example, he has rightly not followed Mayor in shifting III, 53-60 to come directly after III, 42, but has allowed the passage to stand in its traditional position (see his discussion on p. 1050).¹⁵ The sections III, 43-60 make tedious reading indeed, wherever they are put. Hirzel (quoted by Pease, p. 1092) observed that they have "little to do with religion and even less with philosophy" and Pease himself calls them a defect, remarking that they "approach more nearly to the style of a mythological dictionary, like Hyginus, than to a conversation between friends" (p. 27). This does not deter him, however, from lavishing upon these paragraphs nearly eighty pages of commentary, although they require only eight pages in Plasberg's Teubner text.

Of the Corrigenda and Addenda which Pease has supplied for both volumes (pp. 1235-8), the former apply principally to Volume I, the latter to Volume II.¹⁶ There were, inevitably, many misprints in Volume I, especially in the Greek passages cited, and Volume II also has its share. Certain of these, rather odd, are perhaps due to the book's having been printed abroad. Still and all, these two volumes stand as a truly remarkable specimen of complicated printing. The Index to the whole edition (pp. 1239-57) is a necessary and useful guide to the commentary, which has imbedded in it so many informative notes upon an astonishing diversity of subjects. This wide range can best be indicated by listing a few consecutive entries from the Index, which may be taken as typical: ". . . *platanus*, Plato, *plectrum*, Pleiades, pleonasm, Pliny (Elder), Pluton, poets, poisoned arrows, polecat, politics, Pollux. . ."

It is perhaps presumptuous for any one person to attempt to review what is, *au fond*, an encyclopaedia. The only one really qualified to pass judgment on these volumes is their author. But it remains to say again what was said in my review of the first volume, that Pease's edition of the *De Natura Deorum* is a monumental example of a kind of rigorous scholarship that is fast disappearing, and as such it must command immense respect. Its defects—and not all would agree that they are defects—are all too easy to criticize; its virtues reveal themselves gradually and will

¹⁵ Bailey remarks of his own editions of Lucretius, another author who in the past has suffered greatly from editorial omniscience: "Comparing the edition of 1898 with that in the three-volume edition of 1947 I have returned to the MS reading in almost 200 places, the text of 1921 representing nearly a half-way house" (*Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship*, ed. M. Platnauer [1954], p. 280).

¹⁶ As might be expected, there are already addenda to Pease's addenda: e.g. G. Pfligersdorffer, "Cicero über Epikurs Lehre vom Wesen der Götter (nat. deor. I, 49)," *Wiener Studien*, LXX (1957), pp. 235-53; R. Coleman, "Cicero De Natura Deorum I 65 and the Stoic Criticism of the Atomic Theory," *Mnemosyne*, ser. IV, XIII (1960), pp. 34-8; K. Kleve, "Die Unvergänglichkeit der Götter im Epikureismus," *Symb. Osloenses*, XXXVI (1960), pp. 116-26.

ensure its taking its place as an indispensable aid to the study of ancient philosophy and Roman religion.

Professor Pease has now made two notable contributions—the other is his *De Divinatione*—to that admirable series of editions in English of Cicero's several philosophical treatises which was inaugurated well back in the last century by Holden, Mayor, and Reid. Unfortunately, the very excellence of these editions, with their microscopic attention to individual segments, has prevented our seeing clearly, in the total corpus, a coherent plan, an orderly sequence, and a sustained argument, to use Hunt's words. It is truly incredible that it was not until the appearance of his *The Humanism of Cicero* a few years ago that we had a synoptic view of Cicero's achievement. It is possible now to imagine that Cicero had worked out over the years a personal philosophy, which Hunt is pleased to call humanism. And it may no longer be necessary to wonder at length (Pease, Introduction, pp. 33-6) what Cicero, the professed Academic, meant by remarking at the very end of the *De Natura Deorum* that the Stoic presentation of Balbus seemed to him *ad veritatis similitudinem . . . esse propensior*. He might have meant what he said.

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MICHEL LEJEUNE. Mémoires de philologie mycénienne. Première série (1955-57). Paris, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1958. Pp. 402.

Mycenaean philology is moving out of pioneering articles and groundbreaking monographs into stolid handbooks and exhaustive treatises. Books like S. Luria's *Jazyk i kultura mikenskoj Grecii* (Moscow, 1957) and O. Landau's *Mykenisch-griechische Personennamen* (Göteborg, 1958; see *A. J. P.*, LXXX [1959], pp. 325-8) may still hover on that borderline of frisky conjecture that has in a few short years outdated much of the philological detail of *Documents in Mycenaean Greek*. But works such as the Mycenaean appendix (pp. 314-61) of A. Scherer's revision of the second volume of Thumb's *Handbuch der griechischen Dialekte* (Heidelberg, 1959), and E. Vilborg's *Tentative Grammar of Mycenaean Greek* (Göteborg, 1960) are well beyond the stage where, to quote one of our reviewee's rare flashes of printed humor, "le mycénien doit se manger chaud."

Whoever insists on piping hot Mycenaean must occasionally be content with a warmed-over helping out of those two refrigerators of past Mycenological endeavor, *Studies in Mycenaean Inscriptions and Dialect* and *Nestor*. Yet that is by no means a ground for complaint when Michel Lejeune, well-known Sorbonne professor, author of the excellent *Traité de phonétique grecque*, great recent protagonist of Venetic philology, and with P. Chantraine prime mover of Mycenaean studies in France, here offers us a collection of past and present essays, published under the auspices of the research institute that he heads. Rather one welcomes the new convenient accessibility of so much scattered work, augmented by material not otherwise published.

The volume contains fifteen chapters, including a general introduction, dated November 1957, and excluding addenda (April 1958) and diverse useful concordances,¹ indices,² and corrigenda.³ 2-9 were written between April 1955 and January 1957, and published in *Revue de philologie* (2, 6),⁴ *Revue des études anciennes* (4),⁵ *Études mycénienes* (Paris, 1957) (5, 7), *Minos* (3, 9), and *Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris* (8).⁶ They are duly provided with the sigla ML 2-ML 9 assigned by *S. M. I. D.*, and the new ML 10-ML 15 bring up the rear, while the volume at large is dogtagged ML 16 by the careful recorders of the London Institute of Classical Studies.⁷

Varied as is the subject matter in time, scope, and consistency, it is an admirable body of evidence for one man's protracted and specialized preoccupation with a new branch of philology. Lejeune

¹ Notably that of Evans' Knossian inventory numbers with the running alphabetic classification by tablet groups in Bennett-Chadwick-Ventris, *The Knossos Tablets* (*B. I. C. S.*, Suppl. 2 [1956]), now replaced by a new edition (*B. I. C. S.*, Suppl. 7 [1959]).

² Cross-referencing within the volume is, however, inconsistent; in the latter half of the book there is needed double reference to both original publication and new location within the *Mémoires*. Yet in the earlier articles one finds merely the former, and only some familiarity with the tome will make one realize that many a *locus* quoted is readily accessible within the same covers (see e. g. page 111, n. 7, which should refer to ML 3, and page 167, n. 33, where ML 4 is meant).

³ Add the following: P. 34, n. 63 read Risch. P. 42, line 16 read $\zeta > \delta$. P. 62, line 29 read *na* for first *ne*. P. 196, n. 31 read Bechtel. P. 217, line 20 read Colombaria. P. 244, line 3 read identifications. P. 248, line 34 read *πέρυγο[ves]*. P. 299, first n. read 64 for 65. P. 309, n. 107 read *so-wo* for *wo-wo* (cf. note 11 below). P. 316, line 16 read *ἐπλάτο*. P. 316, line 32 read pronunciation. P. 322, line 24 read Goold-Pope. P. 347, line 13 read Ashmolean.

⁴ Identical with his *Essais de philologie mycénienne*, 1-3 (*État de la recherche*, Inventaires de roues; Nouveaux inventaires de roues), of which new instalments have appeared as follows: 4-5 (*Observations sur les composés privatifs*, *Observations sur le nombre duel*) in *Rev. Phil.*, XXXII (1958), pp. 198-217, 6 (*Les dérivés en -ter-*), *ibid.*, XXXIV (1960), pp. 9-30.

⁵ This equals *Études de philologie mycénienne*, 1-2 (*Langue, écriture, orthographe*; Les tablettes pyliennes de la série Ma), followed later by 3 (*Les adjectifs mycéniens à suffixe -went-*) in *R. E. A.*, LX (1958), pp. 5-26, and 4 (*Comptabilité de Pylos: un barème dégressif de rations alimentaires*), *ibid.*, LXI (1959), pp. 5-14.

⁶ Apart from reviews and short contributions too numerous to mention, Lejeune's work on Mycenaean includes "De quelques idéogrammes mycéniens" (*Rev. Ét. Gr.*, LXXII [1959], pp. 123-48), "Textes mycéniens relatifs aux esclaves" (*Historia*, VIII [1959], pp. 129-44), "Les sifflantes fortes du mycénien" (*Minos*, VI [1960], pp. 87-137), "Présents et 'absents' dans les inventaires mycéniens" (*La Parola del Passato*, XV [1960], pp. 5-19), and "Prêtres et prêtresses dans les documents mycéniens" (*Hommages à Georges Dumézil* [Brussels, 1960], pp. 128-39).

⁷ ML 1 is "Déchiffrement du linéaire B," *R. E. A.*, LVI (1954), pp. 154-7. But neither *S. M. I. D.* nor *Nestor* has recorded Lejeune's second earliest publication on Mycenaean Greek, "Interprétation de quelques textes de Cnossos et de Pylos," *C. R. Acad. Inscr.*, 1955, pp. 159-61.

is sound, sober, commonsensical, and always lucid in his exhaustive marshalling of evidence. While not lacking in ideas, he has no use for bold theorizing, and the result is a certain occasional aridity. Nor has he any patience with Beatty-esque chicanery, and wastes hardly a word on the detractors of Ventris' solution (p. 205).

Lejeune's essays fall into several discernible types. There is the kind that takes a specific group of tablets (wheel-inventories from Knossos and Pylos [So, Sa] in 2 and 6, Pylian 'proportional tribute' [Ma] ledgers in 4, and 'flax' or 'linen' [Na, Ng, Nn] records in 7) and subjects it to exhaustive scrutiny by internal evidence, drawing especially on the book-keeping system and other kinds of nonlinguistic content. Elsewhere he chooses a feature of phonology (labiovelars in 14), morphology (the ending *-phi* in 8), word-formation (reduplication in 11), or lexicon (*da-ma*, *du-ma* in 9, *πρέσβς* in 12), and tries to reach the limits of the assured or the plausible, being content, if need be, to conclude with a *non liquet* (p. 253). The five chapters not yet accounted for deal with the writing system: phonetic values of rare signs are treated in 3 and 10, sign 43 (*ai* or *a₂*) in 5, signs for cluster groups like *nwa*, *pte* in 13, and reflections on the general efficiency of the Linear B script make up chapter 15. Lejeune thinks, *inter alia*, that the presence of a separate voiced dental series and the lack of distinction between *r* and *l* may have a single cause, a fluctuation of *l* and *d* in the language of the model script, substantiated by such pre-Hellenic items as 'Ὀδυσσεύς: δάφνη: λάφνη, λαβύρινθος: *da-pu₂-ri-to-jo*. Thus the *l*-series might have been taken over as *d*. But Lejeune realizes that the most likely model, Linear A, fails to offer support (*da* = *da*), and that Cypriote *ta* and *lo* equal in form Myc. *da* and *ro* (pp. 327-8). E. L. Bennett uses a more convincing argument from frequency, there being a lot more *t*: *d* opposition in the Linear B texts than would be the case for the other occlusives, had separate voiceless: voiced signs existed for them. Because incidence of ambiguity swells geometrically in relation to distributional frequency, mere practicality may have been reason enough for the introduction of a separate *d*-series (*Language*, XXXVI [1960], pp. 139-40).

Uncertainty is still the order of the day in Mycenaean philology. Nobody excels Lejeune as a practitioner of *ars nesciendi*. Yet for all his caution, a considerable amount of contradiction, retraction, and rectification has found its inevitable way into the volume. For example, *a-mo-ta* is interpreted by Lejeune as an adjective *ἀρμοστά* (pp. 31-2, 38, 116, 122). But p. 116, n. 16 he mentions Ventris' idea that it should be taken as *hármo(ta)* (= Gk. *ἄρματα*) meaning here 'wheel + axle,' later replacing Myc. *i-qi-ja* as the word for 'chariot.' On pp. 334-6 new Pylian evidence finally convinces him of the correctness of Ventris' view. Here as elsewhere the reader must unlearn in the addenda what was solidly and stubbornly expounded and maintained throughout the regular volume. But such is the havoc wrought by *annorum series et fuga temporum*. Another sort of frustration faces one in papers like the one on *πρέσβς*, where 14 pages of inquiry serve to determine that there is really no conclusive evidence for its Mycenaean attestation. This reader, at least, instinctively tried to credit the article instead as a study of

πρέσβυς 'old, elder, ambassador, chairman' at large. As such it unfortunately could not profit from the remarks of Ernst Fraenkel in *Lingua Posnaniensis*, VII (1959), pp. 7-9. Lejeune (p. 240), usually very shy of etymology, even latches on to a possible Indo-European comparison with Arm. *erēc* 'elder, priest' < **pre(i)s-g^wu*-, thus literally a 'fore-goer' (cf. e.g. Skt. *agre-gā-* 'front-going'). We are not surprised to find him in the company of Wackernagel, Schwyzler, and Fraenkel in considering the Homeric feminine πρέσβα an analogical formation (not, however, after πότνα θεά, but by phonological analogy from a possible feminine in -yā, which should have yielded *πρέσζα; after all, πρέσβυς itself has analogical β from πρέυβος, πρέσβιστος, while dialect forms like Doric πρέιγυς are phonologically regular). Lejeune finds it unlikely that we might have **pres-g^wā* beside **pres-g^wu*-; but he should have brought in the Sanskrit *purogavā-* 'leader' with its variants *purogā-* and *purogamā-*, which clearly betrays the variants *gam-* and *gā-* (Gk. βαίνω and ἔβην) of the root related to English 'come.'

That very form *πρέσζα leads us over into another of Lejeune's important subjects of concern, the interpretation of rare signs. There is the Mycenaean word *pe-re-82*, where Furumark saw πέλεκυς or πρέσβυς, Palmer Πέλεια and Doria Πελειώ 'Dove-goddess,' and Gallavotti Πλέρζα 'seafaring goddess.' Instead of the values implied by those suggestions, Pugliese (*Studi classici e orientali*, VII [1958], p. 20), Ruipérez (*Minoica*, pp. 359-64 [Berlin, 1958]), and Lejeune (pp. 210, 217, 243) came independently to take 82 as *sa₂*, seeing in *pe-re-82* a name related to Perse(phone), or (Lejeune) the above-mentioned form *πρέσζα. Yet the table on page 323 gives no value for 82, and the same lack obtains in regard to 88, whose very existence is questioned (cf. p. 55), whereas on page 51 it was "very probably" *ro₃* or *ra₃*. In some other instances Lejeune finds a solution simultaneously with others (29 = *pu₂*: *ze-pu₂-ro*, etc., pp. 53-4), or joins in the chorus (e.g. 23 = *mu*, pp. 52-3). Two signs in particular, 71 and 87, have preoccupied Lejeune at great length. 71 is read as *we₂* on the basis of *te-mi-71-ta* = *termíwenta*, corresponding to the Homeric *τερμώεντα* (pp. 34, 51, 111, 118, 323) with secondary liaison-vowel (cf. Hom. *φοινκόςσσα*, *κλωμακόςσσα* in place of **φοινικ-ε-*, **κλωμακ-ε-*). But in the addenda (pp. 338-9) the newly added Pylos tablet Sa 1266, reading *te-mi-de-we-te*, causes a reinterpretation of 71 as *dwe* (thus a genitive *τέρμωδος must once have existed, beside the *τέρμωις implied by Homer, of Hes. *τέρμωις· ποίς*). This *dwe* neatly matches the *dwo* (42 bis) discovered by Risch (*Minos*, V [1957], pp. 28-34), and falls into the pattern of *nwa* (48) and *kwe* (87) (cf. chapter 13 on 'signes syllabiques complexes').⁸ The latter hinges on the evidence of *o-da-ke-we-ta* beside *o-da-87-ta* (pp. 34-6, 50, 263-4, 327; interpreted as *ondark-wenta*), and is taken to denote a secondary morphological cluster of velar stop + *w*, rather than either IE *k^w* (labiovelar) or *k̂ + w* (Myc. *i-qo* 'horse'), where the special 'labiovelar signs' are used (16 *qa*, 78 *qe*, 21 *qi*, 32 *qo*). Benveniste (*B.S.L.*, LIV² [1959], pp. 87-8)

⁸ Georgiev's value *the* (*Études mycéniennes*, pp. 76-8 [Paris, 1957]) may be safely consigned to oblivion.

is right in voicing some bewilderment at this point, but 'juncturalists' would probably cheerfully drive a juncture through the middle of the sign and hail the graphematopoeic acuity of the Mycenaean scribes. On sign 85, the best Lejeune could do was to stress its word-initial environment and assume vowel value in consequence (p. 51). Georgiev suggested *ó* (*Ét. myc.*, pp. 68-71), rejecting Furumark's earlier *su* and Palmer's *sja*. Yet the latter has now been strikingly vindicated by the interpretation of PY Ma 225.2 *za-we-te* (vs. *pe-ru-si-nu-wa*) as the Mycenaean equivalent of *σῆτες*, *τῆτες* 'this year' (**kyā-wetes*, cf. *σήμερον*). KN Od 666 **85-u-te a-pe-i-si to-so* then contains the same word with samprasāraṇa grade (cf. (f)έτος vs. πέποι), and the equation *a-si-ja-ti-ja*: PY Ma 397 *a-85-ta₂* adds further support.⁹

That brings us to another, final topic among the many here treated by Lejeune (cf. also *Minos*, VI [1960], pp. 87-137). The series of signs conventionally transliterated *za* (17), *ze* (74), *zo* (20)¹⁰ seems to denote the clusters appearing in classical Greek as *σσ* (ττ) or *ζ* (δδ). The notation with *z* is arbitrary, and from analogy with the stops Lejeune in his earlier articles writes *ss* instead (pp. 20, 47, 62), but later resigns himself to using *z*, in the name of unity among scholars (pp. 205-6, 322, index; *Minos*, VI, p. 91). Lejeune's 'siffiante forte' (a term suffering from some overuse under his pen) is thus on a par in the script with *k*: *g* or *p*: *b*. Chadwick (*Ét. myc.*, pp. 83-91, cf. *J. H. S.*, LXXIX [1959], p. 190) maintains that *ζ* alone is regularly so written, and would explain other instances as exceptions; but Lejeune's view makes better systematic sense. Thus we find *ky* in *za-we-te*, *ka-zo-e* (PY Va 1323; **κάκιοες*, cf. *a-ro₂-e* = *ἀριοε* beside superlative *ἀριστος*), *su-za* (*σύκλαι*), and *gy* (*g^wy*, *dy*, *Hy-*) in *me-zo-e*, *wo-zo* (vs. later *ῥδω*), *zō-wo*,¹¹ *to-pe-za*, *ze-u-ke-u-si*, *ze-pu₂-ro*, *ze-so-me-no*. On the other hand *ky* is also written with *s* in *wa-na-so-i*, *pa-sa-ro*; this is the regular notation for *ty* (later *σ(σ)* or *ττ*) in *to-so*, *a-pe-a-sa*, *-we-sa*, and for *ts* (later *σ(σ)* or *ττ*) in *-da-sa-to*, while of *tw* (later *σσ* or *ττ*) there is no clear example. But there is also *ke-re-za* with *ty*; hence simply a certain amount of assimilation and incipient graphic overlapping of the two notations has to be recognized.

This review has dealt not only with the *Mémoires*, but has also included works of the same type published subsequently. Mycenaologists will await and anticipate their appearance in due course as a second set of *Mémoires*, much to the benefit of Helladic philology.

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⁹ Cf. L. R. Palmer, *Minutes of the Mycenaean Seminar* of the Institute of Classical Studies, University of London, June 1, 1960.

¹⁰ Hardly *zu* (79), for which Lejeune tries out *wo₂* instead (pp. 211-17).

¹¹ In *Minos*, VI, p. 126 one should add PY An 519.2 *zō-wo* to Lejeune's material. The reading *wo-zo* is due to earlier erroneous copying. Thus we probably have a proper name *Zōos* (cf. Landau, *Myken.-griech. Personennamen*, p. 153 [1958]); for its classical attestation see O. Masson, *Beiträge zur Namenforschung*, VIII (1957), p. 167.

DIETMAR KORZENIEWSKI. *Die Zeit des Quintus Curtius Rufus.*
Köln, 1959. Pp. v + 86.

Since Curtius' *History* is one of the five extant consecutive accounts of Alexander's expedition, it seems strange that almost nothing is known about the man or his work. Tarn (*Alexander the Great*, II, p. 91; references are to this volume) unnecessarily confused the question of Curtius' purpose in composing his *History* by pronouncing in his typically persuasive way that "the reason for the existence of this [work] cannot even be guessed." I have pointed out (*History of Alexander the Great*, I, p. 2), however, that at V, 1, 1-2 Curtius says that he is writing formal history. The question of his date, which has been variously placed over a period of two centuries, now remains to be settled.

It is a special pleasure, then, to welcome the most recent work on the subject, an excellent far-ranging German doctoral dissertation, typically solid and sober, with a precise and well-reasoned solution to offer. The text is preceded by two pages of bibliography directed at Curtius' date. The first chapter, ten pages long, reviews the literature that has appeared since 1841; I have not read all these works.

Nothing much has ever been extracted from Curtius to suggest his date, I believe, save the well-known statement at X, 9, 3-6; after a reference to the civil wars following Alexander's death: "Therefore the Roman people rightly and deservedly asserts that it owes its safety to its prince, who in the night which was almost our last shone forth like a new star. The rising of this star, by Heaven! rather than that of the sun, restored light to the world in darkness, since lacking their head the limbs were thrown into disorder. How many firebrands did it extinguish! How many swords did it sheath! How great a tempest did it dispel with sudden prosperity! Therefore our empire not only lives afresh but even flourishes. Provided only that the divine jealousy be absent, the posterity of that same house will continue the good times of this our age, it is to be hoped forever, at any rate for very many years" (Rolfe's translation in the Loeb edition throughout).

Who was the emperor? The choice is not very wide, because we must select an emperor who was preceded by civil wars that threatened the physical existence of the Roman Empire. Furthermore, we must take a date before the fall of the Parthian Empire (A. D. 227), since Curtius refers to that Empire as standing. I quote Tarn (p. 113, n. 1) *in toto*, so that we may have the references and the gist of the matter and also note that his summary misses a forthcoming point: "V, 7, 9, the Parthians now rule Macedonian cities; V, 8, 1, they now hold Ecbatana; VI, 2, 12, they now rule everything beyond the Euphrates." (To this add IV, 12, 11, the Parthians now hold Scythian lands.) So far as I have ever been able to discover, there is only one other passage in Curtius' *History* that has any meaningful bearing on a possible date: "Having therefore suffered many disasters and having risen again from their ruins, now at last wholly restored by long-continued peace [*longa pace*], they [the people of Tyre] are at rest under the protection of

Roman clemency" (IV, 4, 21). Curtius is speaking not merely of Tyre's long peace, but also of Rome's protection, implicitly the protection made possible by Rome's long peace.

We have now before us the problem and the ancient references. If ever the date of Curtius is to be established, it must be on the basis of internal factual evidence. I agree entirely with Tarn (p. 112, n. 4) that "Curtius' date cannot be decided by style—few questions of fact can."

Korzeniewski methodically presents the various possibilities: which emperor, preceded by Roman civil wars and before the fall of Parthia, did Curtius have in mind? Augustus excepted for the moment, could it have been Claudius (the candidate, incidentally, of Rolfe in his introduction to the Loeb edition, p. xxi), or Vespasian or Septimius Severus? Korzeniewski (pp. 38 f.) considers them all and especially the possibility of Septimius Severus: here the discussion revolves chiefly around Altheim's unconvincing study of Curtius' style and the linking together of Hercules and Liber Pater. Nor is Korzeniewski convinced by Altheim that late imperial times are indicated by Curtius, VII, 5, 42 ("the use of arrows is now frequent") and III, 11, 15; IV, 9, 3 (the protective "plates" worn by Darius' horses and horsemen in battle). Oddly enough, Tarn does not consider Septimius Severus, but says (p. 113) that Curtius' book "could have been written for Caracalla . . . but not published till the accession of Severus Alexander in A. D. 222." But, as he says, the civil wars after Commodus were by that time far in the background, and he settles rather cursorily for Augustus (p. 114).

Nothing very conclusive has ever been said for any one of these emperors. Korzeniewski, however, now argues at length (pp. 51 f.) that Curtius' style and content are appropriate to early imperial times. Various "parallels" are also found for the passage in the tenth book: the Roman world after the death of Caesar (a person truly like Alexander) resembled Alexander's empire after the death of its king; with Octavian Rome, unlike the world after Alexander, found its savior, a head; and more of the same, which apparently can be easily culled to support almost any position. Korzeniewski then proceeds (p. 85) very ingeniously to place the completion of Curtius' *History* at a precise moment, between 25 and 23 B. C. In 25 B. C., that is to say, the temple of Janus was closed for the second time by Augustus in recognition of the "long peace" (the Tyre passage, IV, 4, 21) that had settled on the world; moreover, Marcellus was clearly the designated successor of Augustus. But in 23 B. C. Marcellus died, which would vitiate the reference (X, 9, 6) to the *posteritas* of the royal house (a telling point, which certainly gives us the *terminus post quem non*, if Augustus is to be the date, for we need not underline the other deaths in his family).

There are difficulties, however, with 25 B. C. First, Curtius X, 9, 5: *Non ergo revirescit solum, sed etiam floret imperium*. Tarn's paraphrase and comment (p. 112) are: "The world not only grows green again but flowers [i. e. Curtius was writing quite a time after the Emperor's accession]." Secondly, it is difficult to believe that Curtius, despite his rhetoric, could in 25 B. C. speak of a *longa pax*. Peace, yes; but in the preceding year Augustus himself had campaigned in Spain.

There is another possible objection to Augustus as the date; but first let me say that Claudius cannot be considered, since the civil wars of the late Republic were so far in the background. Nor can Vespasian, since the physical existence of the Empire was never in doubt. Moreover, as Korzeniewski says (p. 38), Vespasian's Jewish war rules out Curtius' reference to neighboring Tyre's long peace. This leaves Septimius Severus who, when he had established himself in Italy following the disturbances, revolts, and murders after Commodus' death, had still to face the possible physical dismemberment of the Empire, with rebellions in Britain, the East, and Gaul.

Moreover, it seems to me that we are not forced to come to Septimius Severus as the emperor of X, 9, 3-6 simply by the process of elimination, though that should suffice. To me, Curtius V, 7, 9 (so abruptly summarized by Tarn, as I have remarked) seems significant: "And not even in the long age which followed its [Persepolis'] destruction did it rise again. The Macedonian kings laid waste other cities, which the Parthians now possess; of this city not a trace would be found, did not the Araxes River show where it stood. That river had flowed not far from its walls; the neighbouring peoples believe, but do not really know, that the city was twenty stadia distant from it."

The question now is, was Persepolis in existence in Augustus' day or rather did people customarily think of it as such, for in that case Augustus is definitely ruled out as Curtius' date? In any event, the first sentence of Curtius is clearly a misstatement of fact (though see Herzfeld, below). Alexander, of course, burned the palace at Persepolis, but Diodorus, XIX, 21 and 46, mentions the so-called partition of Persepolis in 316 B. C. We know from II *Maccabees* 9, 1-2 that in 165 B. C. the people of Persepolis repulsed Antiochus IV Epiphanes. Strabo mentions Persepolis at II, 79, 80; XV, 727-730. Tarn (*C. A. H.*, IX, p. 599, with bibliography), in discussing trade routes of the first century B. C., refers to the description of Persepolis as "the mart of the Persians" and to Strabo's references to the Persepolis-Carmania route. Three graffiti of the second century A. D. have been found at Persepolis (E. Herzfeld, *Archaeological History of Iran*, p. 80 and cf. p. 45; *Iran in the Ancient East*, p. 308 and cf. p. 276). It is not clear, to me at any rate, whether Herzfeld's references always mean Persepolis or Istakhr, the town three miles from Persepolis that succeeded it and perhaps preceded it. He speaks of Persepolis as sinking into oblivion soon after Alexander, says that Diodorus means Istakhr not Persepolis, and yet the graffiti, he says, come from Persepolis. Certainly by the second century A. D. the center of the area was Istakhr (cf. N. C. Debevoise, *A Political History of Parthia*, p. 268, with references and map).

The one thing certain in Curtius, V, 7, 9 is that Persepolis no longer existed in his day. For our point, it matters not at all whether Diodorus and Strabo meant Persepolis or Istakhr: what *does* matter, as I see it, is that Persepolis stood for something other than oblivion in the thinking of Diodorus and Strabo. If Curtius had been their contemporary, would he have written as he did? It strikes me as more credible to speak of Persepolis in oblivion from the vantage

point of *ca.* A. D. 200. Certainly Curtius' references to the emperor and his family (and the preceding civil wars threatening the physical existence of the Empire, quite a time after which Curtius wrote) and to the long peace fit Septimius Severus better than the Augustus of 25-23 B. C.; we are indebted to Korzeniewski for his acute observation that no other period in Augustus' reign is possible.

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A. ERNOUT and A. MEILLET. *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine: histoire des mots.* Quatrième édition, revue et corrigée. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1959-1960. Pp. xviii + 820.

The demand for earlier editions of the justly renowned dictionary of Meillet and Ernout has been so considerable as to make necessary a fourth edition (henceforth designated as IV), and this edition, in contrast to the photo-offset format of III, has been printed in the usual manner. It has two columns per page. It contains nothing fundamentally new in plan or doctrine; like previous editions it gives very detailed accounts of the word-families as they are represented in Latin texts, with careful attention to levels of usage, and it gives adequate data regarding cognates in other languages while avoiding extensive discussion of conflicting views in cases where the actual Indo-European etymology is in doubt. For this one turns to Walde-Hofmann, the two dictionaries being thus complementary to one another.

The latest edition of the *Dictionnaire étymologique*, however, has undergone extensive revision in many minor details. This results in part from the fact that account has been taken of work published subsequent to the appearance of III in 1951. Vetter's *Handbuch der italischen Dialekte*, vol. I (Heidelberg, 1953), is generally taken as the basic work of reference for Italic dialect forms, in this function largely replacing Buck's *Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian*. André's *Lexique des termes de botanique en latin* (Paris, 1956) is cited with moderate frequency in connection with plant-names. There are a fair number of new entries, some of them Greek loans (e. g. *alpha*, *alphabetum*, *antefana*, *authepsa*, *cataphractes*, *cataplasma*, *chaos*, *c(h)aracter*, *cottabus*, *cubus*, *melus*, *paedagogus*, *palaestra*, *paragraphus*, *paralysis*, *schisma*, *scincus*, *stauro*, *theatrum*, *tropaeum*, *typus*), some divine names (e. g. *Apollo*, *Fatuus*, *Fatua*, this last pair having been briefly noticed in III under *fatuus*, *fatuor*; *Feronia*, *Panticia*, *Picummus*, noticed briefly under *pica*, *picus* in III; *Sancus* and *Sangualis*, noticed in III under *sancio*, here have a separate article of 20 lines; *Summānus*, noticed in III under *mānis*). The number of Hittite cognates cited is nearly double that in III, and several Umbrian forms also appear for the first time in IV.

Within the limits of a review it would not be profitable, even if it were possible, to list all the instances in which IV shows evidence of revision; a few of the most important and interesting will have to suffice. *anas*, *-atis*: connection with *no*, *nare* is suggested as a possibility; plausible, if the *s-* in Skt. *snāti*, U. *snata*, OIr. *snám*

does not constitute a difficulty.—*ancus*: taken as a dialectal variant of *uncus*.—*anser*: the notion that the loss of *h-* was induced by the influence of *anas*, which was ignored in III, is here rejected as "arbitraire."—*araneus*: etymological discussion greatly expanded, partly in dissent from Benveniste's reconstruction **arak-s-n-*.—*aries*: Gk. ἄριος, Irish *earb* (both with suffix *-bho-*) are added to U. *erietu*, Arm. *aru* as cognates.—*caesius*: southern Italic origin favored because of the unrhottacized *s*.—*Camēnae*: discussion is expanded to include *Camillus* and other derivatives of the Etruscan root *Cam-*.—2°-*cando*: Skt. *candati* 'il éclairer' is added to the Latin forms, which were the only verbal forms admitted in III.—*casa*: the intervocalic *s* is taken as evidence of borrowing in III, of borrowing or of pre-Indo-European origin in IV; but is not the true significance of the *s* that the borrowing took place, from whatever source, sufficiently late to escape rhotacism, or in other words probably not earlier than the fourth century B. C., unless we admit *-s-* from an earlier *-ss-*?—*cassiterum*: IV goes back through Gk. κασίτερος to Elamite as the ultimate source.—*culina*: taken to be related to *coquo*, as in III, but with the added suggestion that contamination with *cūlus* (commonly adjacent to the kitchen) was responsible for the phonetic form of *culina*.—*culleus*: because of the *-eus* and the Etruscan origin of the *poena cullei*, the punishment of patricides, an Etruscan origin is suggested for this word, but without abandoning an ultimate Mediterranean source and some sort of connection with Gk. κολεός.—*cura*: IV in effect rejects the connection with Gk. τερίνμαι suggested in III, since the labiovelar implied by such a connection would have to yield *p-* in the Paelignian form *coisatens*, which we cannot avoid connecting with *cura*, *curaverunt*.—*famulus*: Etruscan origin receives much less favor here than in III.—*guberno*: in IV it is no longer considered necessary to assume an intermediary between *κυβερνώ* and the Latin form.—*habeo*: in the Oscan form *hafiest* Ernout takes the *f* as an error, as in III; yet *haf-* in Buck, no. 18², = Vetter, no. 28, despite the damage caused by the cutting of the window in the wall, is generally restored *haf[iar]* = *habeatur* and regarded as support for the *f* in *hafiest*.—*haru-*, *har-* (in *haruspex*, *hariolus*): IV contains some references bearing on the theory of derivation from Assyrian *har-*, recently revived because of resemblances between Babylonian and Etruscan divination.—*horreo*: possible connection with (*h*)*ēr*, *hirtus*, *hordeum* is suggested.—*Italus*, *Italia*: these words make a new entry not found in III, but Ernout rejects the familiar connection with *vitulus* as 'land of calves' and proposes a possible Illyrian origin.—*lambo*: at the end of this article he suggests connection with *labia*, *labra*. The implication then appears to be that the lips are 'what are licked'; for adjectives in *-io-*, *-ro-* with passive sense one may compare *saucius*, *sacer*, *lacer*.—*liber*: connection with ἐλεύθερος is treated with more skepticism than in III, because of the lack of support for Latin *ī* from *ou* < *eu* and because of Faliscan [l]oiferta beside Loferta.—*mina*: the Semitic origin of Gk. μνᾶ is expressly stated in IV.—*mordeo*: Skt. *mardati*, Ved. *mradata* and *mardayati* are cited as alone having a plausible connection; in III no sure connection was admitted.—*mulier*: the ancient explanation *a mollitia . . . velut mollier*, ignored in III, is

here cited merely to be rejected.—*mūs*: the final paragraph, on the failure of Latin to make a thorough distinction between mice and rats and on the late appearance of the true rat, is a new addition.—*negotium*: IV cites Benveniste's suggestion (*Ann. d. Sc. Norm. Super. di Pisa*, XX, I-II, pp. 1-7) that *negotium* is a translation of ἀρχολία.—*Nero*: IV cites not only the usual cognates O. *nīr*, U. *nerf*, but also suggests derivation of O.-U. **nerthro*- 'left' [actually represented by U. *nertru*, with no Oscan evidence] from the same root, as a euphemism with 'the strong(er) hand' as literal meaning of the full phrase, and ἀπιστερός is a semantic parallel; quite plausible, but it raises the question whether English *north*, etc., then go along with *nertru* ('stronger > left > north,' based on eastward facing) or remain with γέρτερος 'lower.'—*no*, *nas*: to the Indo-Iranian, Greek, and Celtic cognates of III is added Toeh. [B] *nāskem* 'ils baignent.'—*norma*: in III no etymology was admitted; IV suggests derivation from γνώμονα, accusative of γνώμων, through an Etruscan medium. *grōma*, on the other hand, is derived in both III and IV from γνώμα, a by-form of γνώμων.—*ob*, *obs*: IV adds Venetic *op* to the cognates already given; we might further add Mycenaean *opi* to the Greek forms ἐπί, ὀπίθεν, ὀπίσω.—*obscēnus*: the new article is little changed, but ends with an interesting conjecture of derivation from **ob-scae-nos* 'qui vient à gauche.'—*poples*: treated as of obscure etymology, but E. P. Hamp's article (*A. J. P.*, LXXV [1954], pp. 186-9) is worth citing, in which he produced new Albanian evidence in support of the derivation of *poples* as a *p*-dialect form from **k^wek^wl*-.—*repudium*: treated in III under *pēs* ('fait de repousser du pied'), connection with *pudet* being taken as a popular etymology, while IV has a 20-line article favoring connection with *pudet* against *pēs*.—*sero*, *sēvi*: connection with Gk. ἱημι, which was ignored in III, is mentioned in IV only to be rejected; Frisk, while not positively accepting it, regards it with more favor.—*sublimis*: the article in IV cites at the end *Lang.*, 16.93, though without mention of the author or the content: N. W. DeWitt had here proposed derivation from *limus*, designating a straight, seamless web of cloth worn as a girdle by attendants at certain religious and legal ceremonies; celestial beings are represented in art with a *limus* held in the two hands and arched over the head: if *limus* is understood of the zodiacal belt, *sublimis* becomes clear.—*testa*: IV shows considerable revision; while he adds Gk. κόγχος 'shell' and 'skull,' and German *Kopf* < *cuppa* as semantic parallels, he largely rejects the notion that the barbarian habit of using human skulls for drinking-cups played a part in the semantic evolution of *testa*.—*tugurium*: formerly treated under *tego* as a probable derivative of the same root; in IV it has a separate article and is taken as a probable loan, possibly Gaulish.—*turpis*: the etymology is declared unknown, as in III, but IV follows the remark with a suggestion of possible borrowing of a dialect form related to *torqueo*.—*uatēs*: Celtic origin is suggested in IV on the ground that *uatēs* is the only Latin masculine agent-noun in -ēs. But μάντῆς on the Greek side is also rather unique.—*uenus* and *Venus*: IV has been extensively revised and expanded, with incorporation of a part of the material in Ernout's *Philologica*, II, pp. 87-111 = *R. Ph.*,

XXX (1956), pp. 7-27. *Vesta*: IV has here made use of Frisk's discussion under *ἐστία* and of Dumézil's *Rituels indo-européens à Rome*, pp. 33 ff.—*uir*: the usual cognates are given: with *ī* Irish *fer*, Welsh *gwr*, Goth *wair*, etc., with *ī* probably U. *uiro ueiro*, positively Skt. *vīrāḥ*, Lith. *výras*. For the quantitative variation he compares *uīrus*, which in conjunction with Skt. *viṣam* shows the dialectal distribution of *ī* and *ī* reversed. The *ī*-forms are attributed to "popular" lengthening, but it seems likely that *uir*: *vīrāḥ*, Gk. *φύρος*, Skt. *bhūtāḥ*, and many similar pairs reflect a variation of monosyllabic and disyllabic bases in zero-grade, or, to use Sanskrit terms, of *aniṭ*- and *seṭ*-roots, and that evidence for laryngeals in the prehistory of the long forms should be sought with the help of Hittite.

The typographical errors which I have found are so few as to be almost negligible. Under *cautus* the cross-reference should be to *caueo*, not *cauco*. Under *fel* the Old Church Slavic form *zlūti* in the ninth line from the end of the article should read *zliti*, as ten lines above, while *zlūči* in the seventh line from the end should read *zlūči*; the forms are important because they involve *ž* from an original labiovelar but *z* from a palatal. Under *grex* the Hesychian form *γέγρεπα* should read *γέγγεπα*. Under *septem*, ninth line from the end, for *setpiñtas* read *septiñtas*.

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JOHN ARTHUR HANSON. *Roman Theater-Temples*. Princeton Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 112; 16 pls. with 55 illus. \$7.50. (*Princeton Monographs in Art and Archaeology*, XXXIII.)

The author, who is now a professor at the University of Michigan, received an excellent education at Princeton University, under Erik Sjöquist in the Department of Fine Arts, and under George E. Duckworth in the Department of Classics. He also studied from 1953 to 1955 in Rome, where he benefited from the knowledge of Lily Ross Taylor and Lawrence Richardson. He thus combines knowledge of ancient architecture, Roman topography, ancient literature, and ancient religion, all of which were necessary for reaching his goal: to show the connection between Roman theater and Roman religion. This goal is clearly expressed in the Introduction, but unfortunately not in the title. Many people may at first think that Hanson intends to discuss temples which were used for theater performances, as medieval churches were.

In the first chapter the author shows in a convincing way that the site of early dramatic performances was in front of sanctuaries, long before Pompey in 55 B. C. erected the first stone theater below the temple of Venus Victrix. The oldest recorded Roman *ludi*, the Consualia and Equirria, were given at the altar of the god to whom the games were dedicated. From them developed the circus games in the Circus Maximus and in the Circus Flaminius. Hanson believes that only *ludi circenses*, not *ludi scaenici*, were given here (p. 12), but that from the beginning temporary auditoria were erected for

dramatic representations before the temples of the gods to whom they were dedicated. Several of these temples for which scenic plays are testified are near the Circus Maximus. Thus the *ludi Megalenses* were undoubtedly given on the Palatine before the temple of Magna Mater, as Cicero tells us (*De haruspicum responso*, 20-9): "... those games which our ancestors wished to be held on the Palatine, in front of the temple in the very sight of the Great Mother, at the Megalensian festival. . . ." This temple is fortunately well known. It stands on a high podium. The open space before it was built up to a level platform by means of a terrace wall (Fig. 2). When the plays were presented here, the goddess could watch the games and the participants of the games could look up to her. We know that the goddess during the second century B. C. was a spectator of Plautus' *Pseudolus* (191 B. C.), Terence's *Andria* (166), *Hecyra* (165), *Heauton Timorumenos* (163), and *Eunuchus* (161). Mimes also were performed before the temple of the Great Mother, but particularly in front of the temple of Flora, which stood on the slope of the Aventine hill; Ceres, with Liber and Libera, had another temple on the Aventine, overlooking the western end of the circus. Lily Ross Taylor believes, in contrast to Hanson, that not only the circus games, but also the scenic plays were given on the occasion of the dedication of temples, in their vicinity, like those of the Magna Mater and Ceres, and then were celebrated regularly on their anniversaries at the same place. When Livy (XI, 51, 3) mentions in the year 179 the theater and proscenium near Apollo (*theatrum* and *proscenium ad Apollinis*), he certainly must mean that an auditorium and a stage were constructed near the temple of Apollo. This temple, erected in the republican period and rebuilt in 32 B. C. by the consul C. Sosius, has been excavated recently near the later Marcellus theater. Augustus, who dedicated the theater to his nephew Marcellus in 11 B. C., names it in his *Res Gestae* (*Monumentum Ancyranum*, IV, 22), *ad aedem Apollinis*, "near the temple of Apollo." Thus it is certain that in the republican period temporary auditoria were built in front of temples.

In Chapter II Hanson makes the important and interesting statement that the architectural pattern which we find in the republican theaters and later in the theater of Pompey, that is the steps for spectacles placed below temples, is found also in sanctuaries as well as in civic buildings. It surely is a Roman form, in contrast to Greek theaters which stand alone inside a sanctuary, separated from the temple of the god. The Roman theaters, in contrast, are joined to the temple so as to form an organic unit with it. Such a combination is found best in the sanctuaries of Gabii, Tibur, and Praeneste. In Gabii there are about 12 rows of steps or seats in a semicircular staircase, which leads to the level of the temple podium (p. 30, Fig. 5). Below the staircase was a semicircular platform, which probably served for ceremonies connected with the cult of the divinity worshiped in the temple. A priest standing in the doorway of the temple would look down directly on the stage building behind the orchestra. The sanctuary of Hercules Victor at Tivoli is closely parallel to the one at Gabii, but on a larger scale (pp. 31f., Figs. 7-8). The sanctuary of Fortuna Primigenia at Praeneste, after being bombed and shelled in World War II, was recently newly studied and

reconstructed (Fasolo and Gullini, *Il santuario della Fortuna Primigenia a Palestrina* [Rome, 1953]; Hanson, pp. 33-6, Figs. 9-11). The uppermost of the series of terraces contains a circular shrine. Its façade is hidden by a curved double colonnade, from which a cavea-like staircase descends with seventeen steps to a small semicircular platform. The next terrace is an immense rectangular piazza, surrounded on three sides by a double colonnade. A simple ceremony or a sacrifice could be performed on a small top orchestra; a more extended ceremony or a pageant could be performed on the lower large piazza. We have here a typical Italo-Hellenistic axial and frontal building unit.

The same architectural pattern of theater-like steps dominated by an important building is also found in political meeting places of the republican period. The American Academy of Rome has recently excavated in Cosa the comitium and the curia, dated from the third century B. C. The curia is a rectangular room; the comitium has a circular pavement, around which eight circular steps are laid, designed for about 500 standing people. The speaker stood in the center of the orchestra (Hanson, pp. 37-9, Figs. 12-13, after Richardson). In Rome also the comitium had a concave theater-like seating place (Erik Sjöquist, *Studies Presented to David Robinson*, I, pp. 400 f.). Thus curved steps served simultaneously as the entrance to an important building and as a theatron. The curia was a political as well as a sacred place like a temple; the comitium was a gathering place for masses like a theater. Many of these models discussed in chapter II may have been known to Pompey, when he placed a theater below a temple.

In Chapter III Hanson, therefore, can definitely state that the combination of a theater with a temple is in a good Italic-republican tradition. It is testified for the theater of Pompey by Tertullian (*De Spectaculis*, 10, 5), "a structure dedicated as a temple of Venus, under which he had placed steps for watching games" (*non theatrum sed Veneris templum nuncupavit, cui subiecimus, inquit, gradus spectaculorum*). Hanson rightly rejected the suggestion that this combination of a temple placed above a cavea was what Pompey borrowed from the theater in Mytilene. He had a model of it made and erected one in Rome on the same design, but larger and more solemn (Plutarch, *Pomp.*, 42, 3). The reviewer assumes that the theater in Mytilene was an odeion, a music hall for lyrical contests; indeed Plutarch tells us that Pompey "was present in Mytilene at the traditional contests of the poets, who took at that time no other subject than the actions of Pompey." The odeion had—like other Greek assembly halls, bouleuteria and prytaneia—a closed form, with the platform of the speaker connected to the rows of seats by a small semi-circular or square place, all under one roof (see M. Bieber, *The History of the Greek and Roman Theater* [Princeton, 1961, 2nd ed. revised and enlarged], pp. 181 f., Figs. 630-3).

Hanson leaves the question what Pompey borrowed from Mytilene without a definite answer (p. 53). He is, however, inclined to regard the immense rectangular enclosure behind the theater as an explanation of Pompey's borrowing (see Figs. 1 and 19). This portico is surrounded by a colonnade with a series of exedras around the circumference. Hanson calls it rightly the first public park in Rome,

which had many descendants, for example in the Porticus of Livia (Fig. 20). It is also suggestive of the Kaisareion (Caesareum) form, investigated by Sjöquist ("Kaisareion, a Study in Architectural Iconography," *Opuscula Romana*, I [1954], pp. 86-95) in Caesarea and Alexandria, and by Ward Perkins in Cyrene (Fig. 46; Sjöquist, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-104, figs. 1-5). Hanson considers the porticus behind the theater of Pompey a temple temenos of the Caesareum type which may have been inspired by the Hellenistic counterpart of the Kaisareion (p. 96). The reviewer, in contrast, considers the large garden porticus a Roman addition, developed from the simple colonnade of the Greek theaters like Athen and Ephesus (Bieber, *op. cit.*, pp. 250, 258, 448). Also new is the fact that the temple is no longer dominating but has become a small shrine incorporated into the uppermost colonnade of the large auditorium. There were, beside the central shrine dedicated to Venus, four other smaller ones dedicated to Honos, Virtus, Felicitas, and probably Valetudo (see pp. 52 f., note 51). These are personifications of the virtues attributed to Pompey. The theater is not only a religious building but a means of political propaganda and personal glorification, as the building activities of dictators often were.

The same can be said of the many examples of imperial theater buildings combined with temples which Hanson has collected in Chapter IV (pp. 59-77, Figs. 21-44). The largest number has been found in North Africa, and the best documented is the theater of Leptis Magna, excavated and investigated by Giacomo Caputo (*Dioniso*, XIII [1950], pp. 164-78; full publication in progress. Bieber, *op. cit.*, p. 207, Figs. 696-9). Others are in Tipasa, Dugga, Calama, Philippeville, Timgad, and Cherchel. In France the best preserved and described theater is that of Vienne (Fig. 32; Jules Formigé, *Le théâtre romain de Vienne* [1938], pp. 8-11, fig. 30), dedicated to Apollo. Others are at Lillibonne in Gallia Belgica, Saguntum in Spain, Nicopolis in Epirus (pp. 69-71, Figs. 34-6). Sometimes the ruins have been wrongly interpreted as staircases leading from above into the auditorium, and Hanson was able through other parallels to give the right interpretation as cavea temples.

Most interesting in Italy itself is the so-called Academy in the Villa of Hadrian at Tivoli, reconstructed from drawings by Piranesi and Pannini (pp. 72 f., Figs. 37-8). The shrine has the unusual form of a circular structure preceded by a vestibule with a façade of four columns and a large platform in front, which could be used for an imperial box. Small theaters in the villas of Pausilypon (p. 73, Figs. 39-40) and of M. Agrippa Postumus on the island of Planasia have a similar arrangement with an open area before the shrine. A statue stood inside the shrine, and before it was a platform for the seat of an important person.

The theater at Herculaneum (pp. 74 f., Fig. 41; Bieber, *op. cit.*, pp. 183 f., Figs. 635-9) had three shrines, each flanked by two equestrian statues. The assumption of a shrine above the center of the cavea in Sepino, Fiesole, and Falerii (pp. 75 f., Figs. 42-4) is less certain. There are, however, certainly more examples in Italy and elsewhere than the twenty-one discussed by Hanson. The book by Hanson will instigate further investigation of this question, how

theaters had a shrine on the central axis of the theater, overlooking the orchestra, the front facing the stage building, so that the divinity could look down on the performances given in her honor. It is likely that several times the platform interpreted by other scholars as an entrance with staircase to the center of the uppermost gallery, will turn out to have been such a cavea shrine.

In Chapter V Hanson discusses further bonds between temple and theaters, namely *pompa*, *sellisternium*, and altar. A sacred procession opened all theatrical as well as circus plays. It began at the temple or altar and ended on the stage (Tertullian, *De Spect.*, 10, 1-2). Among the objects brought to the theater were chairs (*sellae*) with cushions, drapery, and symbols of the gods for whom the games were given. In the pediment of the temple of the Great Mother, represented in a relief in Villa Medici (p. 15, Fig. 3) stood the *sella* with the turreted mural crown of the goddess. Thus she could look down on the plays, as in other cases the statue of the goddess was supposed to do. Other such seats were set up in the cavea among the other honorary seats for important persons. Thus the god was an onlooker to the performances. Remains of permanent altars have been found in the orchestra near the front rows of seats, or in the center or near the *pulpitum* of the theaters at Leptis Magna, Dugga, Arles, Merida, Taragona, Philippi, and Tusculum.

In an Appendix Hanson adds other architectural bonds between theater and temple (pp. 95-101), through which the two buildings are connected. The most important and clear examples are the large *portici* behind the scene-building in the form of the one behind the theater of Pompey, but with a temple in the center, as in the Caesarea. Such colonnaded squares exist in Leptis Magna and Ostia (Fig. 45). In the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia the Romans built an auditorium around the temple about 200 A.D. The Roman gymnasium in Syracuse had a temple directly behind the *scena* and an altar all enclosed in one *portico* (Fig. 48; Bieber, *op. cit.*, Fig. 620, photographic view). A looser connection exists between temple, theater, and altar in the Fountain sanctuary at Nîmes (Fig. 50). Similar are the groups in Dura, Seleucia, and Delos (pp. 66 f., Figs. 29-31). Theater and temple open upon the same court of the sanctuaries, without any direct connection. These three, therefore, belong in the appendix, not in chapter IV dealing with theater buildings combined with temples. Still looser is the connection of temples outside the cavea, separated by considerable distance and not axial to the theater, in Champlieu (Fig. 49), Lyons, Alesia, and Fiesole (Figs. 51-3). Also the three temples near the large theater at Pompeii, the earlier temple in the Forum triangulare, the later temples of Zeus Meilichios and Isis (Fig. 54), are neither contemporary nor in direct connection with the theater (Bieber, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-4, Figs. 605-12).

A real material connection with the theater exists, in contrast, with regard to the sanctuaries for Nemesis in the central room of the stage building in Stobi (Fig. 55) and in Philippi, and the one for Pietas in the Marcellus theater.

The book is well written, richly documented, and illustrated with clear plans. The main result is the fact that in Roman times the

different gods became onlookers at the games and ceremonies in their honor, while in Greece Dionysus was the main lord of all dramatic festivals. Theater and temple are separate units in Greece; they become one architectural axial unit in Italy.

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HANS PETER SYNDIKUS. *Lucans Gedicht vom Bürgerkrieg. Untersuchungen zur epischen Technik und zu den Grundlagen des Werkes.* Munich, "Uni"-Druck, 1958. Pp. 180.

In the course of the centuries many darts have been shot at Lucan, few as deadly as those of Robert Graves, his most recent translator: "Lucan may be called the father of yellow journalism, for his love of sensational detail, his unprincipled reportage, and his disregard of continuity between to-day's and yesterday's rhetoric. . . . Lucan may also be called the father of the costume-film." There have been more glib generalizations about the poem than careful studies of it, and more investigations of single points than comprehensive criticism of the whole. Little serious attention has been devoted to Lucan's poetic technique, to the manner in which he transmutes recent history into poetry. It is therefore gratifying to find that a serious dissertation on the subject has been written in Munich by a pupil of Professor Klingner, Hans Peter Syndikus.

Almost every significant aspect of the poem is examined: the sources used by Lucan, his handling of them, his presentation of historical events, his narrative technique, his use of "pathos," views on life and the world, his creation of characters, the poetic unity of the design and the disposition of the parts, the overall structure of the poem. Some of Syndikus' most penetrating comments deal with Lucan's handling of time, particularly in contrast with Vergil's. He shows that historical occurrences are in themselves no primary concern of the poet, that he has little interest in the description of swiftly moving action or the orderly succession of events. One of the striking characteristics of the epic is the lack of motivation, the static quality, of the historical episodes and the scanty treatment which they receive. Events are painted when they are past and therefore unalterable, contrasting scenes juxtaposed, incidents and issues so tersely handled as hardly to inform the reader of what is happening. Lucan prefers instead to depict scenes of emotional intensity, reminiscent of Ovid and Seneca. He chooses to build up, expand, and heighten moments of passion and tension rather than to describe the actual facts of history.

Syndikus attempts to characterize Lucan's style. He discusses his images, the use and abuse of rhetorical devices, his partiality for antitheses, paradoxes, repetitions, catalogues of all kinds, the heaping up of details, the abruptness of the exposition and of the transitions. The extravagance of Lucan's florid portrayal of men and emotions, his love of violence, his intemperance, the exaggerations of his diction resemble the excesses of the Baroque style. Syndikus

analyzes the way in which Lucan draws out and strains the description of stirring scenes and prolongs them almost beyond endurance. But whereas the critical examination of Lucan's pathos is subtle and searching, that of his style and diction, of his images, metaphors and symbols, of the vocabulary with which he achieves his poetic effects, is superficial. There is no study of his versification.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the work is that dealing with Lucan's historical sources. Instead of repeating, as most scholars have done, Pichon's thesis that Lucan used Livy as his only source, Syndikus subjects the texts dealing with the civil war to a fresh and rigorous scrutiny. After examining numerous passages, he determines that Appian and Plutarch represent a different tradition from that of the *Periochae* and the "Livian" authors, Valerius Maximus, Florus, Dio Cassius, Eutropius, Julius Obsequens, and Orosius. His examination of the texts leads him to the conclusion that Livy used the annalistic method in the lost books as he did in those that have survived; that he described the events of the civil war in chronological sequence without attempting to separate the essential and significant from the irrelevant, to knit the episodes tightly or to analyze historical processes by seeking to discover hidden relationships, causes and effects. On the other hand, in the passages where Appian and Plutarch diverge from the Livian school, as they often do, this is due, according to Syndikus, to their common source, Asinius Pollio. A comparative study of such passages shows, he thinks, how radically different Pollio's historical method was from Livy's. Pollio subordinated the exposition to an artistic design, he selected for inclusion only essential material in order to create a well unified synthesis, in which large and small units were articulated, often stylized and dramatized to illustrate the whole. The focus was always upon the main and central development, events were forced into an orderly and coherent pattern or left out as irrelevant and their mutual connexions were made clear. It is a pity that Syndikus did not have access to Emilio Gabba's study of Appian (Florence, 1956).

Lucan clearly belongs to the Livian group. Like these authors, for instance, he describes graphically the siege of Marseilles which Caesar reports at length but Appian and Plutarch leave out as marginal. Like them he emphasizes the Roman elements in law and politics, whereas Pollio's imitators show that he concentrated upon the universal. The two traditions meet when Pollio's work is behind Livy's since Livy used both Caesar and Pollio. Lucan and the other Livian authors show similarities with Caesar when Livy himself had used the *Commentaries*. They are close to Appian and Plutarch when Livy is not using Caesar, but is presumably following Pollio.

That Lucan depends almost entirely upon Livy is not disproved by the fact that he mentions events about which the Livian authors are silent. But in a few passages he agrees with Appian and Plutarch in opposition to the Livian tradition. This would indicate, Syndikus thinks, that in rare cases, when he had some special effect to achieve, he drew from a source other than Livy, as of course he did in the non-historical parts of the poem. The reviewer is not entirely convinced by the evidence so ably marshalled by Syndikus. Lucan was well read, and must have known general histories of Rome which

comprised the civil war, and other works no longer extant. He may also have had access to some historical text book convenient for quick reference.

In the course of his analysis of the text, Syndikus notes that many apparently irrelevant episodes or digressions are introduced by the poet because they shed light upon the hidden motives of men. Instead of describing individuals directly, Lucan often prefers to build up personalities through the insertion of scenes that have no real function in the development of the main action. Such scenes also serve to foreshadow coming disasters, to give expression to the poet's views on fate, fortune, and the gods, to point up the real meaning of the *Pharsalia*. They are therefore an organic part of the whole and often play a more significant role than the historical sections. Syndikus gives many proofs that Lucan had carefully planned his poem from the beginning and that its composition was consistent with the plan. The climax was not Pharsalus, but rather the downfall of freedom, the deaths of Cato and Caesar. Syndikus does not agree with Bruère that the poem was to include the battle of Actium. He sees no indication that it went beyond the murder of Caesar.

He does not believe, as does the reviewer, that the Stoic view of life to which Lucan was committed is the groundwork on which the poem is built. For him Lucan was first and foremost a Roman, his thoughts were informed and his imagination fired by the ideals of the early Republic. He yearned to glorify these and felt that the madness of the civil war had put an end to the true greatness of Rome. The painful realization of how little nobility survived in his own day inspired him to make the war between Caesar and Pompey the theme of his epic. Hence the deliberate contrast with the *Aeneid*. But when he praised the lost glory of the Republic he had no polemical or political purpose. In Cato he created a true Roman endowed with the traditional virtues that had made Rome great, rather than the ideal Stoic. His Caesar is the typical tyrant. Both Cato and Caesar are almost depersonalized idols. Pompey, on the other hand, is a great Roman general portrayed compassionately, with his weaknesses and sufferings, almost as a character in tragic drama. He does not change, develop, or progress in the course of the poem. Syndikus takes strong exception to the reviewer's interpretation of the characters and of the meaning of the *Pharsalia*. These will be expanded and clarified in a forthcoming book in which Syndikus' views will be examined in more detail.

There are a number of typographical errors and evidence that the book has not been carefully proofread. To give just one instance, a line in the middle of page 150 is left blank where a quotation should have been inserted. The footnotes, gathered together at the end of the volume, are very difficult to refer to. The absence of running heads as guides to identification of the chapters to which the notes belong hampers the reader unnecessarily. The chapters have titles but no numbers. And in order to have space, the footnotes are printed continuously, without a blank or a dash to separate them.

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WILLIAM C. HELMBOLD and EDWARD N. O'NEIL. Plutarch's Quotations. London and Beccles, American Philological Association (to be ordered through the Secretary of the Association or through B. H. Blackwell), 1959. Pp. xiii + 76. (*Philological Monographs*, No. XIX.)

This monograph is a compilation of Plutarch's quotations, listing in parallel columns the citations from the authors quoted and the references from the *Moralia* and the *Lives*, where the quotations are to be found. It includes, however, in addition to the actual quotations, reminiscences and paraphrases; and various symbols are used to indicate a reference that is not a direct quotation, a direct quotation from a work extant in its entirety, a doubtful attribution, an attribution that is conjectural or very likely false, and a list of citations that is probably incomplete. The entire Plutarchian corpus has been indexed (with the exception of those portions of Bernardakis VII which the compilers regard as undoubtedly spurious), and Latin as well as Greek authors are listed.

Although there are occasional comments (e. g., "one begins to feel certain that Plut. had been reading the *Leges* while working on the *Lycurgus*," in reference to *Leges* 772B and *Lycurgus* 47a), such remarks are exceedingly infrequent; and the slender volume aspires to be nothing more than a compilation. This fact, however, does not conceal the erudition and industry that went into its preparation, for Plutarch was a prolific writer, who quoted or alluded to a really vast number of earlier authors, as a cursory glance through the index reveals. The compilers themselves readily observe that "there is an enormous amount still to be done" and in the preface issue an appeal to specialists in all areas to submit directly to them any additional references that would properly augment the index.

The preface also contains a brief presentation of some of the problems which the compilers anticipate their index will be useful in solving. In the first place, the work makes it possible to discuss more accurately whether Plutarch knew a particular author well, had read him only superficially, or was relying entirely upon secondary material. It is, furthermore, pointed out that the compilation will be valuable for the study of certain MS traditions and for the interpretation of the general nature of fragmentary quotation in antiquity, for Plutarch's own library must have provided him with many of the texts from which he quoted, and he is the only, or a primary, source for the fragments of numerous works no longer extant. We might add that it should now be easier to determine the extent to which Plutarch was independent of a particular source as regards vocabulary, style, and ideas, when he is not actually quoting but is relying upon it for facts or still has it in mind. And this, in turn, may shed some light on his method and technique.

Although other scholars have frequently pointed out certain quotations or reminiscences occurring in Plutarch, to a considerable degree the compilers have had to depend on their own knowledge of Greek and Latin literature, particularly in the case of the *Moralia*, for the preparation of the lists, since this is the first attempt at a

complete index of the whole Plutarchian corpus. The reviewer wonders if the *testimonia* at the foot of each page in the Teubner editions of the *Lives* and the *Moralia* were of any help. Perhaps they were not. For the parallels between Plutarch and Plato, however, there was available the index prepared by Roger Miller Jones, which constitutes the final chapter of his dissertation, *The Platonism of Plutarch* (Chicago, 1916). Jones in this index has listed all the Platonic quotations and reminiscences of Plutarch known to him, both drawing upon references given by other scholars and adding a large number discovered by himself. Helmbold and O'Neil have, of course, incorporated into their own compilation the references of Jones, but they have supplemented them with over two hundred additional ones. For the *Lives* the compilers had at their disposal Konrat Ziegler's "Index auctorum a Plutarcho laudatorum" in the Teubner edition (IV, 2), but their citations from the *Lives* in general tend to outnumber Ziegler's.

Ziegler has based his interpretation of Plutarch's "Bildung" ("Plutarchos," *R.-E.*, cols. 914-28) on the index just mentioned for the *Lives* and on his own compilation for the *Moralia*, although in the case of the latter he has provided only the final statistics, without any index. Helmbold and O'Neil's work corroborates Ziegler's conclusion "dass P. zu den gebildetsten und belesensten Menschen seiner Zeit gehört hat" (a quotation also utilized and briefly discussed by the authors in their preface), for their more complete statistics consistently equal or surpass his. For instance, Ziegler remarks, "Die homerischen Hymnen sind bei P. nicht zitiert, doch werden wir nicht bezweifeln, dass er sie gekannt hat," yet Helmbold and O'Neil list five references to the *Hymns* in the *Moralia*. There is not generally, however, so striking a divergence in statistics, and we can not be sure just where Ziegler drew the line between quotation and reminiscence.

No attempt has been made by the reviewer to check systematically the accuracy of the citations, but it should be noted that if Aeschylus is cited by the *OCT*, as indicated by the compilers, *Prometheus* 351-2: *923C and 380-1: *102B should read *Prometheus* 349-50: *923C and 378-9: *102B.

Although the reviewer scarcely feels qualified to evaluate the thoroughness of the compilation, it is his impression that the index is exceptionally complete for a first edition. At any rate, the compilers are to be complimented for providing modern scholarship with a needed and useful tool. And if they receive an enthusiastic response to their plea for additional references, the *lacunae* remaining in the lists will soon be filled.

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D. R. SHACKLETON BAILEY. Towards a Text of Cicero *Ad Atticum*. Cambridge University Press, 1960. Pp. ix + 104. \$5.50. (*Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society*, New Series, X, 1959.)

Dr. Shackleton Bailey has undertaken a new Oxford Classical Text of *Ad Atticum* IX-XVI, and the present volume, originally intended as a series of articles, represents a preliminary stage of his work. He claims neither comprehensiveness nor finality, and indeed invites criticism which may modify his conclusions. This modest disclaimer gives no hint of the harvest of learning which awaits the reader of these few pages, and one may hope that the author will not finally limit the results of his work to the austere text and apparatus of the Oxford series, where only results appear without their supporting arguments.

The University Lecturer in Tibetan launches Housmanic barbs at earlier students who failed to see the light. Tyrrell and Purser are favorite targets: thus on p. 71, "A fleeting visitation of common sense led TP to think of altering *adfectus* to *refectus*. . . ." There is much here, however, besides polemics, and perhaps Shackleton Bailey is entitled to his Olympian laughter. His suggestions are based on various grounds. There is in particular a resolute refusal to suppose that Cicero, whatever his faults, wrote or thought like a fool: in contrast to the object of one of his shafts, the author never makes Cicero babble. Thus on p. 11, discussing II, 24, 4, he writes: "In the next sentence editors read with Lambinus *nihil me <infortunatius, nihil> fortunatius Catulo*. It matters comparatively little that dictionaries record no other example of *infortunatus* between Terence and Apuleius, nor of *infortunator* at any period. Cicero may have been an egoist, but he was not a fool; and it is mere fatuity for a man whose party is threatened with massacre to write that *he* is therefore the most unfortunate thing on earth. In reality Cicero's mind here is plainly *not* on himself, though it turns that way in the next sentence, *nos tamen* et sqq. Something, of course, has disappeared after *me*. Perhaps *hercule*, since *me iudice* for *meo iudicio* seems to be un-Ciceronian." Again, we find on p. 84 this comment on XVI, 13b: "Only half-wits ask their friends to advise them every day on the same point. Editors began to make Cicero do so in the seventeenth century. Previously they printed thus, or nearly thus:

tu quid faciendum sit videbis, praeterea possimne propius accedere . . . an etiam longius discedendum putes. crebro ad me velim scribas. erit autem cotidie cui des."

A thorough knowledge of the history of the period proves a valuable tool: it is pointed out that *quae* . . . *pervertuntur* in XV, 6, 3, "if a statement of fact, is a monstrous exaggeration of anything that was going on in Italy in May 44." The suggestion, p. 75, is brief and sensible: "Perhaps *pervertentur*." History and palaeography combine to solve the curious reference to Clodius in IV, 15, 4, *Publius sane deserto epilogo criminans mentes iudicum moverat*. A convincing argument puts it almost beyond question that Clodius spoke for

Procius, not for the prosecution, and that his appeal *ad misericordiam* was emotional: "*criminans* should be *lacrimans*." Purely palaeographic is the final comment, p. 43, on IX, 11, 4: "No one, on the other hand, has to my knowledge drawn attention to the similarity in minuscule between *tantum* and *iā nrum* and wished to read *numquam tantum*."

Much may be learned from Shackleton Bailey's comments on usage. A few examples from early pages are those on *legatio* and *adlegatio*, p. 1, on *sine causa*, p. 5, and on *nihil esse* and *nihili esse*, p. 6. It is refreshing to find no pretence that all problems have been solved, and indeed passages remain where the only proper decision is *non liquet*. Thus after three and one-half pages of discussion of XII, 5b the author concludes: "The passage should be obelized."

This is not a book for the casual reader, and in some ways is perhaps not truly a book: articles, after all, might have been a more suitable means of presenting this matter. None the less the reviewer found all the discussions well worth serious consideration, and most of them convincing. If one may judge by this evidence, the new Oxford Text will be a genuine advance in Ciceronian scholarship. At least one reader hopes that the text will be followed by a commentary presenting in ampler form the results of Shackleton Bailey's profitable labors.

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PAUL MACKENDRICK. *The Mute Stones Speak: The Story of Archaeology in Italy*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1960. Pp. 369. \$7.50.

To compress within these pages the study of archaeological discoveries in Italy from prehistoric times to the fourth century A.D. is a task as exacting as that of presenting the material in such a way that it will appeal not only to the general reader but also to the classical student. A highly intelligent non-classicist, whose opinion of the book I sought, found the opening chapter on prehistoric Italy with its "complicated tables" too technical. On the other hand, the specialist who reviewed the volume for the *Saturday Review* described this same chapter as "very weak indeed." In the ranks of classical scholars too, there would inevitably be differences of opinion, for example, on such points as to whether the amount of space has been properly apportioned among the periods of Roman history which are included. But every one would agree that Professor MacKendrick's problem of selection was a difficult one. Since his engagingly-written account is meant primarily for the "general reader," it is from this point of view that it must be judged rather than from that of the professional scholar.

To the latter, however, the book will also recommend itself for a number of reasons. In the first place, it includes fairly detailed descriptions and informative diagrams concerning such recent archaeological discoveries as the Sperlonga Cave, the Villa of Piazza Armerina, and the tombs beneath St. Peter's. It also brings together

material that is scattered among publications that are not always easily accessible to students in this country. Its attractive format and excellent illustrations give pleasure to the seasoned professor and at the same time may well lure younger people to develop an interest in Italian archaeology. A suggestive bibliography for each of the thirteen chapters invites the reader to explore more deeply a particular topic.

Among the recent spate of books both popular and scholarly which describe archaeological discoveries connected with various civilizations, it is good to have a book of this sort, dealing with things Roman. We may hope that it will find a place not only in school and college libraries, but also in the personal library of students whose interest in Roman civilization has recently been awakened.

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(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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THE CORRECTOR OF THE CODEX OF CICERO'S *DE REPUBLICA*.*

The corrector of the famous Ciceronian palimpsest, according to a hypothesis recently advanced in this journal by Mr. G. V. Sumner, was "not a mere scribe, but a man of antiquarian interests, whose corrections were those of a reader trying to makes sense of the corrupt text before him."¹ Accordingly, in the chapter on the *comitia centuriata* (II, 22, 39-40), Sumner proposes the elimination of most of the additions made by the corrector and the insertion of some changes of his own which would, he holds, produce an intelligible account of the Servian assembly. In applying his hypothesis to the chapter Sumner does not mention the fact that he is following a long series of constitutional historians and philologists, beginning with Niebuhr, whose emendations Cardinal Mai quoted but did not accept in the edition of the *De Republica*, published in Stuttgart in 1822, the year of the first Roman editions.² This chapter was the basis of the suspicion with which the corrector was long regarded.³

* I wish to express my gratitude to my colleague Professor Berthe Marti for advice and encouragement in the preparation of this paper.

¹ "Cicero on the Comitia Centuriata," *A. J. P.*, LXXXI (1960), pp. 136-56; for the quotation see p. 146, where the alternate suggestion is made that the corrector may have used a manuscript with corrections made earlier by "some possessor of antiquarian knowledge."

² Niebuhr's views on the passage are reflected in his correspondence and in his *Römische Geschichte*, I⁴ (1933), note, pp. 472 f., where he declares that the "dummes und verwegenes Ändern" of the corrector contributed to the "gräuliche Corruption" of the passage.

³ See, for instance, *Rhein. Mus.*, VIII (1853), with articles by Friedrich

The failure of scholars to examine all the corrections before condemning the corrector was a result of Mai's failure to note fully the changes and additions in the codex, many of which appear without comment in Mai's editions of 1822 and later, and also in the editions of other scholars. The codex was not made available for examination until several years after Mai's death in 1854. The first published collation, the work of a young Dutchman, G. N. Du Rieu, appeared in 1860 with a strong defense of the corrector.⁴ The task of investigating the corrections as a whole was suggested by August Reifferscheid to his student Abraham Strelitz. Strelitz's excellent dissertation, published in 1874,⁵ disposed of the suggestion that the corrector was an antiquarian inventor. His view that the corrections were based on excellent manuscript authority was accepted by the great Ciceronian scholar C. F. W. Mueller in his Teubner text of 1878.⁶ Later, confirmatory evidence was presented by Carl Pfaff and particularly by Konrat Ziegler in his five successive Teubner editions.⁷ In the dim writing of the corrector, even more obscured by the cleaning of the parchment than the original text was, Ziegler has been able to find a number of additional

Ritschl, pp. 308-20, Ludwig Lange, pp. 616-23, and E. Huschke, pp. 404-15. The two former scholars condemn the corrector, while Huschke defends him, but makes emendations. Orelli (see his text of Cicero, IV, 1 [1828], p. 450, the commentary on *R. P.*, II, 39) shared Mai's confidence in the corrector.

⁴ *Schedae Vaticanae* (Lugdunum Batavorum, 1860). The edition of Carl Halm in the Orelli-Baiter text of Cicero, IV (1862), was the first to take account of Du Rieu's work and also of an examination of some pages of the palimpsest made by Detlefsen. See p. 759 and his critical apparatus. But Halm was decidedly arbitrary in accepting and rejecting the work of the corrector.

⁵ *De antiquo Ciceronis de republica librorum emendatore* (Breslau, 1874). For a summary of discussions of II, 39-40, see pp. 59-76.

⁶ *Ciceronis opera*, IV, 2, *adnotatio critica*, p. xxiv, with criticisms in succeeding pages of the attitude of Halm and Baiter toward the corrector.

⁷ C. Pfaff, *De diversis manibus quibus Ciceronis de republica libri in codice Vaticano correcti sunt* (Heidelberg, 1885). The author depends in part on the collation of August Mau. Pfaff's identification of two separate correctors of the codex is doubted by Ziegler, 5th ed., pp. xxvii f., who finds only one sure example of a late correction. Ziegler's first edition appeared in 1915, the later ones in 1929, 1955, 1958, and (5th) 1960. On the corrector, see the 5th edition, pp. xxiii-xxxi and the article cited below, n. 8.

corrections, some of which confirm emendations made by scholars in the text. The corrector's orthography, for instance in the change of *senatus* to *saenatus*, may, Ziegler concedes, be his own, but the relation of his changes to the accepted text of the *De Republica* is shown by the fact that in seven passages the corrections are reflected in *testimonia* from Nonius, Servius, and St. Augustine.⁸ The conclusions of Strelitz, Pfaff, and Ziegler can be tested in A. W. Van Buren's careful collation⁹ and, with more difficulty, in the Vatican reproduction of the codex.¹⁰

The manuscript used by the corrector, in the view of Strelitz, Pfaff, Ziegler, A. C. Clark,¹¹ and Cardinal Mercati, was the manuscript copied by the scribe; the corrections, Mercati suggested, may have been made, soon after the codex was copied at Bobbio, by a man whose duty it was to examine the work of the less careful and more ignorant scribes.¹² The corrector's use of the scribe's manuscript is particularly clear in the filling out of omissions, some of which occur in the middle of sentences or even of words. Instances where a different word is substituted for one that made sense are explained by Ziegler and Clark on the theory that the manuscript had alternate readings.

On the character of the archetype there has been some difference of opinion. Strelitz noted omissions, some of them explained by *homoeoteleuton*, and also repetitions of about 30 letters, and suggested that this was the measure of one or perhaps of two lines. Pfaff made a longer list, particularly of repetitions, noting that some of them were explained by *homoeoarcton*, and estimated that there were about 35 letters to the line. That

⁸ The passages are I, 41, 59, 60; II, 9, 17, 19, 26. See Ziegler, *Hermes*, LI (1916), pp. 266 f.

⁹ *Supplementary Papers of the American School of Classical Studies in Rome*, II (1908), pp. 84-262.

¹⁰ *M. Tullii Ciceronis De Republica libri e codice rescripto Vaticano Latino 5757 phototypice expressi* (Vatican, 1934), two vol., the first containing *Prolegomena* by Cardinal Giovanni Mercati.

¹¹ *The Descent of Manuscripts* (Oxford, 1918), pp. 124-38.

¹² *Op. cit.* (n. 10, above), pp. 200-3; see p. 202 for the passage summarized, a statement quoted with approval by Ziegler, 5th ed., p. xxvii. L. Castiglioni in the *praefatio* to his text (Turin, 1st ed. 1936; 2nd, 1947) criticizes the orthography and some changes of the corrector and leaves open the question whether he was using the manuscript of the scribe. But Castiglioni accepts all the corrections listed under A and B below.

estimate is accepted by Ziegler in his second (1929) and subsequent editions,¹³ but he does not collect the pertinent passages, all of which appear, sometimes with new readings, in his excellent critical apparatus.

As a result of a careful study of omissions and repetitions, Clark reached a different conclusion on the character of the archetype. Publishing in 1918 without access to Ziegler's first edition, and apparently without knowing the work of Strelitz and Pfaff, Clark tried to show that the archetype, like the palimpsest, was in double columns, with a similar average of slightly more than ten letters to the line, but with nineteen or twenty instead of fifteen lines in each column. A repetition of 197 letters (see B 6, below), in Clark's view, was the measure of a column of the archetype.¹⁴ Recently Otto Skutsch has proposed insertions based on the assumption that there were nine to eleven letters in the line of the archetype.¹⁵

Thus the evidence for the character of the manuscript used by the corrector was unknown to Clark and Skutsch, as well as to Sumner. It has also been unknown to various editors of the *De Republica*. I cite, for example, the statement of C. W. Keyes that there is "great disagreement in regard to the comparative value of the first and second hands."¹⁶

¹³ 5th ed., p. xxix, with citation of Pfaff's long note, *op. cit.* (n. 7, above), p. 5.

¹⁴ Clark, *op. cit.* (n. 11, above), pp. 135 f. Clark holds (p. 52) that at least two examples of similar omissions are required as a basis for conclusions on the nature of the archetype, and he finds another example of the omission of 197 letters in II, 20, but here the scribe, who wrote *mortalitate* for *mortali*, could not have repeated more than four letters. The example is not convincing.

¹⁵ *Philol.*, CIII (1959), pp. 140-4. The passages are I, 37 and II, 39 (on the centuriate assembly). Skutsch's suggestion on the number of letters in the line of the archetype is based on Ziegler's rather misleading comment on Clark's theory (5th ed., p. xxix; Skutsch quotes the 3rd ed.). See also K. Büchner's objections to Skutsch, with no reference to the evidence on the manuscript the corrector used, *Philol.*, CIV (1960), pp. 298-309, with Skutsch's reply, *ibid.*, pp. 309 f. Cf. n. 23, below.

¹⁶ Loeb text (1928, reprinted 1943, 1948), p. 9, n. 1, with references to Ziegler's first edition and to Galbiati's *praefatio* to Pascal's text (Turin, 1916). See n. 12, above, for Castiglioni, who is quoted with approval by Ferrero in his text and commentary (Florence, 1953, reprinted 1957), p. 4. But Ferrero's criticisms of the corrector are much more severe

The really decisive evidence is provided by the omissions and repetitions, lists of which are buried in the dissertations of Strelitz and Pfaff and are presented under a misleading arrangement in Clark's important book. The collection of material presented below owes much to these scholars and also to Ziegler, whose readings I have, in general, followed.¹⁷ The numbered omissions and repetitions indicate lines of 28 to 40 letters. The pertinent passages are in italics (with Roman type for preceding and succeeding words which often explain the scribe's error. References to the *De Republica* are followed in each case by the page number of the codex and by the number of letters omitted or repeated.

A. Omissions supplied by the corrector

- 1) I, 31, p. 182 (33): *quaerit quo modo duo soles visi sunt non quaerit cur*
- 2) I, 43, p. 106 (29): *similitudo quaedam servitutis si Athenienses quib. dā temporibus*
- 3) I, 60, p. 265 (29): *ducebat adque eam consilio sedari volebat adde avaritiam*. Ziegler was the first to read *que* and *ad* in the insertion.
- 4) I, 61, p. 268 (35): *quippe vilico quid domi pluresne praesunt negotiis tuis immo vero unus*. The reading of the preceding words, altered by the corrector, is *quippe vili tuis*, with *tuis* inserted from the line omitted.
- 5) II, 28, p. 70 (39 or ca. 29): *Numam Pythagoraene ipsius discipulum aut certe Pythagoreum fuisse saepe enim hoc*. Here the page has only fourteen instead of the usual fifteen lines, and the corrector has made his insertion in two lines below. If Ziegler is right that the last line is erased, the addition is about 29 letters.
- 6) II, 31, p. 217 (28-30): *creavit isq. de imperio suo exemplo Pompili populum consuluit*. Here the letters preceding the omission are

than Castiglioni's. In spite of doubts about the corrector, Keyes and Ferrero put in their texts, usually without a word about the corrector, all the passages listed under A below.

¹⁷ Strelitz, *op. cit.*, p. 67, cites seven omissions and two repetitions. He asks whether it is likely that the corrector would have tried to make his additions credible by introducing *homoeoteleuton* in II, 39. Pfaff, *op. cit.*, p. 5, n., lists additional repetitions, pointing out *homoeoarcton* in several instances. Clark cites most of the passages, also noting explanations for omissions and repetitions, usually of three lines, in accord with his estimate of about ten letters to the line. (He also notes shorter omissions and repetitions which would represent one or two lines, but there are few of these.) Ziegler's readings have led to the addition of A 3 to the omissions and, in several instances, to a different estimate of the number of letters omitted or repeated.

CRAEUIPILO. *Is* or *isq.* may have followed *creavit* in the line, but the scribe's eye dropped down to the end of the next line.

7) II, 39, p. 108 (ca. 33): *centurias habeat quibus e cent. quattuor centuriis tot enim reliquae*. This is Ziegler's reading for the *quib.* and *centuri* of Van Buren. Ziegler and Du Rieu also read *tot* at the end of the insertion, but the word appears in the next line of the codex.

8) II, 45, p. 255 (29): *et cum metueret ipse poenam sceleris sui summā metui se volebat*

9) II, 58, pp. 8, 191 (34): *ut contra consulare imperium tr.pl. sic illi contra vim regiam constituti*. The reading of the scribe is *consularem*.

The only other omission longer than two words is a passage of 50 letters where a series of geographical names ending *-am* were left out (II, 9, p. 228).

B. Repetitions cancelled by the original scribe or by the corrector

1) I, 60, p. 266 (36): *probas igitur animum ita adfectum nihil vero inquit magis ergo non probares*. The repetition is explained by the familiar word *profectum*.

2) II, 5, pp. 290, 157 (39): *copiisq. facillimum ut in agrum Rutilorum Aboriginumq. procederet*. For the second *q.* in the scribe's first version *-ve* appears at the end of the line, perhaps a sign of a double reading in the archetype.

3) II, 27, pp. 88, 69 (29): *nam quae perdiscenda quaeq. observanda essent multa constituit*

4) II, 51, p. 189 (30): *totum genus hoc regiae civitatis everterit sit huic oppositus*

5) II, 70, p. 9 (40): *falsum illud esse sine iniuria non posse set hoc verissimum esse sine summa iustitia*

6) I, 49, p. 170 (197 letters, apparently six lines). The passage begins and ends *societas civium*. There is a lacuna in the text after 74 letters of the repetition, but the passage was probably repeated in its entirety. See Clark's discussion, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

7) I, 64, p. 150 (57, two lines?): *mansisset eadem voluntas in eorum posteris si regum similitudo permansisset sed vides*

The next three examples are repetitions of portions of lines which seem to be accounted for by lines of about 35 letters in the archetype.

8) I, 52, p. 117: *nulla cupiditate*, 15 letters, repeated after 67 letters (two lines) in the form *in ulla cupiditate*

9) I, 27, p. 140, repetition of 18 letters following a line of 35 letters: *numquā se plus agere quam nihil cum ageret numquam se plus agere numquam minus solū*. The repetition of *numquam*, if it was at the beginning of a line, would explain the scribe's mistake.

10) II, 60, pp. 130, 41, insertion, apparently from the next line, of 15 letters before a line of 35 letters: *annis post res multis dicendis ea XX ex eo quod L. Papirius P. Pinarius censores multis dicendis*.

There are a number of shorter repetitions with a maximum of 22 letters, but only one other example of more than 40 letters: I, 11, p. 85 (49), explained by the recurrence of *necessitate*.

The average number of letters in all the lines omitted and repeated is about 32.5 and approximately 33 in the long passage under B 6. The length is similar to that of the Ciceronian lines in Asconius' citations (34.2 letters to the line) and slightly less than the standard hexameter line on which the ancient scribe's pay seems to have been based.¹⁸ The variation in the length of the lines, which average longer in the repetitions than in the omissions, may be partly explained by the compressed space available to the corrector and perhaps by a tendency on the part of the scribe to expand on his model. Another factor may have been that, like the codex, the archetype was written by more than one scribe. Of the two scribes whose hands Ziegler was the first to distinguish in the codex, Scribe A averages about ten letters to the line, Scribe B about eleven.¹⁹

All these omissions and repetitions, as Ziegler has pointed out, come from the work of Scribe A, the copyist of six sevenths of the codex. Scribe B was, in general, more careful. In the sections of the codex attributed to him, most of the surviving portion of Book III and one sheet of Book V, I find no omission longer than one word.

Homoeoteleuton accounts for six of the nine omissions—A 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9. *Homoeoarcton* explains six of the ten repetitions—B 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 (only of the initial letter in the first two cases). There are other explanations for the errors in A 4 and 6 and B 1. Of the 21 omissions and repetitions longer than 22 letters, 19 indicate that the scribe omitted or repeated an entire line of his model.

This evidence for the archetype of the codex proves that Mai was right in resisting the strictures of the great Niebuhr and in

¹⁸ See Birt, *Antikes Buchwesen* (Berlin, 1882), p. 199. For the normal number of letters in the estimates of lines, see Dziatzko, *s. v.* "Buch," *R.-E.*, col. 954 and the bibliography cited by Weinberger, *s. v.* "Stichometrie." Pfaff and Ziegler (see his *praefatio*, p. xxix, "ex more antiquo") recognize the relationship of these lines to the standard Ciceronian line.

¹⁹ On the two copyists, see the *praefatio*, pp. xv-xxiii and Mercati, *op. cit.* (in n. 10, above), pp. 196-200, with additional evidence for the two scribes.

keeping the readings of the corrector in the chapter on the centuriate assembly (II, 22, 39-40). The corrections here show the character of the archetype. The change from *liticinibus* to *cornicinibus* (39) suggests that there were variant readings in the original.²⁰ The long insertion of about thirty-three letters represents the omission, because of *homoeoteleuton*, of a line of the archetype. The text must be dealt with as an ancient version of what Cicero wrote.²¹ Now that the *Tabula Hebana* has provided confirmation for Mommsen's seemingly fantastic suggestions on the method of counting votes, there is, as Tibiletti was the first to show, no longer any reason to doubt that the text is right in showing the same number of votes (193) in the reformed assembly that existed in the Servian organization.²² Cicero, whose introductory remarks would, if we had them, perhaps explain his curious procedure, speaks first of the Servian and then of the reformed assembly (39), and then returns (40) to the Servian organization. In the *illarum sex et nonaginta centuriarum* of the latter section Cicero makes a slip, forgetting that this remainder belonged not to the Servian but to the reformed assembly.²³ It is a slip that I think anyone who has

²⁰ Sumner, *op. cit.* (in n. 1, above), p. 138, accepts the corrector here, favoring, as I do, the reading *liticinibus cornicinibus*. He also accepts the correction in § 40 of *mille centum* to *quingentos*, which depends on the D which no one except Mai has been able to see in the codex.

²¹ Since Strelitz's work was published, the authority of the corrector has been much more widely recognized by constitutional historians than by editors (see n. 16, above) of the *De Republica*. See, for instance, Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, III (Leipzig, 1887), p. 274, n. 4, and Fraccaro in the paper cited in n. 23.

²² *Athenaeum*, XXVII (1949), pp. 210-45. The results have been widely accepted. E. S. Staveley, *A. J. P.*, LXXIV (1953), pp. 1-33 (see also *Historia*, V [1956], pp. 112-19), takes 193 to be the total number of votes in both assemblies but rejects Mommsen's suggestions on the methods of counting the votes.

²³ This is the explanation of Fraccaro, *Studi Bonfanti*, I (Pavia, 1929), pp. 109-13 (reprinted *Opuscula*, II [Pavia, 1957], pp. 176-81). Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 139, n. 3, misunderstands the arguments of Fraccaro which are directed primarily against De Sanetis and, more particularly, Klebs, whose attribution of crass ignorance to Cicero Fraccaro is unable to countenance. While agreeing with Mommsen's view in general, Fraccaro does not think that Cicero treated the Servian and the reformed assembly as equivalent and would not supply *curavit*, with Servius as subject, to explain the tenses of *excluderetur* and *valeret*. Instead he interprets

tried to explain to students the intricacies of the centuriate assembly could pardon. But one would have expected Cicero himself or Atticus, who read Cicero's works with great care, to catch the error. Perhaps it was caught, and perhaps, like other corrections noted in the letters to Atticus,²⁴ this one failed to find its way into the text tradition of a published work.

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these tenses from the point of view of the men who created the reform and cites as parallels Cicero, *Leg.*, III, 27 and *Mil.* 11. See also *evenirent*, *Fin.*, II, 34, with notes of Madvig and Reid. But the subjunctives remain difficult, and it is possible that in the tradition of the archetype something like *evenit ut* has fallen out of the text. Skutsch and Büchner, in their arguments on these subjunctives (see n. 15, above), show no familiarity with the discussions of the centuriate assembly.

²⁴ Atticus' correction of Phliuntios to Phliasios in *R. P.*, II, 8 (*Att.*, VI, 6, 2, 3) does not appear in the codex. The name of L. Corfidius, which Cicero asked Atticus to have removed from the *Pro Ligario* (33, see *Att.*, XIII, 44, 3), remains in the manuscripts. On the other hand, the correction of Eupolis to Aristophanes in *Orator*, 29 (*Att.*, XII, 6A), has been made and *sustinere*, which, at Atticus' suggestion, Cicero had changed o *inhibere*, has, in accord with Cicero's request (*Att.*, XII, 21, 3), been restored to *Academica*, II, 94. See, for such changes, Ziegler, *Hermes*, I ^{CVI} (1931), pp. 268-70.

THE ARROW AND THE AXE-HEADS IN THE *ODYSSEY*.

In an article entitled "A Layman's Delight in the *Odyssey*," in *Greece and Rome*, March, 1958, Sir Evelyn Howell referred to "the riddle of the axe-heads." It is a riddle, and there should be an answer to it, as there are answers to other riddles in the *Odyssey*. Whether the poet is drawing from earlier epic sources for the tale, or describing something he had seen for himself, his account of the matter should make sense. This has been felt instinctively even by those who look upon his geography as entirely poetical and unrealistic.

The main references we shall have to consider for the solution of this riddle are as follows:

In XIX, 572-8 we hear from Penelope that Odysseus, in the days of his youth, used to set up a row of axes (*πелέκεις*) "like keel-blocks" (*δρυόχους ὥς*) "in line with one another" (*ἐξείης*); and then "standing well away" put an arrow "through" the axes, twelve of them in all.

In XIX, 587, as again in XXI, 97, 114, and 127 we read that the arrow must pass "through the iron" (*διοῖσ τεύσαι τε σιδήρου*).

In XXI, 120 f. Telemachus sets up the axes, "digging one long *trench* for all of them," straightening them to a line, and firming the earth around them.

In XXI, 419 f. Odysseus "straight from the stool on which he *sat*" let fly his arrow so that the bronze-tipped shaft "missed not" (*οὐκ ἤμβροτε*) the first "*στειλειή*" (*πρώτης στειλειῆς*) "of all the axes" (*πелέκων πάντων*), but sped straight through them all and out at the other end.

In V, 234 f. the *πέλεκυς* (there of bronze, not of iron) is described (also in a ship-building context) as being a great axe "sharpened on both sides"—i. e. a double-headed axe with straight handle, like the ordinary woodman's axe as used in Canada today.

The handle of olive wood, in V, 236 is *στειλειόν*, neuter.

Three main explanations for the setting up of a row of axes, or axe-heads, as a test of skill in archery, have been offered, and one of these must be chosen. They are as follows:

(A) The feminine word *στειλειή* in XXI, 422 is taken to mean the straight wooden handle of the double-headed axe, as does the neuter word *στειλειόν* in V, 236. In order to justify the thrice repeated statement that the arrow passes "through the iron," a double axe-head is imagined so excessively crescent-shaped that the upper portions of its two blades *almost* meet, and *nearly* form a circle of metal above the handle, which is of course planted vertically in the ground.¹

The objections to this are as follows:

(1) An axe so excessively crescent-shaped is unexampled and highly improbable as a practical tool.

(2) Even if such an axe was used, and even if there were no other difficulties, it would not in fact sufficiently justify the expression "through the iron."

(3) The shot at short range, indoors, would be a somewhat simple one.

(4) There is no point in Telemachus' digging "one long trench" for all the axes (XXI, 120-1). A hole in the presumably hard earth would have to be made for each, and the handle driven pretty deep into the ground, in order to keep the axe-heads steady and aligned.

(5) There is no good reason for the change of gender from *στειλειόν* in V, 236 to *στειλειή* in XXI, 422—a minor point in itself, perhaps, but not unimportant in combination with other things.

(6) Most decisive of all, the words *οὐκ ἤμβροτε* "missed not," in XXI, 421, are taken to mean "almost grazed" or "*just missed*" the "top" or "tip" of the "wooden handle" (*πρώτης στειλειῆς*) "in the case of all the axes" (*πελέκεων πάντων*). This surely cannot be accepted as a legitimate use of language.

(7) Alternatively, therefore, but not less improbably, Butcher and Lang take the meaning of the words to be "missed not all the axes, starting from the first axe-handle"—a very awkward use of the "ablative" genitive (*πρώτης στειλειῆς*), and as a whole an impossibly clumsy sentence.

¹ For illustrations of this and other suggested types of axe-head cf. *Monro*, p. 176; *Butcher and Lang*, p. 419; *Merry, Homer's Odyssey XIII-XXIV*, Frontispiece.

(B) The word *στειλειή* is taken to mean the wooden handle as above, but in place of the crescent-shaped double axe-head an instrument is visualized, with one blade only, made of open-work instead of solid metal, in order to justify the expression "through the iron."

Butcher and Lang, p. 420, say hopefully: "Probably if we could see the weapon with which Homer was familiar the puzzle would instantly disappear." But it would still be necessary either to take *οὐκ ἤμβροτε* to mean "just missed" so that *πρώτης στειλειῆς* would now have to mean the "side" or "edge" of the handle; or we should still have to have recourse to Butcher and Lang's very improbable alternative.

(C) The third explanation is that the word *στειλειή* means not the wooden handle but the hole for the handle in the iron of the double axe-head, the feminine gender being appropriate for the socket as being receptive of the handle. (For this usage see Stanford, *Odyssey of Homer*, on XIX, 572 or indeed any English dictionary *s. v.* "female," *mechanical*.) Telemachus in this case sets up the axe-heads along the centre of his trench (XXI, 118 f.), one blade firmly in the ground, with the handle-holes all exactly in line with one another, so that the marksman may see, and his arrow pass, "*through the iron*" of all twelve of them (Fig. 1).

To this explanation the only possible objection—but one which, so far as I know, has been regarded as insuperable (see L. S. J., *s. v.* *στειλειή*)—is that, even without Telemachus' trench, the handle-holes would be only two or three inches above ground-level, so that it would be impossible for Odysseus to send an arrow through them, from a standing, or sitting, or indeed any other position.

The objection, however, is not insuperable. But prior to further discussion of it, the comparison between the axes and *δρύοχοι*, or keel-blocks, requires consideration. There is rather more in it than meets the eye; and it does much, I think, to suggest that the poet had a real picture in his mind and knew very well what he was talking about.

In no circumstances can a number of axes, either with handles or without, look, in themselves, like a series of structures of heavy wooden blocks laid regularly on top of one another. The whole point of Penelope's comparison, therefore, lies in the words

ἴσταςχ' ἐξείης. Odysseus set up the axe-heads "like keel-blocks" only in so far as they were set up at short intervals, dead in line and with their handle-holes registering exactly with one another.




Fig. 1.

A. Perspective view of axe-heads set up in deep trench to afford some measure of safety to spectators.

B. Sectional view of axe-heads perfectly aligned as in A. A target or back-stop to be imagined at end.

C. Sectional view of axe-heads set up, alternatively, in shallower trench intended only to break hard surface of trodden earth.

Note. Telemachus' very swift setting up of the axes is intended to be taken *cum grano salis* (*Od.*, XXI, 122-3).

None of the editors or translators I have come across appears to make this point clear, or to have considered carefully what δρύοχοι in this context were and what keel-blocks are and how

they are set up. So Merry, *op. cit.* on XIX, 572, says that the axes "*resembled* a row of δρῶχοι, which *seem* to be trestles or blocks with a *central notch*, on which the keel of a ship was laid" (my italics); but he seems to have no idea why or how they did resemble it. Stanford on p. 339 of his edition says that the axe-heads "*were perhaps propped up* so as to give the *general effect* of a ship's keel, as described in 574." A. S. Way translates "like the ribs of a galley arw"—which is nonsense; T. E. Shaw, "like an alley of oaken bilge-blocks"—which is pretentious nonsense.²

The method of laying the keel of a ship (the δρῦς in the Odyssean phrase, the *tree* that was the beginning and the backbone of the ship) upon structures of short oblong timbers, piled fore and aft on top of one another, at short intervals, so that they may be trued up and adjusted to support (ἐχέειν) the whole length of the keel, has no secrets about it, and will not have changed in principle (as ship-builders are aware) from the days of the *Argo* to those of the *Queen Mary*. A description of the process will be found, for example, in A. C. Hardy, *From Ship to Sea* (Glasgow, 1935).

If there were any doubt as to the exact meaning of δρῶχοι in the Greek of *Od.*, XIX, Penelope's comparison of the axes with them would clear it up. The only way of aligning the apertures of the twelve axes in the *Odyssey* would be by *visual sighting*. The only way of aligning a row of ship-builders' "blocks," "trestles," or "stocks," and levelling, or truing, them exactly with one another—especially on the inclined plane on which a ship is usually built to facilitate the launching process—is, and always has been, by *visual sighting*, "sighting through," to use the shipwright's term. A description of sights made of wood and the method of using them in conjunction with a lamp, in recent times, will be found in the book referred to, pp. 45-6.³

² My italics. Bilge-blocks form neither an "alley" (which is not required for the axes), nor a single straight row (which is required). Bilge-blocks are set up on either side of the straight line of keel-blocks, well away from it, and following, sometimes quite irregularly, the curves of the hull as it takes shape. Nor is there any reason why they should be of oak.

³ It may be remarked that it would have been quite feasible in Odyssean times to lay cast-iron axe-heads at intervals on the top of a row of keel-blocks and to use the central handle-holes as a series of ring-sights

We can now return to the third explanation (C, above). The conclusion that the *στειλαι* were the sockets or handle-holes in the iron of the axe-heads is inevitable, inasmuch as the objections against their meaning the wooden handles themselves are insuperable. Here for once we can agree with Stanford. The riddle to be solved then is narrowed down to this: "How could Odysseus in XXI, 419 f. put an arrow through the holes of the axe-heads 'straight from the stool on which he sat,' if they were only a few inches above ground level?" The answer is, of course, that he could not possibly do so—if the floor of the *megaron* was all upon one level. It follows, therefore, if the story is to make sense at all, that the floor was *not* all upon one level. Some portion of it, either by reason of the natural conformation of the ground, or artificially for some conventional reason, must have been at least some three feet higher than the portion where Odysseus sat and shot his arrow through the axes. That is the only possible answer to the riddle that makes sense; and it is at least consistent with the stage directions in the poem.

Before studying these, however, one point remains to be disposed of. It has been suggested (and Stanford at the end of his note on XIX, 572 f. seems to regard it as a possibility) that the axe-heads were somehow arranged in juxtaposition with one another so that the handle-holes formed a "continuous pipe," through which, even if lying close to ground-level, an arrow discharged from a higher level might find its way, provided that it entered the first and foremost handle-hole. It is hardly necessary to say that this is quite out of the question. Apart from the fact that it is not in the least in harmony with the simile of the keel-blocks, or the description of Telemachus' trench, and even if it were possible to arrange the handle-holes of twelve axe-heads to form a "continuous pipe," an arrow would infallibly be broken and arrested by the iron, unless it passed through the "pipe" on an absolutely straight trajectory.

for levelling purposes (a system of wedges being used, then as now, for final adjustments). This does not affect the present problem directly; but the idea of using a row of axe-heads as a test of skill in archery might have thus originated, and the poet might very well have seen it practised. The handle-holes, if used for either of these two purposes, will, I imagine, have been somewhat larger and rounder than the narrow elliptical types to which we are now accustomed—more like those in the modern pick- or mattock-head in fact.

Let us now reconstruct events with the aid of a plan (Fig. 2) based on the poem itself. After the episode of the hound Argos *outside* the house of Odysseus (XVII, 264-323), Eumaeus enters the house, by the way of the αἶλγῆ, and goes "straight to the *megaron*" where the suitors sat and feasted (324 f.). At Telemachus' beckoning he picks up a settle from where the carver sat or stood (331) (2 on Fig. 2), takes it up to Telemachus' table (6 on Fig. 2), and sits beside him.

Close behind Eumaeus (336 f.) Odysseus enters and, as befits a mere beggar, sits humbly on an οἶδός of ash-wood (1 on plan) *inside* the doors (A) of the *megaron* (339), "leaning against a pillar of cypress-wood." It is to be noticed, first, that this οἶδός, *inside the doors*, furnished also as it is with pillars (340) and seats (339, 466; XVIII, 10, 17, 32), is not really a threshold in our sense of the word, but a ceremonial porch or *vestibulum* of some sort (see L. S. J., s. v. πρόθυρον); secondly that it is at no great distance from where Telemachus and the suitors were sitting at their banquet. For Telemachus sends food by Eumaeus to Odysseus, and a message bidding him go round begging of the suitors (XVII, 345 f.). This he does, going round ἐνδέξια (365)—i. e. from left to right of them, as looked at from the *prodomos* (down below according to my hypothesis). After being struck with the footstool by Antinous, he returns to the οἶδός of ash-wood (466), resumes his seat, and exchanges words with the suitors from it (468 f., 477 f.). It must therefore have been quite close to them.

And yet, between this wooden οἶδός and that portion of the hall where the suitors sat at table there is another οἶδός, the great οἶδός of stone (XX, 258, XXII, 2, XXIII, 88). From this it is evident that the *megaron* is divided into two portions. There is a forecourt or πρόδομος, beginning at the ash-wood οἶδός, inside the doors, where the food was prepared (no doubt) and from which it was served. There the carver cut up the meat for the suitors in appropriate portions (XVII, 331), and there probably the fire mentioned in XVIII, 44 was burning, with the blood-puddings cooking before it. The portion of the *megaron* where the suitors sat (the portion beginning with the great οἶδός of stone) was at a higher level, according to my hypothesis, and as is borne out by, or is at least consistent with, the directions given us by the poet. It was not, however, a separate compart-




Fig. 2.

- A. Folding doors to courtyard.
- B. Folding doors to women's apartments and interior of the house.
- C. The *ὑποθήρη*.
- D. *ῥῶγες*.
 - 1. *οὐδός* of ash-wood.
 - 2. Carver.
 - 3. *οὐδός* of stone.
 - 4. Seat of Odysseus.
 - 5. The row of axe-heads in trench.
 - 6. Seat of Telemachus.
 - 7. Leiodes.
 - 8. Antinous.
 - 9. Phemius.
 - 10. A fire-place.

ment from the lower portion of the hall. This is shown quite clearly from what has already been said, and from the fact that in XX, 257 f. Telemachus, according to plan (κέρδεα νομῶν), puts a stool and a small table for Odysseus "beside the threshold of stone, inside the *megaron*" (ἐντὸς εὐσταθέος μεγάρου)—i. e. not just at its entrance, as in XVII, 339. Now if the floor where the suitors sat was indeed three feet higher than the floor of the *prodomos*, the οὐδός of stone also, leading to it, must have been at least three feet higher at its summit, and must obviously have consisted partly of steps leading up from the floor below, though, quite naturally, they do not happen to be mentioned. In XXII, 127 however we have the phrase ἀκρότατον δὲ παρ' οὐδόν—"beside the highest portion" of this οὐδός. If it had a highest portion, it must also have had a lower and a lowest portion—i. e. steps, in all natural probability.

Odysseus' seat then will have been at 4, down below, beside the steps which formed the lower portion of the great οὐδός of stone. In XXI, 118 f. Telemachus digs his trench for the axe-heads (5), making it terminate immediately above the spot where he has put Odysseus (at 4). For in XXI, 419 f. Odysseus, after having fondled the bow, strung it, and made it "sing like a swallow" (411), sets an arrow on the string, and, without rising from his seat (420), swings to the right direction and lets fly his arrow up the trench and through the handle-holes of all twelve axes: "The bronze-tipped shaft missed not the foremost handle-hole of all the axes but sped straight through them all and out beyond" (421-3).

Then, sure enough, in XXII, 2 he "leaps up onto the great threshold," and puts his second arrow through Antinous' throat.

It has been objected (in private discussion) against the foregoing argument that ἄλτο δ' ἐπὶ μέγαν οὐδόν in XXII, 2 proves nothing, inasmuch as the words could be used of a long jump as well as for a high jump. And so they could of course if the sense demanded. The point is, however, that the hypothesis of the differing floor levels is the only one that can possibly make sense of the story of the axe-heads; and that the words in question are at least consistent with that hypothesis. The hypothesis, moreover, sheds light on other problems of the battle in the *megaron* and the fetching of the arms. These matters, therefore, in so far as they substantiate the hypothesis

of the differing floor levels, have also a bearing on the argument concerning the axe-heads.

In the matter of geographical detail in the *Odyssey* we know where we stand. That detail, for the most part, is still to be seen and studied.⁴ Architectural detail is another matter. The degree to which the poet is realistic or otherwise in that cannot be exactly decided. My diagram, however, has been constructed, as simply as possible, from the stage-directions in the poem, on the assumption that he must have had some real architectural lay-out in view, if only in his mind's eye.

(1) The folding doors, A, from courtyard into *megaron* speak for themselves. Enough also has been said about the "threshold" of ash-wood at 1 to indicate that it is of a conventional nature, with the details of which we are by no means familiar. The same will apply to the great threshold of stone at 3. The carver, 2, has been placed reasonably close to the threshold of stone at 3, as the servitors must have passed up and down its steps in order to wait upon the banqueters (cf. XVII, 331-2).

(2) The folding doors, B, and their position in relation to the οἶδός of stone at 3, are also very important.

(a) They are the main doors to the interior of the house, and of course to the women's quarters. Through them, therefore, Penelope enters at XXI, 63 f., coming from the store-room with the bow, and with her maids carrying the axe-heads. Later on, when the bloodshed is over and the hall cleaned up, she comes down from her upper chamber (XXIII, 85), enters the *megaron* again by doorway B, walks up the steps of the stone threshold (88) and joins Odysseus sitting in the light of a fire at 10 by the opposite wall (90).

(b) Doorway B, moreover, and the stone threshold must be close to one another. For at XXI, 124 Telemachus takes up his stand "by the threshold" (Butcher and Lang)—i. e. down below, according to my hypothesis, by the steps. He nearly succeeds in stringing the bow, but at a sign from Odysseus desists and puts it down, "leaning it against the polished well-wrought doorway" (136 f.)—i. e. beside doorway B—and returns to his seat at 6.

(c) Antinous, whom for dramatic reasons I place up-stage

⁴ See my *Reality and Allegory in the Odyssey* (Amsterdam, 1959).

centre at 8, then says, at 140 f., that the suitors are to try to string the bow, taking it in turn from left to right—ἐπιδέξια this time (141), as looked at from his point of view. Leiodes therefore, the first man to try, is placed at 7, the closest of them all to the stone threshold and, as it happens, to the bow, which is leaning against doorway B where Telemachus has left it. He sits, we are told, “beside the great mixing-bowl” (XXI, 145, the natural place for which is close to the threshold of stone), sitting “μυχότατος αἶέν,” which I take to mean “tucked away in a corner,” so to speak, the farthest away to the right of all the suitors, looked at from down below, as they sit, roughly in a semicircle, around the trench, 5, containing the twelve axe-heads. Leiodes, according to hypothesis, goes down the steps, takes up the bow, takes his stand beside the οἶδός (149), as Telemachus had done, fails to string the bow and replaces it where Telemachus had placed it, against doorway B (163-4) for the next man on his right to try.

(d) In XXI, 235 f. Odysseus tells Eumaeus to bid the women bar the doors (at B) and to stay at their work beyond them, whatever they may hear; Philoetius is to fasten the gates of the outer court or αἶλη. These orders are carried out at 381 f. *Doorway B remains barred and bolted, on the far side, throughout the fighting.* For in XXII, 393 f. Telemachus rattles the door and calls on Eurycleia to open it and come in.

(e) At XXII, 89 f. Amphinomus charges straight at Odysseus, trying to drive him away from the doors εἰ πῶς οἱ εἴξειε θυράων. These again will be the doors at B. (Those at A, however, barred presumably by Philoetius after bolting the outer gates of the αἶλη [XXI, 388-9], may be included.)

(f) The doorway, the pillar, and the wall, struck by stray shots from the suitors (XXII, 257-9 and again at 274 f.), will most naturally mean the *doors* at B together with the *pillar*, where Odysseus leant his bow at XXII, 120, “against the shining *wall-face*,” i. e. between doorways B and C.

(3) It will be clear by now why 3, 4, 5, and 6 are placed where they are on Fig. 2. The threshold of stone (3) must be reasonably close to the carver (2) and to the doorway B. A central position for the trench and the axe-heads (5) is in any case desirable. The suitors will be sitting round it in a great semicircle. It will not have been cut through the stonework

of the great threshold, obviously. It *must* terminate immediately above Odysseus' stool 4, by the threshold of stone (XX, 258), since Odysseus puts his arrow through the axe-heads "straight from the stool whereon he sat" (XXI, 420).

Telemachus' seat (6) must of course be on the higher floor-level; and it must be close to where Odysseus sat (cf. XXI, 129-39). For Odysseus, having shot his arrow through the axes, and spoken to Telemachus (XXI, 423 f.), gives him a nod at 431. Telemachus puts on his helmet, slings on the sword he had taken off at 119, and stands up *by his chair, close* to his father's stool (ἄγχι αὐτοῦ—433), but not "beside him," as the translators say. For then, and not till then, Odysseus leaps *up* (see above) onto the great threshold (XXII, 2), and standing there, now with Telemachus on approximately the same level, commences the slaughter of the suitors.

The function of the trench also now becomes intelligible. Apart from giving softer ground and a straight runway for the axe-heads, it provides, with the earth banked up on either side of it, a measure of safety for the spectators, in case of a deflected shot, and a back-stop for the arrow in the case of a successful one.

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TIBERIUS GRACCHUS: THE OPPOSITION VIEW.

The ancient writers of the history of the second century B. C. emphasized, somewhat exaggeratedly, no doubt, that the conflict which ended in the death of Tiberius Gracchus was the first violent civil conflict in the history of the Roman Republic. Certainly the assassination of Tiberius was the first important civil outbreak in many years.¹ It seems difficult, therefore, to try to explain why, after so long a period of relatively peaceful politics, the senatorial opponents of Tiberius should have become so disturbed by his program that, led by Scipio Nasica, the *pontifex maximus*, they resorted to crude violence. The answer has usually been thought a simple one. However, it is not so simple as it seems, and it is not to be deduced entirely from the specific proposals of Tiberius. In large part, the answer must be sought in the political and intellectual climate which had developed among the Roman *nobilitas*.

This paper is an attempt to reconstruct, in a necessarily limited way, the picture which Tiberius Gracchus evoked in the minds of his opponents, what so frightened them that they were willing to kill to stop it. The quick answer, the usual answer, is that his major opponents had been hurt economically through the operation of his agrarian law. He had confiscated public land which they held in order to distribute it to the poor. Nothing, it is remarked, hurts like a stab in the pocketbook. But here is by no means a full answer. If this were the *casus belli*, then the murder should have come months earlier when the agrarian law was first proposed or immediately upon passage, in order to prevent its going into operation. Instead, it is seen that neither before nor after Tiberius' death was any effort made specifically to undo the recovery and redistribution of land already accomplished. In fact, the land commission was reorganized and permitted to continue its work for at least three

¹ See, for example, Plutarch, *Ti. Gracchus*, 20. The long period of peaceful civil affairs is generally accepted by historians. Tenney Frank says, "History can show no parallel to Rome's first four republican centuries of progressive political reform accomplished without violence in primary assemblies" (*Aspects of Social Behavior in Ancient Rome* [Cambridge, Mass., 1932], p. 107).

or four years after Tiberius' death.² The direct economic motive, then, while no doubt strong, was not the precipitating factor. The nobles feared some future action; they suspected that Tiberius aimed for some sort of complete overturn; and their apprehensions drove them to violence.

Before they were driven so far, it should again be emphasized, the opponents of Tiberius had been willing to put up with a good deal from him. Modern historians have usually presented Tiberius as a political maverick with a novel program, but initially, at least, he was not so regarded by his contemporaries. An investigation of his family and political background—usually overlooked—will demonstrate why he was not at first stamped a revolutionary. His agrarian proposal, though thought unwise and even somewhat radical, was hardly a complete surprise, for it was not altogether unlike some measures previously undertaken by the political faction to which Tiberius belonged. This fact and this faction deserve closer attention than they have received in the past.

The important work in unravelling the family-political groupings in Rome of the late third and early second century B. C. done by Friedrich Münzer and others is useful to this phase of the problem.³ Unfortunately, Münzer's work does not treat adequately the Gracchan period, and there is no definitive work for these years. But it is quite clear that in the 140's and 130's B. C. there were two major political factions in Rome: the

² At least until 129 B. C., when certain judicial functions of the commission apparently were given over to one of the consuls. See Appian, *Civil Wars*, I, 19. The work of the commission is dealt with at length by J. Carcopino, in *Autour des Gracques* (Paris, 1928), pp. 125 ff. Plutarch's view (*Ti. Gracchus*, 22) was that the continued work of the commission was a mere sop to the people.

³ Münzer's chief work is *Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien* (Stuttgart, 1920). Also valuable are many biographical articles by the same author in the Pauly-Wissowa *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Earlier works on which Münzer depended include W. Drumann and P. Groebe, *Geschichte Roms in seinem Übergange von der republikanischen zur monarchischen Verfassung*, 6 vols. (2nd ed., Berlin, 1899-1929), and M. Gelzer, *Die Nobilität der römischen Republik* (Leipzig, 1912). Those who wish to avoid the badly written and poorly organized book of Münzer will find much of the same material, revised and better treated in H. H. Scullard, *Roman Politics 220-150 B. C.* (Oxford, 1951).

Claudians and the Scipionians. A group important earlier, the Fabians, had declined and been absorbed by the others. The Metelli were in process of forming yet another family-political alliance which was to be important for some decades after the Gracchi. It is also clear that Tiberius Gracchus belonged to the Claudian group—in spite of the ancestry of his mother, a daughter of Scipio Africanus. The elder Gracchus was an opponent of Scipio Africanus in his lifetime⁴ and married Cornelia only after Africanus' death. An incident which occurred in his second consulship (163 B. C.) illustrates his continued partisanship against the Scipionians: when he held the elections for 162, two Scipionians were elected, P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica and C. Marcius Figulus; several weeks later, when Nasica was already en route to his new province, Gracchus suddenly "remembered" he had not taken the auspices. He annulled the elections, which were held again, and two other persons were elected.⁵ The tribune of 133 was supported by his father-in-law, Appius Claudius, a leader of the Claudian faction, and opposed by his relative by marriage and adoption, Scipio Aemilianus, leader of the opposing Scipionic faction.⁶

On at least three or four occasions earlier in the second century the Claudian faction, in a colonization program somewhat unlike preceding ones which had established numerous military colonies, settled many Romans on publicly owned land, mostly in the *Ager Gallicus* (Umbria), in the *Ager Calletranus* (Etruria), and in the Po valley.⁷ Members of the Sempronian family had partici-

⁴ Plutarch, *Ti. Gracchus*, 1.

⁵ See the references in T. R. S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, I (New York, 1951), p. 442.

⁶ Factional politics in the program of Gracchus have been recognized. Konrad Bilz has remarked, "Like all Roman political crises, the work of [Ti.] Gracchus was also a crisis and a struggle between the separate parties," in his "Die Politik des Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus," *Würzburger Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft*, VII (1936), p. 66. See also Gelzer, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

⁷ See, for example, Livy, XXXIX, 44, 10-11 and 55, 7-9. It is particularly interesting that Polybius, whose work betrays something of a bias against the Claudians and for the Scipionians, pointed to one such colonization program (in II, 21) and pronounced it "the first step in the demoralization of the people." If this was a late addition to his history (see note 23), there was for him a direct link between these earlier schemes and the legislation of Tiberius Gracchus.

pated in the settlement of the *Ager Gallicus*, and Tiberius Gracchus' father had been involved in one such colonization program, serving on the commission which founded a citizen colony at Saturnia in Etruria.⁸ The tendency of Roman sons to follow in their fathers' footsteps is relevant to this investigation. It was no accident that Tiberius served as quaestor in Spain and Gaius in Sardinia, in both instances provinces where their father had earlier served also. These colonization schemes had served a useful purpose. But they also, no doubt, benefited the Claudian faction. And although little used of late, any similar plan would be recognized by the Scipionians as a familiar political tactic. So when Tiberius Gracchus brought forward his land law, supported by the Claudians, he appeared to his opponents not a revolutionary but simply another Claudian opportunist, perhaps stung by the disaster of his quaestorship⁹ and so a little more radical than the usual Claudian. However, in view of the combination of depression and shortage of grain with consequent high prices that then plagued the city,¹⁰ the extent of his proposals could not have been very astonishing.

The land law was strongly opposed by the Scipionians and others, but the Claudians as has been said were in support of the measure. After its passage Appius Claudius himself, along with the Gracchus brothers, served on the commission of three for redistributing the land. In his early months in office, then, Tiberius seemed to fit very nearly the usual family and faction pattern. The work of the tribune up to this point—and especially the deposition of his colleague Octavius—was resented, to be sure, but there was as yet no talk of violence. We must look further to find what actions of his most disturbed his enemies, and why they disturbed them.

What really infuriated Tiberius' opponents, it appears, were

⁸ Livy, XXXIX, 55, 9. For the work of the earlier Sempronii see Pliny, *N. H.*, III, 113; Strabo, V, 227; Velleius, I, 14, 7.

⁹ At any rate Tiberius' opponents later so explained his motives. (Tiberius was with Hostilius Mancinus in 137 B. C. before Numantia in Spain when Roman forces were humiliatingly defeated and forced to draw up a treaty later rejected as disgraceful by the Senate.) See Plutarch, *Ti. Gracchus*, 5-7; Velleius, II, 2, 1; Cicero, *Brutus*, 103; Florus, II, 2, 2.

¹⁰ See the author's article, "The Urban Side of the Gracchan Economic Crisis," *A. H. R.*, LXIII (1958), pp. 890 ff.

those measures of his which were constitutionally significant. A listing of these measures, with some indication of constitutional implications, is pertinent.

1. It has been mentioned that Tiberius pushed through a kind of recall election of the tribune, Octavius, who opposed his agrarian law. It is easy to overlook the implication of this measure. The Roman constitution was set up along dual lines. The major officials, elected by the *comitia centuriata*, were by tradition responsible to the Senate, which generally controlled their election, and were expected both to guide this body (at least the consuls were) and to follow its decrees. The tribunes, on the other hand, with their great obstructive power, were elected in the *comitia tributa* (or the *concilium plebis*), and as the Gracchi showed, were potentially capable of exercising great legislative power in that assembly, completely aside from the curule officials and the Senate. The potentiality in this essentially divided system was toward a chaotic struggle such as did finally develop in the first century B. C. The aristocrats in general were aware of the need for one of these antithetical branches of government to dominate the other. The famed balance of the constitution was largely a fiction and a practical impossibility. The nobles therefore had weakened the tribunate by exerting great effort to see that one or more of the tribunes was sympathetic to their aims. They had been able to do this for at least a century and a half and also, consequently, they had maintained a stable government and a fairly continuous policy. In recent decades, they had also made a tremendous personal profit out of the arrangement, which gave their chief members juicy governorships and other military commands. To put into the hands of the *concilium plebis* the potential power to set up a panel of tribunes, all of whom might support one popular champion, was to destroy the system that existed and to insure the kind of disastrous competition that later destroyed the Republic.

2. Tiberius proposed that the tribal assembly dispose of the treasury of Attalus, King of Pergamum who died in 133 B. C., willing his kingdom to Rome. The money he wished to use to make his agrarian scheme of resettlement operable. This challenged the traditional control of the purse by the Senate, for

the whole process of appropriating, spending, and minting of coins was controlled by the nobles, chiefly through the quaestors and other officials. It should be remembered that direct taxation in Italy had ceased in 167 B. C. so that the provinces were now the chief source of revenue for the Roman state. Tiberius' plan not only threatened one of the major powers of the Senate; it also introduced what was for Rome a novel idea for the expenditure of public money, direct spending on a large scale for the benefit of lower-class citizens.

3. Tiberius proposed that the tribal assembly should settle the affairs of the new province, Pergamum (later Asia), thereby threatening Senatorial control of the provinces.¹¹ The term "province," of course, still denoted primarily a military post, and it may be doubted that Tiberius was challenging the general authority of the provincial governors. In a new province, the Senate ordinarily sent a commission to help the provincial governor draw up the city charters and otherwise regularize affairs and the Senate then ratified the arrangements. But if the tribes could control arrangements in a new province, the tribunes might also claim further, regular powers. Expansion into empire had increased the importance of financial and political control of the provinces, and these powers would become yet more important in the future. Perhaps it is not incidental to Tiberius' interest in Asia that his father had had extensive diplomatic service in that area.¹²

4. Contrary to constitutional precedent, Tiberius proposed to succeed himself in office. He had already cast the tribune in the role of leader of the state and not merely guardian of the rights of plebeians; now this new role bade fair to become permanent.¹³

5. According to Plutarch,¹⁴ Tiberius also used the obstructive

¹¹ It should be noted that Carcopino rejects the whole of Tiberius' reported dealings regarding Pergamum, on what seems to the author inadequate data in view of the strong literary evidence. He also doubts other reports of Tiberius' excesses in office; see *Autour des Gracques*, pp. 17 ff., 34 ff., *passim*.

¹² In 165 B. C. and again in 162-161. See Polybius, XXX, 7-8; 27; XXXI, 1, 3, 15, 19, 32, and 33.

¹³ See H. H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero* (London, 1959), pp. 29 f.

¹⁴ *Ti. Gracchus*, 10, 5-6. Plutarch's chronology is obviously faulty

powers of the tribune in an arbitrary and probably novel fashion, halting all public business and threatening quaestors and praetors who disobeyed him.

It is universally conceded that Tiberius was high-minded and idealistic, interested chiefly in doing something for his poverty-stricken compatriots. But it must be conceded on the other hand that these were very sweeping precedents which he was establishing and that he was introducing them in ways that to his aristocratic opposition at least must have seemed "unconstitutional," to use a modern term. By the middle of his tribunician year Tiberius' opponents began to view him as a demagogic revolutionary.¹⁵

That Tiberius' opponents were much perturbed over these constitutional threats is clearly attested in the ancient writers. According to Plutarch, who dismissed the charge as mere rationalization, it was alleged "that Tiberius was introducing a re-distribution of land for the confusion of the body politic [τῆς πολιτείας], and was stirring up a general revolution."¹⁶ Again, Plutarch records the "greatest" of the accusations against Tiberius was that he "deposed his colleague from the tribuneship and canvassed for a second tribuneship himself."¹⁷ Both charges are of an essentially constitutional nature. The timing of the final move against Tiberius seems significant. The Senate had been convened and Tiberius' opponents were demanding of the Claudian consul Mucius Scaevola that he take action against Tiberius in his extraordinary effort to be re-elected. Just then,

here and it is likely that these acts of Tiberius occurred during the campaign for re-election.

¹⁵ Guided by idealism, Tiberius initiated measures which ultimately harmed all the aristocratic groups, even the Claudians. The division of Roman politicians into *populares* and *optimates*, with the decreased importance of the older factional groups, was a consequence. See the discussion in L. R. Taylor, *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar* (Berkeley, 1949), ch. 1. Cf. R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939), pp. 11 ff.

¹⁶ *Ti. Gracchus*, 9, 3.

¹⁷ *Agis and Cleomenes and the Gracchi Compared*, 5, 1. It was Cicero's opinion that the deposition of Octavius was what ruined Tiberius: *De Legibus*, III, 10. The language of the Livian Epitome (58) regarding this incident is especially interesting: "Gracchus then went so insane [*in eum furorem exarsit*] as to remove from office . . . his colleague M. Octavius . . ." (Loeb tr.).

the event which fired the aristocratic opposition to action—if Plutarch may be trusted in such details—was a false report that Tiberius was demanding a crown—that is to say, tyrannical authority. In Plutarch's words, "Nasica demanded that the consul should come to the rescue of the state and put down the tyrant."¹⁸ When Scaevola gave only limited assurance, Nasica accused the consul of betraying the state and called on the senators to support "the laws" and follow him. He and a crowd of supporters seized sticks, stones, and pieces of wooden benches (would they not have been better armed if the attack had been previously planned?) and, routing Tiberius' supporters, killed him and 300 others.

Is there any evidence suggesting what type of revolutionary Tiberius' opponents saw in the young tribune? Can it be determined more exactly what sort of pattern was now conjured up in their minds? In any intellectual field such as the study of constitutional history, the Romans were turning increasingly to the Greek experience. And for the Roman of the Gracchan period the chief interpreter of the Greek political experience was certainly Polybius. This author had recently completed his history. His flattering opinion of Rome and the Roman constitution surely made his work popular and widely read among the Roman upper classes, and this probability applies especially to the major faction in opposition to Tiberius, that is, the Scipionians. It is well known that Polybius was very close to Scipio Aemilianus, living in his home after he was brought to Rome as a hostage about 167 B. C., tutoring him, and later no doubt taking an important part in the so-called "Scipionic Circle." Some notice of Polybius' view of Greek constitutional development as set down in his Roman history is therefore likely to be fruitful to the purpose of this study.¹⁹

¹⁸ *Ti. Gracchus*, 19, 2-3. Note also the report of Plutarch (*ibid.*, 17, 4) that Blossius was concerned that Tiberius should not give the impression that he was aiming at tyranny. See also Florus, II, 2, 7.

¹⁹ Most of Polybius' constitutional ideas are found in Book VI of his history, but there are scattered references elsewhere. As Polybius was an enemy of the social and economic revolution both in Greece and Rome, so Plutarch's major source for the period of Cleomenes, the contemporary historian Phylarchus, was a friend of the revolution. See the discussion by W. W. Tarn, "The Social Question in the Third Century," in J. B. Bury and others, *The Hellenistic Age* (Cambridge, 1923), p. 139. For a

The son of an important official in the Achaean League, Polybius made a hero of Aratus, a major leader of that League after the middle of the third century B. C. who strongly opposed absolutist forms of government, and who was the major opponent of Cleomenes of Sparta, the revolutionary and somewhat tyrannical social and economic reformer. Polybius disliked Cleomenes, his predecessor Agis, and his later more brutal imitator, Nabis. He was a strong admirer of the mixed constitution of the traditional—if perhaps also partly fictional—Spartan variety, and he felt that Agis, Cleomenes, and Nabis, in their attempts at reform, had accelerated Sparta's decline. From his knowledge of Greek history, or more precisely, from his knowledge of the ideas of Aristotle and other Greek political theorists, with modifications suggested by experience, Polybius concluded that constitutional development everywhere follows a certain pattern, passing through three stages, each of which tends to deteriorate: monarchy is first and declines to tyranny, followed by aristocracy, which degenerates into oligarchy; then democracy arises, which in turn slips into mob rule and the chaotic end of the cycle.²⁰

Mixed, balanced constitutions, like those of Sparta and of Rome with their elements of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy, Polybius much admired, and felt them to be much more stable than the simpler varieties. Nevertheless, he felt that the same step-by-step deterioration would eventually destroy a mixed constitution as well as the others, for like most historians who have postulated cyclical systems, he made almost universal application of his rules. The decline would come more slowly to such a constitution; the popular assembly would tend to demand an undue share of power, so altering the political balance and, true to the cycle, producing at last mob rule.

Polybius' comparison of the complex constitutions of Rome and of Sparta was a close one. After distinguishing external and internal causes for the deterioration of such a constitution, he wrote:

recent excellent treatment of Polybius' constitutional ideas generally see K. von Fritz, *The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity* (New York, 1954).

²⁰ Polybius, VI, 5-9.

When a commonwealth . . . has arrived at a high pitch of prosperity and undisputed power, it is evident that, by the lengthened continuance of great wealth within it, the manner of life of its citizens will become more extravagant; and that rivalry for office, and in other spheres of activity will become fiercer than it ought to be. And as this state of things goes on more and more, the desire of office and the shame of losing reputation, as well as the ostentation and extravagance of living, will prove the beginning of a deterioration. And of this change the people will be credited with being the authors, when they become convinced they are being cheated by some from avarice, and are puffed with flattery by others from love of office. For when that comes about, in their passionate resentment and acting under the dictates of anger, they will refuse to obey any longer, or to be content with having equal powers with their leaders, but will demand to have all or far the greatest themselves. And when that comes to pass the constitution will receive a new name, which sounds better than any other in the world, liberty or democracy; but, in fact, it will become the worst of all governments, mob rule.²¹

This was Polybius' view of the decline of Sparta: it was, as well, his prediction for the future of Rome. These points are emphasized and reemphasized by Polybius throughout his whole work, which is strongly pragmatic and moralistic. It should be kept in mind that Polybius had set out to explain why, in so short a time, Rome had been able to dominate the Mediterranean world. His answer, in brief, was—her superior constitution. The erosion of it was obviously a crucial matter. Polybius remarked "The chief cause of success or the reverse in all matters is the form of a state's constitution. . . ." ²²

The Romans, then, were forewarned of attempts by the popular organs of government to encroach on the powers of the monarchical magistrates or the aristocratic Senate. They were alerted to watch for lower-class dissatisfaction with their political privileges and with their economic position as well, in a time of growing extravagance of the richer classes. Indeed, Polybius so well described the Roman situation in the Gracchan period that it seems possible that he may have introduced new material into this section of his history after Tiberius Gracchus' death.²³ But

²¹ Polybius, VI, 57 (translation of E. S. Schuckburgh).

²² VI, 2, 10.

²³ See von Fritz's discussion of the composition of the history, *op. cit.*,

the Roman *nobiles* did not require a Polybius to persuade them to be jealous of their prerogatives. Also, the specific comparison between Roman and Spartan experience was a natural one which thinking Romans had no doubt already considered. Moreover, it may be taken for granted that the comparison of Agis and Cleomenes of Sparta with Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus was not original with Plutarch. In the case of Sparta, Agis, Cleomenes, and Nabis had made themselves actually tyrants; their programs had included schemes of land redistribution and debt-cancellation; and their methods were extra-constitutional. Any Roman student of Greek history would therefore have equated with economic revolution the establishment of tyranny. Further, the Romans had learned their lesson also from practical experience. They, too, had fought Nabis, under Flaminius in 195 B. C. When social revolution infiltrated the Greek leagues generally, they dissolved them (after 146 B. C.) and put the propertied classes in control in the cities.²⁴ As Cleomenes had his Stoic adviser, so Tiberius had his, Blossius of Cumae;²⁵

pp. 31 ff. Also see C. O. Brink and F. W. Walbank, "The Constitution of the Sixth Book of Polybius," *C. Q.*, N. S. IV (1954), pp. 97-122; also F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, I (Oxford, 1957), pp. 101 ff., 292 ff., 636. Walbank thinks it unlikely that Polybius added much at a later date. However, it seems necessary to choose between (a) astounding prescience on Polybius' part, or (b) some minor late additions, of which (b) seems more acceptable.

²⁴ See the collection of material relating to Roman contacts with Greek revolutionary movements and leaders in M. Cary, *The Legacy of Alexander; A History of the Greek World from 323 to 146 B. C.* (New York, 1932), pp. 192 ff. and 204 f.

²⁵ It has been plausibly suggested that Blossius' ideas were not necessarily Stoic: D. R. Dudley, "Blossius of Cumae," *J. R. S.*, XXXI (1941), pp. 94 ff. And it is true, no doubt, as G. H. Sabine and S. B. Smith have said (in the introduction to Cicero's *On the Commonwealth* [Columbus, Ohio, 1929], p. 23), "The political importance of Stoicism lay precisely in the reaction of the ethical and religious principles upon political thinking, not in a specific theory of the state." It will be remembered that the Scipionic group had its own Stoic, Panaetius—who, however, admired Rome and adapted Stoic ideas to the Roman political and social climate. Still, the Stoics' egalitarianism seems to have led many of them toward theoretical communism, as it appears was the case with Cleomenes' adviser Sphaerus (see Cary, *op. cit.*, p. 156); and both Zeno and Iambulus seem to have constructed a sort of communal utopia (see the discussion in Tarn, *loc. cit.*, p. 131, p. 17). However, surely

if Tiberius at first limited his land redistribution to *ager publicus* and did not follow the Greeks in demanding debt-cancellation, who knew what was to come next?

The opponents of Gracchus, then, saw in him the image of the Spartan tyrants in the setting sketched by the pen of Polybius. It is not new, of course, to say that these enemies of Tiberius Gracchus thought him to be aiming at tyranny. The historians in the ancient period mention that he was called a tyrant; both Plutarch and Cicero so quoted Nasica.²⁶ But modern writers ordinarily have not believed that anyone really thought that Tiberius was aiming at tyranny. They have followed Plutarch, who, though he mentioned the objections to Tiberius of a constitutional nature, dismissed them as mere pretexts. Nevertheless, in view of the knowledge and experience of Scipio Nasica and others of the Gracchan opposition, in the light of which, naturally, they interpreted Tiberius' actions, it appears extremely likely that Nasica and the rest were actually convinced he was aiming at demagogic tyranny. These nobles feared that the deterioration predicted by Polybius was upon them. Admitted that these men saw what they wanted to see, that is, what best served their own interests, there is yet no good reason to doubt that the murderers genuinely thought they had saved the state by killing a would-be tyrant—perhaps a well-intentioned tyrant, like Cleomenes of Sparta—but a tyrant nonetheless, whose actions were bound to result in the ruin of the Republic. A Nabis might follow in due time.²⁷

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Cleomenes was chiefly influenced by the romanticized, partly fictional accounts of the Lycurgan constitution of early Sparta.

²⁶ Plutarch, *Ti. Gracchus*, 19, 3; Cicero, *De Re Publica*, VI, 8; the latter is a rather indirect quotation in Macrobius, *Commentary*, IV, 2.

²⁷ Neither E. Badian's excellent book, *Foreign Clientelae* (Oxford, 1958), nor the article of H. H. Scullard, "Scipio Aemilianus and Roman Politics," *J. R. S.*, L (1960), pp. 59-74, came to the attention of the author until after this article was in finished form. The former extends the views expressed here of the importance to Tiberius Gracchus of his father's eastern diplomatic connections, and the latter agrees that Scipio's opposition to Tiberius was based primarily on constitutional grounds.

A NEW MEANING FOR ΝΑΥΣ IN THE CATALOGUE.

Scholarly opinion concerning the Catalogue of Ships has tended to settle upon the view that it is a traditional list of military contingents originally fitted to a context of Aulis harbor, and only awkwardly recast upon the Trojan plain.¹ Most recently D. L. Page has reminded us of this hypothesis: "Nobody seems to care if the passage introduced to describe the forces arrayed for battle at the present moment actually describes something wholly different—the assembling of armies at a Greek harbour ten years ago."² Page, however, introduces another consideration when he remarks that *nobody seems to care*. We may speculate whether such a situation is ever true in first-rate literature. Certainly in the *Iliad* there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that the poet cared no little about the Catalogue; clearly he was at great pains to motivate it. The whole of the second book that precedes may be said to perform this function. There are the suspenseful specifics of an army's morale crumbling and needing restoration; there is the elaborate stage direction of Nestor (II, 362-3), which has no further relevance than to herald the Catalogue. And finally the bard brilliantly illuminates the audience's imagination by a description of the muster in straight narrative and in simile that will serve to hold the dramatic moment for them over the hundreds of lines of essentially undramatic verse.

The notion that Aulis harbor was the original locale comes from the repeated references to the number of ships involved in the war. While, on the one hand, it is true that drawing attention to ships is ill-suited to a scene of an army mustering upon a plain, this is, on the other hand, the information least

¹ The literature is naturally vast: for this view see T. W. Allen, *The Homeric Catalogue of Ships* (Oxford, 1921), p. 171; C. M. Bowra, *Tradition and Design in the Iliad* (Oxford, 1950), p. 70; F. Jacoby, "Die Einschaltung des Schiffskatalogs in die Ilias," *Berl. Sitzb.* (Berlin, 1932); V. Burr, ΝΕΩΝ ΚΑΤΑΛΟΓΟΣ, *Klio*, Beiheft XLIX (Leipzig, 1944), pp. 114 f.; H. T. Wade-Gery, *The Poet of the Iliad* (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 53 ff.; G. Jachmann, *Der homerische Schiffskatalog und die Ilias* (Westphalia, 1958), pp. 218-41.

² D. L. Page, *History and the Homeric Iliad* (Berkeley, 1959), p. 124.

real (I mean in terms of the specific numbers which the bard employs),³ and least necessary for the scene, which, if it had caused him the slightest embarrassment, could have been so neatly omitted. But a re-examination of the verbs connected with the word 'ship' suggests an altogether different sense for that word which removes any difficulty in interpreting the dramatic context of the Catalogue.

The following quotations show the language in which the bard gives the ship complement of each area's contingent:

1. τοῖς δ' ἅμα τεσσαράκοντα μέλαινα νῆες ἔποντο
(524, 534, 545, 556, 568, 630, 637, 644,
652, 710, 737, 747, 759).
2. τοῖς δὲ τριήκοντα γλαφυραὶ νέες ἐστιχόωντο
(516, 602, 680, 733).
3. τῶν μὲν πεντήκοντα νέες κίον, ἐν δὲ ἑκάστῃ
κούροι Βοιωτῶν ἑκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι βαῖνον
(509-10).
4. Αἴας δ' ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος ἄγεν δυοκαίδεκα νῆας
(557, 654, 671, 748).
5. τῶν ἑκατὸν νηῶν ἦρχε κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων
(576, 586, 609, 713, 718).
6. τῶν αὖ τέσσαρες ἀρχοὶ ἔσαν, δέκα δ' ἀνδρὶ ἑκάστῳ
νῆες ἔποντο θοαί, πολέες δ' ἔμβαινον Ἐπειοί
(618-19).
7. τῶν αὖ πεντήκοντα νεῶν ἦν ἀρχὸς Ἀχιλλεύς
(685).

The numbers indicate the lines which are parallel except that they will differ, of course, in the name and often in the number of ships as well. The most common formula (1) employs the imperfect tense of the verb ἔπεσθαι. We are here concerned with two of its meanings; first, the physical act of following after another object. In this sense its application to inanimate objects is quite limited, because it implies conscious action, and in every case in the *Iliad*⁴ suggests something other than what

³ The neatness of the numbers and their formulaic repetition can only suggest that they were meant to give the merest fictional notion of size. Notice that Odysseus after the wastage of time and storm and the death of men still has a contingent of twelve (*Od.*, IX, 159: νῆες μὲν μοι ἔποντο δυώδεκα . . .), which was the number of *Il.*, II, 637. The formulaic nature of number in Homer may be studied in P. Waltz, "L'exagération numérique dans Homère," *Rev. Études Homériques*, III (1933), pp. 1-38.

⁴ See, e.g., III, 143, 376; IV, 430; XII, 398; XVI, 504. The expression

we would have to assume here, namely a convoy of ships all following the leader's ship. Again it can mean to follow along in the train of someone, in the sense of to obey their direction, not so much in the matter of specific commands, but simply to go along under their leadership.⁵ This second meaning of *ἔπεσθαι* takes it outside of any particular moment of time in the story of the Trojan War. The ships followed along after their leaders; it is an historic fact, and the imperfect loses its special force.⁶ That *ἔπεσθαι* bears this meaning in the formula is made more likely by the occurrence of the same expression at XI, 227 f., and most specifically at IX, 43 f., where . . . *νῆες δέ τοι ἄγχι θαλάσσης/ ἔστᾱς αἶ τοι ἔποντο Μυκῆνηθεν μάλα πολλάί* indicates that *ἔποντο* is an historic fact, although the imperfect is used.

But the frequency in the *Iliad* of the expression *λαοὶ εἰποντο* (the people were following along after their leaders) suggests that *ἔπεσθαι* always implies movement.⁷ This feeling is reinforced in the Catalogue itself by lines 542, 577-8, 675, and 749. In each case the people instead of the ships are introduced. At 542 **Αβαντες ἔποντο θοοί* and only a few lines later (545) *μέλαιναί νῆες ἔποντο*. The description of the Abantes in the lines between suggests the battlefield, not a convoy on the seas. At 578 when Agamemnon is mentioned (*ἐν δ' αὐτὸς ἐδύσετο νώροπα χαλκόν, κ. τ. λ.*), the *ἐν*, 'among them,' i.e. *οἱ λαοί*, with the following description suggests again the battlefield.

The phrase *νῆες ἔποντο* either reports an historic fact, or it is describing movement actually taking place in the narrative moment. Demonstrations of the rigid and mechanical nature of the formulaic phrase raise the important question of whether

νέφος εἶπετο πεζῶν (IV, 274; XXIII, 133) is metaphorical like the usage in the Catalogue, and the animate element is transferred. Cf. Bowra, *Tradition*, pp. 115 f.

⁵ See, e.g., V, 551; XXIII, 297; XXIV, 400. L. R. Palmer, "Mycenaean Greek Texts from Pylos," *Trans. Philosophical Soc.* (1954), p. 51, discusses Linear B *e-qe-ta, heq^w etas* equaling *ἐπέρης*, which seems to mean 'companion' or 'follower.'

⁶ W. W. Goodwin, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb*² (Boston, 1900), pp. 16 f. (§§ 56-7). An historic fact by its very nature ought to be complete.

⁷ Lines XIII, 690 and XV, 559 juxtapose forms of *ἄρχειν* and *ἔπεσθαι* exactly in the manner of the Catalogue (indeed the former line is part of a minor catalogue) and clearly in the physical sense.

it can carry more than one meaning. In this particular instance the verb occurs seventeen times between lines 524 and 762, having as its subject almost always νῆες, a few times λαοί or its equivalent. Its frequency and formulaic nature make it most likely that the meaning is consistent, and the strong sense of movement which the verbs in the equivalent formulae call to mind implies movement here, and so a metaphorical meaning for the word 'ships.'

The verb στιχᾶσθαι is sometimes substituted for ἔπεσθαι (see ship number formula 2).⁸ An uncommon verb, it is found in the *Iliad* only in the third person plural of the imperfect.⁹ Elsewhere¹⁰ it is used only of animate objects, so that even more than ἔπεσθαι it is unusual when associated with the word ship. The word means 'to march along in ranks.' Obviously this is awkward with νῆες, so that the usual practice is to alter the meaning and so in the context to understand 'to sail along in rows.' It is difficult to understand why this verb suggests to so many students of the Catalogue that the scene is in reality at Aulis. For the ships must have been beached there just as at Troy, and this verb clearly emphasizes movement. If that feature of it were to be obscured in order to highlight the conception of ranks or rows, then the verb is equally valid for either beach. Most obviously again it suggests voyaging on the high seas.

It is unlikely that it, like ἔπεσθαι, could represent the historic fact, since it is a much more vivid verb. It specifically points to place and manner of action, so that it strongly represents motion. Why should the bard employ an imagistic verb, such as στιχᾶσθαι, which draws attention to the action unless the action is paramount? Although στιχᾶσθαι occurs only in formulae involving the number thirty we may exclude as remote the possibility that this is the solution of a metrical dilemma. Much more likely in view of the fact that στιχᾶσθαι portrays mass movement on foot, something to which this book in its narrative

⁸ In the *Contest between Homer and Hesiod* note the interesting and relevant juxtaposition of these two verbs in a variant of the Catalogue entry for Diomedes, *Certamen*, 299-300 (O.C.T., V, p. 237).

⁹ P. Chantraine, *Grammaire Homérique* (Paris, 1948-53), I, pp. 358 f.

¹⁰ II, 92; III, 266, 341; IV, 432; XVIII, 577.

and every simile is largely devoted, is that here again the word 'ships' is used metaphorically.

The first contingent mentioned by the bard has a more elaborate kind of description of its ship complement (see ship number formula 3). The verb *κίον* is generally recognized as being aorist in Homer.¹¹ Other than in this instance it refers in the *Iliad* only to the movement of animate beings.¹² *κίον* is made more specific by the clause including the phrase *βαίνειν ἐν νηί*. This phrase occurs in the Catalogue also at 610-11, at 619, and at 719-20 (in the pluperfect). The usual translation is 'were embarking.' Thus *ἐν* with the dative is understood as "a pregnant construction of verbs of motion, *into* implying both *motion to* and subsequent *position in* a place."¹³ If one examines the instances of *βαίνειν ἐν νηί* or *ἐμβαίνειν ἐν νηί* in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, it becomes clear that there is never a necessity to translate the construction as 'to embark.'¹⁴ It is undoubtedly this expression which suggests more than any other the scene at Aulis except lines 719-20, where the perfect tense appears and so bears another implication.¹⁵

If it is to mean 'embark' then we must understand the two lines 509-10 as an historic fact similar to the possible interpretation of *ἔπροντο*, or as an absolutely conflicting statement which refers to another setting. But what exactly could the two lines mean? First there must be some clarification of where the poet is in his mind's eye. This is essential to any description, and at this point we may hypothesize three places: at Aulis, at Troy,

¹¹ Chantraine, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 392 f.

¹² Except for the mules of XXIII, 115, always to human beings.

¹³ *L. S. J.*, p. 552; however, observe the following remark *ibid.*: "this construction occurs later with verbs of coming or going," which would be the case with *βαίνω*.

¹⁴ *Il.*, II, 351; XII, 16; *Od.*, I, 210-11; II, 18, 27; III, 131; IV, 181, 656; XIII, 317. At *Il.*, I, 311 *ἐν* means 'then' or 'among them'; *Od.*, IV, 653 *ἐν* means 'among them' although cf. W. W. Merry and J. Riddell, *Homer's Odyssey*² (Oxford, 1886), note on IV, 653. *Od.*, IV, 656 in point of view of time must not mean 'to embark.' *L. S. J.*, p. 302, *s. v.* *βαίνω* A, I, 1, *ἐπὶ νηὸς ἔβαινον* 'was going on board ship,' *Od.*, XI, 534; but *ἐν πρὲ ἐκάστῃ [νηί]* . . . *ἐκάρον καὶ εἰκοσι βαίον* 'were on board,' *Il.*, II, 510.

¹⁵ *L. S. J.*, p. 302, *s. v.* *βαίνω* A, I, 2, gives the perfect meaning as 'to stand or be in place'; perhaps *ἐμβαίνειν* could also bear that meaning in the perfect. Cf., however, *L. S. J.*, p. 538, where *Il.*, II, 720 is cited as an example of the meaning 'to embark on a ship.'

or on poetic high, a detached place of objectivity. κίον cannot mean 'went' to Troy (at Aulis) because the embarkation would already have occurred. κίον cannot mean 'came' to Troy (at Troy) or went to Troy (on poetic high) because the idea of embarkation would then be meaningless in terms of the time sequence. κίον does not likely mean 'came' to Aulis (at Aulis) or 'went' to Aulis (on poetic high) with the subsequent embarkation, because this being the Boeotian fleet, and Aulis presumably the main port of Boeotia, there is no reason for the ships to arrive; they would already have been there. Perhaps this logic represents the sort of insistence on likelihood which is opposed to the Homeric manner of representation. At any rate, the idea of embarkation makes the whole thing difficult; since there is no reason to translate the phrase in that fashion it is better to do otherwise.

If the sentence is translated "of these people fifty ships went, in each of which went along one hundred twenty warriors," then perhaps this is simply the historic fact which makes no demands on the moment being described. It is interesting, however, that κίειν elsewhere describes the animate movement, and βαίνειν essentially refers to movement on foot. These together with ἔπεσθαι and σπιχᾶσθαι are not really appropriate to the action of ships, or those aboard, and strongly suggest that the bard has the present army activity clearly in mind.

Elsewhere in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* the verbs commonly associated in formulae with νέες or νῆες are rarely ones of intransitive motion; most frequently forms of φέρω or verbs of like meaning. In addition note ἦλυνθον (e.g., *Il.*, XIII, 174) and περώωσιν (e.g., *Od.*, V, 176), and then a verb with almost the same connotation as the Catalogue verbs, πέμπωσι (*Od.*, VIII, 556). None is in a metrical position similar to the positions of the verbs in the Catalogue. The over-all impression one gains is that a ship in motion is thought of generally in terms of its function of carrying things over the water.

The construction τῶν . . . νέες of line 509 occurs many places elsewhere in the Catalogue (see ship number formulae 5, 6, 7, and some of the parallels of 4). τῶν is either possessive genitive or partitive genitive. It seems unlikely, in view of the relationship between the epic leaders and their followers that in these many instances the meaning is 'the ships of these people were commanded by,' especially in the fuller expressions of 534-5 and

654 where the name of the people is given. Rather it is to be translated as "of these people there came fifty ships," or as in 654, "Tlepolemos was leader of nine ships of Rhodians."¹⁶ Note here the absence of the definite article, similar to 535, suggesting a *commodity in quantity*. In this view the word 'ship' would mean most particularly a measurement; there would be no signification of the actual vessels. It would be similar to our present expression, to wit, "about five cars of people came," or "there were ten tables of us at bridge." Similar to but not the same as metonymy, it is an easier way of conveying size, easier to think of and easier for the hearer to digest than great numbers would be; it is, of course, also more imaginative.

An immediate objection to this sort of identification is the presence of the epithets *γλαφυρός*, *μέλας* or *μέλαινα*, etc., which direct the hearer's attention to the physical object 'ship.' But these are so traditional that it is doubtful whether they would cast any impression on the hearers. The epithets, in that they are generic, have nothing to do with the specific instance.

The verbs of leadership in the Catalogue help to reinforce belief in a term of measurement. Consider the lines devoted to the greater Ajax (ship number formula 4), which have suffered strong criticism from many sides. Whether it is an interpolation or not is beside the point at this moment; it, together with the passages identified as similar to it, represents another formula for indicating the number of ships. I am assuming that whoever composed the two lines (557-8) was sufficiently versed in the Greek language to be able to know whether he was making sense. At first glance line 557 seems to depict a scene at sea: "Ajax was leading out from Salamis twelve ships." The *ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος* especially points up the motion. However the repetition of *ἄγω* indicates another meaning altogether. Line 558:

στῆσε δ' ἄγων ἔν' Ἀθηναίων ἵσταντο φάλαγγες

because of the context of the Catalogue would indicate that the bard is describing in detail that which he had generally mentioned at 476:

ὡς τοὺς ἡγεμόνες διεκόσμεον ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα.

ἄγων has no expressed object; the natural inference is to carry over *νήας* from the line before. In so doing, the literal meaning

¹⁶ So W. Leaf, *Iliad*² (London, 1900), note on II, 575.

of ship has to be abandoned, something like the notion of shiploads or ship's companies must be imagined. ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος then would become an expression of place of origin.¹⁷ If nothing else, the two lines make clear that whoever wrote them was not under the impression that the Catalogue was describing a scene at Aulis. He would not have created the obvious time sequence in the repeated ἄγεν—ἄγων.

This formula elsewhere is immediately bound up in the people of the contingent:

1. 654 ἐννέα νῆας ἄγεν Ῥοδίων ἀγερώχων
2. 671-5 . . . ἄγε τρεῖς νῆας . . . παῦρος δέ οἱ εἴπετο λαός
3. 748 . . . ἦγε δῶ καὶ εἴκοσι νῆας
τῷ δ' Ἐπιήγες ἔποντο μενεπτόλεμοί τε Περαιβοί

Here again, although the vivid phrase ἄγε νῆας suggests the actual sailing, and hence the historical fact, the introduction of the people continues as elsewhere to cast the attention on them, and so reconstruct the muster scene, which the bard has indicated he is describing.

Other references to the number of ships involve the verb ἄρχω or the noun ἀρχός, which implies the abstract qualities of leadership and is in no way as concrete and immediate as ἄγω. Each time this formula is used (see ship number formulae 5, 6, 7) ships seem to be a quantitative measurement:¹⁸ τῶν ἑκατὸν νηῶν ἦρχε, he commanded one hundred ships of these people (shipfuls, or shiploads of these people). It is also interesting to note that in the *Iliad* ἄρχειν when used in the sense of commanding or ruling is always outside the Catalogue used in connection with human beings. Only in these passages are inanimate objects, ships, used as objects of ἄρχειν.

What sort of metaphorical use might we then assume for 'ship'? I suggest that it be 'shipload' or 'ship-unit,' the latter being an actual political or military division.

Nestor prepares for the Catalogue by suggesting (362) that there be a muster κατὰ φύλα, κατὰ φρήγρας. He later urges the plan again (437 f.):

¹⁷ As *Od.*, XV, 425: ἐκ μὲν Σιδῶνος . . . εὐχομαι εἶναι.

¹⁸ Schol. A on II, 576 disagrees and has the meaning as τούτων τῶν πόλεων ἑκατὸν νηῶν ἦρχεν, but one cannot always make the cities into the logical antecedent of τῶν, when in every case the point of our attention is to the people in οἷ, and this relative pronoun must have an antecedent which can only be the following τῶν.

ἀλλ' ἄγε κήρυκες μὲν Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων
λαὸν κηρύσσοντες ἀγειρόντων κατὰ νῆας.

The final phrase of the Greek is generally rendered "let them gather the folk throughout the ships." Since, however, the forces gather together upon the plain (465), and are there arranged (476), this translation is perhaps wrong. It is possible that κατὰ φῦλα, κατὰ φρήτρες and κατὰ νῆας are all of a piece in implication. Most reasonably the ships of each region or people were manned and sent out from the important towns of the region individually, or, at any rate, when the army was called up in each area it was no doubt arranged κατὰ φῦλα, κατὰ φρήτρες and on that basis was assigned to the ships of that area; each ship's company would be a part of a φρήτρη. Thus the consequent emphasis upon ships by the bard, and the absence of any further mention of the φῦλα or φρήτραι would be realistic in terms of the muster, and would imply nothing about the present use of the ships.¹⁹

It is conceivable that we have here the reflection of a practice similar to the Athenian naucrary, whose origins are obscure, but may have been in the very early period. Hignett²⁰ calls attention to a lexicographer's comment on a place name: "a region of Attica . . . also a naukraria." This Athenian unit seems to combine the elements of locale, population group, and something nautical (perhaps even an outfitted ship) in the same way that my reading of the Catalogue does.²¹ It would be the logical way to administer an overseas army who were crew and fighters at once. Nestor's remark κατὰ νῆας at 438, together with such expressions as πολέες δ' ἔμβαλλον Ἐπειοί would refer to this unit in which the men grouped; and the reading of the Catalogue of Ships becomes much more intelligible.

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¹⁹ Note also the change from brotherhoods and clans to ships is completed by the bard's final line of invocation, i. e. 493, ἀρχὸς αὖ νηῶν ἐρέω νῆας τε προπάσας.

²⁰ C. Hignett, *History of the Athenian Constitution* (Oxford, 1952), p. 68.

²¹ W. M. Calder III has reminded me of a Thucydidean usage of ναῦς which may mean 'shipload,' namely VIII, 29, 1 πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ τοῖς which the Schol. says (p. 412, 9-10 Hude) ἀντὶ τοῦ τοῖς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ.

THE SERVIAN CORPUS AND THE SCHOLIA OF PSEUDO-PROBUS.

The present study¹ is a comparison of the scholia of the Servian corpus with the notes of the Vergilian commentary which bears the name of Valerius Probus.² Its purpose is to discover whether they are in any way related, and if so to determine the nature of the relationship. This investigation is limited to the notes in the two commentaries.

As one compares individual notes of the two commentaries, it is immediately seen that they often contain the same information. There are, of course, the usual identifications and simple paraphrases, the commonplace explanations and interpretations, which we must consider the public property of Vergilian exegesis. To conclude a relationship between these notes of common material, we must have in addition some indication of singularity, some clue that it is the same note appearing in both commentaries. There are no word-for-word repetitions and consequently no simple copying on the part of either author. Any

¹ This article is largely an abridgement of a doctoral dissertation presented to The Johns Hopkins University in 1958, entitled *The Relation of the Pseudo-Proban Commentary on Vergil to the Scholia of the Servian Corpus*.

² The problem of authorship of the "Proban" commentary, whether it does or does not go back, wholly or in part, to the work of Valerius Probus, is not directly involved here. Lest use of the terms "Probus" or "Pseudo-Probus" misdirect the attention of the reader, the commentary is referred to simply as P. For convenience the normal practice is employed of referring to the shorter, or Vulgate Servius, as S; and the additional material first published in Daniel's 1600 edition as D. The term "Servian" is to be understood as including the entire corpus, both S and D, and does not mean "of Servius." The Harvard edition of Servius (vol. II [Lancaster, Pa., 1946]) is at present available only for *Aen.* I and II, and the single citation from these books in the present article is printed according to the system of that edition, i. e., material of D alone printed on the left, from S alone on the right, material found in both S and D across the full width of the page. All other citations are from the edition of Thilo and Hagen (Leipzig, 1881-1902) and according to their arrangement (D in italics; parts in Roman type from Servius proper). The text of P is found in vol. III, fasc. II of the latter edition.

evidence of common origin must come from the notes themselves and their placement with the particular Vergilian passage at which they occur. The following seven cases are chosen as containing such evidence, and as being both typical and cogent.

(1) *Georg.*, I, 10. In P:

ET VOS, AGRESTUM PRAESENTIA NUMINA FAUNI . . . Existimatur autem fuisse Faunus rex Aboriginum, qui cives suos mitiorem vitam docuerit ritu ferarum viventes, et primus loca certis numinibus et aedificia quaedam lucosque sacraverit, a quo et fana sunt dicta. . . .

P identifies Faunus, and credits him with consecration to specific gods of places and buildings, called, for him, *fana*.

The S note does not discuss *Fauni*, but the D supplement advances three etymologies. The first two are of *Faunus* and *fauni*. The third D attributes to Cincius and Cassius:

. . . Cincius et Cassius aiunt ab Euandro Faunum deum appellatum ideoque aedes sacras 'faunas' primo appellatas, postea fana dicta, et ex eo, qui futura praecinerent fanaticos dici.

P and this third section of the D note are clearly presenting the same information. D gives it in a somewhat fuller form, with the intermediate stage of *faunae*, and the further development of *fanatici*. That they are presenting *the same note* is shown by their very usage of the etymology of *fana* in this place. In both notes it is a detail unnecessary to, and independent of, exegesis of the passage. It is inserted, legitimately enough, for the sake of etymological completeness, but the appearance of this same fortuitous detail, under the same lemma,³ shows that this section in the two notes represents one original notation.

(2) At *Georg.*, I, 67-8, P has:

AT SI NON FUERIT TELLUS FOECUNDA, SUB
IPSUM ARCTURUM TENUI SAT ERIT SUSPEN-
DERE SULCO. Arcturus est stella in cauda maioris ursae,
quam Graeci Helicen vocant, quae Latine Septentrio vocatur,

³ There are etymologies of *faunus* in the Servian notes on *Aen.*, VII, 47; 81; VIII, 314; *Ecl.*, VI, 27. In none of these instances is this detail included. The P commentary does not contain other etymological discussion of *faunus*.

dicta a cauda et ursa: ἄρκτος enim Graece ursa dicitur, cauda οὐρά, cuius ortu hiems incipit.

Neither the S nor D notes on this line comment on the etymology of Arcturus. There is, however, at the beginning of the note on *Aen.*, I, 744, the following in S:

ARCTURUM stella est post caudam maioris ursae, posita in signo bootae; unde "arcturus" dicta est, quasi ἄρκτου οὐρά. . . .

This derivation of Arcturus is found nowhere else, except Isidore, *Or.*, III, 71, 9, which Avery has shown is directly copied from the Servian note.⁴

(3) In the note on *Ecl.*, VII, 61, P gives two derivations of *Alcides*:

POPULUS ALCIDAE. Alcides Hercules ab Alcaeo monte (avo E) sive ἀπὸ τῆς ἀλκῆς id est fortitudine. . . .

There is no S note for this line, and the D note is devoted entirely to the myth connecting the poplar with Hercules. However, included in the note on *Aen.*, VI, 392, is the following etymology in S:

. . . sane Alciden volunt quidam ἀπὸ τῆς ἀλκῆς dictum, id est a virtute: quod non procedit, quia a prima aetate hoc nomen habuit ab Alcaeo, patre Amphitryonis. et scimus agnomina ab accidentibus dari.

We find here, then, both the etymologies suggested by P, with S rejecting the second and receiving with approval the first. Even though S presents the derivation ἀπὸ τῆς ἀλκῆς as incorrect, the etymological sections of these notes are the same, and the etymology ἀπὸ τῆς ἀλκῆς is, to be sure, striking. It is found nowhere else.

(4) At the beginning of the first Georgic, Vergil invokes the rustic deities whose provinces will be treated in the four books. Addressing Liber and Ceres, he writes (*Georg.*, I, 7-9):

Liber et alma Ceres, vestro si munere tellus
Chaoniam pingui glandem mutavit arista,
Poculaque inventis Acheloia miscuit uvis. . . .

⁴ W. T. Avery, "Isidore (*Orig.* III, 71, 9) and Servius (*In Aen.* I, 744)," *C. P.*, LXIX (1954), p. 104.

P gives the following interpretation at line 9:

POCULAQUE INVENTIS ACHELOIA MISCUIT
UVIS. Aetolus pastor Staphylus, cum Oenei capellas in
pabulum deduceret, notavit unam praecipue secedentem a
grege, laetio(que) ceteris recipientem se serius in prae-
sepia. Cuius rei ut causam cognosceret, secutus est eam
clam et in remota stirpe animadvertit uvam edentem,
pomum iis temporibus incognitum, et sustulit regique per-
tulit Oeneo, qui expresso humore delectatus, cum eum vetus-
tate cognosceret mitescere, Libero patri posuit excepto a se
hospitio. Cuius rei cultum cum demonstraret Liber, ut
perpetua inventorum esset gloria, constituit, ut ab Oeneo
οἶνος appellaretur vinum, a Staphylo uva *σταφυλή*. Achelous
est autem flumen Aetoliae. Ita quantum ad Acheloum perti-
net, aqua intellegi poterit, quem ideo potissimum nominavit,
quod primus in Graeciam videtur fluxisse. Uva autem
significat vinum.

The S notation is, in part:

CHAONIAM P. G. M. A. Epiroticam, a loco, in quo abun-
dant glandes, quibus antea homines vescebantur. Et modo
speciem pro genere posuit; non enim aut in Epiro tantum
glandes fuerunt, aut de solo Acheloo homines potare con-
sueverant. Sane 'Acheloia' non praeter rationem dixit: nam,
sicut Orpheus docet, generaliter aquam veteres Acheloum
vocabant. Sed quia specialiter quidam fluvius Achelous
dicitur, aut species est pro genere, aut secundum antiqui-
tatem est locutus. . . .

The D note corresponding to that of P begins with a myth-
ological account of the creation of the river Achelous, and
continues:

. . . Circa hunc (fluvium) *Staphylus*, Oenei pastor, cum
animadvertisset ex capellis unam esse pinguiissimam, intel-
lexit id pabuli ubertate fieri. Secutus itaque eandem cum
vidisset uvis vesci, admiratus et novitatem et dulcedinem,
decerptum fructum pertulit regi. Qui cum liquorem expres-
sisset, a suo nomine appellavit *οἶνον*, ab inventore *σταφυλήν*. . . .

D maintains this etymological course and proceeds with a far-
fetched derivation of *κεράσαι* from *κέρας*, the horn of Achelous
broken in his fight with Hercules, concluding with a somewhat
expanded and, in parts, differently worded expression of the two
explanations given by S: *species pro genere* and *secundum
antiquitatem*.

All three commentators clearly agree in these last two notations. In the "Staphylus" story, P and D are the same. The D note is fuller; it contains some background material on the origin of the river, and includes an additional etymology, along with the justification for it. P has a few details, in the telling of the story, not found in D. Still, the material of the P and D notes is the same. Can the two notes be said to be identical? As regards the Vergilian passage, the explanations that Achelous was considered the oldest river, or that it was not uncommon for "Achelous" to be used for water in general, are surely the most attractive. They have their precedents.⁵ Even the connection of the Achelous with the discovery of the grape is found, in Hyginus,⁶ where we read that a certain Cerasus mixed wine with the waters of the Achelous, and that therefore to mix wine is *κεράσαι* in Greek. But Hyginus also is probably thinking of Achelous as the most ancient of rivers, as Rose remarks in his note to Hyginus' passage.⁷

Aetiological tales of this sort, relying heavily on etymologies, are not startling, but the justification for including this one here is slight. D says that Staphylus happened to be feeding his goats by this river when he noticed that one was unusually fat, observed the animal's feeding habits, and discovered the grape. P requires the reader to draw his own conclusion from mention that Staphylus was an Aetolian with later mention of Achelous as a river in Aetolia. Without the word *inventis* of the Vergilian line there would be no excuse for the story to be given here. Clearly a commentator has taken an aetiological myth of the discovery of the vine to explain *inventis . . . uvis*, and grafted upon the myth a specific geographical setting to connect it with *poculaque . . . Acheloia*. But this could be done only for this line. It would indeed be large coincidence for two independent commentators to do exactly this in precisely the same way. It cannot be original in both commentaries.

(5) There are several notes in both commentaries dealing with the creation of horses and the origin of riding. Comparison

⁵ Eur., *Andr.* 166, *Bacch.* 165; Macrobius, V, 18, who also quotes Ephorus and Aristophanes.

⁶ *Fab.* CCLXXIV, p. 166 (Rose).

⁷ *Ibid.*

of them all is interesting,⁸ but the comment on *Georg.*, III, 113-15 is particularly noteworthy. In P we have:

... Lapithae ergo primi existimantur equitasse, et, ut Palaephatus in libro 'Απίστον ait, eius gentis utique [et hei pro hi diphthongus est Graeca] ii, qui in Nephela castello morentur. Ex qua causa Centauri nebulae filii creduntur, et Ixion iis mercedem promisit, si furem taurorum gregem occidissent, quorum velocitate equorum cum impetus effugerent et ipsos telis conficerent, ἀπὸ τοῦ κεντεῖν, quod est figere, καὶ ταύρου Centauri dicti sunt. Existimati sunt bifformes, quia primi equitare coeperunt.

Servian material corresponding to this P note is found on line 115:

FRENA PELETHRONII LAPITHAE G. D. Pelethronium oppidum est Thessaliae, ubi primum domandorum equorum repertus est usus. nam cum quidam Thessalus rex, bubus oestro exagitatis, satellites suos ed eos revocandos ire iussisset illique cursu non sufficerent, ascenderunt equos et eorum velocitate boves secuti, eos stimulis ad tecta revocarunt. sed hi visi, aut cum irent velociter, aut cum eorum equi circa flumen Peneon potarent capitibus inclinatis, locum fabulae dederunt, ut Centauri esse crederentur, qui dicti sunt Centauri ἀπὸ τοῦ κεντῆν τοὺς ταύρους. alii dicunt Centaurorum fabulam esse confictam ad exprimendam humanae vitae velocitatem, quia equum constat esse velocissimum. . . .

Explaining Vergil's *Lapithae*, P states that they were Thesalians said to have been the first to ride horseback, and cites the Περὶ 'Απίστον of Palaephatus for the story given. Comparing the P version with what is actually found in the text of Palaephatus as we have it,⁹ we see that P is a good abbreviation, and that many of the main details are included in the P version. The conspicuous difference is that our text of Palaephatus represents the Lapiths as inhabitants of Larissa and subjects of Ixion, and the "bull-goaders" as a people who lived nearby. Palaephatus gives credit of the discovery of riding to these imaginative cowboys, who were subsequently called *centauri*.

The S note on line 115 is beyond any question using the same material as Palaephatus and P, although S has tried to make it

⁸ *Georg.*, I, 12 f.; 18; III, 122.

⁹ N. Festa, *Mythographi Graeci* (Leipzig, 1902), III, fasc. II, pp. 2-5.

more plausible by inserting remarks on the speed of their riding and suggesting that the mistake might have been made while the horses were inclining their heads to drink water.¹⁰ However, S understands the Lapiths to be subjects of the unnamed *Thessalus rex*, and the riders to be the king's own men, *satellites suos*, and not a neighboring people. The S version is the same as that of P, but omits certain details preserved in P and Palaephatus, details such as the name of Ixion, the name of Nephele, which is important in the other two, the tactics of shooting at the bulls while retreating, and, very important, the source of the story. P has given both author and title.

Although S does not cite Palaephatus as his source, there can be no doubt that both S and P are reproducing the same material, ultimately material of Palaephatus, whether either the author of P or that of the D scholium had actually seen a copy of the *Περὶ Ἀπίθρων*. But can an identity in the two notes be proved? Such an identity is revealed by the very fact that both commentaries use this explanation here at all: the *lemma* is *Lapithae*; why tell an elaborate story about their famous enemies? Vergil is consciously recognizing the Lapiths; he makes no mention of their uncouth rivals. The rather ridiculous rationalization of the belief in centaurs has nothing at all to do with the thought of Vergil here, and explains nothing. It could not even be said that both commentators happened to introduce mention of centaurs to illustrate the use of horses for riding, since centaurs are part horse themselves and would not be thought of as "riding." Only the Palaephatus rationalization of the tradition of centaurs, that they were actually men riding horses, could connect riding with centaurs at all. Have both annotators by chance chosen the same indirect way of appealing to the same source to disagree with Vergil and insist that the Lapiths did not, after all, discover riding?

But, it might be said, by making these *centauri* subjects of the king of the Lapiths, therefore Lapiths themselves, the com-

¹⁰ In the first part of the P note, dealing with Erichthonius, P and S on line 113 have the same account, including the same derivation of the name. Likewise in their explanations of *Pelethronii*, P is fuller, submitting an exact geographical designation, whereas S is general. D has two additional and distinct interpretations. For material which they both preserve, S and P are the same.

mentators have retained for them the honor of the discovery. In this case, either they have both consciously distorted the Palaephatus account to fit this passage, or they have made, in remarkable coincidence, the same mistake. Palaephatus is quite clear in stating that the *centauri* were a separate group from the Lapiths, and goes further to state that they later became so insolent as to carry off the wives of the Lapiths to their own country, which began the great war between centaurs and Lapiths. That both P and S give the same distorted (or mistaken) version of a rationalization of the story, to explain a passage in Vergil for which their explanation is not appropriate, goes far beyond probable coincidence and makes quite clear that the notes are of common origin.

(6) On *Ecl.*, IX, 47, we have in P:

DIONAEI CAESARIS. Sive eadem Venus sive mater Veneris est: divum Iulium significat, cuius capiti in statua stella addita est.

In the Servian scholia we find:

DAPHNI QUID ANTIQUOS S. S. O. ECCE DIONAEI PROCESSIT CAESARIS ASTRUM cum Augustus Caesar ludos funebres patri celebraret, die medio stella apparuit. ille eam esse confirmavit parentis *sui*: unde sunt versus isti compositi . . . *Baebius Macer circa horam octavam stellam amplissimam, quasi lemniscis, radiis coronatam, ortam dicit. quam quidam ad inlustrandam gloriam Caesaris iuvenis pertinere existimabant, ipse animam patris sui esse voluit eique in Capitolio statuum, super caput auream stellam habentem, posuit: inscriptum in basi fuit 'Caesari emitheo' . . .*

D proceeds here along different lines.

S explains Vergil's *processit Caesaris astrum* as referring to the star which appeared at Julius' funeral. The first sentence of D is supplement to the S note, restored by the compiler. D then goes on with the interpretation that Vergil means Octavian by "the star of Caesar," and states that Octavian had a golden star mounted over Caesar's statue to remind the people of the apotheosis of the divine Caesar and to suggest that his spirit was present in the person of his heir. This, D implies, is what Vergil means. The S note gives us information about

the star which appeared; the D addition discusses Vergil's purpose in mentioning the star.

The detail of the golden star over Caesar's statue, not found in Servius, enriches the D interpretation. If Vergil means by "the star of Caesar" his successor Octavian, the detail of the star on the statue shows that Octavian also was anxious to keep current the association made by Vergil in the passage discussed. It is, so to speak, a precedent for Vergil's allusion.

Comparing this with P, we see that aside from the identification of *Dionaeus*, the P note says nothing but "He means the divine Julius. A star was added to the head on his statue." This is meaningless. Certainly a metal star over the head of Caesar's statue could not be taken as beneficial to farmers in any way. It is Octavian who is the farmer's savior, as the D note points out. D includes the detail as illustration of his interpretation, and as such it is valuable. But P has only the detail and it, alone, is not even applicable in explanation of the passage. If we take the notes to be the same, and the P note to be an abbreviated version of the note as it is presented by D, this problem is resolved.

(7) *Georg.*, IV, 211. The P note:

AUT MEDUS HYDASPES: flumen Indiae, sed Vergilius Mediae dixit flumen Hydaspem. Hi Medi duce Alexandro Porum, regem Indorum, et ipsam Indiam subegerunt.

In the Servian scholia we have:

MEDUS HYDASPES fluvius Mediae . . . *MEDUS HYDASPES civitas Medorum. et aliter: apud omnes satis constat Hydaspem flumen Indiae esse, non Mediae; sed potest videri poeta Hydaspem Medum dixisse iure belli, quod Medi duce Alexandro vicerint Porum Indorum regem, et eum in suam redegerint potestatem. oritur Hydaspes ex Caucaso et miscetur Indo.*

The S note mistakenly locates the Hydaspes, and goes on to relate the reverence felt by the Medes for their rulers to that of the bees for their "king." The first D notice incorrectly makes it a Median state. A contrary explanation follows, that the Hydaspes is unquestionably in India, and that Vergil may have called it "Median" because Medes were serving in Alexander's

army when he conquered Porus, king of "India." It is a clever way out of the problem,¹¹ but it is most unlikely that two separate commentators would have hit upon this far-fetched idea independently.

It has been demonstrated above that in many instances the notes of P and the Servian corpus give the same material and in such a way as to indicate that it is the same note which is reflected in both commentaries. Before attempting to determine the nature of the actual relationship between the commentaries, we must first point out that this relationship is only partial. In some instances the same Vergilian passage occasions a different treatment.¹² There are different interpretations of the same material.¹³ And there are in parallel notes contradicting answers to the same question.¹⁴ Furthermore, we have seen that P contains notations identical with notes found both in S and in D; there can consequently be no possibility of P being related to the shorter commentary published by Servius. Hence our investigation will be to determine the dependency and relationship of P with the original commentary from which Servius excerpted his material. The D scholia represent material added at a later time to the text of Servius to replace material which Servius had not chosen to use, thereby reconstituting, in great measure, the substance of the original commentary.¹⁵ The current theory that the author of this original commentary was Aelius Donatus is widely accepted and variously substantiated.¹⁶

¹¹ The last sentence of D probably explains the Vergilian expression. If Vergil thought with D that Hydaspes rose in the Caucasus, he would consequently have imagined it as flowing through the territory of the Medes on its way to juncture with the Indus. On the confusion of "Caucasus" with the Hindu Kush, see M. Cary and E. H. Warmington, *The Ancient Explorers* (London, 1929), pp. 196 f.

¹² E. g., *Ecl.*, IV, 58; *Georg.*, I, 16; 20; 73-6; II, 425; III, 146-9; 408.

¹³ E. g., *Georg.*, I, 212; 336 f.; III, 25; 382; IV, 462.

¹⁴ E. g., *Georg.*, II, 64; 437; 448; IV, 387.

¹⁵ That there was some abbreviation on the part of the compiler has been established by J. J. H. Savage, "The Scholia in the Virgil of Tours, *Bernensis* 165," *H. S. C. P.*, XXXVI (1925), pp. 91-164; "The Manuscripts of the Commentary of Servius Danielis on Virgil," *H. S. C. P.*, XLIII (1932), pp. 77-102. See especially the résumé on p. 78 of the latter article.

¹⁶ This thesis was initially suggested independently and almost simultaneously by K. Barwick, "Zur Serviusfrage," *Phil.*, LXX (1911), pp.

Could the Donatian commentary have been the source, or rather one of the sources (since the dependency is only partial), of the P commentary? It was much used; did the author of P draw on it? Considering this hypothesis, we would expect a substantial number of notes in the two commentaries to explain Vergil in much the same way, although it would, of course, be too much to ask that they furnish us in every note direct evidence that the two commentaries were related. Investigation fulfills the expectation. There are, in addition to notes having some suggestion or evidence of relationship, many notes which contain fundamentally the same interpretation. However, in these notes there are many details in P which do not appear in S or D, details which the author of P could not have found in Donatus, had that been his source.¹⁷ To explain this situation, it could be assumed that in such cases the author or compiler of P either added some details of his own, augmenting the material of his source, or that he chose to use some other source quite similar to the note of Donatus, possibly even itself derived from Donatus' note.

Let us test, then, a potential explanation unlikely because of the great element of coincidence involved: that the Donatian

106 ff.; F. Lammert, "De Hieronymo Donati Discipulo," *Comm. phil. Ien.*, IX, 2 (1912); and E. K. Rand, "Is Donatus's Commentary on Virgil Lost?," *C. Q.*, X (1916), pp. 162 ff. Cf. F. Lammert, *Bursian's Jahresberichte*, CCXXXI, 2 (1931), pp. 85-92.

¹⁷ *Georg.*, I, 47 is a good example. Cf. also *Georg.*, I, 12; 36-9; 138; II, 87; 89; 197 f.; 380-4; 481 f.; III, 38; 122; 312; IV, 231. Probably the best example is the P note on *Eol.*, VI, 31, which contains several major points as well as many details not found in the corresponding Servian note or anywhere else in the Servian corpus. The several instances of the P material appearing at various places in the Servian scholia have been pointed out by Thilo ("Über Probus Commentar zu Vergils Bucolica und Georgica," *Neue Jahrb.*, CXLIX [1894], pp. 421-32). For those elements of the P note not found in the Servian notes, Thilo inferred that the authors of both P and the S and D notes were using some source other than the "original discussion," also inferred by Thilo. This conclusion of Thilo's was based on a comparison involving this note alone. Since this study has revealed other cases of P and the Servian notes containing the same material, with P sometimes giving the fuller note, sometimes S or D, Thilo's conjecture is greatly weakened. For a substantial refutation of other arguments used by Thilo, see R. S. Conway, *Harvard Lectures on the Vergilian Age* (Cambridge, 1928), pp. 37 ff.

commentary was P's source only for those notes which offer us internal evidence that the P and Servian notes are the same. Yet even in these notes there are details in P not found in its Servian counterpart. In (5) above, the two commentaries contain the same note, seen not only in that they preserve the same material in detail, but also in that their common explanation has very slight justification. P, however, introduces Liber into the story as a main character, central to his note. In the D note Oeneus names both wine and grape. In (6) the Servian account fails to preserve details supplied by P, the name of the king of the "Lapiths," Ixion, and the name of the town Nephele, on which a derivation is based in P. The method used in attacking the bulls is found in P, not in S. Most important, P mentions the author of the tale and title of the work in which it was to be found. The P note is certainly fuller and more detailed, and the details missing in S are authentic elements in the Palaephatus story, and pivotal in the development of it. This eliminates even the chance that P might have himself added these elements to the story.

Another indication that Donatus was not the source of P is seen in some of the *variorum* annotations of the Servian corpus. Often an opinion given is attributed to a source that is named; more often the transition is marked by an impersonal introductory notice such as *alii dicunt*, *quidam volunt*, or *alii exponunt*. In many instances the note in P is found in S or D introduced by such a phrase.¹⁸ In several of these instances, had P been using the Donatian commentary, he would have chosen a portion of the greater note to which less importance was attached, and neglected or omitted parts to which his "source" attached greater importance. It would be extremely difficult to attempt to analyze the taste or criteria of selection of the author of P; but it would still be agreed that were P using Donatus as his source, we should expect him to pay some heed to that portion of the note treated with most favor and in most detail, rather than pass over it in favor of one briefly alluded to, apparently, for the purpose of completeness.¹⁹

¹⁸ E. g., *Ecl.*, IV, 34; VI, 42; 61; 78; VII, 61; IX, 47; *Georg.*, I, 12; 47; 60-3; and there are many others.

¹⁹ E. g., the notes to *Ecl.*, IV, 34. The material in P is found to be a small portion of the more complete note of D. If D had been the source,

Whereas it might seem irregular that one extracting material and interpretations from a greater body of commentary would neglect the more important elements in favor of the less important, it would be much more unlikely that such an author, gathering information from a source reliable for its judgment and completeness, would take information which the source had pronounced incorrect, especially when the source gave reason for the rejection and sponsored one or more acceptable explanations of the problem. In (3) above, P repeats both derivations given by S, even though one was actively supported by S and the other definitely stated incorrect. The notes to *Georg.*, I, 18 furnish a better example. D refers the reader to his discussion at line 12. At the beginning of that note D recognized two possible readings, *fudit aquam* and *fudit equum*, and chose *equum*, giving reasons for his preference. The P note on line 18 could not have been included in D, since D has committed himself to the reading *equum*. Further, if the D note in its original form had been P's source, P would have been giving a note based on a reading which the "source" discouraged.²⁰

Some other explanation of the relationship of P with the Servian scholia must be found. The Servian author has clearly consulted and included in his great *variorum* commentary the work of many previous commentators. A possible solution to our problem could be that the P commentary was one of these sources used by Donatus. Such a thesis would explain the occurrence of the same material in the two commentaries. It would explain the notes which are not related: in those instances Donatus had not chosen to use the P material. Where the P and Servian notes contradict, Donatus disagreed with the view expressed in P, but recognized it to refute it. However, even if our assumption were that the author of the Servian scholia had drawn on P only in those notes which offer indication of identity, there are still in those notes several instances of the Servian note containing information and details not found in the corresponding P note.

In (5) above, D adds to the story preserved in P an additional

P would have passed up the major part of the note, as well as the standard etymology, to choose for his note a lesser element.

²⁰ See also the notes on *Georg.*, III, 46-9; 345; 27 on *victoris . . . Quirini*.

etymology, which is supported by extension of the story to include subsequent events connecting Achelous and Hercules. The notes of P and D are the same in detail, but D has an additional element. In (1), the derivation of *fana* from *Faunus* is found in P and in D, but D preserves as well an intermediate stage of the derivation, *faunae*, and the further derivation of *fanaticus* from *fana*. There is no mention of Evander in P. (7) above showed that the whole matter of the P note on *Ecl.*, IX, 47 corresponds to what is in D a detail used to enrich the D derivation, and there is consequently in D much not preserved in P. It was seen that the P note makes no sense at all unless it is compared with the parallel D note and recognized as the same note much abbreviated. This abbreviation made by P is the clue to the exact relationship of P and the Servian corpus.

Many students of the scholia which bear the name of Probus have concluded that they are abbreviated extracts of a greater commentary. They explain the "silly and useless" notes as interpolations.²¹ If the two commentaries are related, but neither is in descent from the other, then they must be related through a common source. This mutual source we will call P'.²² For Donatus this P' commentary was one of the many works consulted. We submit that the "Proban" commentary as we have it contains a stratum, at least, of scholia descending from P', in some cases much abbreviated. In the case of those P notes which show no relationship with parallel Servian notes, no conclusion can be drawn as to whether they represent P'

²¹ O. Jahn, *Auli Persii Flacci Satirarum Liber* (Leipzig, 1843), *Proleg.*, pp. cxlvii-clii, accepted by Reifferscheid, *C. Suetoni Tranquilli Reliquiae* (Leipzig, 1860), p. 398; Ribbeck, *Prolegomena Critica ad P. Vergili Maronis Opera Maiora* (Leipzig, 1866), pp. 163-5; F. Marx, *C. Lucilii Carminum Reliquiae* (Leipzig, 1904), *Proleg.*, pp. lxxii-lxxv; I. Aistermann, *De M. Valerio Probo Berytio* (Bonn, 1910), pp. 72-80.

²² This conclusion was suggested by B. Keubler, *De M. Valerii Probi Berytii Commentariis Vergilianis* (Berlin, 1881), pp. 39 f., whose study of the discussion of the origin of Bucolic poetry found in P and in the Servian corpus led him to conjecture that these discussions go back to a common source. Funaioli, *Essegesi Virgiliana antica* (Milan, 1930), pp. 240 f., found that in some instances the same note is found in P and in the remains of the work of Junius Philargyrius. His conclusion that the Philargyrian material and the P note both go back to a commentator which the author of the D scholia used is, in so far as P is concerned, the conclusion to which this study has come.

material not used by Donatus or are inserted into and among the P' notes preserved in P.

This thesis resolves all aspects of the problem. It explains the occurrence in both commentaries of the same original note. There are no word-for-word similarities of phraseology to indicate connection, but P notes are shortened from the form of P', which is the link with S and D. Details found in Servian notes, and not in P, are likewise explained. The problem of P notations for which there is nothing similar or comparable is resolved: Donatus did not, of course, include all the views of any of his predecessors; he mentioned them only when he considered them suitable for his own purposes, whether as a possible explanation of the Vergilian passage or for critical review. There are details in P which are not found in the parallel Servian note: we expect the author of a *variorum* commentary making extensive use of the work of previous scholars to abbreviate the expression of their interpretations, often simply to refer to them.

There have been those who, in studying the P commentary, have concluded that there is in it a body of scholia actually going back to Marcus Valerius Probus, published by his students.²³ But whether or not we consider P' the publication of the ideas of that early notable of Vergilian studies, as a source of Donatus, if for no other reason, it and the commentary which today bears his name occupy an important place in the development of Vergilian exegesis.

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²³ Jahn, Ribbeck, Marx, Aistermann, *op. cit.*; also E. K. Rand, "Once More Vergil's Birthplace," *H. S. C. P.*, XLIV (1933), pp. 82 f.

SOME VIRGILIAN BEATITUDES.

In the works of Virgil we find a fair number of "beatitudes" or *makarismoi*, more or less fixed expressions which ascribe happiness to a person for the possession of some object or quality. Typical formulas are: *felix qui*, *fortunatus qui*, *beati qui*. To an inquiring mind two questions may naturally suggest themselves: first, whence did Virgil derive these beatitude-formulas? Secondly, what can we learn about his personal ideas of happiness from a study of the content of these beatitudes? When he speaks in his own person, as in *Georg.*, II, 490 ff., there is no difficulty about his own sentiments. But when he speaks through the mouth of others, as generally in the *Eclogues* and *Aeneid*, how can we be reasonably sure that these thoughts are his own? Only if we can find other passages and different contexts where these sentiments are often repeated.¹ While a study of these beatitudes may not give us a complete picture of Virgil's ideas of happiness, it will at least help us to divine the direction in which his mind was moving at various periods of his life.

The first question, whence came these beatitude-formulas, is easily answered: Virgil found them in the Greek poets he knew and loved so well.² So, for example, his *terque quaterque beati* (*Aen.*, I, 94) is a close imitation of *Odyssey*, V, 306 ff. From time immemorial, it seems, men had often expressed their ideals of happiness in such set phrases: *olbios*, *makar(ios)*, *eudaimon hostis*. So it was in Homer and Hesiod, in Theognis, Pindar, and Euripides, to mention only a few, that Virgil found these formulas.³ The happiness of which these poets speak is generally earthly felicity, to be achieved in this life. When in time the mystery-religions appeared, they eagerly laid hold of these old

¹ The old *Vitae Vergilianae*, especially that by Donatus, also may give some help. Cf., for example, A. Rostagni, *Suetonio de Poetis* (Turin, repr. 1956), pp. 94-5, notes.

² Of course Virgil may have found some of these formulas in the old Latin poets or in common speech. But the main influence, I believe, came from the Greek poets. Cf. Heinze's note to Horace's Epode II, "*Beatus ille*."

³ For a good list of typical Greek beatitudes, see E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos* (Stuttgart, 4th ed., repr. 1956), p. 100, note.

expressions. But now they acquired a deeper meaning. They became *hieroi logoi*, promises of bliss in the world to come, based on a religious experience in this life.⁴

The three Greek words for "lucky" or "happy" originally had different connotations. *Makar(ios)* suggested that a man was like the blessed gods in his good fortune; *olbios* had its face turned towards material blessings; *eudaimon* once meant a man with a good *daimon* or god who assigned him a good lot; gradually it came to mean simply a man with a good portion in life.⁵ But such distinctions are often blurred in the poets and we find Theognis using all three words in a single verse (1013). This may explain why Latin poets like Virgil and Horace use rather indifferently any one of three Latin words for "happy": *felix*, *fortunatus*, *beatus*.

In conclusion, it seems clear that Virgil inherited these old formulas from the Greek poets. Occasionally, for pathetic effect, he uses a conditional form. So Dido, soon to die, exclaims (*Aen.*, IV, 657-8):

*felix, heu nimium felix, si litora tantum
numquam Dardaniae tetigissent nostra carinae.*

For the content of his beatitudes Virgil ranged farther afield. Directly or indirectly he derived his ideas of happiness from the older Greek and Hellenistic moral philosophers who had speculated on this theme. For, to quote Festugière, "le Grec n'a jamais changé quant à l'universalité de cette fin (*eudaimonia*). Il n'a jamais admis que l'homme pût tendre, en définitive, à autre chose qu'à être heureux. C'était la pour lui l'une de ces vérités incontestables, s'imposant à tous, qui, dans l'ordre de la pratique, tiennent le rang de principe premier, de prémisse au syllogisme."⁶ Let us briefly review what one influential Greek philosopher thought about happiness. For, as we shall see, his ideas coincide rather closely with those of Virgil.⁷

⁴ Norden, *op. cit.* (note 3), pp. 100 ff.

⁵ For *eudaimon*, cf. A. J. Festugière, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon* (Paris, 1950), pp. 269 ff.

⁶ *Op. cit.* (note 5), p. 276, note.

⁷ Virgil was surely acquainted with some of Aristotle's ideas on happiness, at least indirectly from handbooks and from Cicero's works. The latter had used Aristotle's *Protrepticus* for his *Hortensius*, while he cites or refers to the dialogue *On Philosophy* in his *Nat. Deor.*

At the outset of his inquiry into the nature of *eudaimonia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1095a 20), Aristotle says: "both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that the highest good is happiness . . . ; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise."⁸ After a long dialectical discussion, he draws his final conclusions in Book X (1177a 10 ff.). The highest happiness for man must consist in the highest activity proper to man. This is *theoria* or contemplation, in which the intellect finds its perfection in the direct knowledge of its proper objects, the realities revealed to man by metaphysics and other studies. Such a life is most like that of the gods and Aristotle praises it with unusual warmth (1177b 30): "We must not, as people counsel, think humanly, being human, nor as mortals, being mortal, but as far as it may be we must put on the life of the Immortals and do all we can to live according to what is best in us."⁹ But Aristotle knew that, if all men are in theory called to such a contemplative life, only a few in fact choose it. For man is not pure intellect but a composite being set in the midst of his fellows in the *polis*. Most men find their happiness in the life of virtuous action and this is the best life for man in so far as he is merely human. For this reason he dedicates the first nine books of the *Ethics* to a study of the virtues of man *qua* citizen. And what of those external goods of which the poets had made so much? "Being a man," he says, "one will also need external prosperity; for our nature is not self-sufficient for the purpose of contemplation, but our body must be healthy. . . ."

After Aristotle came the Stoics, whose moral principles (e. g. *vivere secundum naturam*) were drawn not merely from an analysis of man *in se* but from their doctrine of the Cosmos and man's immanent relation to the divine Logos which penetrates all things. For them happiness consisted in a life in conformity with the divine Reason in the world and in man. Stoicism

⁸ I have used the English translation of *The Works of Aristotle* (ed. by W. D. Ross, Oxford, 1915). Cf. also H. H. Joachim, *Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford, 1951), pp. 287 ff.

⁹ At the conclusion of the earlier *Eudemian Ethics* (VIII, 3, 1249b 20), philosophic contemplation is described as *the* means to man's moral perfection. "Everything, whether possession or action, is morally bad and reprehensible if it hinders a man from serving and knowing God."

made a strong impact on many educated Romans thanks to Posidonius and others. For these neo-Stoics humanized the rigid dogmas of early Stoicism and came to terms with much of traditional Roman religious and ethical thought. By Cicero's day a new philosophic *koine* had come into being, drawn from common elements in various systems, Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic. So, when Virgil began to ponder the problem of human happiness, he had a wealth of ideas from which to choose. Like the Psalmist, he might well have cried: *Quis ostendet nobis bona?* In a world of chaos and moral disintegration, where could a man find the way to beatitude?

For the world in which he lived was a chaos (*G.*, I, 505 ff.):

quippe ubi fas versum atque nefas; tot bella per orbem,
tam multae scelerum facies. . . .
vicinae ruptis inter se legibus urbes
arma ferunt; saevit toto Mars impius orbe.

In a world of moral relativism, where could he find unchanging principles? In a world of disorder, where could he find order? What he needed to ensure peace of heart was a knowledge of the World and man's place therein, a liberating knowledge that would free him and others through him from gnawing anxiety and fear. So he turned to the Garden of Siro at Naples (*Catalepton*, 5, 8-10):

nos ad beatos vela mittimus portus,
magni petentes docta dicta Sironis
vitamque ab omni vindicabimus cura.

He was impressed by the gospel according to Epicurus (cf. *Ecl.* VI). But Epicurean rationalism and materialism could not satisfy him for good. Lucretius the poet laid a spell on him, but his "scientific" explanation of the *maiestas cognita rerum* left a void that must somehow be filled. For Virgil, as we divine from his poetry, had a soul whose gravitational force carried him beyond sensible phenomena to the Author or Power behind it all.¹⁰ In all his works we see a man of delicate sensibility confronting the deep, dark mystery of life and groping his way to an understanding and love of the order and the *Mens* that

¹⁰ Cf. F. Klingner, *Römische Geisteswelt* (Wiesbaden, 2nd ed., 1952), pp. 208-9.

must be there. We turn to his beatitudes to see where his search for happiness led him.

Ecl. I opens with the picture of a happy and an unhappy man: Tityrus, lying at ease, singing and piping; Meliboeus, heartsick, going off to exile. Through question and answer the bucolic mime unfolds before us against a dark background of disorder, injustice, and human suffering. Then, in line 46 (repeated in 51) we meet our first beatitude, spoken by Meliboeus: *Fortunate senex, ergo tua rura manebunt*. . . . "You, Tityrus, are happy because your little home is secured to you with its simple delights; I am a homeless wanderer and can nevermore be happy; *carmina nulla canam*." We ask ourselves: did then Virgil think that happiness depends on external things, on having a *patria*, a home and enough to live by?

Now Virgil knew as well as his friend Horace that the essence of happiness lay within a man rather than without. Perhaps he recalled the saying of Democritus: "Happiness does not dwell in flocks of cattle or in gold. The soul is the dwelling of the *daimon*."¹¹ But, like Aristotle and others, he well knew that, for most men, happiness does in fact depend on certain externals. So the Jews in exile by the waters of Babylon, when asked for songs by their captors, made answer (*Ps.* 136): "How can we sing the Lord's song in a strange land?" How could a homeless, hungry exile be humanly happy, unless he were of heroic temper, a Socrates or a Stoic sage? In this poem Virgil is voicing the complaints of all those who suffered in those troubled years, but he voices also the feelings of others upon whom, as in Tityrus' case, a ray of hope had shone. It is probable that he also had suffered personal loss. At all events, the theme of the loss of home and the sorrows of exile runs through much of his poetry. The *Aeneid* is full of exiles: Aeneas himself, Dido, Evander, and others. Death, far from home and loved ones, always brings poignant regret. So Aeneas in the storm (*Aen.*, I, 94ff.) envies the lot of those who fell at Troy *ante ora patrum*.¹² At Carthage (I, 437ff.), he sees homes arising and sighs: *O fortunati, quorum iam moenia surgunt*. All through

¹¹ Democ. 171. For the pre-Socratics I have used H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 7th ed., 1954).

¹² See V. Pöschl, *Die Dichtkunst Virgils* (Innsbruck-Wien, 1950), p. 59.

the first part of the epic Aeneas is a man of memories, racked by homesickness. The other exiles he meets have found a home, but he seems destined to wander forever, seeking *sedes quietas*, a new home and a new happiness.

The events of the years in which Virgil was writing the *Eclogues* (42-39 B. C.) filled many hearts with an unbearable tension. The Roman world was crowded with displaced persons. And it was for these unhappy souls that Virgil spoke out in *Ecl.* I and IX. But, unlike the Horace of *Epode* XVI, he did not despair. Through Tityrus, *fortunatus senex*, he expressed his hopes in the future: *pascite ut ante boves, pueri; summittite tauros.*

The *Georgics* were written (37-30 B. C.), not to give technical advice on farming, but for a deeper purpose. In *G.*, I, 41, Virgil speaks of the farmers as *ignaros viae*. Now what is this "way" of which he speaks? Is it merely the *colendi via* of *G.*, I, 121-2, the proper methods of husbandry which, perhaps, the old countrymen have neglected or the new ones, the veterans, have never known? Here, I believe, the *via* which he will teach the farmer is a way of life, the *hodos* or *bios* of which the Greeks had often spoken.¹³ All through the *Georgics*, while he seems to be giving practical advice on farming, he is really intent on teaching men the inner meaning and worth of such a life. And that is the true function of his "digressions." So, in *G.*, I, he stresses *labor improbus*. But in a myth (121 ff.) he gives the purpose of it all: by Jupiter's will, labor is the means by which man achieves self-perfection and happiness. Thus work has a deeper meaning than in Hesiod. In *G.*, II, he dwells on the brighter, more idyllic side of country-life, especially in the *laudes Italiae* (138 ff.). Work is again stressed (397 ff.), with echoes of Hesiod and old Cato, and stressed also is the worship of the gods. Then, after praising the trees which yield so much at the cost of so little pains, he exclaims (458-9): *O fortunatos nimium, sua si bona norint, agricolas!* That is the "way," the *via beate vivendi*, that he would teach them. He would give them eyes to see and hearts to feel the true *bona* that are already theirs.

The picture he paints here goes far deeper than that in *Ecl.* I.

¹³ For *hodos* as "the way of salvation" see W. Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford, 1947), pp. 98 ff.

As there, external blessings are lovingly described (469 ff.): *speluncae vivique lacus et frigida tempe/mugitusque boum mollesque sub arbore somni*. But here it is the moral wholesomeness of such a life over which he lingers. *Facilis victus* is theirs, but also peace, far from war's alarms, reverence for old age, religious rites, and a sense of justice.¹⁴ Country-life, says Virgil, keeps men free from the fear, envy, and ambition that rack the city-dweller; it gives what philosophy often promised—peace of soul—but it gives it more simply and naturally. In the country there still remained the old morally wholesome life by which Rome had risen to greatness. Such a life, with its purer teachings, was a living relic of the ideal past of Rome, a simple life lived in a spiritual atmosphere. For the gods were everywhere, ready to aid if man did his part.¹⁵

We can hardly doubt that these are heartfelt convictions of Virgil. He was a country boy who, after living in large cities, had withdrawn to a retreat at Naples. He seldom visited Rome though he had a house there, preferring the quiet of Campania or Sicily.¹⁶ In *Aen.*, VIII, when he brings Aeneas to the site of later Rome, he dwells on the poverty and happy simplicity of life there: *aude hospes contemnere opes*. In all this, he was of one mind with Augustus and Horace and other thoughtful Romans of his day.¹⁷

We come now to our last and best known beatitudes. In the midst of his praises of country-life the poet pauses to reveal his own heart's desire (*G.*, II, 475 ff.): "May the Muses give me welcome and a knowledge of heavenly things: *caelique vias et sidera monstrent*. But if my nature be unsuited for this kind of knowledge, may I love the country, its charms and its gods." Then come the beatitudes (490 ff.):

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
atque metus omnis et inexorabile fatum

¹⁴ On this subject Klingner, *op. cit.* (note 10), pp. 226 ff., is excellent.

¹⁵ Horace felt much the same about the country. Cf. E. Fraenkel, *Horace* (Oxford, 1957), pp. 313 and 320.

¹⁶ "Habuitque domum Romae . . . quamquam secessu Campaniae Sicillaeque plurimum uteretur," *Vita Donati* (ed. by C. Hardie, Oxford, 1954), lines 42-3.

¹⁷ The ideals of Horace and Augustus are well described by F. Solmsen, "Horace's First Roman Ode," in *A. J. P.*, LXVIII (1947), pp. 342 ff.

subiecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari.
 Fortunatus et ille deos qui novit agrestis,
 Panaque Silvanumque senem Nymphasque sorores.

In words reminiscent of Lucretius he calls the man *felix* who has attained a knowledge of the causes of things and is thus freed of idle fears of death and an afterlife.¹⁸ Is his ambition, then, merely to write another *De Rerum Natura* in the spirit of Lucretius? The whole spiritual mood of the *Georgics* up to this point militates against such a view.¹⁹ Virgil admires indeed the boldness of Lucretius and the deep earnestness of his work, but not his rationalism. In this passage he is thinking, beyond Lucretius, of other philosopher-poets and especially of Empedocles who once had written the beatitude: "Happy is he who has acquired the riches of divine thoughts, but miserable the man in whose mind dwells an obscure opinion about the gods."²⁰ Empedocles had been at once a poet, a philosopher, and a mystic whose nature impelled him "to devote himself with understanding and reverence to the world about him and the interplay of its forces."²¹ He had written a poem *On Nature* in which he had called on his Muse to give him knowledge and the gift of reverent song (frg. B 3). His doctrine of Love and Strife which alternately rule the world might well appeal to Virgil as he surveyed his own chaotic world.

The hieratic tone of the *felix qui* passage, which Norden traces back, via Lucretius, to Empedocles and the mystery-cults, shows Virgil's intense sincerity and piety.²² As priest of the Muses he yearns to devote himself to a study of Nature, not in the pragmatic spirit of Epicurus and Lucretius, but in the reverent spirit of Empedocles and of Plato. And, to understand this quasi-mystical yearning of his heart in this context, where he is praising the moral purity of country-life, we must look back and see what religion had come to mean to many cultured

¹⁸ Cf. P. Boyancé, "Le sens cosmique de Virgile," in *R. E. L.*, XXXII (1954), pp. 235 ff.

¹⁹ Klingner has always stressed the religious inspiration of the *Georgics*. Cf. his chapter on Virgil in *L'influence grecque sur la poésie latine de Catulle à Ovide* (Entretiens Hardt, Geneva, 1956).

²⁰ Emped. 132 (Diels-Kranz).

²¹ Jaeger, *op. cit.* (note 13), p. 125.

²² Norden, *op. cit.* (note 3), pp. 100 ff.

Romans of Virgil's day. For such an inquiry is closely connected with the quest for happiness.

By Cicero's time, says Festugière, the religion of the Cosmos and the Cosmic God was a pagan dogma, the private religion of most educated Romans.²³ Its gospel, in a sense, was Plato's *Timaeus*, which Shorey has called "a prose poem of science, a hymn of the universe, Plato's *De Rerum Natura*."²⁴ In that work the visible world, the Cosmos, and the visible gods, the stars, were described as most worthy objects of religious contemplation and worship. Later on the *Epinomis*, Aristotle's dialogue *On Philosophy*, and Stoic doctrines spread these ideas among the educated. For men who found no intellectual satisfaction in the civic worship, true piety and religion now consisted in contemplating the order in the heavens and in bringing a similar harmony into one's own soul. For in this, as Plato had declared in the *Timaeus* (90 A 2 ff.), lay true happiness. And for this the study of physics, especially astronomy, and mathematics was of the highest value. In the Hellenistic Age, because of the great interest in scientific studies, this Cosmic religion broadened into a doctrine of the universal presence of God on earth as in the heavens. And Cicero, in his *De Natura Deorum* and *Somnium Scipionis* as well as by his translation of part of the *Timaeus*, is a witness to the intense interest such ideas awakened in thoughtful Romans.²⁵ Such in brief was the climate of religious thought in which Virgil lived and moved, and such too is the broad context into which we must fit these beatitudes.

Virgil has just called the farmers happy, *sua si bona norint*.

²³ Père Festugière has given a masterly summary of this Cosmic Religion in *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, II, *Le dieu cosmique* (Paris, 1949).

²⁴ *C. P.*, XXIII (1928), p. 343.

²⁵ Cf. Festugière, *op. cit.* (note 23), pp. 424-5. In a recent essay, "Posidonius," *J. R. S.*, XLIX (1959), pp. 13 ff., A. D. Nock has urged that "Posidonius was the cause of a new enthusiasm about physical phenomena in general which came to be in the air and to affect people who need not be thought to have opened even an epitome of one of his treatises." His concluding words may well apply to Virgil: "Posidonius did not remake the Stoa, but he greatly enlarged men's concept of the divine in the universe and in their breasts and it may be that, like the author of the Fourth Gospel, he was the cause of mysticism in others without being himself a mystic."

And, as their *vates*, he has tried to reveal these *bona*. But, for himself now (*Me vero*), he feels a longing for a still higher beatitude such as Plato had described so movingly in the *Timaeus*. He yearns for that peace of heart which only a reverent and enlightened study and contemplation of heavenly things could bring: *caelique vias et sidera monstrent*. Let us try to follow the workings of his mind here and see what has given rise to such an aspiration.

The *Georgics* are an act of faith in and love of the *iustissima tellus* and its benevolent forces. But, as early as *G.*, I, 204 ff., the poet's vision widens and he sees the farmer's work in the broad perspective of cosmic order and providential design (353 ff.):

ipse pater statuit quid menstrua luna moneret,
quo signo caderent Austri, quid saepe videntes
agricolae propius stabulis armenta tenerent.

Now Virgil was a realist who knew that the farmer's world was not all sunshine and *ver assiduum*. There are sudden storms which ravage the ripening grain; there are pests and plagues which decimate the herds; all about the peasant as he works is *plurima mortis imago*. So there come times when the farmer—and perhaps the farmer's poet—may feel that the world is ruled only by chance and blind mechanical forces rather than by a benign *pater*. Hence in the *Georgics* that variation of tone between joy and sadness, hopefulness and dejection which makes them a “conception dramatique du monde.” One senses that at times the mood of Hesiod and Lucretius cast dark shadows over Virgil's mind. But in the end the brighter mood prevails, the *pondus* of his love for Nature gains the victory over doubt. Already, in *Ecl.* IV and V, he had affirmed his faith and hope in a world that seemed falling to pieces. And in the *Georgics* also, to quote Büchner, there is “ein gläubiges Weltbild, das . . . in dem Drückenden, Schweren und Hässlichen immer wieder Sinn aufweist. Ein Glaube, der nicht nur nicht am Sinn verzweifelt, sondern immer wieder Bestätigung dieses Glaubens in der Welt findet. . .”²⁶ And by now this faith in a providential world-order was a *fides quaerens intellectum*. Where could it find better confirmation of order in Nature and the presence of a

²⁶ P. Vergilius Maro, *der Dichter der Römer* (Stuttgart, 1957), col. 315.

Mind working for good than in the harmonious movements of the heavenly bodies? So, at a time of grave spiritual crisis, had felt Plato as he wrote the *Timaeus* and *Laws*; so Aristotle in his work *On Philosophy*; so the Stoics, whose ideas had found eloquent expression in Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*.

But such a study of the mysterious phenomena in the heavens (*G.*, II, 477-8) and their no less mysterious influence on the earth (479 ff.) and on the microcosm that was man called for great natural aptitude and years of leisure. Virgil hopes and prays—but his hour is not yet come. Meanwhile, he would devote himself to the task at hand for which he felt well fitted. He would sing the praises of the *divini gloria ruris* and the gods of the country. For in that too lay a true happiness, in a life in harmony with the Nature he had always loved: *fortunatus et ille deos qui novit agrestis*. Lucretius had written some lovely lines about the satyrs, nymphs, and Pan of popular belief (*R. N.*, IV, 580 ff.). But his chill science had blown them away into airy nothingness. Virgil felt differently. For him, the omnipresence of the divine power was manifest: in Ceres who ripens the corn, in Bacchus who fills the grape with juice, in bees and birds and every living thing. In Lucretius, man is alone in a world of atomic forces, fighting his battle unaided by the gods; in Virgil, man is surrounded by divine forces, *agrestum praesentia numina*, ready to aid if man does his part, *laborando et orando*. For Virgil Pan, Silvanus, and the Nymphs are symbols of those invisible forces operative in the farmer's world, manifestations, in special spheres and functions, of the Cosmic *Mens* which ruled the world. And they appealed to his imagination as a poet. So, until the time comes and the Muses inspire him with a deeper knowledge of the Cosmos, he will sanctify himself by singing of the country-gods and in that find his happiness.²⁷

²⁷ For a different interpretation of this passage one may consult W. Richter, *Vergil, Georgica* (Munich, 1957), pp. 254 ff., and Inez Scott Ryberg, "Vergil's Golden Age," in *T. A. P. A.*, LXXXIX (1958), pp. 123 ff. Richter sees much Virgilian irony here; the prayer to the Muses is not seriously meant but merely expresses Virgil's high esteem for earlier poets who had written *de rerum natura*. In fact, Virgil "opfert das Grosse und ist gewiss, das Grössere zu gewinnen." I still believe the appeal to the Muses comes from the heart. In *Aen.*, I, 742 ff., where parts of this passage are repeated, Iopas may, as Boyancé suggests, be

Such are the beatitudes of Virgil and the insights they give us into the mind and heart of a great poet. In the world of the *Bucolics* there is the *fortunatus senex*, Tityrus, happy because he has a humble home and simple delights. Without some external goods human life is intolerable for most men and happiness a mirage. In the world of the *Georgics* the farmers would be happy, if only they realized their blessedness. For they have not only external goods but also all the means of leading a life of moral virtue and thus attaining a true beatitude. But still higher in the scale of happiness, Virgil saw, was the life dedicated to the philosophic and religious contemplation of celestial things and eternal verities. For therein lay the truest knowledge and the surest joy: *gaudium de veritate*.²⁸

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the type of cosmic poet that Virgil dreamed of becoming. At any rate, both the works of Virgil (*Ecl.*, III, 40 ff.; VI, 31 ff.; *Aen.*, I, 742 ff.) and the Suetonian *Vita* suggest that Virgil was deeply interested in natural philosophy to the end of his life. Cf. Rostagni, *op. cit.* (note 1), pp. 54 and 143, notes.

²⁸ Cf. St. Augustine, *Conf.*, X, 23: "beata quippe vita est gaudium de veritate; hoc est enim gaudium de Te qui veritas es. . . ." Posidonius held that man's highest good was "to live contemplating the truth and order of all things and doing one's part in helping to establish that order, without being in any way led by the unreasoning part of the soul." Cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.*, II, 21, 129, and the remarks of Nock, *op. cit.* (note 25), p. 12.

A POSTSCRIPT ON HORACE, *CARM.*, I, 2.

At the outset I must stress that what follows is a continuation of thoughts suggested by Professor Steele Commager's illuminating article in the *American Journal of Philology* for January, 1959 (LXXX, pp. 37-55). Both the foundation of scholarship (and in particular the remarkably full bibliographical citations) and the broad lines of analysis, for which many must feel grateful to Commager, are here taken as read. My purpose is only to suggest some ways in which, with respect, I believe his analysis can usefully be extended.

Commager argues that this ode, addressed to a triumphant Octavian in 29 B. C., should be read as a warning and a plea for mercy to defeated enemies and for a turning outwards, against outsiders, of the vengeful spirit of civil war. "The ode recommends not vengeance but an abandonment of vengeance against the Romans" (p. 47).¹ The destructive vengeance of Tiber for the wrongs of Ilia (lines 13 ff.) is to be read, not as a noble example, but as a warning against excess (see especially pp. 41-2). It is well shown (p. 38) how this twin theme of vengeance and excess is pointed up by the words Horace uses: *ultor* and *inultos* repeating at lines 18-44-51, with *scelus* at line 29; *iam satis* (1), *nimum* and *iactat* (17-18) and *nimis* (37), balanced by *minus* (27).

For this interpretation of the ode the phrase *patiens vocari Caesaris ultor* (43-4) is clearly crucial. The gist of the passage in which it stands (29-44) is this: 'To whom will Jupiter give the role of expiating the crime?—to Apollo?—Or Venus?—or Mars?—Or to you, son of gentle Maia (i. e. Mercury), dwelling on earth in human form and allowing yourself to be called Caesar's avenger.' As we have seen, Commager ably argues against the view that this is to be read as an exhortation to Octavian to punish the enemies of Caesar, his adoptive father, a reading on which has been hung the interpretation of the

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, line references throughout are to Horace, *Carm.*, I, 2, and page references to Prof. Steele Commager's article on that ode quoted above. I should like to thank Prof. J. M. T. Charlton of the University College of North Staffordshire, England, for his reading and careful discussion of the article with me. The views expressed remain my sole responsibility.

whole ode as a recantation by the once Republican Horace. Commager recurs to his point several times, rephrasing it in various ways, each of which still leaves a vague sense of difficulty, of a lump in the otherwise smooth texture of the argument. I believe this can be resolved if we see in this phrase an invitation to Octavian to assume *Caesaris ultor* as a quasi-official title which, as is natural with a title enshrining a specific exploit, views that exploit *in retrospect*. I quote from Commager's article: "Horace had come less to praise Caesar than to bury him (p. 38). . . . The coming savior's task is threefold: to save the empire from civil wars, to expiate the Romans' *scelus*"—which, standing where it does, clearly refers to civil war in general (25-9), even if line 44 shows that it includes Caesar's murder (see especially p. 42)—"and, as we infer from line forty-four, to avenge the death of Caesar. . . . The Ode recommends not vengeance but an abandonment of vengeance against the Romans. . . . The phrase *Caesaris ultor* (44) is by its context rendered almost ironic.² Jove himself has disapproved Tiber's punishment of the Romans, whether for Caesar's murder or for a more general *scelus*. To exact vengeance would be to perpetuate the sin of civil war rather than expiate it, to renew the past and not redeem it (p. 47). . . . Horace may now introduce the adjective *almus* . . . thus suggesting the character Mercury, and by extension, Octavian, is to display. . . . If . . . Horace proposes 'the son of gentle Maia' as *Caesaris ultor*, his implication is clear: there is to be no vengeance (p. 49). . . . In dispatching his peace-loving son Jove declares his will: *iam satis*. . . . The *Caesaris ultor* (44) must transmute the type of Tiber's vengeance, *iactat ultorem* (18), into punishment of the Medes" (p. 51).

Undoubtedly the cumulative effect of this reasoning is to overpower the common idea which would attach the ode specifically to the murder of Julius Caesar, and to show that Horace is here,

² The word "ironic" to describe the force of *Caesaris ultor* is perhaps the least happy of those used by Commager to try to pin the phrase down, and shows particularly well the need to look at the point again. So, too, on p. 47 after the words "to avenge the death of Caesar" Commager writes: "Horace does not grant to the last the initial importance of the other two." Cf. what is said below about "playing down" the Ides of March.

as so often, concerned to exorcise the spectre of renewed civil strife. But in order to make his point Commager has been forced to play down those passages to which the erroneous interpretation particularly appeals, namely, Jove's portents at the opening of the ode (1-4), the avenging of Ilia (17-18) and, above all, the avenging of Caesar himself (43-4). One feels that if (as I believe) Commager is right about the ode, Horace could have made a clearer appeal to bury the past by avoiding any mention of Julius Caesar, above all in association with the idea of vengeance. Let us therefore look again at these three passages.

First, the portents. (See also footnote 12.) Commager points out that they do not seem to refer to the famous series of prodigies that are supposed to have followed Caesar's death, omitting as they do the most striking items from that passage in the first Georgic (Verg., *G.*, I, 466 ff.) which does refer to that event and which was known to the author and readers of our ode (pp. 40-1). Yet, while accepting that these opening portents do not proclaim a poem on the expiation of the Ides of March, it is hard to think that any talk of portents in 29 B. C. (especially among persons acquainted with the first Georgic) could have failed to *associate* that event, even while an overt reference to it is at this point deliberately avoided. A rough parallel might be if one were to speak of mushroom clouds in the years after the war and not expect that to associate the thought of Hiroshima, and that just after a great poem had recently described the manifestations that followed the first atomic bomb.

Thus the murder of Caesar, as distinct from the spirit of civil strife in general, is indeed present from the beginning of the ode as an undertone. It sounds again, I think (in spite of Commager, pp. 41-2), in the Tiber-Ilia passage. The key word here is *uxorius* (15-16). Surely it is impossible that this word, associated with a figure that threatens Rome in her very Roman-ness as symbolized by Vesta, could have sounded in Roman ears in 29 B. C. without associating Mark Antony. To think that it could seems far more improbable than the interpretation of the passage in which this association involves us. It is that Tiber stands for Antony, and that Ilia has a double reference. Superficially, since she must give point to *uxorius*, she is Cleopatra. But behind the later Antony who would sacrifice Rome to his

"wife" stands the earlier Antony who was, after all, co-partner with Octavian in the avenging of Julius.³ His career in that role, however, had forsaken the path of true and legitimate vengeance (cf. *vagus*, 18) for an ill-starred course (suggested by *sinistra*, 18) which came to threaten the Roman heritage (symbolized by Vesta, 16, cf. 28) with extinction. Assuredly it remains true that the passage is not giving Octavian a noble model to follow. But perhaps it is not a warning either, but rather the portrait of one career that is of a piece with the portrait of this whole age of portents, to be set in contrast with the coming portrait of a very different career and a very different age.

The murder of Caesar remains in the background during the lines which speak explicitly of general civil war (21-5), especially in the suggestive phrase *acuisse ferrum* and in the word *scelus* (29). Then at last in lines 43-4 it becomes overt, pointed up as it is by the key word *ultor*. The recurrence of this word is not a case of sheer iteration. If we link the three points at which it occurs together, we find a progression whose stages punctuate the ode as a whole. The first *ultor* (17-18) stands fairly in the past: *Vidimus flavum Tiberim . . .*, as does the whole opening section of the ode down to line 20.⁴ The second *ultor* (44) stands with a present verb, *imitaris*, while at the close of the poem *inultos* stands with a jussive subjunctive whose reference is future (51). Alongside this temporal progression there is a parallel moral progression. The first carries explicit rejection; the last, hopeful anticipation; and the crucial middle one, with its *patiens vocari*, acceptance. Thus we pass in the

³ It is tempting to pursue the symbolism of this passage further. Tiber, the river of Rome (*Pater Tiberinus*, etc.) represents Antony, the true Roman; *litus Etruscum* represents what is foreign, and hostile, to Rome, and so its violent influence over the river's waters represents Cleopatra's influence over Antony's life and actions. Turning to the name *Ilia*, it is particularly well suited to carry the double association here suggested. In its primary sense of "the Trojan one" (*Ilium*) it will suggest the East and Cleopatra. In its connexions with the origins of the Roman state and of its first king Romulus, through its assonance with Iulius and the legend of a genealogical link from Aeneas with the Gens Iulia (all of which I hesitate to discount as readily as does Commager) it serves to bring in the association with Caesar.

⁴ *Vidimus* is the operative verb, since the tense of *iactat* is due to the peculiar rules applying to *dum*.

ode from a past rejection through a present acceptance to a future hope.

Present acceptance—of what, and by whom? If we are right in our interpretation of the vengeance of Tiber, then clearly we must approach this invitation to “Mercury” Octavian to “suffer himself to be called avenger of Caesar” as standing in implicit contrast with the earlier rejection of Mark Antony in that same role. Antony had arrogated that title to himself (*dum se iactat ultorem*) and had been repudiated in it by Jove; the divine emissary in human form who is acceptable to Jove, on the contrary, “suffers himself” to be called by it. He is acceptable not only to Jove but also to the Roman people—the *populus* of line 25⁵—in answer to whose prayer the saviour is sent. It is by them that he shall suffer himself to be called, to be hailed, by the name “Caesar’s Avenger.” And indeed there is cause for rejoicing for if, and only if, the avenger’s work is done is there hope of peace—a peace which neither god could grant nor man expect while Caesar’s blood cried to heaven.

But if Octavian is acceptable to god and man under this title, the title is to be acceptable above all to Octavian himself. Octavian seemingly liked to cast himself in the role of the “hero” of Greek legend and poetry,⁶ which would lay it upon him as a sacred duty to avenge his “father” Julius Caesar. So at Philippi he vowed the temple *pro ultione paterna*. That

⁵ The verb *voco* is also used in line 25, but in a different sense, viz. “call to aid,” and with a different construction from that of lines 43-4, where the passive infinitive is copulative in the manner of verbs of naming, becoming, etc.; cf. line 50 and *Carm.*, III, 24, 27-8.

⁶ The role which was later symbolized by the head of Alexander on his coins—Alexander, who had cast himself as a second Achilles. With this connexion in mind it seems probable enough that the association would have occurred to the young Octavius, or to others, after the assassination of his adoptive father. To people as conscious of Hellenic parallelism as cultured Romans of this time were, the comparison with the young Alexander after the assassination of Philip, his father, would have seemed natural and significant. “Justice” through family vendetta is, of course, a well-defined institution of the pre-legal stage of Greek society from which the great legends were inherited; it does not seem to be at home in the native Roman tradition, whose legalistic bent is so much stronger than that of Greece. *Ultio Paterna* is not a concept of Roman law or even Roman traditional morality, but a fossil from Archaic Greek society preserved in literature.

is to say, he offered a prayer to be granted victory in the battle, in traditional manner, by promising the divine powers who should grant it an offering of thanksgiving *post eventum*. With Antony's help, through the proscriptions before Philippi and through the victory there, Caesar was indeed avenged—by 29 the last of his assassins had been executed. But Antony's claim to share in that glory has been discredited by his subsequent career. The glory thus remains to Octavian alone, and is to be formally conferred on him through the title *Caesaris Ultor*, whose very conferment is the mark of final completion. If Octavian will only "suffer himself" to be called by it, then the world will know that the bloody chapter of vengeance, and with it of civil strife, is at an end.

Thus the phrase *Caesaris ultor*, so far from being a source of possible uncertainty in Horace's attitude (let alone a partisan trumpet-call), sums up his theme—the theme of salvation and reconciliation—in a titular formula. Horace knew how to use the pregnant technical phraseology characteristic of the genius of Latin to heighten the Roman colouring of his lyric verse.⁷ At the close of this ode no less than four such quasi-official titles are suggested by him: *Caesaris Ultor* (44), *Pater and Princeps* (50), and, possibly, *Dux* (52).⁸ They are supported by the terms *populo Quirini* (46) and *triumphos* (49),⁹ which strike

⁷ Cf. e.g. *Carm.*, III, 1, 11 *petitor*; III, 5, 42 *capitis minor*.

⁸ It seems likely that *dux* here has a more permanent connotation than that of commander in a particular campaign, so that the phrase *te duce* can be taken as an ablative of "time within which" to mean "during your leadership, viz. reign." Perhaps *princeps* (50) and *dux* (52) are complementary terms, representing the civil and the military head of state respectively, who are to be united in the person of Octavian for the duration of his rule, and that is to be a long one (45-6). Kiessling-Heinze (9th ed., 1958, *ad loc.*) reject any such interpretation of *pater*, *princeps*, and *dux*, but for no stated reason; contrast Wickham (3rd ed., 1896). Kiessling-Heinze (*ad loc.*) also note the increasing sense of presentness that runs through the preceding passage (29 ff.), and it was remarked above that the ode exhibits a particular progression from the tone of past rejection, through present acceptance, to hopeful anticipation. Now of the titles here put forward, *Caesaris Ultor* alone belongs to the phase of present acceptance. The others fall within the hoped-for "shape of things to come," and this may help to reduce any difficulty we might feel at finding these words in Horace's mouth as early as 29.

⁹ I venture to resist Commager's suggestion (p. 53) that the *hic* . . .

the same official Roman note. In another passage, which recalls the lines under consideration in form as well as in sentiment (*Carm.*, III, 24, 25-8), Horace appeals to "whosoever would take from us kindred bloodshed and civil madness, if he shall desire to have *Pater Urbium* inscribed beneath his statues. . . ." ¹⁰ There is no question of statues in *Carm.*, I, 2, of course. ¹¹ But

hic of lines 49-50 is a contrasting doublet, referring to the East and to Rome respectively. It seems more natural to take them as an emphatic doublet, reinforcing one another and the whole context. They mean "on earth," and, above all, "amongst us" where "we" are the Romans. With *populo Quirini* coming so close before it, the first *hic* would naturally suggest Rome, and the word *triumphos* immediately following would, after all, carry its traditional meaning of triumphal celebrations rather than the generalized idea of military successes, as Commager has it. So far from switching attention to the East, line 49 continues the appeal to local national sentiment intoned in line 46. This interpretation of *triumphos* admirably fits Commager's dating of the ode (pp. 52-4 and note 47). Octavian did celebrate triumphs, at Rome, in August of 29 B. C., and if the ode was written either just before or just after his return, these celebrations, whether forthcoming or recent, would naturally be in the mind of the poet and his readers if they were in Rome at the time. Thus *triumphos*, which Horace offers as one of the chief attractions to the disguised god to linger *in terris* (lines 41 ff.), suggest the metropolis' celebrations over her true, foreign, enemies, which, throughout a long reign, shall continue to symbolize Rome's dominion over the world, while at peace within herself.

¹⁰ As in *Carm.*, I, 2, 43-4, so in III, 24, 25-8, Octavian, to whom the appeals must refer, is not named, and perhaps actually gains in stature thereby. It is worth noting that the grammatical construction in these two passages and in I, 2, 50 is parallel, which adds to the impression that *Caesaris Ultor* would ring like a quasi-official title or dedication.

¹¹ Or is there?—The parallel with III, 24, is provoking. When a Roman talked by name of an Olympian deity, how far was the thought of that God's statue from his mind, so as to confuse in some sense the sign with the thing signified? The question would be academic enough in relation to *Carm.*, I, 2, 25 ff., but for the language Horace uses in speaking of the theophany of the son of gentle Maia in lines 41-3: "Or whether you, son of gentle Maia, changing your (visible) form, do imitate, winged on earth, (the form of) a young man (viz. Octavian)." This does suggest a statue of Octavian, but with wings, to show that it is "really" Mercury. In that case *Caesaris Ultor* would be literally a dedicatory inscription, despite the inappropriateness of Mercury for the role (see pp. 48-9 and note 34 and the literature there cited). Perhaps that is just the point: Horace means to say that, while Octavian has, as he was bound to do, done his duty as agent of divine punishment of

the suggested titles have precisely the same quality as if they were indeed dedicatory inscriptions on a monument, namely, to record and reward an accomplished exploit. Perhaps *Pater* would recall the title *Pater Patriae* conferred, as a novelty, on Cicero to acknowledge him as the saviour of Rome from the civil madness of Catiline. Horace is inviting Octavian to accept a similar kind of formal recognition for a similar, if much greater, achievement. And the first title he offers is *Caesaris Ultor*—first, because it stands for the punishment on which alone, according to the underlying theology, the new order can be built.

Commager writes (p. 38): "The concept of vengeance includes those of crime, punishment, and expiation." This implies or assumes that Horace is here handling a religious concept, and one which, as here analysed, is fundamental to the right understanding of the ode. Theologically, it represents a doctrine of redemption through divine justice or atonement through retribution. I should like in conclusion to trace a further theological strand which Horace seems to have woven into his poem—the role of Jupiter.

The ode falls fairly clearly into two main parts.¹² The first

Caesar's murderers, his true character and role were far different, and would be seen as such.

¹² Some points bearing on the general interpretation of the ode may conveniently be brought together here:

(a) Kiessling-Heinze, in their commentary on the opening stanzas, recall that we have there the old idea of a flood sent by an angry divinity (signalled by the word *dirae* of line 1) to destroy mankind for its sin, and recurring in successive ages (hence *saeculum* in line 6). The picture with which the ode opens is thus one of the storms such as to make men think the time for the next flood is at hand: but this fear brings to man the realization that god is angry, and so the storms have achieved their purpose: man sees his sin (so Kiessling-Heinze interpret *iam satis* in line 1). The next step, however, must be to explain that these weather- and nature-portents symbolize the Roman civil wars; here we have the following consideration:

(b) Kiessling-Heinze go on to explain the connection of thought at line 13 thus: "Men feared the destruction of the world—and well they might—we ourselves saw things that boded as much." Now if the "things we saw" (the Tiber flood) stand for the menace of Antony, as suggested above, then it is logical to take the preceding deluges and so forth as representing civil war in general. This in turn affects the old problem of whether these natural disasters really happened or not: for, if the first readers were meant to understand that all this was symbolic,

five quatrains are concerned with the description and symbolisms of portents, all expressive of divine disapproval. The last six quatrains deal with divine favour expressed through the vehicle of theophany. It is a sort of question-and-answer in the relations between god and man, treating respectively of man's danger and man's salvation through divine intervention. The sixth and seventh quatrains form a transitional link, of which the first half (21-4) is still close to what precedes, and the second (25-8) leads directly up to what follows.

Jupiter is named three times in the ode:¹³ as *Pater* in the

it might actually be desirable that none of the meteorology of the opening lines (especially the striking of the Capitol, which alone in the list belongs to the class of official Roman portents) should have been actual historical occurrences. The idea of a sort of moral vicious circle by which civil war is itself the punishment of civil war is familiar enough in Horace (cf. *Carm.*, III, 6).

(c) Horace uses nature symbolism in the same way elsewhere (so *Carm.*, I, 9; II, 9, and, in a political connexion, as here, in I, 14). Nevertheless, the choice of symbol—portents—must retain its own significance. It is still improbable that talk of portents in 29 B.C., especially "on first looking into Virgil's *Georgics*," could fail to echo memories of the supposed historical portents that were being associated specifically with the Ides of March. Moreover, through such an undertone this ode would establish from the outset that connexion with the person of Octavian and, above all, with Octavian as "on the gods' side."

(d) Line 40 is crucial for the relation between the ideas of civil and of foreign war (accepting the reading *Marsi*; see Kiessling-Heinze *ad loc.* and cf. besides *Carm.*, II, 20, 18; III, 5, 9, where the Marsian is the type of the Roman, or Italian, legionary in a foreign war). The idea here is surely that Mars is to turn from his "sport" of civil war to his "business" of foreign war. *Hostem* emphasizes this point by specifying "foreign enemy" in contrast to the *cives* of line 21, and probably referring to the Parthians themselves, in view of lines 22 and 51 (cf. *Carm.*, III, 5, 4-6, where we have *hostium* referring to the Parthians under the same name—*graves Persae*—as they have at line 22 here). It may be objected that, since Mars is passed over in favour of Mercury as the divine saviour, Horace does not intend to make this idea part of his vision of the coming "reign" of Octavian. But "Maia's Son" is to combine many attributes, among them *triumphi* and *dux* in a Median war—itself a fitting role for the *ultor* of that Caesar who was on the point of undertaking such a war when he was cut off. Throughout the Odes Horace's advocacy of a punitive war—and that seems to be synonymous with a war of conquest—against Parthia runs parallel to his abjuration of civil war; cf. especially *Carm.*, III, 2, 1-4; 5, 1-4; 6, 5-12.

¹³ Horace sometimes likes to revert to the opening of an ode at its

opening sentence (2), and twice more in the body of the poem (19 and 30). Clearly he stands for the supreme moral agency governing the world, however this is to be conceived. The visible evidence of the fact that this agency is outraged by the conduct of man and especially of Rome (cf. *terris* and *Urbem* 1 and 4) forms the ode's point of departure. Later we come to the visible signs of the outraged feelings of another, if minor, deity—Tiber; but he only earns himself the disapproval of the supreme deity by the excesses to which they led him. Both gods, the greater and the lesser, resorted to portents to give vent to their indignation: but while the lesser sought, on doubtful justification (*nimum querenti*), to punish through destruction, the "father" preferred to terrify mankind, and particularly the Romans—to warn them, to bring them to their senses. Thus Jupiter stands both at the opening and the close of this first section of the ode. He stands there so as to moralise the portents, to give the physical events their true moral significance and force. The point of the portents is that they show the supreme deity morally outraged, but unwilling to condemn and destroy.

The transitional lines (21-8) now do two things. First, they bring the reason or source of the divine indignation into men's consciousness by visualizing how future generations will look back on these terrible times. Secondly, they show man responding to this consciousness by visualizing the nation at prayer. Jupiter's purpose through his portents is thus fulfilled: men have taken the warning, have come to their senses.

This brings man face to face with his wickedness—the *scelus*

close. Now this ode opens with Jupiter and closes with Caesar (Octavian). Could it be that Horace means "the Father," i. e. the symbol of moral order, to be taken as standing for Octavian? We know that Julius Caesar was canonized as Jupiter Julius as early as 44, and that occasionally Horace seems to refer to Augustus as Jupiter (L. P. Wilkinson, in *Horace and his Lyric Poetry*, pp. 33-4, quotes *Epp.*, I, 19, 43; *Carm.*, II, 7, 17 and, more tentatively, III, 1, 6; 4, 49; to which we may add III, 5, 1-2, translating: "We have believed that Jupiter rules in heaven from his thundering there; Augustus shall be held to be the [same] god on earth when, etc."). Equally Augustus is explicitly contrasted with Jupiter at III, 25, 3-6. But the idea seems inapplicable here. How can Octavian be at once Jupiter himself and the son of Maia whom Jupiter sends? If we feel a need for some link between the opening and close of the ode, perhaps that suggested in note 12(c) above is more plausible.

which now appears for the first time (29), and with his impotence to heal it—hence the prayers. Here the second part of the ode begins, and again Jupiter appears at the opening. He will himself, through a divine emissary, be the ultimate author and giver of salvation. “To whom will Jove give the role of expiating our crime? To Apollo—or Venus—or Mars—or Mercury? Yes, to Mercury, in the form of Octavian.” This third appearance, then, makes it clear that his earlier indignation did not mean that he required man to put things right himself, but only that he should acknowledge his dependence and his guilt. The second entry, rebuking Tiber’s vindictiveness, prepares us for the third. In effect we have some such scheme as this:

1. The supreme deity is angry with man, who is not doing his will;
2. But this does not mean that he wills to destroy man;
3. His will is man’s redemption through a divinity in human form.

For we should note that what we have is a question in form only “to whom will Jupiter give, etc.” and in fact declares “Jupiter will himself provide an expiator. Who will he be?”

We see, then, that Jupiter occupies three key points of the ode. Like other repetitions discussed earlier, this one serves both to point up a dominant theme and to punctuate its progressive stages. His person acts as a focus for the pattern on which the ode as a whole is constructed. Horace has given us a poem in which he has not merely used religious material in details, as he does constantly, but which is built round a dominant theological motif. It may be that in so doing he was using ideas—drawn no doubt from contemporary, especially philosophical, religious thinking—as a kind of allegorical machinery through which to express thoughts which, to him, were not at all, or only vaguely, religious. One wonders how far, in Horace too, conscious indifference and scepticism may cloak, from himself as well as others, deeper subconscious affinities, which could have drawn him to write such a poem on such a theme. At any rate, the presence of theology in this ode is not only unmistakable, but its content, so far from being perfunctory or vague, is unexpectedly clear and profound. Kiessling-Heinze (9th ed.,

1958, p. 11) write: "The accents of religious language in which he (Horace) clothes his political fears and hopes, must have sounded startlingly new in Roman ears." The newness, they explain, lay in the choice and combination of imported Greek and traditional Roman elements, e. g. a combination of *sceleris expiatio* (Roman, line 29, etc.) with Theophany (Greek, lines 30-42, etc.). If this is true, one must wonder why it was in particular to religious ideas that Horace turned for a new vehicle to express his interpretation of the times.

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AN EARLY TRACE OF SOCRATIC DIALOGUE.

Although the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* has been the subject of a number of inquiries, the trace of dialogue that appears in this rather perplexing treatise has been almost completely overlooked. W. Kranz apparently is the only one who has noticed this peculiarity.¹ He disposes of it in a few words without any attempt at analysis, since it is for him only one of a number of indications of Socratic influence in this writing.

This brief dialogue occurs in the last half of the first antinomy (1, 12-14).² The writer has completed his argument that good and evil are the same, and has just begun a discussion of the antithetical hypothesis that good and evil are different. At this point, instead of proceeding in narrative form as he has been doing, he suddenly changes his method of presentation and plunges into the dialogue in which a vague *τις* (in reality the writer) questions a hypothetical subject who has said that good and evil are the same:

(12) οἶμαι δὲ οὐδέ κ' αὐτὸν ἔχεν ἀποκρίνασθαι, αἷ τις [αὐτὸν] ἔροιτο τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα· 'εἶπον δὴ μοι, ἥδη τί τι τοὶ γονέες ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησαν;' φαίη κα· "καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα." 'τὸ ἄρα κακὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ τούτοις ὀφείλεις, αἵπερ τῷτόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῷ κακῷ. (13) τί δέ, τὼς συγγενέας ἥδη τι ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησας;' "καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα." 'τὼς ἄρα συγγενέας κακὸν ἐποίησας. τί δέ, τὼς ἐχθρὼς ἥδη κακὸν ἐποίησας;' "καὶ πολλὰ καὶ <μεγάλα>." 'μέγιστα ἄρα ἀγαθὰ ἐποίησας. (14) ἄγε δὴ μοι καὶ τόδε ἀπόκριναι. ἄλλο τι ἢ τὼς πτωχῶς οἰκτίρεις, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ κακὰ ἔχοντι, <καὶ> πάλιν εὐδαιμονίζεις, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράσσουντι, αἵπερ τῷτόν κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν;'

The passage is worth careful consideration. At first reading the similarity between it and Socratean dialogue as Plato presents it is striking. In the first place, it is the question and answer type of investigation in which the questioner is in complete control of the situation.³ There are points of similarity, too,

¹ Walther Kranz, "Vorsokratisches IV; die sogenannten *Δισσοὶ λόγοι*," *Hermes*, LXXII (1937), pp. 231 f.

² The paragraph and sentence numbers here and elsewhere are those of Hermann Diels, rev. Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*⁶ (Berlin, 1952), II, pp. 405-16.

³ The device of introducing an imaginary subject is found also in the

between some of the basic vocabulary used here and that of the speeches of the Platonic Socrates. The transitional combination $\tau\acute{\iota}$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ occurs fairly frequently in the Platonic dialogues;⁴ $\alpha\gamma\epsilon$ $\delta\eta$ is also an attention getting device common to this trace of dialogue and the Platonic writings,⁵ while an $\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron$ $\tau\iota$ η is found in both places.⁶ The occurrence of these particle groups does not necessarily show any direct connection between this passage and the Platonic writings. I suspect that colloquial speech provided a common source for this vocabulary and that in both cases we have attempts to recapture the atmosphere of informal discussion.

The dialogue in the $\delta\iota\sigma\sigma\omicron\iota$ $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\iota$, then, has an overall appearance of being Socratic. But a closer appraisal of it reveals that in certain respects it is anything but Socratic. In most of Plato's dialogues Socrates attempts to ascertain by a logical succession of questions exactly what the subject being questioned means by a statement he has made or by a stand he has taken, and tries to show the subject through this questioning how his statement is illogical or his position untenable. But the atmosphere in the $\delta\iota\sigma\sigma\omicron\iota$ $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\iota$ is entirely different. Because the answer to each question is the same, it becomes repetitious. The writer, obviously, unlike Socrates, has little interest in the answer, and so puts no emphasis on this part of the dialogue. Perhaps we have here the reason for the manuscript omission of the second reply and one half of the third. The answers are all the same, and at the same time are obvious and colorless. For all intents and purposes they may be omitted. In Socratean procedure, even though the question may be a leading one presupposing a certain answer, this answer is important.

The questions put forward in this dialogue are also not like those we find in the Platonic dialogues. In reality, after the first one, they cease to be simple questions at all. For each is made up of an assertion followed by a question, the assertion

Apology (28 B), although the passage of the *Apology* does not at all resemble this one.

⁴ See F. Ast, *Lexicon Platonicum* (Leipzig, 1853), I, p. 421.

⁵ E. g., *Phaed.*, 116 D; *Phil.*, 33 A, 39 E; *Soph.*, 235 A; *Laws*, X, 893 A; *Ion*, 530 B; *Phaedr.*, 237 A (pl.).

⁶ E. g., *Phaed.*, 70 C; *Theaet.*, 154 E; *Repub.*, V, 478 B; *Gorg.*, 470 B, 481 C; *Crat.*, 436 B; *Alcib.*, I, 116 D.

coming as a result of the answer immediately preceding, and the question in turn leading to another similar answer. I think the author's consciousness of parallelism and antithesis, elements of literary style stressed by the sophists, accounts for this un-Socratic element.

The writer fails to produce a dialogue in the Socratic manner for yet another reason. He is too impatient. The lack of interest in the answers and the conclusion-question arrangement of the interrogator's part of the dialogue indicate as much. This impatience is underlined by the fact that the writer cannot even wait for the usual answer to the last question, but breaks the dialogue rather abruptly, and hurries on to another example in narrative form (1, 14 f.).

Why, then, was this dialogue even attempted? I think the writer has brought it in to provide some variety in the presentation of his arguments. In one way, then, this device is a failure, because it is anything but authentic. But, however dull it may be, it does provide a breather from a narrative that is still duller.⁷

This trace of dialogue, then, has both Socratic and sophistic characteristics. But is it a reflection of sophistic dialogue or Socratic dialogue? That the sophists engaged in dialogue of one kind or another we must conclude from the remains of their writings and from the ancient authorities. But in most cases the discussion is not at all similar to the Socratic question-answer investigation. Prodicus' *ῥῆται*, for instance, is a debate between Virtue and Vice for the benefit of a hesitant Heracles, and is a far cry from dialectic.⁸ There is no reason either to think that Hippias' *Trojan Dialogue* with its legendary setting and heroic participants was any more than a formal debate.⁹

⁷ The writing verges on dialogue at two other points. In 2, 28 we have the questions without answers. *φέρε δὴ* occurs from time to time in the Platonic dialogues; e. g., *Prot.*, 330 B; *Gorg.*, 455 A; *Phaed.*, 63 B, 79 B; *Theaet.*, 151 E; *Soph.*, 229 A; *Crat.*, 385 B. Once again this is a colloquial device to gain the attention of the person addressed.

In 3, 2-8 the argument is put forward in a series of questions so that, while it is not a true dialogue because of the lack of answers, it is at least reminiscent of the dialogue form.

⁸ Xenoph., *Mem.*, II, 1, 21-34. Diels, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 313-16.

⁹ Philostratus, *Vit. Soph.*, I, 11. Plato, *Hipp. Mai.*, 286 A; Diels, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 327, 331.

Regarding Critias' *δμιλίας* we are unable to pass a sure judgment, but I see no reason for assuming that question-answer dialogue played any part in them.¹⁰

When we come to Protagoras, however, we find what appears at first sight to be reliable evidence for the use of dialectic. For Socrates early in the *Protagoras* (329B) states that this elderly sophist is one of a very few who can successfully take part in dialectic. If we take the statement by itself, it would appear to point to considerable experience with the Socratic manner of investigation. But the general tone of the rest of the dialogue suggests not only that Protagoras dislikes this method of inquiry, but that he is completely unfamiliar with it as well. It is true that at first he does go along with Socrates and his questions (329D-333E). However, he soon loses patience and ends the exchange with a rather lengthy reply that prompts Socrates to request that he observe the rules for brevity (334D).¹¹ Protagoras at this point is so far from participating in Socratic dialogue that Socrates is determined to give up the discussion (335B ff.). Finally, after some negotiation, Socrates proposes that Protagoras question him first. But the sophist is unwilling to do even this (338E). We should have expected that if he were a partisan of the question-answer technique where the questioner has the upper hand he would have welcomed the opportunity to show his competence.

Why, then, does Socrates early in the dialogue praise Protagoras' dialectic ability? Taylor has pointed to the fact that Socrates is here being ironic.¹² Certainly this whole passage is crammed with irony. Socrates, as we learn later, is anything but overwhelmed and convinced by Protagoras' opening blast. It is with tongue in cheek that Socrates dissociates Protagoras from those public orators who cannot answer briefly a simple question, for the sophist proves to be one with them in this respect. The irony reaches a climax with the rather preposterous suggestion that this long-winded professor could limit himself

¹⁰ Diels, *op. cit.*, II, p. 395.

¹¹ Socrates' mention of Protagoras' ability to speak either in a few words or at length on a given subject (334E-335A) is not to be taken as another reference to his dialectic potential.

¹² A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, First Series (*Saint Andrews University Publications*, No. IX [Oxford, 1911]), p. 125, n. 1.

to brief questions and answers. In fact, the irony is heightened by the fact that Socrates throws out this observation in the shadow of Protagoras' long involved metaphorical opening monologue.

But what are we to say of Diogenes Laertius' statement that Protagoras originated the Socratic method of discussion?¹³ Perhaps we should not take his observation too seriously, since it is highly likely that it is based on this passage in the *Protagoras*.

The only other references to dialectic among the sophists are to be found in the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* itself. There are two of these, both of which occur in the last chapter but one (8, 1 and 13).¹⁴ The emphasis on dialectic that is present here no doubt derives from Socratic rather than sophistic influence. Taylor has shown convincingly, I believe, that the writer's point of view in this chapter "... is the same as that expressed by Plato in the demand that philosophers, as the masters of the 'art of dialectic, shall be kings, and by Xenophon in the claim which he puts into the mouth of Socrates that dialectic makes men 'fit to bear rule.'"¹⁵

I think we may say, therefore, that this trace of dialogue is Socratically inspired. There remains one question about which we must speculate: How did our sophist become acquainted with this dialogue form? Taylor has shown that the whole treatise

¹³ IX, 53. Diels, *op. cit.*, II, p. 254.

¹⁴ Both occurrences of *διαλέγεσθαι* are improvements upon the MSS. The first instance is an emendation of a seemingly corrupt passage, while the second is an addition necessary for the sense.

E. Dupréel, *Les Sophistes Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias* (*Bibliothèque scientifique*, 14 [Neuchâtel, 1948]), pp. 190-6, suggests that Hippias' influence is strong in this passage. He also brings in passages from the *Protagoras* (315 C) and the *Hippias Minor* (363 D) to show that Hippias not only used but even invented dialectic. Taylor's observations on this passage seem more to the point. The two passages from Plato's dialogues, moreover, prove nothing about any relationship between Hippias and dialectic such as Socrates uses. For in the *Protagoras* the questioners are seeking information on astronomy and Hippias is answering as an authority. In the *Hippias Minor* Hippias once again is the authority to whom questions may be put. In neither case does the form or feeling resemble the Socratean type of philosophical investigation.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 127.

is heavily under the influence of Socratic thought.¹⁶ Presumably the author met dialectic at the same time he came in contact with the thought of Socrates.

Taylor suggests the "interesting possibility" that the writer may have been influenced by the Platonic dialogues,¹⁷ although he goes along with the generally accepted date for the treatise ("at the latest not long after 404, and possibly before the death of Socrates").¹⁸ The writer, then, may have had access to the *Protagoras* and *Meno*, dialogues which contain the Socratic thought found in the *δισσοὶ λόγοι*. There is nothing in the *Protagoras*, he says, to preclude its being written before the death of Socrates and nothing in the *Meno* to prevent us from thinking of it as dating from immediately after 399.

Taylor himself has supplied the objection to the possibility of publication of any of the dialogues before 399 when he says it would be strange for Plato to dramatize the actions of a living Socrates when seemingly "the original motive for the composition of 'discourses of Socrates' by the *virī Socratici* was to preserve the memory of a living presence which they had lost."¹⁹ Taylor may be right, however, when he suggests that the *Protagoras* and *Meno* may have been composed immediately after the death of Socrates. The *δισσοὶ λόγοι*, then, could have been written within two or three years after 399.

But there is another equally plausible solution. Kranz²⁰ gives it serious consideration, while Taylor, because of the number of times he makes reference to it,²¹ seemingly would like to believe it. The writer of the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* could have heard Socrates himself. Perhaps we should not go so far as Kranz does who says that the writer was a *Sokratesschüler*,²² but it would be better, I think, to suppose that this sophist heard the

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, *passim*.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 119-21.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 93 f. C. Trieber, "Die ΔΙΑΔΕΞΕΙΣ," *Hermes*, XXVII (1892), pp. 210-22, carries out the most thorough inquiry into the date of this treatise. He concludes that it comes from the years immediately following 404 B. C.

¹⁹ Plato, *The Man and his Work*⁶ (New York, 1956), p. 21.

²⁰ Kranz, *op. cit.*, p. 227, mentions the possibility that the writer heard Socrates and was even a fellow student of Plato and Xenophon.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 110, 118.

²² Kranz, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

philosopher conversing a few times. The writer could easily have been a resident of Megara, Sparta,²³ or some other Peloponnesian center, for that matter, who came to Athens with the victorious Lacedaemonians or who was simply in the habit of visiting Athens from time to time. On one or more of these visits Socrates could have caught his ear.

According to this solution, the treatise can be dated immediately after 404/3, as the internal evidence suggests. The instances of Socratic thought and the trace of dialogue could be reflections of this brief or intermittent association. A conversation of Socrates could be the common source for the views on stealing and lying that appear in the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* (Chapter 3), the *Memorabilia* (IV, 2, 14-18), and the *Republic* (I, 331).²⁴ This casual relationship would also account for the sophist's failure to reproduce the Socratic dialogue with accuracy. For if he had only listened to dialogue and had heard it only a few times at the most, carried on by Socrates in his usual informal manner, we should expect the inaccurate presentation that we find in the *δισσοὶ λόγοι*.

By now our conclusions may be obvious. This fragment of dialogue is another clear indication of Socratic influence in this treatise. Also, if it dates before the death of Socrates, it becomes important for another reason. For in this case, in spite of its obvious shortcomings, this piece would stand as the earliest extant example of the Socratic type of dialogue.

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²³ Kranz, *ibid.*, p. 224, suggests Sparta as a possible residence for this sophist.

²⁴ I wonder if there is any significance in the argument of the *δισσοὶ λόγοι* being couched in question form at this point (see note 7)? All we can do is speculate, but perhaps these questions are a reflection of an oral discussion carried on by Socrates on which Plato and Xenophon also drew.

NOTES ON AN ATHENIAN PRYTANY DECREE.

An Athenian decree of 140/39 B. C., passed in Maimakterion in honor of the prytaneis of the preceding month (Pyanopsion), was published by B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia*, XVII (1948), pp. 17-22. Lines 5-12 contain an enumeration of the sacrifices offered by the former prytaneis, of the tribe Antiochis. Meritt's text of this passage, with the exceptions noted in the *apparatus criticus* below, reads as follows:

- 5 [Εὐ]κτί[μενος Ε]ὐδήμου Εἰτεαῖος εἶπεν· ὑπ[έρ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν
οἱ πρυτάνεις]
[τῇ]ς Ἀντ[ιοχ]ίδος ὑπὲρ τῶν θυσιῶν <ῶ>ν ἔθυσ[ον τὰ πρὸ τῶν
ἐκκλησιῶν τῶι τε]
[Ἀπ]όλλωνι τῶι Προστατηρίῳ καὶ τεῖ Ἀρτέμ[ιδι τεῖ Βουλαίαι καὶ
τοῖς ἄλλοις]
[θε]οῖς οἷς πάτριον ἦν, ἔθυσαν δὲ καὶ τεῖ Ἀρτέμ[ιδι τεῖ Φωσφόρῳ
καὶ ἅπαντα τὰ]
[ἄλ]λα συνετέλεσαν καλῶς καὶ εὐσχημόνως· ἐβ[ουθύτησαν δὲ καὶ
τὰ Στήνια]
10 [τ]εῖ Δήμητρι καὶ τεῖ Κόρει ὑπὲρ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ το[ῦ] δήμου καὶ
τῶν συμμάχων·]
[ἐ]θυσαν δὲ καὶ τῶι Θησεῖ καὶ τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι τῶι Π[υθίῳ καὶ τῶι
Ἀπόλλωνι]
[τῇ]ν εἰρυσιώνην ἀνέθηκαν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια . . .
9 τὰ Στήνια supplevi; ἐβ[ουθύτησαν δὲ καὶ τὰς θυσίας] Meritt.
11 Π[υθίῳ] supplevi; Π[ατρώῳ, καὶ τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι] Meritt.

The formulas in lines 9-10 concern sacrifices to Demeter and Kore. These sacrifices are to be identified as the Stenia, occurring on the 9th day of Pyanopsion,¹ on the analogy of *I. G.*, II², 674, honoring the prytaneis of Antiochis, 275/4 B. C., lines 6-8, where the Stenia are mentioned together with the Chalkeia. Dow has restored reference to the Stenia in a similar passage in another decree of Pyanopsion dated *ca.* 290-275 B. C., honoring the prytaneis of Akamantis.² In view of the absence of both the Chalkeia and the Stenia in a decree of Pyanopsion dated 178/7 B. C., honoring the prytaneis of Hippothontis,³ Dow

¹ L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* (Berlin, 1932), pp. 52-3.

² S. Dow, *Prytaneis* (= *Hesperia*, Suppl. 1, 1937), p. 38, no. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 120, no. 64.

suggested that by this time, these sacrifices were either abandoned by the prytaneis, or simply omitted from mention.⁴ The reference to the Stenia of 140/39 in lines 9-10 above would leave the alternatives open.⁵

Lines 11-12 seem to refer to the Theseia and Pyanopsia, occurring, respectively, on the 8th and 7th days of the month.⁶ In an otherwise convincing reconstruction, Meritt restored Π[ατρώϊ] as the epithet for Apollo in line 11, and placed a comma thereafter, thus suggesting that the sacrifices to Theseus and Apollo are to be taken together, as occurring on the same day. In the absence of evidence for sacrifices to Apollo during the Theseia, we have assumed that the sacrifice to Apollo is to be construed with the ceremonial placing of the εἰσεσιώνη at the entrance to the temple of Apollo during the Pyanopsia. The epithet used for Apollo in this connexion appears in the Eleusinian calendar (*I. G.*, II², 1363, dated at the beginning of the 3rd century B. C., line 7): it is not Πατρώϊος but Πύθιος.

It seems possible to retain the view of L. Deubner, that the Pyanopsia were in essence a Fall harvest festival, complementing the Spring Thargelia.⁷ Just as the Thargelia assumed a strongly apotropaic character,⁸ so in the inscription from Eleusis, we find the Pyanopsia celebrated in honor of the god of purification. The link between the two festivals is confirmed by the fact that the god of the Thargelia was Apollo Pythios.⁹

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵ The sacrifices may have been temporarily discontinued or only sporadically offered by the prytaneis, perhaps depending upon the religious interests of the prytanizing tribe; or they continued to be offered by the prytaneis, but were not invariably recorded.

⁶ Deubner, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-6, 198-201.

⁷ The interpretation proposed by H. Jeanmaire, *Couroi et Courètes* (Lille, 1939), chap. IV, differs substantially; but see L. Ziehen, *Gnomon*, XVI (1940), p. 439.

⁸ Deubner, *op. cit.*, p. 193 f.

⁹ The *Suda*, s. v. Πύθιον; cf. the conclusions of A. Mommsen, *Feste der Stadt Athen* (Leipzig, 1898), pp. 485-6; Deubner, *op. cit.*, p. 198; and W. S. Ferguson, *Hesperia*, VII (1938), pp. 30-1, reached on the basis of Isaeus, VII, 15, with G. Gilbert, *Constitutional Antiquities* (London, 1895), pp. 196-7, and M. P. Nilsson, *Cults, Myths, Oracles, and Politics in Ancient Greece* (Lund, 1951), p. 168. An inscription of 128 B. C., renewing honors to Apollo and regulating the celebration of the Thargelia, specifies that sacrifices are to be offered at the Pythium to Apollo

The reference in lines 11-12 to the Theseia and the Pyanopsia, unique in a prytany decree, may be due less to the vagaries of chance preservation than to the innovation characteristic of decrees in this period. Perhaps the presence of the *εἰρυσιώνη* is to be associated with the intensified interest in the Pythian Apollo signalized by the revival of the Athenian Pythais in 138/7 B. C.¹⁰

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Patroos and to Apollo Alexikakos, as well as to Apollo Pythios, by the priest of Apollo Pythios (W. Peek, *Ath. Mitt.*, LXVI [1941], pp. 181-95, especially p. 187, lines 52-5; cf. J. and L. Robert, *Bull. ép.*, 1942, no. 30; republished by A. Wilhelm, *Wien. Sitzb.*, Bd. 224, Abh. 4 [1947], pp. 27-53). The usage here in regard to cult, epithet, and priesthood strengthens the case for maintaining a similar emphasis upon Apollo Pythios in the reference to the Pyanopsia in line 11 above.

¹⁰ G. Daux, *Delphes au II^e et au I^{er} siècle* (Paris, 1936), pp. 577-83.

REVIEWS.

W. V. CLAUSEN, ed. A. Persi Flacci et D. Iuni Iuvenalis Saturae.
Oxford, Clarendon Press; New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1959.
Pp. xiv + 198. \$2.40.

As the first American to edit an Oxford Classical Text, Clausen enters a distinguished company, and deservedly. For many years now, it has been obvious that the text of Juvenal which S. G. Owen produced for the Oxford series in 1903 and slightly revised in 1908 needed drastic changes. Housman's brilliant edition of 1905, ignored by Owen in 1908, exposed the approach of all previous editors as patently inadequate. Since then, the student of Juvenal has rejected Owen and turned first to Housman or to Leo's revision of Jahn-Buecheler (1910), then lately to the truly excellent edition of Knoche (Munich, 1950). For Persius, there was no Housman or Knoche to revolutionize the situation; all editors, from Jahn to Scivoletto (Florence, 1956),¹ continued to practice the same principles, to base their texts blindly on three MSS. As a result, Owen's text seemed no worse than that of Jahn-Buecheler-Leo, Villeneuve, Cartault, or Scivoletto; there might be minor disagreements as to whether P or AB should be preferred, but essentially the same apparatus criticus appeared in all editions. Then, in 1956, Clausen published his text of Persius, and immediately Owen became utterly outdated. A new Housman had appeared to expose the inadequacies of his predecessors, albeit in a more gentle manner; and it was only natural for the Oxford Press to select Clausen to produce the edition which was to supersede, and undoubtedly has superseded, that of Owen.²

To begin with Clausen's contributions to the text of Persius, it immediately becomes necessary to discuss the principles announced in the earlier and fuller edition of 1956.³ Inasmuch as this work has received virtually no attention in American journals, it is worth the effort to emphasize what Clausen has accomplished; for the *praefatio* to his Oxford Classical Text merely suggests the crucial difference between him and other editors.⁴ I can do no better than to quote Clausen himself: "The tendency to underestimate the secondary MSS., like the tendency to overestimate P, has made steady progress (i. e., since Jahn's edition of 1868); and now, despite Leo's demur in 1910, the common, if not prevailing, opinion is that the secondary

¹ Clausen reviewed Scivoletto's edition in *C. P.*, LIII (1958), pp. 141-2.

² Clausen had already shown his interest in the text of Juvenal: cf. *C. R.*, LXV (1951), pp. 73-4, and *A. J. P.*, LXXXVI (1955), pp. 52-3 and 57-60.

³ The edition of 1956 remains basic for all who intend to study Persius' text seriously, for, while our Oxford Classical Text possesses a more useful format and in some cases corrects earlier infelicities, it necessarily compromises upon some of the finer points of detail.

⁴ I know of only my own brief review in *C. W.*, LI (1957-8), p. 23, for American journals. More considerable reviews may be found in *C. R.*, LXXI (1957), pp. 226-8, and in *Gnomon*, XXXII (1960), pp. 119-28.

MSS. have so little independent value that wherever they present a true reading not found in *Pa* it most probably results from conjecture. I shall state here, what I hope to prove in the following pages, that this opinion is false. The secondary MSS. are simply less good than *Pa*, but not on that account contemptible or essentially different in character."⁵ It is in the subsequent pages of the 1956 edition that Clausen amply demonstrates his thesis, proof which underlies the choice and treatment of the seven *codices deteriores* used for our Oxford Text of 1959: namely, CGLMNRW.

To reach a conclusion that has radically altered the editor's approach to Persius henceforth, Clausen personally collated, according to my reckoning, not merely the three usual MSS plus the Bobbio Fragment, but 41 other MSS, in addition using the full collations of eight more MSS made by others. In so doing, he found that another MS called V deserved to rank with the major three. For the first time, therefore, an editor of Persius has been able to produce a text based on intimate knowledge of the many early and widely scattered MSS in European libraries, refusing to limit his horizons to the traditional triad PAB. To quote Clausen again: "No previous editor of Persius has succeeded in putting together a selective apparatus criticus at once accurate and representative of the textual tradition. I have attempted to do just this. . . ."⁶

The text which Clausen presented in 1956 and now has re-published in substantially the same manner—I shall discuss the differences below—contains no especially startling or important new readings; what it provides is what Clausen designed, namely, "a selective apparatus criticus at once accurate and representative of the textual tradition." For readers who delight in a full apparatus criticus, containing not only the essential readings of the MSS but also the fruits of learning, such as Housman once produced for his admirers and enemies, Clausen's 1956 edition offers much. Even in our Oxford Text of 1959, the riches seem boundless in comparison with what Owen could offer; and one might detect almost a note of irony in that traditional remark annexed to the title: *brevi adnotatione critica instruxit*. To bring out the contrast between Owen and prove how utterly Clausen's work has superseded his predecessor's, we might glance at Satire 1. Clausen alters Owen's text about ten times.⁷ In every case, we find that Owen chose the reading of P or of PAB, unable correctly to estimate the MS tradition because of his incomplete knowledge of

⁵ Clausen (1956), pp. xvi-xvii; cf. the mild statement of his in the O. C. T. Praefatio, p. vii: "Codices autem, qui deteriores habentur, cum aliquid boni, quod non compareat in melioribus, interdum praebent, omnino negligere non licet." I might add that Villeneuve in 1918, like Leo in 1910, expressed his dissatisfaction with the situation, p. xxiii of his Preface, and hoped for someone like Clausen to bring order out of the chaos of some eighty MSS known to him. O. Seel, reviewing Clausen's work in *Gnomon* and in his article, "Zum Persius-Titel des Codex Pithoeanus," *Hermes*, LXXXVIII (1960), pp. 82 ff., argues that, since Persius' textual tradition was an "open" one, Clausen wrongly retains the concept of "secondary MSS."

⁶ Clausen (1956), p. xxvii.

⁷ Cf. 1, 6, 8 (twice), 9, 12, 17, 23, 46, 129. Clausen (1956), p. xix, discusses several of these, as well as in his apparatus criticus.

other MSS. However, when we compare the two editions as to apparatus criticus, then the radical difference leaps to the eye. We are no longer faced with the simple decision between P and AB, cherishing a prejudice for P; now we realize that other MSS bear directly upon our choice of reading and that the revered trinity PAB rarely present a correct reading alone without the support of the "secondary" MSS.⁸ Until other editors begin to follow Clausen's lead, his two editions of Persius alone provide a student the data on which to judge the validity of the text. Whether or not we follow him in his preferences—and inevitably there is, and will be, disagreement—Clausen has at least given us the means of forming a text.

I now come to the differences between the 1956 and 1959 editions of Persius. In his earlier edition, Clausen stated: "I have provided minute collations of PABV Bob., so that their merits and faults may be the more justly estimated, and full collations of CGLMNRW, which however omit some obvious and unimportant aberrations of the individual scribes."⁹ Such meticulous detail would have been otiose in an Oxford Classical Text, designed as it is for British schools and university students in all parts of the world. Misspellings, minor alterations in verb tenses or moods, omission of a word in obvious error, and the like can be virtually disregarded. Moreover, where the MSS fall more or less into two classes, Clausen has wisely chosen to ignore unimportant variations and present the two divisions lucidly. He has announced his principles in this respect, admitted his *libertas*, but always made his criterion that of providing an apparatus criticus worthy of the name; few readers, I think, will quarrel with those principles.¹⁰ Those who want to check up on minutiae can always refer to the 1956 edition.

Essentially, Clausen has left his text unchanged. I have noticed a single important alteration: at 5, 59, in response to criticism and after reflection, he has wisely abandoned his earlier choice of *fecerit* and accepted a good Persian metaphor *fregerit*.¹¹ Besides this change, he has given up a number of awkward spellings: *ecfundat* at 1, 65, *ecfluis* at 3, 20, *chuentis* in 3, 75, *reliquum* in 5, 87, and *Chrusidis* in 5, 165. These can all be considered improvements.

However, there are some major changes in the apparatus criticus, apart from those required by good sense and mentioned above. The most important consists in the new estimate of Vaticanus Palatinus 1710, called x in 1956, and now christened X. As Clausen noted, the MSS was discovered and collated when his 1956 edition was nearly complete.¹² On the basis of a quick judgment, he decided to rank it as "in many respects quite an ordinary MS"; he therefore cited it sparingly in 1956, at perhaps thirty places where it seemed to be

⁸ Cf. Clausen (1956), p. xvi: "Whoever turns to the apparatus criticus will find that it is usually not a question of preferring P or a in isolation; their readings are shared by the Z, by V, by one or several of the secondary MSS. Apart from trivial matters of orthography, P alone preserves a true reading in only six places."

⁹ P. xxvii.

¹⁰ Clausen (1959), Praef. pp. xiii-xiv.

¹¹ Kenney questioned *fecerit* in his review in *C. R.*

¹² Clausen (1956), p. xiii, n. 1.

relevant. Now, he has come to the conclusion that it deserves to take its place beside V as one of the peculiarly good MSS which have been discovered since the Nineteenth Century and demand consideration together with PAB. When we compare the two editions, we quickly observe the importance assigned to X in 1959 as a totally new feature of the apparatus.

Clausen has dropped the *incipits* and *explicitis* as well as the individual *tituli* for the Satires. The latter move I personally regret, because, although Persius did not devise titles, they do appear in the MSS and provide us a means of approaching the medieval conception of the satirist. Also, Clausen has eliminated his lengthier discussions of text and interpretation. The comment in the apparatus at 1, 121 now seems perfectly ordinary, the usual reference to the change of an earlier version because of the allusion to Nero; but Clausen's minute study of the Scholia has altered the usual reference, for he discovered an error of Jahn: the Scholia clearly state that Persius himself, not his editors, made the change in the original. Similarly, at 3, 45 Clausen now cites the Scholia as agreeing with P, whereas in his 1956 edition he quoted them and corrected Jahn. Such modifications, while inevitable, must be regretted, and we can only wait impatiently for the new edition of the Scholia which Clausen has promised.

Two other changes in the apparatus have caught my attention, both improvements. Clausen now makes a number of comparisons with the MS tradition of Juvenal which throw light on the MSS or on his preference for a specific reading.¹³ Second, he has now increased the number of *testimonia* which he regards as relevant to the constitution of the text; one especially notices the new respect shown towards Isidore of Seville.¹⁴ I would propose one addition to these *testimonia*: for 5, 130 Horace, *Serm.*, II, 7, 105, which after all Persius quotes verbatim in *qui tu impunitior*, admirably backs up the rarely cited MSS Paris. 8070 and Bern. 398. In any case, these *testimonia* are the most elaborate that I know of in any edition of Persius and possess great value, helping to constitute the text, but also bearing upon the history of the text and showing how popular Persius continued to be throughout the centuries when for instance Juvenal remained virtually unknown.

Clausen made two important discoveries in working out his edition of 1956. In previous editions, one could never anticipate where one would find the celebrated choliambics, but many editors (Buecheler, Owen, Cartault), devotedly following AB and recognizing that a second hand had placed the lines in P at the beginning, felt certain about assigning them a post after the Satires. Clausen has proved beyond a doubt that the archetype or archetypes of all these MSS contained the choliambics *before* the Satires. However, as Kenney has already remarked, this fact still leaves us in doubt as to the original function of these lines. While Clausen accepts the *titulus* of *Prologus* on the evidence of but two inferior MSS, namely LM, and thus seems to indicate his conception of these fourteen lines as a unit specifically designed as an introduction or Program poem, much

¹³ Cf. 1, 8, 17, 74; 3, 34; 5, 150; and 6, 76.

¹⁴ Cf. 1, 32; 2, 16, 37, 45; 3, 56, 84; 4, 2, 9, and 13.

remains to be said. Not everyone will consider the title valid.¹⁵ The second discovery of Clausen affects the *Vita*. In addition to his reasonable reconstruction of Lucan's famous remarks in 23-4, he finally made sense out of the legal discussions concerning Persius' will in 36 ff. Having determined the true meaning of *codicillis*, he has shown that Cornutus does not receive the bulk of Persius' inheritance, but that Persius requested of his mother to give to his beloved tutor a portion of what he, Persius, has willed entirely into her control and that of his sister.¹⁶

I now turn to orthography. As we shall see later, Housman and Knoche made Clausen's job easy by formulating clear principles of orthography for reconstructing the text of Juvenal. No such study has ever been attempted for Persius, and Clausen himself leaves most of his principles implicit. It is possible, however, to deduce much from the fuller apparatus of the 1956 edition, and I list for the reader, who may be troubled by some of Clausen's methods in the present edition, such criteria as may be gathered. I find one relevant statement in his 1956 Preface: "I usually adopt the unassimilated prefix when it occurs in the MSS."¹⁷ Thus, for example, with Owen at 5, 31 he accepts *subcinctis* from P alone. All other orthographical data come from the apparatus of the earlier edition. Clausen states that he accepts *tum* rather than *tunc* before a guttural;¹⁸ he informs us that Persius used *nec* rather than *neque* in the thesis of the second, third, and fourth feet;¹⁹ at 1, 74 in both editions he suggests the possibility that Persius used the archaic *quom* for *cum*; at 4, 41 he justified his spelling of *filix* as the older one.²⁰

Now we come to certain principles which could bear further investigation. Clausen often accepts the more formal ending *-is* for the accusative plural of the third declension, in fact, wherever a decent MS provides evidence therefor.²¹ In so doing, he leaves himself open to certain obvious inconsistencies, of which I note but two here. For 1, 20 overwhelming authority supports the reading *ingentis*, and he uses it; for 6, 47 overwhelming authority supports *ingentes* in the same accusative plural, and he employs it. For a man who notor-

¹⁵ It seems likely that V, mutilated at the beginning, once contained the choliambis there; about X, we now know from the 1959 edition that it preserves the original tradition by placing the lines at the beginning. However, Clausen has not given us the MS evidence in respect to the title of *Prologus*; if X is as good as he implies, it could be decisive. Seel, *Hermes*, LXXXVIII (1960), pp. 92 ff. has proposed an intriguing solution of the mystery presented by the title in P, namely, THEBAIDORUM PERSI SATURA. If he is right, the title demonstrates that the ultimate parent of P once contained the choliambis at the start; further evidence to support Clausen's thesis.

¹⁶ For a fuller discussion, cf. Clausen (1956), pp. xxv-xxvi.

¹⁷ P. xxvii.

¹⁸ At 1, 9; he then compares 3, 12; 4, 37; 5, 60—there seems to be some error here—and 5, 186.

¹⁹ At 1, 19.

²⁰ The remarks in the apparatus of our O. C. T. at 2, 5 on the confusion of *b* and *v* appear much more fully in Clausen (1956), p. xx, where he discusses 3, 93 and 5, 97.

²¹ Cf. 1, 20, 65, 106, 113; 2, 45, 60, 61; 3, 17, 64.

iously chose his words so carefully, it seems hard to believe that Persius would have been indifferent about the spelling of the same word in the same gender and case in two different Satires. Even more patently disturbing is the use of *strigiles* in 5, 126 and *strigilis* five lines later in 5, 131; both words are accusative plurals, both in precisely the same position in the line, and 5, 131 patently refers back to 126. It does not seem to me that the meticulous Persius would have been so inconsistent, regardless of the MSS. I do not prescribe the policy to be adopted in all cases where the MSS sometimes provide an older spelling and sometimes the current one of everyday speech; but in instances like the above it might be better to be bold and assume that Persius knew what he was doing, even though the MSS do not.

I also miss some remarks on archaism in Persius. Clausen knowingly allows himself to be inconsistent on *cludere/cludere*, yet I am not sure that he is justified. At 1, 93 he accepts the evidence of ABX for *cludere*, adding that Persius' editor, Caesius Bassus, regularly used this form in his treatise on meter, citing also Quintilian, *Inst.*, IX, 4, 65; but at 5, 11, despite the possible evidence of Bern. 648 for *cluso*, Clausen prefers *clauso*. When he can find MS authority, he likes the archaic *vo-* instead of *vu-*. On the sole evidence of P, he therefore reads *volpem* in 5, 117, *volgi* in 6, 12, and *volvae* in 6, 73; and on the sole evidence of V, he accepts *volnera* in 5, 4 and *voltum* in 5, 40. Here again we find Persius implicitly convicted of inconsistency: *vulvas* in 4, 36, *vulnus* in 4, 44. Knoche leaves the question open as to whether similar inconsistencies in the tradition of Juvenal should be attributed to the satirist or the scribes, and it would be interesting to have Clausen's opinion. It seems to me, however, that the slow writing habits of Persius, which involved such a manneristic search for the economic, concrete word and which after all covered so short a period of years, would negate the charge of inconsistency, whereas it might be maintained for the rather facile Juvenal who had such a long career. I suggest also that not only Caesius Bassus, but even more Cornutus' treatise on orthography should be adduced as relevant evidence for certain spellings.²²

In short, Clausen has given us a highly important edition of Persius. The very fact that he has made additions to his earlier edition while refining the apparatus proves how valuable this present Oxford Classical Text can be. Above all, the fact that we can discuss at such great length his methods bears ample testimony to the success of his designs: he has in fact produced the first authentic apparatus criticus of Persius, so that at last a critic may spend his time positively, not just haggling with the editor over his preference for P or for AB on a particular reading.

²² I have already noted that Clausen changed his mind about spellings at 1, 65; 3, 20, 75; 5, 87 and 165. These changes would have pleased Cornutus, to judge from the fragments of his treatise. I note here other idiosyncrasies. Earlier, at 1, 97 Clausen expressed hesitation about *vegrandi*; now in 1959 he seems confident. In Persius 3, 92 and 6, 17 he spells *lagoena* the same word that throughout Juvenal he writes as *lagona* (cf. Juv. 5, 29); this latter agrees with Knoche's spelling. In Persius and Juvenal Clausen writes *obscenus* in contrast to Knoche's *obscaenus*.

We now proceed to Juvenal. As I have already stated, shortly after it appeared Owen's edition was outdated by the revolutionary work of Housman.²³ Housman had found the same situation prevailing among Juvenal's editors as Clausen has in the case of Persius, and his critical acumen together with his brilliant polemic stimulated an entirely new approach to the MSS. However, in 1905 the seven secondary MSS which Housman selected to counteract the dominance of P were not adequately collated, and Housman committed some unintentional oversights by ignoring relevant readings. Furthermore, since 1905 have been discovered R (1909), the Ambrosian Fragments (1909), the Antinoe Fragment (1935), and the sheets from the Orleans MS (1938). When Housman republished his text in 1931, instead of changing his apparatus to accommodate the important readings of R and Ambr., he added a second preface, containing mention of these two as well as further polemic congenial to his nature.²⁴ It was obviously necessary, therefore, for someone to assume the task of assessing Housman's important edition, bringing into the apparatus criticus the relevant readings of the MSS and fragments found after 1905, correcting as well as expanding Housman's report of his seven secondary MSS, and selecting some additional ones of value. That man was Ulrich Knoche.

When Knoche began to work on Juvenal, he challenged not only Owen, but even Housman. His monumental *Handschriftliche Grundlagen des Juvenaltextes*,²⁵ followed after the war by his epoch-making edition of Juvenal (Munich, 1950), must be taken into consideration as we assess Clausen's work on Juvenal. At the beginning of Knoche's edition, the reader goes through twenty pages of detailed *Handschriftenverzeichnis*, an amazing work in itself. Then, he plunges into the text and discovers that Knoche uses over forty MSS as relevant, classifies them into five principal families, and represents these families or portions of them with a bewildering code of Greek letters. From the *Grundlagen*, we can gather the fruits of many years of Knoche's researches on these MSS and their affinities: there is one vastly superior family represented by PSRWQ;²⁶ next, two families which belong to the Vulgate tradition but have been profitably contaminated with the superior family, one of which is represented by GU, the other by FZLO; finally, two groups which stand very close to the Vulgate but have here and there, in different respects, come into contact with the better tradition: fifteen MSS in Knoche, in Clausen represented only by H. It will be observed that I have not mentioned three of Clausen's MSS, namely AKT. Knoche

²³ Housman had already contemptuously dismissed Owen's edition in *C. R.*, XVII (1903), pp. 389 ff. One of the clearest statements of his thesis about the MSS in his Preface (1905), p. x, demonstrates, by its similarity to a passage quoted above from Clausen, how similar were the situations of Juvenal and Persius before these two editors began their studies.

²⁴ I refer the reader to Knoche's balanced review in *Gnomon*, IX (1933), pp. 242 ff.

²⁵ *Philologus*, Suppl. XXXIII, 1 (1940).

²⁶ Knoche used the sign W for Vind. 107 (V in Clausen); he used V for Arov.

estimates these as contaminated, crossing lines between families in such a way as to render exact classification impossible.²⁷

Knoche's elaborate and meticulous edition, though admirable in many respects, leaves something to be desired as far as the average reader is concerned: its complicated presentation of minute affiliations defeats attempts to derive a quick and clear impression of the textual data, and its affection for the fifteen MSS forming the two families close to the Vulgate rarely contributes much but unacceptable readings. One approaches Clausen's text, therefore, with some relief, free from the necessity of learning a complicated code of reference, able once more to concentrate on a limited number of valuable "secondary" MSS. Clausen has chosen the seven MSS which Housman recognized as important (AFGLOTU), added K that Housman suspected as useful, and HZ that Housman intermittently used. He has personally collated GHLOTZ and relied on Knoche's copious edition for the readings of AFKU.²⁸ I draw this comparison with Housman immediately, because it soon becomes clear that Clausen has patterned his approach more on that of Housman than on that of Knoche.

A number of problems, all envisaged by Housman, face the editor of Juvenal and make his task much more difficult than that of Persius' editor. First, there is the question of the relation between PSQR (or PSRARov.) and the "secondary" MSS.²⁹ Housman inclined towards the view that most of the interpolations had crept into the secondary MSS in Carolingian times and that consequently it was impossible to determine strictly separated families among them.³⁰ Knoche disagrees vigorously with this position and has devoted his best years to proving that interpolations proceeded consistently in the Vulgate from the Fourth Century, that on the basis of these it is possible to determine separate affiliations for the inferior MSS. We have already summarized his conclusions about the five principal families. Now, Clausen has taken a position close to Housman's. He does not argue, of course, as Housman and others did, from an incorrectly dated Bobbio Fragment; it belongs to the Sixth Century, not the Fourth. But while he agrees that P and the Vulgate derive from a pair of archetypes created at the end of the Fourth Century, he pointedly denies Knoche's arguments for affiliations.³¹ Here, then, we grasp the reason for his grouping of "secondary" MSS in a single mass rather than in the separate families of Knoche. I cannot see that the text suffers much from such a theory, since in effect Clausen's selection of MSS involves ignoring the two inferior families of Knoche. However, it remains a point of considerable

²⁷ Cf. *Grundl.*, pp. 160, 189, 195, 206, and 261 ff.

²⁸ Cf. Praef. p. xi. Clausen also announced, p. viii, that he personally went to Montpellier to collate P.

²⁹ Vind. 107 (W or V) occupies an intermediate position.

³⁰ Housman (1931), Pref. pp. xxiv and xli.

³¹ Clausen, p. xii: "Codices ab emendatis exemplaribus deducti, eos dico quorum consensum ϕ littera notavi, ut saepius inter se, ita non semper consentiunt; sed eorum adfinitates, ut ita dicam, tam variae sunt ac mutabiles, ut nullo in stemmate, sit licet vel implicatissimum, designari possint."

importance, one which I am in no position to arbitrate here, whether Clausen's assumption of simplicity or Knoche's theory of complexity in the tradition should be accepted; whether indeed one should talk of "secondary MSS" of Juvenal.

Since Knoche and Clausen both agree, though to different extents, with Housman's insistence on the value of other MSS besides P, and since no important new MSS have been discovered since R (known to Housman for his second edition), it is fairly obvious that neither editor can differ radically from Housman in reporting the various readings—only in so far as Housman possessed inadequate collations—but, on the other hand, they can and will disagree on the relative value of P and other MSS in specific cases. Housman demanded of the editor the exercise of critical judgment, inevitably stimulating his successors to disagree with him and espouse new variants. For the benefit of the future, he listed most of the cases where he preferred the united tradition of his seven secondary MSS to that of P, a total of 26 places.³² It is significant that his judgment seemed so convincing against that of Owen and Buecheler as to win almost total acceptance: of these 26, Knoche prefers to follow P on 7, 78; 13, 65; and 15, 93, while Clausen follows P on 7, 78 and 9, 132. A second list arranged by Housman reveals his preferences for readings of one or two MSS against all others.³³ While it is clear that he possessed inadequate collations of the MSS when assembling his data,³⁴ I find it indicative that Clausen and Knoche prefer P against the MSS of Housman at 6, 120; 10, 313 and 359, but that Knoche goes on alone to reject Housman at 1, 145; 2, 45; 4, 148; 6, 29 and 561; 7, 88; 10, 21; 11, 26; 14, 165; and 15, 98. In short, Housman's judgment wins general support from both Knoche and Clausen, but Knoche goes against him and his "secondary" MSS sixteen times in contrast to the six of Clausen. There are a good number of other instances which Housman would class as indeterminate, where no definite clue but personal preference would lead to deciding for P or the other MSS. I have counted eighteen of these in which Clausen has not agreed with Housman, whether as in 3, 78 or 9, 25 Housman followed P too conservatively, rejected it too freely as in 14, 45 and 66, or whether as in 3, 311 he depended upon an incorrect collation; in all but 4, 41 and 6, 585 Knoche and Clausen agree.

Apart from matters of deletion, emendation, punctuation, and orthography, which I shall discuss later, I have calculated that Clausen disagrees with Knoche in some seventy cases. In roughly half these instances, each appeals to P and rejects a reading of the inferior MSS.³⁵ From these statistics, it might appear that a reader may feel pretty free to make his own choice between these two dis-

³² Housman (1905), p. xviii.

³³ P. xxii.

³⁴ Cf. his edition at 3, 259; 5, 121; 6, 120; 8, 133; 11, 85; 14, 217; 16, 48.

³⁵ In several cases, P is utterly wrong, and the editor must choose among alternate readings offered by the other MSS; thus, Knoche and Clausen choose differently at 6, 329, 561, 660; 10, 344; 12, 14; and 15, 104.

tinguished editors and their preferences, and I certainly do not feel prepared to argue my personal prejudices with confidence. However, as one examines these seventy points in the text, one should be aware of Housman's ghost. Suppose we analyze Book I. At 1, 44, 114, 126; 2, 45, 111; 3, 19, 288, 322; and 5, 116 Clausen follows P, while Knoche chooses the secondary MSS; at 1, 145; 2, 106, 150; 3, 157; 4, 4, 41, and 148 it is Knoche who follows P and Clausen who accepts the secondary MSS or Liutprand. A fairly even division, a good indication that our editors are practicing judgment on P. But if one glances through Housman, one will find that he and Knoche agree only at 4, 41, where, in my opinion, both are wrong and Clausen right.³⁶ Substantially the same figures hold for the other books.³⁷ In other words, when Clausen and Knoche disagree, the presence of a third critic must be assumed; and in most instances, Clausen has accepted the acute judgment of Housman, not broken a new path. The more we study this text, the clearer it becomes that Clausen has made it his primary purpose to assert once again the merits of Housman's edition.

Before Housman, editors like Buecheler, Friedlaender, and Owen had decided that no spurious verses existed in the MSS. Housman revived the more intelligent approach of Jahn, who deleted some seventy lines, and argued effectively for the removal of over twenty lines, mostly those suspected by distinguished predecessors. The discovery of the Oxford Fragment in 1899 undermined the position of Buecheler and cohorts, whether they accepted or rejected it; for in either case, these lines pointed to a disturbed condition in the MSS. Leo found in the Oxford Fragment the inspiration for his famous theory of a double recension; he assumed that Juvenal revised his text in exile and somehow the revisions and the original became incorporated one after the other, to produce a series of doublets.³⁸ Housman and Knoche entertained doubts about Leo's theory,³⁹ and then in 1943 Jachmann developed the idea of a double recension into a more plausible form.⁴⁰ Instead of attributing to Juvenal the "revision," usually of no great merit, we should recognize the alien

³⁶ *neque enim* is paralleled by 1, 89; 7, 59; 11, 30; and 14, 127; Knoche accepts all these but the last. On the above list from Book I, Housman suggests an inclination towards Knoche's position in his apparatus at 1, 114 and 2, 45.

³⁷ Book II: Clausen and Knoche differ in 18 cases; Housman sides with Knoche against Clausen at 6, 308 and 585 and hesitates about 660; all three disagree at 6, 117 and 329. With our MSS we cannot prove Clausen wrong in these five cases; he certainly deals with 6, 117 better than Housman. Book III: of the 13 disagreements between Knoche and Clausen, Housman stands behind Clausen in every case but 9, 118 (where he has his own conjecture) and 9, 132 (where he agrees with Knoche, but the reading of P, with its future tense, seems more pointed and Juvenalian). Book IV: Housman supports Clausen in all 15 divergences from Knoche. Book V: of 16 variations, Housman backs Clausen except in 13, 44, where Clausen has accepted the conjecture of Schurzfleisch, based on the Scholia.

³⁸ "Doppelfassungen bei Juvenal," *Hermes*, XLIV (1909), pp. 600-17.

³⁹ Cf. Housman (1931) and Knoche's approving comments in *Gnomon*, IX (1933), p. 244.

⁴⁰ "Studien zu Juvenal," *Gött. Nachr.* (1943), pp. 187-266.

work of a mediocre editor before the end of the Fourth Century. Both Knoche and Clausen express respect for Jachmann's ideas⁴¹ and follow him in connection with 6, 614 abc; 8, 6-8; 9, 5 and 120-3, ignoring him on 6, 125 and 624-6. Going far beyond Housman, Knoche deleted a total of more than 90 lines. Even in this bold action he has failed to satisfy some critics, of whom W. C. Helmbold has been the most eloquent advocate, in his discussions of Satires 1 and 12.⁴² When Housman began this present trend, he remarked that he was steering a middle course, between the total oblivion of Owen, that is, and the then audacious manner of Jahn in athetizing 70 lines. To steer a middle course nowadays, which is what Clausen does, means following Housman in all his deletions, Jachmann in most of his, and backing away from many of Knoche's freer methods. I estimate that Clausen deletes just over fifty lines, generally on the authority of others.⁴³ He remarks besides that he has noted in the apparatus criticus certain verses which seem suspect to him, but not certainly to be condemned.⁴⁴ From this, I was expecting comments like those of Housman at 5, 104 and 7, 50-1, or even brief statements like those of Knoche at 6, 156, 589; 8, 140, and elsewhere;⁴⁵ apparently, though, the reader must infer Clausen's suspicions from references to others' deletions, for he risks no direct statement of his attitude.

On the Oxford Fragment, Clausen finds himself in good company when accepting it, particularly that of Housman. He cites a selective bibliography of those who have contributed most to the question, including both Knoche and Axelson (who have denied the genuineness of the lines). While I myself do not find the Fragment worthy of Juvenal, Housman and Colin have succeeded in making sense of it, and no scholar can at present be criticized for inclining either way in this matter. We do not possess adequate criteria for reaching a decisive judgment, and each editor must weigh the arguments of those who have accepted or rejected the lines, then follow his own conscience.

After deletions and the Oxford Fragment, inasmuch as the text is now admittedly corrupt, comes the problem of emendations. First, the editor must determine the passages where corruption exists, then attempt to deal with it. Following the lead of Jahn, who had detected

⁴¹ Cf. Knoche, p. vii (Preface to his edition), and Clausen, p. xiii. There have also been some recent attempts to revive Leo's theory of author-variants. Cf. J. G. Griffith, "Author-variants in Juvenal: a Reconsideration," *Festschr. Snell* (Munich, 1956), pp. 101-11, and F. Jacoby, "Zwei Doppelfassungen im Juvenaltexst," *Hermes*, LXXXVII (1959), pp. 449-62.

⁴² Cf. "The Structure of Juvenal I," *U. of Calif. Publ. Class. Philol.*, XIV (1951), pp. 47-60, and "Juvenal's Twelfth Satire," *C. P.*, LI (1956), pp. 14-23.

⁴³ His authority for 8, 134, 223; 13, 153; and 14, 119 is Housman; but Housman did not actually delete these lines, rather calling them into suspicion in his apparatus.

⁴⁴ P. xiii.

⁴⁵ E. g., "versus fort. delendus est" (5, 148); "fortasse delenda sunt" (6, 156-7); "versus nondum explicatus melius abesset" (6, 589); "fortasse damnandi" (8, 140-1).

a lacuna after 16, 2, Housman defined one type of corruption by marking a series of lacunae, namely, at 1, 131, 156; 2, 169; 6, 585; and 14, 229. Knoche adopts all but that at 14, 229; he also places lacunae at 5, 64; 6, 557; 7, 205; and 9, 134.⁴⁶ Clausen admits only Jahn's lacuna at 16, 2 and regards only Housman's ideas at 1, 131 and 156 as deserving mention. A second type of corruption emerges within a line, whether of meter or words, and modern editors of Juvenal owe it once more to Housman that these corruptions now receive serious consideration.⁴⁷ No editor goes so far as Housman, particularly in inserting conjectural emendations in the text. Knoche assumes corruptions at 3, 109; 4, 116; 6, Ox. 9, 11; 7, 149; 8, 105, 241; 10, 197, 295, 313 (accepting Rigaltius' emendation); 12, 13; 13, 49; 14, 269; and 15, 90; but he solves some of the problems noted by Housman by deleting 4, 8; 5, 104; the troublesome part of 6, 195; 7, 15; 8, 7, 202; 10, 326; the offending portion of 11, 148; a different part of 11, 168; and 15, 98. He accepts none of Housman's conjectures, but admits Collins' emendation for 16, 25, as did Housman in 1931. As we might expect, Clausen draws closer to Housman on this point: he marks corruptions at 2, 168; 3, 109; 5, 104; accepts Housman's transposition of the half-lines 6, 64-5; transposes 6, 117 in a slightly different manner from Housman but in accordance with an earlier proposal of Hermann; reverses 6, 307 and 308 as suggested by Madvig and approved by Housman; assumes corruptions at Ox. 9, 11, and 18; 6, 415; 7, 149; accepts Richards' conjecture (with Housman) for 8, 27; obelizes 8, 105, 241; 9, 118; 10, 197, 295, 313, and 326; accepts Housman's emendations for 12, 14; 13, 49; and 15, 90 (the latter, to some extent, supported by a MS written in Italy in 1441); and marks corruption at 14, 269; and he deletes others called into suspicion by Housman.⁴⁸ Finally, he follows the new punctuation proposed by Housman in 1, 50; 2, 37; 4, 116; 5, 31; 6, 455; 8, 142, and adopted from earlier editors by Housman for 7, 36, 124; 11, 114; 13, 188; and 15, 52. Knoche shares only 1, 50; 2, 37; and 13, 188 with them.

Housman devoted a long and important footnote to the principles of orthography which he adopted in 1905.⁴⁹ To correct some of Housman's errors and to analyze the situation more fully, Knoche produced a meticulous chapter in his *Grundlagen*.⁵⁰ I shall not repeat the many details which he introduces. Suffice it to say that he recognizes the unhappy state in which we live, with our MSS giving us a uniform spelling at one point and dividing elsewhere, the preferable set seeming to give us the special poetic, archaic, or vulgar spelling

⁴⁶ Since 1950, Knoche has felt some doubts about the lacuna at 5, 64: cf. his self-corrections in *Die römische Satire* (Berlin, 1957²), p. 122.

⁴⁷ Cf. Housman (1905), p. xxx. In his text he signalized corruptions explicitly or implicitly (by emending the MSS reading) at 2, 49, 168; 3, 109, 218; 4, 8, 79, 128; 5, 104; 6, 50, 55, 64, 117, 158, 167, 195; Ox. 9, 11, 18, 329, 415, 461; 7, 15, 204; 8, 7, 105, 159, 202, 241; 9, 60, 118; 10, 197, 295, 313, 326; 11, 23, 57, 148, 168; 12, 14, 78; 13, 49, 179; 14, 23, 71, 269; 15, 90, 98; 16, 18.

⁴⁸ Clausen adopts the same deletions as listed above for Knoche, with the exception of 5, 104 and 10, 326.

⁴⁹ P. xxi, n. 1.

⁵⁰ Pp. 322 ff.

which has more often been removed by the regularizing tendency of the scribes. He tries to formulate principles for dealing with the rare instances when an attractive spelling appears in a few MSS, often in sound disagreement with Housman. There may be a certain boldness in following Harl. 3872 or Oen. 992, as for example at 2, 17; 5, 16; 8, 2; and 10, 289, but they do use orthography which, when present in other MSS, Housman and Clausen adopt. Although it may be impossible and undesirable to produce complete uniformity of spelling, I tend to think that Juvenal might have used the archaic form as often as Knoche adopts it from the inferior MSS, if not more so; in any case, we can hardly imagine that Juvenal wrote *voltu* in 10, 189 and *vultum* two lines later in 191, regardless of the MSS tradition. With these prefatory remarks, I give a list of places where I find Clausen's orthography questionable: *clausus* in 1, 124; 3, 185, 242; and 10, 170 despite the testimony of other MSS for *clusus* and despite the fact that he accepts *cluso* at 4, 21 and *cludo* at 3, 19 and 131 on the authority of P and others; *coloephia* in 2, 53; *menses* in 5, 16 and *quales* in 10, 194 despite certain MSS and the common use of *-is* in the accusative plural of the third declension (cf. 11, 155); *parvulus* in 5, 138 on the authority of PSR (but not the MSS of Vergil), *parvulus* elsewhere in 6, 89; 10, 340; and 15, 127 despite GU; *convolsa* at 1, 12 on the sole authority of U, but not *servulus* at 14, 67 on the sole authority of U; *pulcher* consistently despite the testimony for *pulcer* in P at 7, 190 and in good MSS at 1, 128, 137, and elsewhere; *pyxide* at 13, 25 despite *pyxide* at 2, 141; *Tentura* at 15, 35 and 76; *vulnus* at 15, 34 despite a suggestive reading in U and the acceptance of the archaic *volnere* at 15, 54 and 156; the archaic *voltum* at 15, 170 on the basis of P, but not at 8, 2 or 9, 3 on the authority of other MSS. The only remarks in the apparatus criticus relevant to orthography concern the spelling of *lagona* (5, 29 and elsewhere) and the archaic *quom* which Ribbeck proposed for 3, 37 and elsewhere, which Knoche adopts, but neither Housman nor Clausen will enter in the text.⁵¹

To conclude, Clausen has not really attempted to break new ground in his text of Juvenal; rather, he seems to have restored Housman to his rightful place of eminence by modernizing the great edition of 1905. In marking out the lines for Juvenal's editors, Housman had inevitably overstated his case in spots, in other places unavoidably lacked the necessary evidence, as he knew only too well, because of inadequate collations of the "secondary" MSS. Moreover, his love of conjecture often led him to discern corruption where none existed. Despite it all, Housman's judgment drove right to the heart of many crucial problems and, as we have said, rendered Owen's text ridiculous almost before it had reached the public. To bring Housman up to date is no mean undertaking nor, considering the importance of Housman's editorial work as well as the special character of Knoche's edition, should it be regarded as supererogatory. I find it ironic indeed that what has replaced Owen is a text after the pattern of Owen's most severe critic and bitter enemy, but it is also singularly

⁵¹ Except for the spellings *coloephia* and *pulcher*, indeed, Clausen seems to have followed Housman in most of the cases where I would question him.

appropriate that Clausen, the man who applied Housman's healthy principles to the problem of editing Persius, should be selected to vindicate Housman as editor of the new Oxford Classical Text of Juvenal. In a sense, this is the most significant, though unplanned, commemoration of the centenary of Housman's birth.

It is almost unnecessary to add that the Oxford Press has produced its usual handsome volume at the usual attractive price. No library that now possesses Owen's text should hesitate to buy this and relegate Owen to the place where scholarly curiosities and sad examples usually end. In addition to the two errors that were caught at the last minute, I have detected two others: in Juvenal 10, 107, instead of *praeceps*, read *praeceps*; in 11, 56 for *pucherrima* read *pulcherrima*. I regret that the editor has seen fit to sacrifice the *Testimonia* which Owen printed, but of course they do not relate to the text.⁵² Clausen does introduce a useful substitute in the form of a pair of *indices nominum*, one for each satirist. I have glanced through that for Juvenal and found it accurate. The reader may be surprised to see that the *Caesar* and *dux* of 7, 1-35 should probably—Clausen leaves it a question—be interpreted as Trajan. Apart from that single detail, the index arouses no disagreement and forms a worthy conclusion to an Oxford Classical Text which every student may use with respect.

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ALBERT BATES LORD. *The Singer of Tales*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp. xvi + 310. \$6.75. (*Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature*, No. 24.)

At his lamentably early death in 1935, Milman Parry left behind him the first few pages of the draft of a book, to be called *The Singer of Tales*, in which he hoped to discuss the results of his expeditions to Yugoslavia (the notes and recordings from which are now among the more envied possessions of Harvard University). Dr. A. B. Lord, who had been one of Parry's pupils and companions and has become one of the principal heirs of Parry's work, published the surviving pages in the course of an article on "Homer, Parry and Huso" (*A. J. A.*, LII [1948], pp. 34-44). So much indeed has Lord become identified with Parry's work that a reviewer in *The Times Literary Supplement* (London, September 19, 1958) has written of "the Serbo-Croatian ballads collected by Milman Lord"; and though workers in Lord's own field may well find the assurance superfluous, it seems desirable that this account of Lord's book should begin by stating explicitly that it really is Lord's work, and should not on any account be regarded as "the book which Milman Parry might have written had he lived." This observation is not meant in

⁵² Clausen also gives us a *Vita Iuvenalis* after his text; it involves no changes from that usually printed, as for instance in the *Scholia* edited by Wessner.

any way to belittle Parry's contribution; like Wolf's Homer, he began the weaving of the web (and indeed spun most of the yarn for it as well)—and if we are now, as I believe we are, in a position to proclaim that the main problem involved in the "Homeric question" has been solved, we owe the decisive step towards that solution to Parry's initiative, as developed by Lord and others (among whom J. A. Notopoulos of Trinity College, Hartford, deserves special mention).

After a preface by Professor Harry Levin, a former Chairman of the Department of Comparative Literature at Harvard (pp. xiii-xv), the main argument of the book is divided into two parts: "The Theory" (six chapters, pp. 1-38) and "The Application" (three chapters, pp. 139-221). Six appendices are devoted to Serbo-Croatian heroic songs, mostly in summary (special mention should be accorded perhaps to the full text and translation of M. Vojičić's song in honour of Milman Parry in Appendix VI); notes to the ten chapters of the book follow the appendices, and there is an index, mainly of proper names.

The first chapter of Part I (pp. 1-12) is a general introduction, stating the approach of students of Comparative Literature (later called "comparatists"—*uerbum horrendum, informe . . . cui lumen ademptum*) to the problems of oral narrative poetry, and especially to the sort of information which can be derived from a comparison of the technique of the improvising singers of Yugoslavia, as they were thirty years or so ago, with that of the Homeric poems. The main difficulty about this, as Lord admits, is that the term "epic" is ambiguous; and I for one am inclined to think that its use should be severely limited—above all, one should steer clear of such expressions (much used by Lord) as "oral epic," which seem to beg the whole question (I should prefer to speak, as Lord sometimes does, of "oral narrative"). In this chapter Lord seems to me to be tilting at windmills, when he complains of the belittling attitude of scholars to "oral" and "folk" literature; it might have been hoped that by now Comparative Literature was adult enough as a discipline not to play favourites between "oral" and "written" literature. Indeed, his whole account of the development of Homeric scholarship since the seventeenth century seems to me prejudicial and unfair; its quality may perhaps be judged by Lord's final assertion (p. 12) that "Homeric scholarship has chosen to disdain oral epic and to move into the more abstruse kinds of literary criticism" (from this condemnation, for which no references are given, a note explicitly excepts C. H. Whitman and Rhys Carpenter). At this point, the serious student of Homer (if he has got so far) will have been tempted to lay the book aside; such persons, if they have not yet begun to read the book, are hereby advised to begin at Chapter II.

This deals with "Singers: Performance and Training," and makes fascinating and highly instructive use of data from the Parry Collection and from Lord's own experience, to show how Serbo-Croat singers come by their material, and how they learn to use it. One of the odd things which emerges from this account is the attitude of such people to accuracy of reproduction: S. Makić, for example, is quoted (p. 27) as claiming that he would sing a song that he had heard from another "just as I heard it. . . . It isn't good to change

or add" and yet all the evidence assembled by Lord and others shows that no two performances, even by the same singer, will be exactly alike. This is not, *pace* Lord, an essential characteristic of oral narrative song; one may contrast with it the more rigid principle of the Gilbertese narrator, as recorded by Sir Arthur Grimble (*A Pattern of Islands* [London 1952], pp. 42, 157), and it may be that here as elsewhere Lord is in danger of treating argument from analogy as if it were equivalent to demonstration; it does not follow that, because many of the conditions of literature in pre-Homeric Greece seem to have been analogous to those in Yugoslavia in the twentieth century, all the conditions in both places and periods must have been identical. Chapters III ("The Formula," pp. 30-67) and IV ("The Theme," pp. 68-98) deal in illuminating detail with the handling by Yugoslav singers of traditional phrases and scenes in the composition of new songs, whether on traditional subjects or on new and topical ones; it becomes evident here that catalogues are freely transferable from one story to another, without regard for time or space, and this may have some relevance for the student of Homeric catalogues. Chapter V ("Songs and the Song," pp. 99-123) considers the relation of particular performances of a story ("songs") to the story as it has been handed down ("the song"), and emphasizes that it is not possible, by collation of particular "songs," to produce an archetypal text of "the song" itself: the elements of the several "songs" may be the same, but each version is a phenomenon in its own right. This principle, which is summed up in Chapter VI ("Writing and Oral Tradition," pp. 124-38) as "stability of essential story" (p. 138), is of course entirely different from that "stability of text" (*ibid.*) which is the goal, not only of written literature (as Lord says) but also of such "oral" narrators as Grimble's Nei Tearia and (one must suppose) the Demodocus of *Od.*, VIII, 261-366. Like the preceding chapters, this is fascinatingly interesting as long as it deals with the Yugoslavs, but is less satisfactory when it comes to lay down general principles; for example, Lord's confident assertion that "It is conceivable that a man might be an oral poet in his younger years and a written poet later in life, but it is not possible that he be *both* [his italics] an oral and a written poet at any given time in his career" (p. 129). This is simply undemonstrable for Homer and his contemporaries; but even among literate moderns it will not agree with the experience of a University teacher who divides his time between oral composition (or does not Lord ever improvise his lectures?) and the writing of books, articles, and reviews. Lord does not seem to me to have thought out very clearly the real problems involved by the revival of literacy in eighth-century Greece (cf. R. Harder, *Das Neue Bild der Antike* [Leipzig, 1942] I, pp. 91-108; *Die Antike*, XIX [1943], pp. 86-108 [both now in his *Kleine Schriften* (Munich, 1960), pp. 57-97]).

In Part II, we jump straight from the Yugoslav heroic songs to "Homer" (Chapter VII, pp. 141-57); and in this chapter Lord answers "the question as to whether the author of the Homeric poems was an 'oral poet,' and whether the poems themselves are 'oral poems.'" The answer is that Homer was indeed an oral poet, and that the first written texts of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were taken

down from dictation; Lord pours scorn on the suggestion (though if it was ever made, I do not know who can have made it) that the texts can have been taken down at an actual performance before an audience. Having accepted Lord's original argument (*T. A. P. A.*, LXXXIV [1953], pp. 124-34) as soon as it appeared (cf. *C. R.*, N. S. VI [1956], p. 206), I find no difficulty in this, provided it is recognized that the man who dictated that version of "The Wrath of Achilles" which, following Herodotus, we call the *Iliad* has the best claim to be called "Homer." It is with this version (and with the corresponding version of "The Return of Odysseus," whether dictated by the singer of our *Iliad* or by another) that we have now to deal; and I am not at all clear after reading Lord's Chapters VIII ("The Odyssey," pp. 156-85) and IX ("The Iliad," pp. 186-197) that he has fully appreciated either the relation of the two poems to one another or the gap which divides them from their forerunners, the improvised oral *klea andrôn*, known to us from both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and the *oimai*, which appear only in the *Odyssey* and are there the monopoly of the professional *aoidoi*. (It may be noted in passing that Lord never discusses in any detail the very considerable amount of evidence which the Homeric poems provide about the literary profession in heroic times—and this is odd, because the analogies with his Yugoslav singers are often striking.) Chapter X (pp. 198-221) is devoted to "Some Notes on Medieval Epic," and extends the method of enquiry to *Beowulf*, the *Chanson de Roland*, and *Digenis Akritas*. Of the last two, I can only observe that the widely differing versions in which the poems are preserved puts them in a different category from poems with stabilized texts like the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*; of *Beowulf* I think that it ought to have been said that distinguished students of Anglo-Saxon literature (it will suffice to name Dr. Florence Harmer) would hesitate to classify *Beowulf* as an epic at all.

The announcement that this book was to be published gave rise to high hopes among those who have followed Lord's work; but it must be frankly confessed that the book itself, for all the interesting and valuable material which it contains (especially in Chapters II-V and the appendices), is a bitter disappointment. The first sight of the volume, with the pitiable photograph on the dust-jacket, was depressing; and the gloom with which I at once began to regard the book deepened as I saw the arty-crafty binding and the execrable Greek type, and observed that whoever was responsible for the *Foreword* (pp. vii-ix) believed that Sir Maurice Bowra's first baptismal name is "Cedric" (the *Foreword* is initialled by Lord, but this part at least cannot be by him, since p. 6 shows that he knows that Bowra was christened "Cecil"). All these are externals, and perhaps should not be allowed to weigh too heavily; but the ungenerous snobberies of the *Preface*, which I was at first willing to disregard as demonstrating merely the truth of Crabbe's dictum, that "Presumption and meanness are both too often the only articles to be found in a Preface," proved far too soon to be in harmony with the tone of the book which Professor Levin was seeking to commend. The root of the trouble appears to be that the circles in which Lord now moves have somehow come to regard Parry's doctrine as the exclusive property of a small and highly "illuminated" sect (it is

noteworthy that so distinguished a student of oral literature as Notopoulos rates only one entry in the index—and that refers to a quotation from Whitman [p. 154]); and this sect contemplates with scorn and ruthless misrepresentation the efforts of those enquirers to whom the true *gnosis* has not been communicated. At first, I was inclined to put Lord's misrepresentations down to inadequate acquaintance with the very extensive (and not always rewarding) literature of the Homeric question; but as I read, I found my mental gauge reading first "Snob" and then "Très Snob"—and the needle turned firmly to "Cad" at pp. 128-9, with the words: "Diplomatic Homerists⁷ would like to find refuge in a transitional poet who is both an oral poet—they cannot disprove the evidence of his style—and a written poet—they cannot, on the other hand, tolerate the unwashed illiterate." Wondering what on earth a "diplomatic Homerist" (apart from Robert Wood) might be, I looked up the note and found (p. 289): "7. Led by C. M. Bowra. See his *Heroic Poetry* (London 1952)"—which leaves me none the wiser. Passing over the question of washing, Lord's reference to which is an irrelevant *captatio malevolentiae* in the worst tradition of the sort of scholarship which he professes to despise, and coming to the merits of the case, I can only say that those who believe, like Bowra and (if I may put myself forward) Davison, that the author of the *Iliad* (whether he was himself literate or not) composed his poem orally and had it taken down by an amanuensis, do so, not because they care whether Homer washed or not or because they think that an illiterate is necessarily less well educated than a so-called literate whose only reading is tabloids and digests, but because the evidence, including that from Comparative Literature, seems to point unmistakably in this direction. In any case, as I have already hinted, it is idle to gird at Homeric scholars nowadays for neglect of oral literature: one has only to think of what has been written over the last thirty years by Homeric scholars of the calibre of E. R. Dodds, Hermann Fränkel, Dorothea Gray, M. P. Nilsson, and D. L. Page to realize how ill-founded are Lord's complaints. It cannot be too firmly pointed out that what Parry discovered, though an essential part of the jigsaw puzzle which we call the Homeric question, was only a part; and that Lord and the rest of those who are in danger of being called by the world "Comparrytists" may find that they have compromised the real services of Parry to scholarship by trying to make out that they, as his heirs, have in this matter a monopoly of absolute truth.

O spare your idol! think him human still;
 Virtues he has, but he has frailties too—
 Dote not too much, nor spoil what ye admire (COWPER).

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JACQUES PERRET. Horace. Paris, Hatier, 1959. Pp. 254. (*Connaissance des Lettres*, no. 53.)

This is the second contribution to a notable series by a distinguished professor of the Classics at the Sorbonne. It is to be hoped that other volumes on ancient authors may follow his *Virgile* and *Horace*.

Horace is not a popular work in the sense that the charming and brilliantly conceived little volume of Pierre Grimal (*Horace* [1958]) is a popular work. M. Perret has excluded almost entirely illustrative quotations, translations, and summaries. His is not a book for the undergraduate in a hurried search for substitutes for knowledge. Perret addresses himself to a "general reader" of a very high order, one who knows his "great books" not only in the original but also *ad litteram*, but desires to compare his impressions with those of a scholar for reassurance, verification, and correction. All, however, who profess to be scholars, teachers, or students of the ancient literatures will find it profitable, stimulating, and enjoyable to compare notes with Perret. For this book does not merely present once more a standard Horace but the results of a fresh examination by a deep and enthusiastic interpreter of the poet. Perret is sound but not dull; he is alert and imaginative yet not venturesome to the point of disquieting the general reader, who after all desires counsel rather than controversy. The academic reader would probably have welcomed more documentation, but any attempt to cope with the now enormous Horace bibliography would have expanded the volume far beyond the norm of the "Connaissance des lettres." A select bibliography with helpful annotations makes up a little for the absence of notes.

"La jeunesse d'un poète" (Ch. I, pp. 5-44) is a refreshing treatment of familiar material with an eye to recovering the "psychological climate" of Horace's world. *Satires* and *Epodes* are considered in Chapter II (pp. 45-87). There is little consideration of the individual satires as works of art; Perret is more interested in drawing a portrait of Horace against the background of the literary quarrels of his time. As already remarked, none of this is perfunctory. The most interesting part of this chapter is a discussion of Horace's relation to both formal and popular philosophy. Emphasizing Horace's independence in philosophy, Perret finds him more Stoic than Epicurean. His derisive treatment of the popular preachers is not to be taken as a condemnation of the doctrines from which these itinerant characters drew their material; Horace dislikes them for their association with the *profanum vulgus*. An interesting paragraph traces Horatian irony to Plato himself and the delicate balance that he maintains between the comic and the serious.

Perret regards Catullus as Horace's inspiration in the *Epodes* rather than Archilochus. There is no detailed consideration of any of the *Epodes*, most of them being dismissed briefly with comments of a word or two. Epode II is essentially a "Tibullan elegy." In V the poet endeavors "to scare us a little." Epode XIII "est la plus belle." And so on.

The third chapter (pp. 88-128) is a discussion of the first three books of the *Odes*. This is divided into "Problèmes formels," "La composition des livres," and "Thèmes d'inspiration." The first and

third sections might well have been one, since both are concerned with the nature of Horace's poetry, whereas the second section is a renewal of the venerable controversy over the arrangement of the books of the *Odes*. Under "problèmes formals" Perret considers at some length Horace's reasons for abandoning the satire, his search for a new genre, and his reasons for selecting Sappho and Alcaeus as models rather than Pindar. A page or two are devoted to the qualities of Sapphic and Alcaic rhythm but there is no consideration of the types of structure of Horatian odes. More notice is taken of individual poems in the paragraphs on "les thèmes d'inspiration," but even there Perret refrains from anything like detailed critiques. Horace's lyric poetry derives from the era of civil wars (some two pages are devoted to Epode 16 as foreshadowing the *Odes*). Perret feels one might summarize the spirit of the "Roman Odes" as a plea: "Comment faire pour qu'il n'y ait jamais plus de guerres civiles?" Perret follows the growth of the panegyric of Augustus, Horace's concept of the hero, Horatian melancholy (which definitely separates him from Epicurus), puzzling questions of Horace's religion, and the charge sometimes brought against him of egotism. Perret selects the phrase *carpe diem* as a fundamental Horatian attitude: "un des aspects les plus essentiels de la personnalité morale d'Horace . . . cueillir les roses de la vie." This is not the place to quarrel over this familiar interpretation of Horace. Like the Bible, Horace says different things to different readers. Even III, 29, to my mind about the best expression of the mature Horace's "philosophy," is by some regarded as Epicurean, despite its stoicizing conclusion.

The debate over the arrangement of the books of the *Odes* remains *sub iudice*. It would be fair to say that students of Horace in general, being concerned with the interpretation of individual poems and attaching no particular importance to the corpus itself, have been content to note the few obvious formal features of the books (the position of dedicatory poems, metrical diversity or symmetry, etc.). A few scholars (including Perret) have attempted to find something like an architectural scheme or some principle to account for the magical art that, while avoiding or obscuring recognizable patterns of arrangement, has insured every poem's having an appropriate context. The pitfall in the way of the investigator of symmetry is the temptation to force or distort the interpretation of individual poems to make them conform to a plan. Perret has been cautious and there can be no question that his results are interesting. He finds the plainest indications of Horace's having intended a schematic arrangement of poems in Book II and especially in the first half of Book II. This part numbers 288 lines of verse. The even-numbered poems are in Sapphics and the odd in Alcaics. Every theme is treated twice (i. e. in two successive poems). These couples correspond to each other in a neat scheme: 2-3 moral counsel; 4-5 love; 6-7 friendship; 8-9 love; 10-11 moral counsel. Perret admits that part II of Book II (the rest of the book) neither metrically nor topically presents as neat a pattern as part I. He analyses, however, as follows: 13-14 death of the poet; 15 "contre le luxe des jardins"; 16 *otium*; 17 friendship; 18 avarice and luxury; 19-20 "le poète se sent immortel." All Perret's captions (some of which I have for

convenience's sake abbreviated) could be debated, for it is never easy to pigeonhole odes of Horace. I am particularly disquieted by part II. Space will not permit detailed questioning of Perret's results. I would simply note that poem 13 (usually recalled for the "tree"!) concerns the poetry of Sappho and Alcaeus as much as it does the poet's miraculous *escape* from death. Perret's preoccupation with his own design would seem to have led him to overlook a feature of the external form of poems 13-14-15 that might be described as "bien visible." All three are in the Alcaic strophe. It is not usual for Horace idly to set three poems together in the same metre. I am not positive about the unifying element in these three poems. One might note, however, that they touch (with increasing emphasis) aspects of the growing blight of luxury-tree culture in Italy (that began with the planting of a single evil tree in poem 13?). Incidentally, poem 14 concerns the death of Postumus, does it not, rather than of the poet?

The pursuit of the Horatian design along the lines of Perret's analysis may eventually succeed, in spite of the treacherous nature of the quarry. To most readers of Horace, the quest is of little importance. The *Odes* are like a harmoniously organized pinacotheca: no matter where one enters, the eye will fall upon a satisfying picture and be guided by gentle transitions to others. But was it a matter of indifference to Horace, at what point one entered his gallery? Was the reader that began at the beginning expected to have no different experience from the casual gatherer of flowers? Again, this question can hardly be pursued to a conclusion in a review. Having given the question a great deal of thought, however, for a very long time, I have come to believe that Horace expected the reader of the complete *Odes* to become aware of a design distinct from an "architectural symmetry" such as has been discussed,—something not measurable or readily tabulated but none the less real. I believe the reader was expected to become aware of a continuity, a progression, a forward movement on several levels, reaching a climax in book III. There is the obvious historical progression, the growth of the Augustan panegyric, but chiefly the growth of the poet's mind as he witnesses the world's struggle between good and evil. And may there not be an underlying philosophical scheme? For while *carpe diem* is perhaps the watchword of Book I, Book II has a Cynic-Stoic program that ends in the discovery of wisdom and poetry as the only good; and there is no materialism and nothing Epicurean in the *Odes* after that.

A disproportionate amount of space has been given to "la composition des livres des *Odes*" (with consequent injustice to the excellent chapters on the *Epistles* and the later lyrics, as well as "la fortune d'Horace." But I felt that readers of Horace should be urged to look not merely for the static architectural symmetry of Horace's edifice but for the soaring lines of movement, an effect at once cohesive and progressive.

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MARTA SORDI. I rapporti romano-caeriti e l'origine della civitas sine suffragio. Rome, "L'Erma" di Bretschneider, 1960. Pp. vi + 188.

The thesis of this book would, if accepted, revolutionize interpretations of Roman and Western Mediterranean history in the thirty years following the Gallic catastrophe. The thesis is that citizenship without the vote, which the Caerites were the first people to receive, was awarded not, as generally believed, shortly after 353 but in 386, and that the status was then equivalent to the *hospitium publicum* which Livy (V, 50, 3) says was granted to the Caerites in recognition of their aid in the Gallic invasion; that the arrangement was bilateral between Rome and Caere and was similar to provisions in the second treaty between Rome and Carthage and in the Tyrrhenian-Carthaginian agreements mentioned by Aristotle, *Politics*, III, 1280a; that in the next thirty years Rome and the Etruscans, led by Caere, made common cause against the alliance formed in 386 between the Gauls and Dionysius of Syracuse (Justin, XX, 5, 4-6); that in this period Rome was pursuing a "Mediterranean" policy, indicated by a treaty with Marseilles (Justin, XLIII, 5), the establishment of a colony in Sardinia (Diodorus, XV, 27, 4), and an abortive expedition with twenty-five ships to found a settlement in Corsica (Theophrastus, *Hist. Plant.*, V, 8, 2); that at this time Rome was at variance with the Latins, and particularly with two of the chief cities, Tarracina and Praeneste, which were aiding the Gauls. The effects of the alliance with Caere are, the author holds, reflected in internal politics; Rome was "etruscanized" under the potent influence of Licinius of Etruscan origin, who brought in *ludi scaenici* and perhaps introduced the curule aedileship from Etruria. There is even the suggestion that the admission of plebeians to the consulship may reflect democratic movements in Etruscan cities. The temporary return to two patrician consuls in 355, the subsequent outbreak of war with Etruria, and the resumption of relations with the Latins came, Sordi notes, close upon the expulsion of Dionysius II from Syracuse in 356. The second treaty with Carthage in 348 is explained as a renunciation of a "Mediterranean" policy; like the first treaty, dating from the first year of the Republic, it marks the end of a period of collaboration with Etruria.

Citizenship without the vote, the author goes on, was no longer bilateral but was still a reward in 338 when it was granted to the Formiani, the Fundani, and the *equites Campani*; but later, by 306, it had come to mean incorporation with inferior status in Roman domain. The Caerites, as punishment for activity against Rome, were, in the view of Sordi, thus incorporated in the early third century.

The author may well be right in holding that the award of *civitas sine suffragio* was made to Caere soon after the Gallic catastrophe and that it was then not a penalty but a recognition of Caere's service to Rome. Sordi strengthens her arguments by a brilliant analysis of the non-annalistic tradition, perhaps of Caeritan origin, which, contrasting Caeritan energy with Roman weakness, gave not to Camillus but to the army of Caere the credit for recovering the Gallic ransom. But the unilateral character which Sordi assigns to the awards of citizenship without the vote in 338 indicates an inferior status, which

may not have been fully realized by Italian peoples for some time. Since the names of the Caerites headed the census list of *cives sine suffragio*, it seems likely that the incorporation of Caere dates before 338. The most probable time is soon after 353 when Caerites were said to have participated in raids of the Tarquinienses on Roman territory.

The evidence cited for Rome's "Mediterranean" policy after the Gallic invasion is slim. The many mistakes in proper names in the text of Diodorus provide a basis for questioning the report of a colony in Sardinia. Theophrastus' account of an attempt to colonize Corsica was written toward the end of the fourth century, but the period to which he refers is uncertain, and he may be confusing Romans and Etruscans. Even if Rome could avail herself of Caeritan ships for such overseas expeditions, the abandonment of an essentially agrarian policy soon after the annexation of Veii's extensive territory would have been strange. (The suggestion of E. S. Staveley, *Historia*, VIII [1959], pp. 410-33, that Appius Claudius Caecus attempted a similar shift of policy in his censorship of 312 is of interest here.)

As for the "Etruscanization" of Rome, there can be no doubt that Etruscan influence was strong in the fourth century. An illuminating discussion of the archaeological evidence is now available in the second chapter of Axel Boethius' important book, *The Golden House of Nero* (Ann Arbor, 1960). But the rise of a "nuova classe dirigente, etrusca o etruschizzata" in Rome in the first half of the fourth century (p. 86) is doubtful. The leaders of the class, according to Sordi, were the plebeian Licinii, whose Etruscan origin is regarded as established (p. 76), and the patrician Fabii and Manlii, with whom the Licinii had intermarried. But the Etruscan origin of the Licinii, suggested by Friedrich Münzer and others (*s.v.* "Licinius," *R.-E.*, col. 214), is by no means certain. The adjective *licinus* from which the *nomen* is derived is apparently Indo-European. See Walde-Hofmann, *Lat. etymol. Wörterb.*, and, on the *nomen*, W. Schulze, *Gesch. lat. Eigennamen*, Gött. Abh., Phil.-Hist. Kl., V, no. 5 (1904), p. 191, n. 1; cf. pp. 107 f., 142. A member of the house was military tribune with consular power in 400 and 396, and there were more doubtful reports of Licinii among the earliest tribunes of the plebs. It is true that the name in the Etruscan forms *lecne*, *licni*, *lecnies* occurs in various Etruscan towns, but there are many Italic names in Etruscan inscriptions. In Latin inscriptions Licinii are common all over Italy as well as in Etruria. Nor is there any evidence that the Licinius who was consul in 364 had a role in the introduction of *ludi scaenici* from Etruria. Democratic movements like that represented by the Licinian-Sextian laws are unattested in Etruria in this period.

But whatever the objections to particular points, Sordi has made an important contribution to the interpretation of non-annalistic traditions for the first half of the fourth century. The discussion includes a valuable analysis of the tradition on the conquest of Veii and interesting suggestions for a possible use by Vergil of an Etruscan source for the Mezentius story. The book is fresh and original, and the reviewer predicts that the careful reader will find it stimulating and thought-provoking.

LILLY ROSS TAYLOR.

JEAN POUILLOUX. *Choix d'inscriptions grecques: Textes, traductions et notes.* Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1960. Pp. 195. N. F. 10. (*Bibliothèque de la Faculté des Lettres de Lyon*, IV.)

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